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ABSTRACT

MEMORY, PHANTASIA, AND THE PERCEPTION OF TIME:
A COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE’S DE MEMORIA ET REMINISCENTIA

By
Evan Robert Strevell
December 2016

Dissertation supervised by Dr. Ronald Polansky
My dissertation is a commentary on Aristotle’s treatment of memory and
remembering in Aristotle’s De memoria that concentrates on four central issues. First,
what is the proper object of memory? There is a general consensus that Aristotle restricts
memory to the past, but there is disagreement over what this means. I argue that the
proper object of memory is the remembering subject’s own past activity on the grounds
that unless what is remembered is perceived as connected to the subject’s prior cognition,
what is remembered will not be conceived as having happened before. By rejecting as
memorable in a governing sense any object that does not include the remembering
subject’s past activity, Aristotle is able to allow for lesser ways of speaking about
memory, thereby allowing for a comprehensive account. Second, because memory is of
the absent past, Aristotle is committed to the position that a present affection must serve
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as a proxy. I explain how the etiology of the present proxy gives the proxy the causal
power to represent the remembering subject’s absent past anew. Because the
remembering subject is aware of a present proxy, I argue that Aristotle is committed to a
form of indirect perception in the case of memory, but one that preserves realism (that
what is remembered is precisely one’s past activity) in virtue of the causal powers of the
proxy. The third central issue concerns how remembering is possible. Because
remembering is by means of a present proxy, an impasse arises. How by attending to a
present proxy does one remember the absent past? Even if the present proxy is a copy of
the absent past, it is unclear why the remembering subject should perceive the present
proxy as a copy. Heretofore, commentary has universally suggested that because the
present proxy is a likeness to the absent past, the remembering subject is able to perceive
the proxy as being a copy. Such an interpretation fails to solve the impasse, for it does
not explain why the remembering subject should become aware of the proxy as a copy. I
argue that Aristotle models remembering on sense perception. The sense power of the
remembering subject is assimilated to the activity of the memory proxy, thereby
becoming aware of the proxy as a copy. Finally, there has been confusion over what
memory is. Aristotle defines memory as a hexis, but what this means has been under
appreciated. I argue that hexis is ambiguous between a disposition (first actuality) and an
activity (second actuality) which captures memory in both its applications as retention
and remembering. The categorization of memory as a hexis has been under appreciated
insofar as a hexis indicates not only retention and remembering, but a disposition in
virtue of which a remembering subject is disposed well or poorly toward its past. The
categorization of memory as a hexis nicely allows for idiosyncrasy pertaining to memory.
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DEDICATION

For Dad, who always urged of me: fingas dum vincas.
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Introduction

This dissertation is a commentary on Aristotle’s treatment of memory in De
memoria et reminiscentia (On Memory and Recollection). The terms for that which
Aristotle examines comprehensively in De memoria are μνήμη, τὸ μνημονεύειν, and τὸ
ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι, respectively, memory, remembrance, and recollection. My
dissertation primarily engages with Aristotle on the topic of memory and remembrance.
Memory was of much interest to Aristotle’s predecessors and his contemporaries.
Before the dawn of literacy in Greece circa 8th century BC, culture and thought could be
preserved only through memory and subsequent oral transmission from one generation to
the next. Hesiod cites Mnemosyne (Memory, Μνημοσυνή) as the mother of the nine
muses, divine patrons of poetry, song, history, and astronomy, making memory the
source for the arts and learning. Hesiod and Homer both begin their works by appealing
to the muses to speak and sing through them. Lacking technology for easy storage of
information, the classical age unsurprisingly saw the development and refinement of an
art of memory.1 Memory and recollection were essential for the mastery and delivery of
rhetorical displays. In Republic vi, 486c7-d2, Socrates mentions good memory among
the qualities without which no one will be naturally suited for philosophy (the forgetful
learn and progress slowly). Reading the opening lines of the Republic, we cannot fail to

1

See Francis A. Yates (1966), the standard for all subsequent scholarship on the ars memoria. The origin
story goes that the classical poet Simonides was performing a recital at the banquet of a miserly host who
refused to pay the poet his full fee. Simonides was called outside to meet with someone who would speak
with him, but when he got outside, no one was there. Before reentering his host’s hall, the roof collapsed,
crushing everyone attending to death, disfiguring the bodies beyond identification. Simonides
subsequently realized that he could remember everyone’s identity by their place at the banquet table; the art
of organizing and storing memories according to place was discovered. Aristotle refers to this method in
De memoria.
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notice the kind of memory with which Plato equips his philosophical hero. In the
Phaedrus, Socrates famously warns against the loss of excellence in memory that follows
literacy and the loss of intellectual self-reliance that the loss of memory entails (274c575b2). Aristotle echoes the point of intellectual self-reliance in Topics viii 14, urging that
excellence in memory for arguments, principles, and associated prominent premises
increases dialectical skill and reasoning by ensuring that all the crucial points needed for
dialectical debate will be familiar and ready at hand to the mind.
Despite the important role of memory in Greek intellectual and cultural life,
memory seems not to have much occupied Presocratic thinkers, whose collective gaze
was focused more on the cosmos than the anthropos. Plato famously treats of
recollection mythically in the Meno and the Phaedo. The Philebus and Theaetetus both
examine memory, but not comprehensively and only in relation to other concerns. De
memoria is the first philosophical inquiry devoted singularly to the topic of memory.
Because memory and recollection are affections common to both the soul and the body,
the study of memory falls within the study of physics. Aristotle explains memory and
recollection in terms of the four causes for which the natural philosopher must account in
the explanation of natural phenomena. Aristotle articulates what each is (form), the part
of the animal to which they belong (matter and substratum), the moving causes on
account of which memory and remembering occur (sense perception and phantasia), and
that for the sake of which they arise. There is also an examination of the primary
impasses concerning how memory and recollection are possible. The articulation of
memory and recollection in terms of the four causes and the examination of the impasses
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concerning their possibility furnishes the first comprehensive explanation of the subject
matter.
De memoria is of great interest due to the crucial role memory plays in learning
and the formation of character. Memory allows for a continuum between present and
past cognition without which there could be no awareness beyond the specious present.
Memory allows an animal to inhabit a world beyond the immediate particulars of sense
perception. The ability to return to past cognitive activity allows for a richer set of
desires and moving causes of animal locomotion regarding pursuit and avoidance.
Retention of past cognition in humans allows for the storage of a vast array of particulars
which allows for the abstraction of universals from which arises productive, practical,
and contemplative science. In Metaphysics i 1 and Posterior Analytics ii 19, we see how
sense perception gives rise to memory, memory to experience, and experience to
knowledge, i.e., the arts and sciences. Memory also enters into the formation of
character. Retention of what is pleasant and painful informs voluntary choice of action,
pursuit, and avoidance.
Memory is also of great interest in its own right due to the enigmatic nature of the
subject matter. We might wonder whether memory is a capacity in its own right or
merely an application of another faculty. For instance, we speak often of remembering
what we know and if we remember something, we may speak as though what is
remembered is known (“I know that it was her with whom I spoke last week”). What
memory concerns is also a matter for wonder. We speak often of remembering things
past, but also of things that do not have past aspect. For example, we speak of
remembering facts (the capitol of Norway), or how to do something (how to play tennis)
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and these are not necessarily things past. But whether memory concerns both the past
and the present, we speak of memory at least as concerning the past and this gives rise to
difficult philosophical questions. Is memory limited to the past activity of the
remembering subject or does it include past things in general? And how is memory of
the past possible? Remembering takes place in the present and the past is gone and
absent. How can present cognition be of what is past? How is it possible to travel back
in time through an act of cognition? What distinguishes true remembering from false
remembering?
We may be ready to accept that Aristotle has a plausible view of what memory is
and what characterizes the act of remembering and its intentional objects. Aristotle had
access to the experience of memory and remembering in the same way that we do:
through the consciousness of his own acts of remembering and the opinions of others
about their experience with their memory. Yet, we may well wonder whether there is
much to learn from Aristotle regarding the causes in virtue of which memory and
remembering occur. Aristotle had no access to magnetic resonance imaging. It is now
possible to correlate brain activity with the exercise of the various psychological
capacities examined in the De anima and Parva Naturalia. Recent advances in
neurobiology suggest that remembering variously defined has much to do with
electrochemical signaling between neurons. Instead of neural systems in the brain,
Aristotle speaks of motions (kinêseis) in the seat of perception, of which some are senselike presentations (phantasmata) derived from and similar to prior cognition, while others
are motions proportionate to passage of time. If we are skeptical of Aristotle’s
physiological commitments, De memoria is still worth careful study for its account of
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what memory is and what cognitive acts it encompasses. But we should see that De
memoria’s account of the causes of memory are also worthy of serious consideration.
The retained phantasma is not conceptually in contradiction with the memory traces
(“engrams”) posited in neurobiology. And neural activity is certainly a kind of motion.
Hence, if nothing else, how De memoria models memory and remembering is worthy of
serious consideration; if we wish to cite neural activity rather than phantasmata in motion
in actuality, still, Aristotle’s conception of the role of phantasmata in memory is
suggestive for what neural activity must accomplish in order to bring about remembering.
Although situated within the study of physics broadly, De memoria contains no explicit
appeal to principles of his physics or zoology. Only the principles secured about the soul
in De anima are explicitly assumed (see DS 436a5) and in the main De memoria appeals
only to those principles that concern the imagination. De memoria is remarkably selfcontained and should be judged on its own merits.
Chapter synopses
Chapter one explains the place of De memoria within Aristotle’s philosophy
generally and, more particularly, within the Parva Naturalia. Memory (and recollection)
is the second topic in the Parva Naturalia, ‘little physical treatises’ that investigate
prominent vital animal affections common to both the soul and the body. Hence,
memory belongs broadly to the study of physics, but more narrowly straddles psychology
and animal physiology. Chapter one examines the subject matter, organization, and aim
of the Parva Naturalia, as well as the method of inquiry and the questions that must be
answered in an investigation of affections common to the soul and the body. The
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examination explains why Aristotle asks what he does of memory and why those
questions are appropriate. Chapter one also explores the relative importance memory has
within Aristotle’s philosophy.
Chapter two engages Aristotle’s initial characterization of memory and
remembering. This chapter examines how Aristotle distinguishes memory and
remembering from sense perception, opinion, and knowledge, and analyzes the initial
definition of memory. How to distinguish memory from other forms of cognition is of
great interest. We may see that in our normal manner of speaking we do not much
distinguish between memory, remembering, and recollecting. We use verbs of recalling,
remembering, and recollecting in much the same way and in reference to the same
objects. First, we might wonder how to distinguish memory from other acts of cognition
for taxonomical purposes. We often speak of remembering in ways that suggest it is a
function of other sorts of cognition. For example, we speak of remembering things that
we know (demonstration of geometrical proofs), how to do things that involve skill (build
a house or play an instrument), and we speak of remembering facts and states of affairs
(that Socrates lived in Athens and died in 499 BC). Does remembering overlap with
knowing or opining?
Second, we might wonder what are the proper objects of memory. Do we
remember anything that was previously acquired even if this is not meant as something
past or do we remember only our own prior activity? Do we remember things that are
past only or also things not past? We often say that we remember what we did
previously, but also often say that we remember things that do not have past aspect, such
as how to bisect a given rectilinear angle. The ambiguity of the object of memory as
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between something past and something present was present in Greek expressions as well.
Egbert Bakker notes instances in Homer where μιμνήσκω (remember, recall) refers to
cognition of present events such as when warriors are urged or reported to remember
battle in the Iliad.2 Hektor, rallying warriors in midst of an Achaean attack, exhorts,
“Friends be you men, and remember (μνήσασθε) ferocious courage” (Il. 6.112). Having
been rallied by Agamemnon and a sign of favor from Zeus when in danger of having
their ships set alight by Hektor, the Achaeans, “with much force rushed upon the Trojans
and remembered (μνήσαντο) battle” (Il. 8.252).
In De memoria, we see Aristotle trying to give probably the first comprehensive
explanation of what memory is. Because memory seemingly enters into much cognition,
it is of great interest properly to distinguish memory from other forms of cognition so that
scientific and philosophical investigations into psychology do not muddle and mistake
the functions of the various forms of cognition for others. Following the model for
articulating capacities for activities in De anima, Aristotle first identifies the object of
remembering and how remembering relates to its object. Chapter two argues that the
genus of the proper memory object (τὸ μνημονευτόν) is ‘what is past’ (τὸ γενόμενον) and
that ‘prior (πρότερον) cognition of the remembering subject’ supplies the differentia.
The reason why is that objects must be attached to the remembering subject’s prior
cognitive activity in order to have past aspect in the relevant sense. Remembering is a
perception of a sort by the animal of its past cognitive activity that includes the awareness
that what appears is the animal’s own activity and that it is prior.

2

Egbert Bakker (2002) 69-70.
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After securing the proper object of memory and articulating how remembering
relates to the object of memory, Aristotle initially articulates memory as a hexis or
affection of some mode of sense perception or supposition, after time has passed. There
has been some confusion over how to read hexis. David Bloch argues that hexis only
means attending to a memory as second actuality.3 Bloch denies that there is such a thing
as a memory disposition and capacity for entering into remembrance. I argue, citing
Meta v 20 and Plato’s Theaetetus, that memory is ambiguous between disposition (first
actuality) and activity (second actuality). Memory (μνήμη) may refer to a retention of
memories that disposes to enter into acts of remembering, to the activity of being aware
of memories retained, and to a memory that is retained.
Chapter three has two primary aims, both related to memory in its application as
retention. First, chapter three furnishes an account of the vehicle for memory content,
what Aristotle calls a phantasma. The phantasma is a moving cause and explanans of
how memory arises in both its applications as retention and as remembering. Because
Aristotle is committed to the view that memory concerns the remembering subject’s own
past activity, an impasse arises. What appears to the remembering animal is a present
affection. How by attending to a present affection (appearance) does the remembering
animal attend to its absent past? Aristotle posits that the present affection is a phantasma
retained and derived from prior cognitive activity that serves as a proxy for the animal’s
past activity. Chapter three argues that Aristotle is committed to a form of what I term
“indirect perception” in the case of memory. The absent past is perceived indirectly
through a phantasma that functions as a proxy for the absent past. Chapter three

3

David Bloch (2007) 81-3.
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examines the nature of the phantasma and considers the etiology in virtue of which the
phantasma is able to serve as a proxy for absent, past cognition. The memory phantasma
is derived from what Aristotle calls the asithêma, which is present in acts of perception.
Aristotle nowhere defines what an asithêma is and there is much dispute over its status.
The third chapter presents a comprehensive analysis of Aristotle’s use of aisthêma and
shows how derivation from the aisthêma enables the memory phantasma to serve as a
present proxy for past cognitive activity. The second aim of chapter three is to supply an
account of the underlying physiological conditions of retention. The account of the
physiology that enters into retention supplies the material cause of memory and lays the
groundwork for understanding memory as a hexis that disposes us well or poorly toward
our past activity much as character disposes us well or poorly toward pleasures and pains.
Chapter four is devoted to a decisive impasse concerning how memory in its
application as remembering is possible. The seed for my motivation to write a
dissertation on Aristotle’s treatment of memory was initially planted in a seminar on
Husserl’s phenomenology of time consciousness concerning the very impasse Aristotle
raises and to which his theory of indirect perception in the case of memory commits him.
In the course of his thinking on time consciousness, Husserl eventually came to reject and
attack the conception of memory as some version of what Husserl sometimes calls
pictorial or image consciousness.4
It is fundamentally wrongheaded to argue: How, in the now, can I know of a not-now, since I cannot
compare the not-now—which, of course, no longer exists—with the now (namely, with the now in the
memory image that I have on hand in the now). As if it belonged to the essence of memory that <I>
take an image on hand in the now for another thing similar to it, and that I could and must compare
them as I do in the case of pictorial representation. Memory is not image-consciousness but something
totally different…A comparing of what is no longer perceived but merely remembered with something

4

For an excellent overview of the evolution of Husserl’s thinking concerning memory and remembering,
see John Brough (1975) 40-62.
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beyond it makes no sense.5

All variations of an image theory of memory share a problem: how by perceiving what is
meant as a present image will one remember one’s absent past? The image is present, but
memory should be of the past. By having the one who remembers mean the object of
memory as a present image, the image theory seems to trap the remembering subject in
the present. For even if the image is a replica or representation of the absent past, it is
unclear why the one who remembers should mean what is present to be the appearance of
what has occurred previously. Further, Husserl wonders how the one remembering will
mean the present appearance as an image of the absent affair. Because the affair of
which the image is supposed to be the image is absent, how will the one who remembers
take the present image to be an image of the absent affair? The absent affair is not
available for comparison, so why should the one who remembers suppose the present
image is a representation of that absent affair?
Aristotle raises practically the same impasse as Husserl.6 Unlike Husserl, who
takes the impasse as insoluble and, hence, as evidence that a theory that makes
remembering a kind of indirect perception of the past by way of present images must fail,

5

Husserliana X, 316; John Brough (1991) 328.
But if such is what occurs regarding memory, which of the two does one remember, this affection [the
present phantasma] or that from which the affection came about [past cognition of X]? For if it this
affection, we would remember none of the absent matters [past cognitions of X]. But if it is that absent
matter, how by perceiving this present affection do we remember that which we do not perceive? Even if
there is something like an impression or picture in us, on account of what would perception of this be
memory of the other rather than perception of this very thing? For the one in actuality with memory
beholds this affection and perceives this. Therefore, how will one remember what is not present? For it
would be to see and to hear what is not present. Or is it somehow possible for this to occur? (ἀλλ’ εἰ δὴ
τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ συμβαῖνον περὶ τὴν μνήμην, πότερον τοῦτο μνημονεύει τὸ πάθος, ἢ ἐκεῖνο ἀφ’ οὗ
ἐγένετο; εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο, τῶν ἀπόντων οὐδὲν ἂν μνημονεύοιμεν· εἰ δ’ ἐκεῖνο, πῶς αἰσθανόμενοι τοῦτο
μνημονεύομεν οὗ μὴ αἰσθανόμεθα, τὸ ἀπόν; εἴ τ’ ἐστὶν ὅμοιον ὥσπερ τύπος ἢ γραφὴ ἐν ἡμῖν, ἡ τούτου
αἴσθησις διὰ τί ἂν εἴη μνήμη ἑτέρου, ἀλλ’ οὐκ αὐτοῦ τούτου; ὁ γὰρ ἐνεργῶν τῇ μνήμῃ θεωρεῖ τὸ πάθος
τοῦτο καὶ αἰσθάνεται τούτου. πῶς οὖν τὸ μὴ παρὸν μνημονεύσει; εἴη γὰρ ἂν καὶ ὁρᾶν τὸ μὴ παρὸν καὶ
ἀκούειν. ἢ ἔστιν ὡς ἐνδέχεται καὶ συμβαίνειν τοῦτο, 450b11-20.)
6
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Aristotle apparently thinks that the impasse has a solution and that he has it. In my
survey of the secondary literature, I was disappointed by the interpretations of Aristotle’s
solution to the impasse. The existing commentary has Aristotle say merely (1) that the
present memory proxy is a likeness of the remembering subject’s past cognitive activity
and (2) that because of (1), the soul can take the phantasma as a likeness to its past
cognitive activity.7 If this is all that Aristotle says, then he fails to meet his own
challenge! For even if there is a present proxy in the remembering subject that is
factually a likeness to some past cognitive activity, why should the animal perceive the
present proxy (that is in fact a likeness) to be the appearance of its past? I wanted to see
whether Aristotle supplies an answer more intellectually satisfying than those with which
commentators have heretofore attributed to him. I think he does.
Chapter four argues that Aristotle models memory on perception. Aristotle
crucially has remembrance analogous not to judging X as such and such, but to sense
perception. Sense perception is not in actuality in virtue of itself, but in virtue of its
sensible object. When acted upon, the sense power becomes such as its sensible object is
in actuality. My thesis is that the sense power has a capacity to assimilate to the activity
of a phantasma actualized as a copy of past cognition and a motion proportionate to past
time. When the sense power is assimilated to this activity, the soul becomes such as the
copy is and perceives it with a sense of time. Hence, remembering occurs when a
phantasma in actuality as a copy and a motion proportionate to past time act on the sense
power. Remembering is phantasia combined with a sense of time. I make my case in
three stages. First, I establish that awareness of memory phantasmata is a kind of

7

See W. D. Ross (1955) 34, Helen Lang (1980) 301, Julia Annas (1992) 304, Victor Caston (1998) 281-2,
Richard Sorabji (2004) 9-10, David Bloch (2007) 70-1, R.A.H. King (2009), 78-80.
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perceiving. Second, I provide a brief overview of how the sense power relates to its
objects. This provides the foundation for the third stage where I argue that remembering
according to actuality is an assimilation to memory phantasmata. In addition to
providing a satisfactory way through the impasse, chapter four also establishes the part of
the soul to which memory belongs, the perceptive part, and explains why memory must
belong to the perceptive part.
The fifth and concluding chapter has three aims. First, I explain how the final,
considered definition of memory articulates memory in its applications as both
dispositional retention (first actuality) and remembering (second actuality) in terms of the
four causes. Second, I explore the rationale and appropriateness of categorizing memory
as a hexis. Third, I survey some recent philosophical conceptions that define memory
much more broadly than the restrictive governing sense favored by Aristotle. I argue for
the appropriateness of Aristotle’s view of the primary sense of memory, but also show
how he allows for our looser way of speaking about memory. Because De memoria at
once provides a strict taxonomical definition of memory in the primary sense and allows
for looser ways of speaking, Aristotle’s account of memory is comprehensive in its
explanation.

12

Chapter One: The place of De memoria within the Parva Naturalia and Aristotle’s
philosophy.

Memory (and recollection) is the second topic in the Parva Naturalia, the ‘little
physical treatises’.8 Other topics include senses and their sensible objects, sleep and
waking, dreams (and prophecy through dreams), length of life, youth and old age, life and
death, and inhalation and exhalation.9 The subject matter, organization, and aim of the
PN is set out at the beginning of De sensu, the first of the inquiries. What binds the
diverse subject matter of the investigations together is that all are “actions (πράξεις)
shared by both the soul and the body” (436a6-8). These actions involve body, but are due
to soul. Lacking choice, plants and beasts do not act in any practical sense (see NE iii 2),
but Aristotle uses πράξις in various works on physics for anything done in the service of
some end.10 Among the actions listed are sense perception, but also spiritedness and
pleasure and pain; these encompass a broad variety of affections that a natural being is
organized to do or undergo. Of the actions common to body and to soul some are
primary, i.e., sense perception, while others follow as a result of the presence of sense
perception. The aim of the PN is to consider what each (τί ἕκαστον, 436a16) of the
affections common to soul and body is and on account of what causes they occur (διὰ
τίνας αἰτίας συμβαίνει, a16-17). ‘What each is’ refers to essence or form, while ‘causes

8

The title Parva Naturalia dates to the latter 13th century, but it is not of Aristotelian provenance. See
W.D. Ross (1955) 1.
9
Quite possibly the progressive motion in animals should be included, i.e., De motu animalium. See my
discussion of the categorization of the nine topics dealt with in the Parva Naturalia below.
10
In GA 731a24-26 Aristotle refers to the πράξις of plants as the production of seed. In the context of
physical investigations, πράξις is sometimes used as a synonym for function or natural end. Such usage is
illustrated at PA 645b14-17 where Aristotle urges that natural bodies are organized for the sake of complex
actions.
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on account of which’ the affections arise indicates the material (i.e., the substrate),
moving, and final causes where relevant. We expect special emphasis on material causes
because the body’s role in vital actions is to be examined. The treatises are organized
around (1) the primary action that involves the soul and the body, namely, sense
perception, and prominent vital actions that follow due to the presence of sense
perception (e.g., memory and dreams), and (2) four prominent pairs of affections
common to the soul and the body to which Aristotle gives special prominence: waking
and sleeping, youth and old age, inhalation and exhalation, and life and death.
I will now examine more closely how Aristotle sets things up. The PN follows on
principles concerning the soul secured in De anima. The purpose of the PN is to extend
the investigation into the principles of living nature to the role the body plays in activities
due to soul. The PN also takes up actions dependent upon the soul and the body that
follow from the primary vital operations of sense perception and nutritive activity. The
opening lines of De sensu set out the dependency of the investigations to come on De
anima.
Because the soul has been demarcated previously by itself (καθ’ αὑτὴν) and in terms of the capacities
that belong to each of its parts, what follows is to make an investigation into animals and all beings
possessing life, what actions by them are unique and what actions are common. The things said about
the soul are to be assumed…11 (436a1-5)

The De anima determines (1) what the soul is, (2) what attributes it has by itself, and (3)
what attributes belong to the composite living being due to the soul (DA, 402a7-10). The
only operation attributable to soul by itself is intellect, which cannot possess an organ

11

Ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς καθ’ αὑτὴν διώρισται πρότερον καὶ περὶ τῶν δυνάμεων ἑκάστης κατὰ μόριον αὐτῆς,
ἐχόμενόν ἐστι ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν περὶ τῶν ζῴων καὶ τῶν ζωὴν ἐχόντων ἁπάντων, τίνες εἰσὶν ἴδιαι
καὶ τίνες κοιναὶ πράξεις αὐτῶν. τὰ μὲν οὖν εἰρημένα περὶ ψυχῆς ὑποκείσθω…
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(429a24-27).12 Other primary operations of soul (nutrition, sense perception, and
movement according to place) belong to the living soul-body composite, but are due to
soul. Soul by itself (καθ’ αὐτός) may mean that the De anima takes up features without
which no soul can be the sort of soul it is (i.e., nutritive soul, sense perception, or
intellect) or that it takes up those operations attributable only to ensouled beings. While
the intellect is bodiless, other functions of soul that require an organ for their operation
are still operations in virtue of the soul because they do not arise in inanimate beings, i.e.,
such operations occur in virtue of being ensouled and not in virtue of being a body. In
De anima ii 1, Aristotle argues for the existence of soul as other than body (though not
separable) on the grounds that not all natural bodies exhibit self-nutritive activity; merely
being a natural, organized body does not account for nutritive function. Hence, the
natural body is not the source of life, but the underlying subject for such a source and this
is nutritive soul. Because certain vital operations are present in soul alone (the activity of
intellect) or are not present without soul (nutritive and perceptual activity), such
operations occur in virtue of soul. Because the soul is the actuality of a natural body
possessing life in potency (i.e., of natural bodies that do not possess life in virtue of being
a body), Aristotle cannot avoid speaking of the body in De anima. Although the soul is
not defined without reference to the body, it is distinguished from the body as actuality
and form are distinguished from potentiality and material. Because the living body is the
instrument without which nutritive and perceptive soul cannot be realized, Aristotle
speaks of the body in De anima, but only as much as is necessary to arrive at the needed

12

Although the intellect cannot have an organ (a material of certain sort would impede the reception of
certain forms), thinking still has a necessary relation to the body because there is no thinking without
phantasmata (see DA 431a16-17 and DM 449b30-50a1) and phantasmata are embodied in the organs of
sense and the blood.
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explanations of the soul and its capacities. If the body is organized for the sake of
realizing vital capacities that are due to soul, it is appropriate to treat of the soul as the
primary source of these capacities first and independently as possible from the body.
After accounting for the primary, basic operations of the soul in De anima, it is
appropriate more fully to discuss the role of the body in those primary operations and to
investigate prominent actions dependent on the primary operations. The examination
moves from what concerns the soul by itself to examine “animals and all beings
possessing life, what actions belonging to them are unique and what actions are common”
(DS 436a2-5); the focus moves from the soul by itself to the role of the soul-body
composite in vital operations. De sensu revisits and expands on the account of sensation
provided in the De anima, emphasizing the material composition of the sense organs,
media, and objects. De longitudine vitae, De juventute, De vita, and De respiratione all
take up various actions that follow from the nutritive activity of plants and animals,
particularly the physiological relation to heat in the preservation of life.
The other principal matter of concern in the PN is an examination of some of the
prominent vital actions that follow from the primary soul capacity of sense perception.
Some actions are common to all living creatures generally (length of life, life and death),
while others have a restricted range (respiration, memory). The inquiry deals with
actions common and peculiar to all beings possessing life (436a11-12), so both plants and
beasts are indicated, although the inclusion of sense perception and the parade of
dependent affections indicates that special prominence is given to actions crucial for
animal life. Exclusive to animal life are memory (recollection is limited to humans),
waking and sleeping, dreams, and respiration. All living things partake of life and death
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because these follow from nutritive activity. Plants, possessing only nutritive capacity,
lack a rich set of secondary operations dependent on the primary operation of nutrition,
which includes metabolism (of food and regulation of heat and moisture), growth, and
reproduction. Due to the presence of sense perception, animal life can support a rich cast
of secondary actions: memory, spiritedness, appetite, desire (which in humans includes
wish in addition to appetite), and pleasure and pain.
The actions that remain to be investigated after those pertaining to soul by itself
are said to be primary (πρῶτον, a6) and the most important things (τὰ μέγιστα, a7) to
examine. These actions are (1) common to the soul and the body and (2) are present in
nearly all animals.
Clearly the most important features, both those common and those unique among animals, are the
features common both to the soul and to the body, such as sense perception, memory, spiritedness,
appetite, and desire generally, and in addition to these also pleasure and pain; for these are present
nearly in all animals.13 (436a6-11)

The most important features that belong to animals are the actions common to the soul
and the body (κοινὰ τῆς τε ψυχῆς ὄντα καὶ τοῦ σώματος). The soul is the source of the
movements and actions that an animal possesses in virtue of itself. Hence, the soul is
most determinative of animal nature, both the activities an animal engages in and the
organization of the animal body. The actions that belong jointly to soul and to body are
the most important to examine because these indicate actions proper to and not incidental
to an animal’s nature. Whereas De anima can be said to be the examination of the source
most responsible for the nature of living beings, the Parva Naturalia is an examination of
the soul-body composite, a kind of psycho-physiology of vital operations. Sense

13

φαίνεται δὲ τὰ μέγιστα, καὶ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ τὰ ἴδια τῶν ζῴων, κοινὰ τῆς τε ψυχῆς ὄντα καὶ τοῦ σώματος,
οἷον αἴσθησις καὶ μνήμη καὶ θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὅλως ὄρεξις, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη· καὶ
γὰρ ταῦτα σχεδὸν ὑπάρχει πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις.
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perception is the primary activity in which an animal engages in virtue of being an
animal. The various affections and dispositions that can issue from sense perception are
not present for all animals and thus differentiate the diverse kinds of animal life. Such
actions are first in importance because they belong to the animal in virtue of itself and
comprise its very nature. While not an exhaustive list, the features mentioned (memory,
spiritedness, appetite, desire, and pleasure and pain) have primary relevance among the
natural, vital animal actions. These functions are the work for which the animal body
generally is organized (generally, because the features mentioned apply nearly, but not to
all animals). The animal features cited in 436a8-10 are not supposed to constitute a
complete catalogue of the important attributes common to the soul and the body. “For
example” (οἷον, 436a8) indicates that the list is illustrative rather than exhaustive. For
instance, Aristotle does not mention imagination, perhaps the most significant attribute
that follows from sense perception. However, the inclusion of desire and memory in the
list of features provided indicates that imagination is already assumed (imagination and
some of its physical conditions are discussed in the examination of memory, sleep, and
dreams). And of the features mentioned at a8-10, only sense perception, pleasure and
pain, and memory are examined in the PN.
In addition to the animal attributes mentioned in 436a8-10, Aristotle examines
four pairs that limit and mark off the investigations in the PN: waking and sleep, youth
and old age (the length of life), inhalation and exhalation, and life and death. These four
pairs are the most important of the features common to the soul and to the body to
investigate, probably because they encompass all that is decisive in animal and plant life
(a11-14). Length of life and life and death belong to all ensouled beings because these
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enter nutritive activity. Preservation of life depends on proper regulation of heat and
moisture, which enters into the examinations into length of life, death, and respiration.
Waking and sleep extend to all animals because these occur as result of sense perception.
Waking and sleep are among the most important topics because these intersect with
nutritive function and the preservation of animal life. The senses have being as potencies
and so cannot always be at work. Sleep is crucial for animal life because it prepares the
senses for being at work. Finally, inhalation and exhalation belong to a restricted range
of animal life that regulates heat through respiration, again connecting to life and death.
The topics in the PN fall into two main categories. The first consists of sense
perception and some dependent affections. The second group consists of a cohesive and
continuous examination (see 467b10-13) of physiological causes pertaining to the
preservation and loss of life centered on the regulation of heat and moisture in ensouled
beings. Order of the topics is as follows: (1) sense perception, sense objects and sense
media, (2) memory, (3) sleeping and waking, (4) dreams, (5) divination of dreams, (6)
length of life (7) youth and old age, (8) life and death, and (9) respiration.14 We may
wonder at the order of presentation. In De anima, Aristotle sets down the principle that
higher-order psychical operations are dependent upon and do not appear without the
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Quite possibly De motu should be included as following the treatment of sleep (and divination by
dreams). The evidence is from De motu 701b1-3: “Therefore, about the parts of each of the animals, and
about the soul and sense perception and sleep and memory and of the common motions, we have
articulated the causes” (Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν μορίων ἑκάστου τῶν ζῴων, καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς, ἔτι δὲ περὶ
αἰσθήσεως καὶ ὕπνου καὶ μνήμης καὶ τῆς κοινῆς κινήσεως, εἰρήκαμεν τὰς αἰτίας·). Placing De motu after
sleep, however, does not affect my interpretation (below) that the Parva Naturalia deals with life from the
top down in perception, memory, sleep, etc. and then life from the bottom up with the treatises on heat and
moisture regulation. The topic of progressive motion bridges the discussion of life viewed from the top
down and the discussion of life viewed from the bottom up. The reason why is that De motu deals with
both voluntary motion initiated by cognition, but ends with a discussion of (1) how cognition relates to the
efficient cause of movement in limbs (the “connate pneuma,” σύμφυτον πνεῦμα) and (2) involuntary
motion (see De motu x-xi). De motu would follow naturally after the treatments of cognition in the Parva
Naturalia (sense perception and memory) because desire gives rise to voluntary motion and desire follows
from sense perception and imagination and memory.
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lower. The nutritive can be separated from the perceptive and intellect, and sense
perception from intellect, but sense perception and intellect cannot be separated from the
nutritive nor the intellect from sense perception (DA, 415a1-3). Hence, the De anima
takes up the nutritive soul first, followed by sense perception, and then the intellect. Yet,
in De sensu, Aristotle emphasizes that all of the attributes mentioned (πάντα τὰ λεχθέντα
κοινὰ, 436b2), i.e., 1-9 as well as health and disease (436a17), depend on sense
perception.
That all the common things mentioned belong to both the soul and the body is not unclear. For all
those mentioned occur with sense perception or on account of sense perception, some of them
happening to be affections of sense perception, others dispositions, but others guards and preservers of
it, and others the destruction and deprivation of it.15 (436b1-6)

The argument is that all the affections mentioned are common to both the soul and body
on the grounds that all connect to sense perception, which belongs to both the soul and
body. Waking, sleep, memory, desire, pleasure and pain all occur as affections arising
from sense perception. Respiration arises only in animals, connecting it to sense
perception. We might see that youth and old age (length of life), and life and death are
not restricted to animal life (see DR xviii), but extend to all living things. And health and
disease seem more primarily predicated upon life simply (nutritive activity) than sense
perception (οὔτε γὰρ ὑγίειαν οὔτε νόσον οἷόν τε γίγνεσθαι τοῖς ἐστερημένοις ζωῆς,
436a18-19). But Aristotle need mean only that because sense perception already implies
nutritive activity, an animal life ipso facto already includes nutritive activity and all the
affections that follow. So while 1-4 (p.19) arise from sense perception (δι’ αἰσθήσεως),
6-9 occur along with sense perception (μετ’ αἰσθήσεως) due to the necessary nutritive

15

ὅτι δὲ πάντα τὰ λεχθέντα κοινὰ τῆς τε ψυχῆς ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ σώματος, οὐκ ἄδηλον. πάντα γὰρ τὰ μὲν μετ’
αἰσθήσεως συμβαίνει, τὰ δὲ δι’ αἰσθήσεως, ἔνια δὲ τὰ μὲν πάθη ταύτης ὄντα τυγχάνει, τὰ δ’ ἕξεις, τὰ δὲ
φυλακαὶ καὶ σωτηρίαι, τὰ δὲ φθοραὶ καὶ στερήσεις·
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capacity required to sustain animal life. The ordering of the topics to be examined
reflects this distinction between what arises from sense perception (1-6) and what comes
along with sense perception (6-9).
Aristotle proceeds from the more complex and higher to the lower, probably
because the topics taken up in 6-9 are much more physiological in nature. The PN
develops a neat, linear progression from De anima. The De anima presents a study of the
soul by itself, PN topics 1-4 next examine the vital operation of sense perception and
some secondary affections with special consideration given to the body’s role, and then
PN topics 6-9 take up the physiological processes due to and affecting nutritive activity
that are necessary to support life. Thus, the PN effectively ends full circle where the
investigation into soul powers began in De anima book ii 3, focused on the nutritive
conditions for life. But while the De anima focuses on nutritive activity of the soul alone
as much as possible, looking at life from the ‘top-down’, the PN ends by emphasizing the
physiological conditions maintained by the work of the nutritive soul and the physical
conditions required by the nutritive soul to continue its work, looking at life from the
‘bottom-up’.
Memory is the second topic in the PN, following the account of sense, sensible
objects, and sensible media. Memory numbers among the affections that arise due to
sense perception and phantasia (imagination). Because the PN takes up only those
features crucial for life and animal life, memory must hold a special place, appearing
second following sense perception. Although imagination arises due to sense
perception—it is not a separate faculty, lacking proper objects that raise it to actuality—
imagination belongs in De anima given the crucial role it plays in animal motion and in
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bridging sense perception and intellect. And sense perception and phantasia give rise to
desire and appetite that in turn cause progressive motion. Because sense perception,
imagination, and desire are all taken up in the De anima, we are to see that after sense
perception, imagination, and appetite, memory holds pride of place in animal life.
The importance of memory is emphasized in the famous opening passage of the
Metaphysics. Aristotle states that humans pursue knowledge as a natural end. The
passage contains some revealing remarks about animal intelligence. The senses are by
nature and we love the senses for their own sake and not just their utility. And the senses
discriminate and pick out differences among things, providing the basis for science.
Love of the senses is thus love of discrimination among things for its own sake. Initially,
to know (eidenai, 980a21) appears to include sensory discrimination. Some confirmation
of the extension to sensory discrimination for eidenai is perhaps provided by Aristotle’s
attribution of intelligence (phronimos, b21-22) to animal life in general rather than to
humans alone (Aristotle references animal intelligence throughout the History of
Animals, primarily in terms of behavior beneficial for the individual, the young, or the
group).16
By nature, animals come into being possessing sense perception, but in some of these, memory
does not come about while for others it does. And for this reason these latter animals are more
intelligent and able to learn than the former that lack the capacity to remember; on the one hand,
as many are intelligent without learning as lack the capacity to hear sounds (for example, the bee
and if there is any other similar genus of animal), while on the other hand, as many learn as have
this sense [for hearing sounds] in addition to memory.17 (Meta 980a21-b25)

Animal life is defined by sense perception. Because sense perception discriminates

16

Regarding attribution of phronimos to animals, see HA, 611a15-21 (care and protection of young), 12a18 (care of self when ill), 12a34-b2 (skill in killing prey), 14b18-26 (organized group cooperation against
danger), 18a25-30 (care of young, action in accordance with ability).
17
φύσει μὲν οὖν αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα γίγνεται τὰ ζῷα, ἐκ δὲ ταύτης τοῖς μὲν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται μνήμη, τοῖς
δ’ ἐγγίγνεται. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ταῦτα φρονιμώτερα καὶ μαθητικώτερα τῶν μὴ δυναμένων μνημονεύειν ἐστί,
φρόνιμα μὲν ἄνευ τοῦ μανθάνειν ὅσα μὴ δύναται τῶν ψόφων ἀκούειν (οἷον μέλιττα κἂν εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο
γένος ζῴων ἔστι), μανθάνει δ’ ὅσα πρὸς τῇ μνήμῃ καὶ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν αἴσθησιν.
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(κρίνει) among its objects and picks out differences among them (e.g., DA 418a11-16 and
424a2-6), animals already have a small purchase on intelligence to the extent that they
may pick out differences among sensibles. Animals that have memory (mnêmê) are more
intelligent (phronimos) and better equipped to learn (mathêtikos), if they have hearing,
than those animals who do not. Beasts with memory are more intelligent because they
retain previous sense perceptions and the discriminations these yield. Learning in this
context may refer to the retention of correlations. Hearing suggests that correlative
learning pertains especially to human commands (cf. HA ix 1, 608a13-20). The source of
greater intelligence is the small share of experience memory allows an animal to possess.
Animals without memory must live in the present alone, without any linkage between
present and past discriminations. An animal with memory has a richer palette of
expectations (desires and aversions) and can be moved to engage in a richer set of actions
as a result. Beasts lacking memory have appetite that connects only to present sense
perception and phantasia. In the next lines, Aristotle continues to fill in the link between
memory, experience, and intelligence.
Now the other animals live by means of imagination and memory, but have a small share of
experience. But the human kind lives also by means of art and reasoning. With humans,
experience comes about from memory, for many memories of the same matter of concern bring to
completion capacity for a single experience. 18 (980b25-81a1)

While not all animals have memory, all perhaps live by imagination to some extent, even
those that live in the present only.19 Beasts that possess memory in addition to
18

τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ταῖς φαντασίαις ζῇ καὶ ταῖς μνήμαις, ἐμπειρίας δὲ μετέχει μικρόν· τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων
γένος καὶ τέχνῃ καὶ λογισμοῖς. γίγνεται δ’ ἐκ τῆς μνήμης ἐμπειρία τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνῆμαι
τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος μιᾶς ἐμπειρίας δύναμιν ἀποτελοῦσιν.
19
In DA ii 3, Aristotle urges that desire follows upon sense perception, of which all animals possess at least
the power of touch for feeding. Pain and pleasure follow as a consequence of sense perception and desire
follows as a consequence of pleasure and pain. We may see that imagination is a necessary corollary of
desire. In order to desire or have an aversion to something, the animal must in some minimal sense
envision itself in a relationship with the object of desire or aversion. Desire is for entering into some
relationship with some object and the relationship must be envisioned.
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imagination have a small share of experience. Memory, imagination, desire, and sense
perception in conjunction allow for animals to act based on more than what affects them
in the present moment. Experience is generated out of many memories of some same and
single class of beings or events. Memory gets many instances of the same kind into the
soul, where imagination can “play” with these. Experience forms from the retention of
many different instances of a kind when an animal discerns some feature that belongs in
common to all the instances (experience is made of many memories of the same pragma).
For the beasts, discernment of what is common is probably an intelligence for
association, but not for picking out universal attributes or principles or essences, which
would require reason. If an animal has memory, it can retain the conjunctions between
events. Conjunctions can be between sounds and behavior (e.g., a fellow beast of the
same species cries out in a certain way followed by the presence of danger or prey) or
one event and another (e.g., the sound of the can opening is followed by food being
placed on a plate and then on the ground). This kind of intelligence ‘puts two and two
together’ and grasps basic correlations. So the beasts have a kind of correlative
intelligence for grasping and learning connections that does not require judgment or
speech, yet there is no grasping of middle terms or reasons or universals. It is a very
modest experience. All that is needed is for relevant memories to join with current
perceptions. Let us see if Aristotle will allow such an interpretation.
And it seems that scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμῃ) and art (τέχνῃ) are right next to experience,
and, for human beings, knowledge and art arise as a result of experience: for, as Polus claims,
experience makes art, but lack of experience makes chance. And art comes into being when out of
many reflections over experience a single universal conception comes about regarding the similar
features. For to have the conception that this thing was beneficial for Callias suffering from this
illness and for Socrates and for many each in this way, it is from experience. On the other hand, to
have the conception that this was beneficial for all of a certain sort having been marked out as a
single form suffering with this disease, that this thing was beneficial, for example, beneficial for

24

the phlegmatic or bilious or caustically feverish, to have that conception is from art. 20 (981a1-12)

Art (τέχνη) and demonstrative knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) are nearly the same (σχεδὸν
ὅμοιον) as experience in that all three require a grasping and conception of some
universal feature common to many different instances belonging to a single kind (cf. PA
ii 19) and all three have memory as their foundation. We may see that recognition of
something that is the same among many different instances is a genus into which
experience, art, and knowledge fit. Experience looks to be both simple conjunction
between two events or objects and a recognition of something common among many
different particulars. For human beings, the common amounts to a universal, what is said
of many particulars, but we cannot extend recognition of universals to animals that lack
speech (cf. NE 1147b3-5). Due to lack of reason, the beasts “possess a small amount of
experience” (ἐμπειρίας δὲ μετέχει μικρόν, 980a26-7). Without reason, beasts are limited
to correlation concerning perceptible particulars, primarily concerned with pleasure and
pain. Human beings, however, through the conjunction of reason with memory and
imagination are capable of realizing a much richer sort of experience resulting in
practical concern for the good and the advantageous, productive arts concerned with
bringing into being those things whose source of genesis is external to themselves, and
contemplative pursuits concerned with truth and understanding for its own sake, such as
the Metaphysics.
Aristotle provides an example of recognizing that some single drug is beneficial
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καὶ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τέχνῃ ὅμοιον εἶναι καὶ ἐμπειρία, ἀποβαίνει δ’ ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη διὰ τῆς
ἐμπειρίας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐμπειρία τέχνην ἐποίησεν, ὡς φησὶ Πῶλος, ἡ δ’ ἀπειρία τύχην.
γίγνεται δὲ τέχνη ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐννοημάτων μία καθόλου γένηται περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων
ὑπόληψις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔχειν ὑπόληψιν ὅτι Καλλίᾳ κάμνοντι τηνδὶ τὴν νόσον τοδὶ συνήνεγκε καὶ Σωκράτει
καὶ καθ’ ἕκαστον οὕτω πολλοῖς, ἐμπειρίας ἐστίν· τὸ δ’ ὅτι πᾶσι τοῖς τοιοῖσδε κατ’ εἶδος ἓν
ἀφορισθεῖσι, κάμνουσι τηνδὶ τὴν νόσον, συνήνεγκεν, οἷον τοῖς φλεγματώδεσιν ἢ χολώδεσι ἢ πυρέττουσι
καύσῳ, τέχνης.
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for several different folks who are ill. Here experience amounts to the recognition that
one thing has for the most part been followed by another: B has usually followed A in
this circumstance. In Aristotle’s example, relief follows some treatment or drug for
certain human beings. Such and such tends to provide relief for the bilious for such and
such reasons, but not the phlegmatic, while such and such provides relief for the
phlegmatic, but not the bilious. Art differs from experience because art grasps the cause
(middle term) through which the result usually follows for some members of some kind.
Grasp of kinds and articulation of causes indicates that reason enters into recognition, and
so human experience and art surpasses the correlative intelligence possible for beasts.
The difference between contemplative science and experience is the same except that
contemplative science aims at articulation and demonstration of causation of being for its
own sake.
The opening line of thought in the Metaphysics indicates the importance of
memory for animal and human intelligence. Without memory, animals cannot live much
beyond the present moment and humans could not recognize the universals or middle
terms necessary for the various sciences. But memory is important not just for allowing
beasts and humans to live beyond the present or for humans to engage in art and
contemplative science. Memory also plays a crucial role in practical life, allowing for
retention of the pleasant and the painful. The ability to return over and over again to
what one remembers as pleasant enters into character development and moral virtue.
Because memory allows for the recognition of universals and the retention of particulars,
memory is a necessary condition of prudence, which must grasp what is good to do and
refrain from doing and apply it to the particular situation. And because it concerns
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actions, prudence is concerned with particulars even more so than with universals.
Hence, a good memory that preserves a broad and rich experience will be a necessary
condition of prudence (one must also be skilled in deliberation and astute). We might see
that the wise have more experience because they look into everything and also that the
wise have especially good memories: seeking wisdom, they look into everything and
retain it. Memory is not only a necessary condition for cognizance beyond the immediate
present and intelligence of correlations in beasts, allowing for a richer array of actions
and desires, but memory is also a necessary condition for contemplative, practical, and
productive sciences for human beings.
Having surveyed the crucial role that memory plays in animal intelligence and
human life, we can now see the logic behind the ordering of the investigation in the PN
into the attributes that arise due to sense perception (δι’ αἰσθήσεως), namely, memory
and recollection, sleeping and waking, and dreams. Sense perception is the primary
operation on which the other attributes depend. Why memory comes second before
waking and sleeping is that waking and sleeping are for the sake of sense perception and
its attendant actions and affections. Waking is nothing other than the activity of sense
perception and its dependent affections, e.g., memory (see 454a1-11). Sleep readies the
animal to enter into perception and any attendant affections of the sense power. Because
sleep is for the sake of these activities, the activities are more primary and ends, and
therefore they come first in order of investigation. The inquiry into dreams follows sleep
because dreams arise only along with sleep, when perceiving no longer overpowers
residual phantasmata that become noticeable in sleep.
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Chapter Two: The initial characterization of the objects of memory, the act of
remembrance, and memory.

De memoria et reminiscentia begins with an announcement of the aim of the
treatment that recalls the general aims of the PN.
About memory and recollection, one ought to say what it is, through what cause it comes about and to
which of the parts of the soul this affection, and recollecting, happens to belong. 21 (449b4-6)

Aristotle announces three aims. First, the treatment is to articulate the being (τί ἐστ)ι of
memory and recollection. The inquiry supplies a definition for the being of each,
supplying a genus and species difference for both. Echoing the opening lines of De
sensu, Aristotle mentions that memory and recollection are affections of soul, thereby
marking off the broader genus in which the subject matter is to be located. Memory
belongs to the proximate genus ‘hexis of a phantasma’, which memory shares with other
kinds of phantasia; the differentia for memory is a phantasma that functions as a copy of
actual, prior cognition (451a14-16).22 Recollection belongs to the proximate genus ‘to
take up again or anew that which a memory is about’. Because it is possible to relearn
acquired knowledge subsequently lost and to reestablish lost memories through new
perception of the subject matter, Aristotle attaches to recollection the differentia and
requirement that we reestablish the lost memory anew from a source within ourselves and

21

Περὶ μνήμης καὶ τοῦ μνημονεύειν λεκτέον τί ἐστι καὶ διὰ τίν’ αἰτίαν γίγνεται καὶ τίνι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς
μορίων συμβαίνει τοῦτο τὸ πάθος καὶ τὸ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι·
22
Hexis (ἕξις) may refer to first actuality, a disposition for entering into an activity, or to second actuality,
an activity that arises in virtue of the disposition (see Metaphysics v 20). The final, considered definition of
memory (451a14-17) categorizes memory (μνήμη) and remembering (τὸ μνημονεύειν) as a hexis so hexis
covers memory in its application as dispositional storage of memories and in its application as the activity
of remembering the past. In order to avoid artificially pigeonholing memory hexis exclusively as a first
actuality (disposition) or a second actuality (activity), I have adopted the practice of transliterating the term.
I have pointed out where Aristotle seems to employ hexis in an unambiguous fashion as either disposition
or activity.
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by our own power (451b9), rather than through an external source, e.g., a book or teacher
for relearning the knowledge lost or another encounter with the relevant perceptible
object. Because memory and recollection belong to some part of the soul, we expect
their being to be either a capacity or affection of some faculty of the soul (πάθος, b5, is
sometimes used by Aristotle to refer to faculties of soul; see DA 403a3-10). Neither
memory nor recollection turns out to be a separate faculty with its own proper objects.
Memory is an affection that arises due to sense perception, while recollection is a sort of
reasoning (συλλογισμός τις, 453a10) predicated on the deliberative power (τὸ
βουλευτικὸν, a13) of intellect and on movements of phantasia. Recollection connects to
deliberative imagination, present only in those with power to reason things out (see DA
434a5-10).23
The second aim is to articulate the causes through which memory and recollection
occur. These causes are material, efficient, and final. For instance, recollection takes
place for the sake of uncovering a memory or piece of knowledge that is not directly or
immediately accessible, and remembering is for the sake of perceiving the past (that for
the sake of which there is retention of past cognition is to remember it). Memory and
recollection both depend on physiological conditions, such as density and fluidity and
moistness and dryness of the body, and quasi-physical motions present in the blood or
organs of sense (450a27-b11). Remembering is initiated due to the association of present
perception, passion, desire, thought, phantasia, or remembering with relevant motions
(phantasmata) in the soul-body composite. The relevant motions (phantasmata) serve as

23

Joe Sachs (2001) 180, f. 14, points out the implicit link between recollection and deliberative imagination
mentioned in DA iii 11. Recollection is a sort of reasoning that utilizes and sets in motions images of
phantasia.
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the vehicles for memories. Sense perception is the ultimate moving cause of memory as
retention (storage of memories).24
The third aim is to establish to what part of the soul and the body memory and
recollection belong. Remembering involves the awareness of phantasmata that function
as likenesses of prior cognition. Such awareness points to phantasia and the primary
perceptive faculty of the soul in virtue of which there is awareness of phantasmata.
Remembering also involves a sense of past time in connection to what the memory
phantasmata represent. Time follows motion and motion is a common sensible of which
the primary sense power is again responsible for discriminating and perceiving.
Retention involves the reception into the seat of perception (the heart) the phantasmata
that enter into remembrance. Physiological conditions impact greatly on the quality of
retention and the phantasmata retained. Aside from a sense of past time, the primary
mechanism through which memory occurs is phantasia that preserves a likenesses of past
cognition. The phantasia motions retained are sometimes compared to pictures. The
pictorial language indicates that memory phantasmata have a cognitive dimension. Other
times Aristotle emphasizes that the phantasmata are motions and moved movers retained
in the soul-body composite. The emphasis on motion indicates that phantasmata are
embodied affections common both to the body and the soul.
449b6-9 That memory and recollection are different.
After articulating the aims of the inquiry, the first order of business is to

24

Aristotle initially mentions that μνήμη is a pathos and hexis of sense perception. As a capacity for
storage, it is a hexis of sense perception. As an object stored, i.e., a memory, it is a pathos arising from the
activity of sense perception and occurring in the primary organ of sense. As an activity, i.e., as
remembering, it is an affection that happens to the power of sense perception.
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distinguish memory from recollection. It is hardly self-evident that there is more than
one kind of cognition of the past, i.e., hardly clear that there is a distinction between
memory and recollection. English terms for memory and recollection are used
interchangeably. “I remember him leaving around 11 pm,” and “My recollection is that
he left around 11 pm” do not obviously name different cognitive operations. But we have
some sense that there are different sorts of cognition of the past. On the one hand, we can
remember something from our past straightaway without difficulty. On the other hand,
sometimes we struggle to recollect or recall something we cannot quite put our finger on
(e.g., where one put one’s keys). Further, we speak of remembering things obviously
past (e.g., what one did two days ago) as well as things without past aspect (e.g., that 3 x
11 is 33). Memory terms in ancient Greek suffer from similar ambiguity. Recollection
(ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι) and remembrance (μνημονεύειν) are used interchangeably to mean
‘recall’ or ‘call to mind’. Plato uses ἀνάμνησις in the Philebus to refer to simple
remembrance of past perceptions and things learned as well as the recovery of lost
memories (34a10–c2).
Given the ambiguity and interchangeable usage of different memory terms,
Aristotle is probably attempting for the first time both to establish precise nominal
definitions and real distinctions between the affections of memory, remembrance, and
recollection. Aristotle tells us that those who excel at memory and those who excel at
recollection are not the same people.
For those who are good with memory and good with recollection are not the same, but for the most
part those better at remembering are the slow while those better at recollecting are the quick and good
learners.25 (449b6-8)

25

οὐ γὰρ οἱ αὐτοί εἰσι μνημονικοὶ καὶ ἀναμνηστικοί, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ μνημονικώτεροι μὲν οἱ βραδεῖς,
ἀναμνηστικώτεροι δὲ οἱ ταχεῖς καὶ εὐμαθεῖς.
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For (γάρ, b6) introduces the justification for the claim that there are two separate
affections of soul to be examined, memory (and its correlative activity of remembrance)
and recollection. The argument for two separate affections to study is that people who
excel with memory are different from those who excel with recollection: the quick are
better with recollection, the slow with memory. Surely slowness and quickness refer to
human cognition as recollection is limited to human beings. The first order of business is
to identify more precisely of what slowness and quickness are the attributes. Aristotle
later correlates slowness and quickness with fluid and sclerotic physiological conditions,
respectively (450b7-11). Those who are quick are fluid in nature and too much fluidity
prevents long term retention of phantasmata in the physical seat of perception. Those
who are slow are sclerotic and much density or hardness makes retention difficult, but
quite lasting once established. Fluidity aids recollection because it allows for easy and
rapid movement among retained phantasmata, while rigidity aids in the stable and longterm retention of phantasmata that serve as the vehicles for memories. Yet, at the outset,
Aristotle cannot rely on later passages that deal with the physiological conditions of
memory and recollection in order to argue that memory and recollection are different.
First, there is no mention of physiology in 449b6-8. Second, the reader can hardly be
expected to have these later passages in mind. Aristotle would be guilty of sneaking in
assumptions that have been neither explained nor justified. Third, claims about the
linkage between certain physiologies and being good with memory or recollection
already assume that memory and recollection are different; but that there are two sorts of
cognition that concern the past to be studied is precisely what 449b6-8 is supposed to
establish. The slow may be better with memory and the quick better with recollection
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due to differences in physiology, but the initial argument that memory is something
different from recollection has nothing to do with physiology.26
Still, the later passages on physiology are important for getting a sensible
interpretation out of 449b6-8. The impact of sclerotic and fluid physiologies on facility
with memory articulated by Aristotle is directly inspired by Plato’s treatment of memory
in the Theaetetus in which the terms for quick and slow learners feature prominently.
The context of the passages that contain these terms in the Theaetetus is an inquiry into
how false judgment is possible. Socrates suggests that in the soul there is something like
a waxen block that receives impressions of sense perceptions and thoughts. Whatever is
impressed into the wax is known and may be remembered for as long as it is retained
(191c-e). The wax differs in quality in different persons and this helps to explain
differences in ability to learn and to remember. False judgment may arise in various
cases where one misapplies a memory (knowledge) imprint to things presently perceived
(Socrates shows that false judgment can arise through misapplication of memory imprints
to present perceptions, but does not give an account of why the misapplication should
occur). The consistency of the wax impacts greatly on the quality of the impressions and
the speed and accuracy with which one is able to learn and apply impressions to present
perceptions.
Socrates: In some men, the wax in the soul is deep and abundant, smooth and worked to the proper
consistency; and when the things that come through the senses are imprinted upon this ‘heart’ of the
soul—as Homer calls it, hinting at the likeness to the wax—the signs that are made in it are lasting,
because they are clear and have sufficient depth. Men with such souls learn easily (εὐμαθεῖς) and
remember (μνήμονες) what they learn; they do not get the signs out of line with the perceptions, but
judge truly. As the signs are distinct and there is plenty of room for them, they quickly (ταχύ) assign
each thing to its own impress in the wax—the things in question being, of course, what we call the
things that are and these people being the ones we call wise. Or do you feel any doubts about this? —
Theaetetus: No, I find it extraordinarily convincing. — Socrates: But it is a different matter when a
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Richard Sorabji (2004) 64-65 and Thomas Aquinas (De memoria, 302) both argue that 449b6-8 is based
on the physiological commitments that only receive articulation later in the treatise.
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man’s ‘heart’ is ‘shaggy’ (the kind of heart our marvelously knowing poet praises), or when it is dirty
and of impure wax; or when it is very soft or hard. Persons in whom the wax is soft are quick to learn
(εὐμαθεῖς) but quick to forget (ἐπιλήσμονες); when the wax is hard, the opposite happens. Those in
whom it is ‘shaggy’ and rugged, a stony thing with earth or filth mixed all through it, have indistinct
impressions. So too if the wax is hard, for then the impressions have no depth; similarly, they are
indistinct if the wax is soft, because they quickly run together and are blurred. If, in addition to all this,
the impresses in the wax are crowded upon each other for lack of space, because it is only some little
scrap of a soul, they are even more indistinct. All such people are liable to false judgment. When they
see or hear or think of anything, they can’t quickly (ταχύ) allot each thing to each impress; they are
slow (βραδεῖς) and allot things to impresses which do not belong to them, misseeing, mishearing and
misthinking most of them—and these in turn are the ones we describe as in error about the things that
are and ignorant.27 (194c4-95a9)

Those who have abundant wax that is neither too hard nor too soft learn easily (εὐμαθεῖς)
and remember (μνήμονες) well (194d3). Quickness (ταχεῖα) and slowness (βραδεῖα)
refer to making connections between things presently sensed and memories of things
previously sensed or thought; quickness and slowness are attributes of the ability to make
connections between present and past perceptions. Those with deep (βαθύς, 194d1),
abundant wax learn easily and remember well what they learn. Socrates does not say
why deep and abundant wax gives rise to facility with learning. Learning requires the
assimilation of principles and ability to make the right connections between things.
Deep, abundant wax of the right consistency allows for accurate and long-lasting
memory, but why such qualities cause accurate, good inferences is not obvious. Accurate
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Translation by M.J. Levett, revised by Myles Burnyeat (1990).
{ΣΩ.} Ταῦτα τοίνυν φασὶν ἐνθένδε γίγνεσθαι. ὅταν μὲν ὁ κηρός του ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ βαθύς τε καὶ πολὺς καὶ
λεῖος καὶ μετρίως ὠργασμένος ᾖ, τὰ ἰόντα διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἐνσημαινόμενα εἰς τοῦτο τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς
“κέαρ,” ὃ ἔφη Ὅμηρος αἰνιττόμενος τὴν τοῦ κηροῦ ὁμοιότητα, τότε μὲν καὶ τούτοις καθαρὰ τὰ σημεῖα
ἐγγιγνόμενα καὶ ἱκανῶς τοῦ βάθους ἔχοντα πολυχρόνιά τε γίγνεται καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι πρῶτον μὲν
εὐμαθεῖς, ἔπειτα μνήμονες, εἶτα οὐ παραλλάττουσι τῶν αἰσθήσεων τὰ σημεῖα ἀλλὰ δοξάζουσιν ἀληθῆ.
σαφῆ γὰρ καὶ ἐν εὐρυχωρίᾳ ὄντα ταχὺ διανέμουσιν ἐπὶ τὰ αὑτῶν ἕκαστα ἐκμαγεῖα, ἃ δὴ ὄντα καλεῖται, καὶ
σοφοὶ δὴ οὗτοι καλοῦνται. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι; {ΘΕΑΙ.} Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν. {ΣΩ.} Ὅταν τοίνυν λάσιόν του
τὸ κέαρ ᾖ, ὃ δὴ ἐπῄνεσεν ὁ πάσσοφος ποιητής, ἢ ὅταν κοπρῶδες καὶ μὴ καθαροῦ τοῦ κηροῦ, ἢ ὑγρὸν
σφόδρα ἢ σκληρόν, ὧν μὲν ὑγρὸν εὐμαθεῖς μέν, ἐπιλήσμονες δὲ γίγνονται, ὧν δὲ σκληρόν, τἀναντία. οἱ δὲ
δὴ λάσιον καὶ τραχὺ λιθῶδές τι ἢ γῆς ἢ κόπρου συμμιγείσης ἔμπλεων ἔχοντες ἀσαφῆ τὰ ἐκμαγεῖα ἴσχουσιν.
ἀσαφῆ δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ σκληρά· βάθος γὰρ οὐκ ἔνι. ἀσαφῆ δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ ὑγρά· ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ συγχεῖσθαι ταχὺ
γίγνεται ἀμυδρά. ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς πᾶσι τούτοις ἐπ’ ἀλλήλων συμπεπτωκότα ᾖ ὑπὸ στενοχωρίας, ἐάν του
σμικρὸν ᾖ τὸ ψυχάριον, ἔτι ἀσαφέστερα ἐκείνων. πάντες οὖν οὗτοι γίγνονται οἷοι δοξάζειν ψευδῆ. ὅταν
γάρ τι ὁρῶσιν ἢ ἀκούωσιν ἢ ἐπινοῶσιν, ἕκαστα ἀπονέμειν ταχὺ ἑκάστοις οὐ δυνάμενοι βραδεῖς τέ εἰσι καὶ
ἀλλοτριονομοῦντες παρορῶσί τε καὶ παρακούουσι καὶ παρανοοῦσι πλεῖστα, καὶ καλοῦνται αὖ οὗτοι
ἐψευσμένοι τε δὴ τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀμαθεῖς.
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retention of information is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for learning. Socrates
seems to equate learning with taking in and retaining information rather than
understanding it. Soon the wax imagery is discounted for its failure to account for false
opinion concerning imperceptible being, specifically mathematics. Socrates says
somewhat ironically that the wise are those who are able quickly to assign present
perceptions to impressions of previous perceptions of the same thing or type. The wise
have abundant room in their souls and so the impressions are not crowded and muddled
together; memories are distinct and accurate. Could wisdom really be the matching up
correctly of present perceptions with memories of perceptions of the same thing? When
we see a tiger, perhaps we recognize that the tiger presently seen is an instance of the
type we have called tiger in the past. But it could imply other kinds of identification. For
instance, having memorized algebraic formulas, one can subsequently match problems to
the correct, required formula (“when you see a problem of type X, carry out operation
Y”). Or having once done something in a situation that worked, one can match future
similar situations to the procedure that worked in the past. But surely this falls short of
understanding why an algebraic formula works or is true or why certain actions produce
certain results. Socrates’ wise man could be a master of correlations. These know what
has worked, but not why. Setting aside just how serious Socrates may be, those with the
right sort of wax are very quick and good at making connections between present and
past cognition.
Those who have exceedingly soft wax learn easily (εὐμαθεῖς, 194e3), but also
quickly forget because the impressions do not hold. Those with wax exceedingly hard
learn with difficulty because the impressions do not easily take, but owing to the hardness
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of the wax, those impressions that do take are not easily rubbed out. Additionally, those
with exceedingly hard wax have only vague impressions; the hard surface is not suited
for receiving impressions. Similarly, the impressions stamped into exceedingly soft wax
are indistinct because they run together and easily blur (before soft wax allowed for easy
learning, but now it is said that soft wax does not receive impressions well—the same
condition gives rise to opposite results!). Owing to their indistinct impressions, those
possessing exceedingly shallow, soft, or hard wax are slow (βραδεῖς) to match present
perceptions to corresponding memory impressions and are apt to misapply present
perceptions to the wrong memory impression. Again, slowness is in reference to making
connections between present and past cognition.
Because the quick and the slow are in reference to making connections between
past and present cognition, the quick and the slow pertain primarily to making
connections. Those who are good at learning (εὐμαθής) make the right connections
quickly and easily. Speaking of the qualities that must combine in those who would be
philosopher kings, Socrates groups together being good at learning (εὐμαθής), having
good memory (μνήμων), being quick to grasp reasons (ἀγχίνοος), and being keen in
insight (ὀξύς) (503c2). In Posterior Analytics i 34, 89b10-20, Aristotle speaks of
angchinoia (ἀγχίνοιά), literally “near to thinking,” as a skill for hitting upon the reason
(the middle term) for the connection between things quickly (ταχύ). Those who make
connections quickly may be skilled at guessing, rather than understanding causal
connections. Quickness can be overvalued if this means hitting on the right reason
without understanding. So the quick refer to quick and accurate reasoners (who because
they reason quickly and accurately learn easily) while the slow are those who do not

36

reason and make connections quickly.
Now that I have discussed the slow and the quick, I will turn to Aristotle’s
argument concerning the distinction between memory and recollection. Aristotle cannot
argue that memory is other than recollection by appealing to their respective distribution
among animals and humans or by appealing to the dependency of recollection on
memory. Either appeal would rely too much on understanding already what memory and
recollection are, thereby presupposing their difference. Hence, Aristotle resorts to a
“different folks, different strokes” argument: varying qualities determine varying ability
with respect to different functions.28 The argument contains the following considerations.
(1) The slow and the quick differ in facility with making connections.
(Different sorts of people are good at different activities.)
(2) The slow and the quick differ in ability for memory and recollection.
(The slow are good with memory whereas the quick tend to be good with
recollection.)
(3) Therefore, memory and recollection are different faculties.
(3) follows from (2) because of (1). People who possess different sorts of qualities will
be good at different kinds of actions. In the background is the relation of virtue and
function. Virtue enables function to be performed well and different functions require
different kinds of virtue. People of different sorts possess different qualities that enable
good performance of actions regarding which their qualities are the virtues (or vices). If
two people vary in quality and, hence, are good at two different actions, then there must
be two separate actions that are distinguishable from each other. Aristotle applies the
general rule to a particular case: different sorts are good at different activities, the quick
to learn and slow to learn are of different sorts, and therefore the quick and slow are good

28

If my reading of Aristotle is right and Aristotle is right, we should see that women for the most part will
have better memory while men for the most part will be better at recollecting.
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at different kinds of cognition, among which are memory and recollection. Because
memory is something the slow tend to be good at, but not the quick, and because
recollection is something the quick tend to be good at, but not the slow, memory and
recollection must be two different kinds of cognition. What secures the distinction
between memory and recollection is that the good performance of each depends on
possession of different qualities.
The general rule that different qualities correlate with good performance at
different functions must be unpacked for the particular case of memory and recollection
and slowness and quickness. The quick and the slow differ in quality (facility with
reasoning), but we are not told why being quick should cause one to be better with
recollection than memory and why being slow should cause one to excel more at memory
than with recollection. Therefore, the truth of the assertion in 449b6-8 centers on why (2)
should follow from (1) because no term connecting the quick and the slow to excellence
with recollection and memory is provided. The connecting term must be supplied either
by observation or from some theoretical commitment or a combination of observation
and theory. The term cannot be supplied by theory for no theory is mentioned. That
leaves observation: experience must tell that those who reason quickly excel with
cognition of the past that differs in kind from the kind of cognition of the past at which
the slow excel. Because memory and recollection are both cognitions of past things, their
difference may not be very evident. But the quick and the slow, who are easily
distinguishable, seem to differ in the sort of past cognition each excels at. And so
Aristotle relies on a “different folks, different strokes argument”: different sorts of people
are good at different sorts of cognition.
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Probably Aristotle requires that his readers recognize from experience that the
slow and the quick do not excel at relating to the past in the same manner. Aristotle
hardly needs to demonstrate that we relate to the past: the proof is that we do it. But not
everyone may be good at relating to the past in the same way. Yet, who has sufficient
experience with the slow and the quick so as to recognize that these excel in relating to
the past in different ways? Perhaps teachers like Aristotle? The implicit appeal to the
reader’s experience requires the reader to perform what the distinction concerns: the
reader must remember or recollect her or his experience with the slow and the quick. The
target audience of Aristotle’s argument is not just anyone, but members of the Lyceum or
others interested in philosophical inquiry. Such people are more likely to be quick and
possess good memory: they will excel at recollection. Aristotle’s reader will either
immediately remember her or his experience with the slow and the quick or will have to
search and recollect for it. Further, the reader will do either one of these (remember or
recollect) well or with difficulty. Surely the reader is meant to engage in self-inspection,
also. The reader is to recognize that he or she is better at one sort of cognition of the past
than another, thereby confirming the distinction: if one excels more at one of two sorts of
cognition of the past, then there surely must be past cognition of two sorts. We might
find that we can remember very well many things, but have trouble recalling quickly
what few things we do not well remember. Or we may find that we are very good
recalling things that we cannot initially recall, i.e., that we are very good at recollection,
but that our need to recall often suggests that we are not as good with memory. This selfappraisal does not require that we already know what memory and recollection are, but
only that we recognize two different kinds of cognitive access to the past. Having
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secured recognition of two differing abilities, Aristotle can take up a discussion of what
the faculties are, their objects, and their causes.
449b9-23 Nature of the memorable object.
Having secured that memory and recollection are different, Aristotle takes up
what memory is. There are two reasons memory receives treatment prior to recollection.
First, memory is the more widely distributed of the two. Any beast with a sense of time
may possess memory, but only humans recollect. Second, memory is more primary than
recollection. Memory is present without recollection, but recollection is not present
without memory. Recollection is the ability to initiate through wish or choice a search
for a memory that is not immediately accessible. Successful recollection ends in the
retrieval of something retained, but inaccessible prior to the attempt to recollect. If what
is sought is no longer retained, there is no ability to retrieve it and recollection cannot
occur.
Aristotle looks to the objects that memory concerns to define memory. What the
memorable objects (to mnêmonueton, 449b9) are is hardly self-evident and Aristotle
warns that people are often deceived about the objects of memory (b9-10). First, the
range of temporal aspect memory concerns is unclear. Is memory only of what belongs
to the past or is there memory of objects that belong to the present or even the future? Is
there memory of atemporal objects, e.g., that triangles have three sides? Can there be
memory of the present location of an object, e.g., that my car is parked in the driveway?
Second, the range of objects that memory concerns is unclear. Do we remember past
objects or past cognitions of objects or both? Does memory coincide with the exercise of
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knowledge and skill or is memory limited to personal experience? For instance, is how to
derive an equilateral triangle from a given radius an object of memory and knowledge or
only knowledge? Similarly, when building a table, is the carpenter remembering how to
do this or exercising knowledge of how to build it or both? The ambiguity concerning
memory objects and the possibility for deception that follows makes Aristotle’s treatment
of the objects of memory of genuine interest. Aristotle nails down what memory is by
determining the sort of objects that memory concerns. Memory concerns only the past
cognitive activity of the one who remembers, what we call episodic memory of
autobiographical events. We might be suspicious that memory should be so narrowly
limited, but, as we shall see, in order for an object to be conceived as past and as having a
connection to the remembering subject, the object must concern the remembering
subject’s own past cognitive activity.
De memoria follows the pattern of investigation into soul faculties in De anima ii
4. Objects of operations reveal the nature of the operations, and the nature of operations
reveals the capacity for the operation. Getting the memory object right is crucial for
understanding the capacity for the operation. If one is mistaken about the object, one will
misconstrue the activity and the ability.
But if it is necessary to say what each [of the capacities of soul is], for example the intellectual power,
the power of perception, the nutritive power, one must say first what it is to think and what it is to
perceive; for the actualities and actions are prior to the capacities in account. But if this is so, it is
necessary to have considered the correlative objects of the activity prior to the activities, having need
on account of the same cause first to make distinctions about those objects, for example what concerns
nourishment and the thing perceived and the thing thought. 29 (415a16-22)

There is a three-tiered prescription for the investigation into soul faculties descending

29

εἰ δὲ χρὴ λέγειν τί ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, οἷον τί τὸ νοητικὸν ἢ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἢ τὸ θρεπτικόν, πρότερον ἔτι
λεκτέον τί τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τί τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι· πρότεραι γάρ εἰσι τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ ἐνέργειαι καὶ αἱ πράξεις
κατὰ τὸν λόγον. εἰ δ’ οὕτως, τούτων δ’ ἔτι πρότερα τὰ ἀντικείμενα δεῖ τεθεωρηκέναι, περὶ ἐκείνων πρῶτον
ἂν δέοι διορίσαι διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν, οἷον περὶ τροφῆς καὶ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ νοητοῦ.
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from actuality to potentiality: first, articulate the object of the operation; second,
articulate the operation in terms of how the operation relates to its objects; finally,
articulate the capacity as the potentiality for the operation. Why articulation of the
objects of operations comes first is because operations are understood as activities for
engaging with certain objects in some characteristic manner. The object has priority
because engagement with the object is the end and that for the sake of which the
operation exists. Operations are defined in terms of their respective objects because the
characteristic manner in which an operation deals with its objects constitutes the
operation’s end. Engagement with an object is not merely instrumental and there need be
no end for an operation beyond its dealing with its object.30 Sight is for the sake of
perceiving the visible world and thinking activity is for the sake of knowing the
intelligible world. And plant life that engages only in metabolic activity has such activity
as its end.31 Once the operation is defined in terms of how it relates to its object, the
capacity for entering into the operation can be articulated (as potentiality is understood in
reference to actuality). Faculties of soul are understood as powers for entering into
characteristic kinds of relations (activities) with different kinds of objects.
Because Aristotle announces a set of objects proper to memory (ta mnêmoneuta,
449b9), it might seem that memory is an independent faculty of the soul with its own

30

See the opening lines of Meta i 1 stressing that sense perception is loved for its own sake.
One might object that nutritive activity does seem to have as its end something beyond the nutriment it
works on, namely, self-sustenance and reproduction. Surely nutritive activity works on food not merely for
the sake of working on food, but for the sake of maintaining the organism. But because nutritive activity
assimilates food to the sort of being the living body happens to be we can say by extension that dealing
with food qua assimilated is the end of nutritive activity. Digestion is a change from unlike to like. Food
when taken in is unlike the organism, but once worked on and digested, food becomes assimilated to the
being of the organism’s body. Thus, assimilation of food is, in a manner of speaking, an end in itself
because assimilation of food is nothing other than the preservation of an organism’s being. And such
preservation is not instrumental. See De anima 416a19-b25 for Aristotle’s treatment of digestion.
31
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proper objects, as food and things perceived and thought indicate distinct capacities of
soul. Yet Aristotle consistently refers to memory as a hexis (449b25, 49a30, 51a16, a23,
51b3) or affection (pathos, 449b5, b25), but never as a faculty or capacity (dunamis).
Even so, hexis can mean a disposition and first actuality and so hexis need not differ from
a capacity.32 Memory depends on phantasia for the preservation and presentation of
previous cognition through a special class of memory phantasmata called
mnêmoneumata (50b20-27; cf. 50a25-32) and the perception of phantasmata is an
activity of the primary power of sense (450a25-30, 50b11-20, b27ff.). Also, memory
discriminates past time and makes discriminations among things belonging to the past
and time is a common sensible for which the primary sense power is responsible to
discriminate (449b28-30, 50a19-22, 52b7-9). Insofar as memory discerns past temporal
aspect from present aspect and differences among past things, it is discriminatory. To the
extent that memory is a result of phantasia, it is presentative (it does not pick out or
discriminate among external objects, but merely becomes aware of internal phantasia
presentations). Discernment of an object (e.g., past from present time) need not indicate
a distinct faculty. For instance, there is no separate sense faculty for common sensibles
(De anima 425a13-27). Remembering discriminates past from present time, but
discrimination of past from present aspect does not mean that there must be special
faculty in its own right limited to the discernment of past from present time. The
discernment of time in all its phases belongs to the primary sense power. Nonetheless,
memory’s dependence on the primary sense power does not mean that memory is
reducible to the activity sense perception and Aristotle takes care to distinguish memory

32

On hexis as both activity and disposition for entering into an activity, see Metaphysics v 20.
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and remembering in actuality from sense perception, opinion, knowledge, and
supposition generally. Remembering is a perceiving, but it is a perceiving of a sort and
memory objects are sensible, but in a peculiar way.
The preceding considerations indicate that memory is a capacity distinguishable
in its own right, but which is one of many functions attributable to the primary sense
power. Psychological faculties are separate only insofar as they appear separate from one
another in different forms of life: plant life has only the nutritive capacity, animal life
both nutritive and perceptive capacity, and human life has nutritive, perceptive, and
intellectual capacities.33 Memory is an affection that follows from and is not present
without sense perception. Because memory is a function of the perceptive part of the
soul, Aristotle may emphasize memory as a hexis rather than a power (dunamis) in order
to avoid giving the impression that memory is an independent faculty. Memory is an
ability distinguishable in its own right, but falls short of being an independent faculty or
part of the soul.
Aristotle begins the investigation into memory by asking what sort are the
memorable objects (ta mnêmoneuta): “First, therefore, one must examine what sort are
the memorable objects” (449b9).34 Following De anima ii 4, we expect memory to
include a capacity for entering into an activity that deals with memorable objects in some
characteristic way, namely, remembering (to mnêmoneuein). The account contained in
449b9-23 leaves little doubt that Aristotle’s first order of business is to give an
explanation of the activity of remembering and the objects that remembering concerns.
In 449b9 Aristotle announces that he will explain what sort of things the memorables are.

33
34

See De anima ii 3.
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον ποῖά ἐστι τὰ μνημονευτά·
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Aristotle then proceeds to speak of (1) the activity of remembering and (2) what
remembering concerns, namely, the past (to genomenon, proteron). Immediately (b10)
he turns his attention to what remembering concerns, the past, and contrasts what
remembering takes up with that of perception, opinion and hope (b10-15). In b15
Aristotle tells us that, memory (mnêmê) is of the past, but straightaway explains memory
in terms of the activity of remembering, rather than retention (storage): “No one would
claim to remember (mnêmoneuein) what is present at the time when it is present” (b1516). Continuing in 449b18-22, Aristotle explains what happens when one recalls
(memnêtai, b20). And in b22-23, Aristotle emphasizes what happens when one
remembers according to actuality (hotan energei kata to mnêmoneuein, b22). As a hexis,
memory may refer to the capacity or to the activity, but we see Aristotle especially
emphasize the activity in the opening account. In total, there are four references
specifically to remembering (three infinitives and one verb) in 449b9-23, but only one to
memory, indicating that initially the primary concern is with memory activity rather than
with the capacity for entering into the activity. Final confirmation is provided by b24-25:
“Therefore, memory (mnêmê) is neither perception nor supposition, but is a hexis or
affection either one of these, whenever time has come to pass” (b24-25).35 Only after
explaining remembering according to actuality and the object to which remembering
relates, does Aristotle provide an initial definition of memory that covers both capacity
and activity by referring to memory as a hexis.
In the initial definition (b24-25), memory is called a hexis or an affection (pathos)
of prior sense perception or supposition. According to Metaphysics v 20, a hexis is

35

ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ μνήμη οὔτε αἴσθησις οὔτε ὑπόληψις, ἀλλὰ τούτων τινὸς ἕξις ἢ πάθος, ὅταν γένηται
χρόνος.
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ambiguous between (1) a shared activity of having between what has and what is had and
(2) a disposition and first actuality for entering into an activity. Memory is ambiguous
between the activity of engaging a memory (remembering in actuality) and the
dispositional retention for entering into the activity. Aristotle has a special term for
memory acts (remembrance, τὸ μνημονεύειν) but not for retention. Still, there is clear
textual evidence that he has something in mind analogous to retention.
For clearly it is necessary to conceive the sort of thing that comes about due to perception in the soul
and in the part of the body containing perception to be a life-drawing of a sort, the affection concerning
which we call memory the hexis: for the motion arising from the sense-affection (αἴσθημα) imprints an
impression of a sort, just like those do who affix seals with their signet rings. 36 (450a27-32)

Aristotle identifies memory as what holds on to and retains a likeness of past cognition
(perception), indicating a storage function for memory. A motion derived from sense
activity (aisthêma) in the percipient is imprinted into the organ of sense as a seal is
imprinted into wax.37 Aristotle begins his examination into memory with remembering
and not with retention because retention is for the sake of remembering and a means is
understood in reference to its end. Retention is conditionally necessary for remembering.
Before a memory is formed and retained, there is only an undeveloped capacity (first
potentiality) to remember something. Once retention is developed (first actuality), there
arises the further ability to remember (second actuality) what is retained. While retention
is a condition for remembering, retention and remembering are not the same. It is
possible retain a likeness of past cognition without currently remembering it. Because

36

δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι δεῖ νοῆσαι τοιοῦτον τὸ γιγνόμενον διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τῷ μορίῳ τοῦ
σώματος τῷ ἔχοντι αὐτήν—οἷον ζωγράφημά τι [τὸ πάθος] οὗ φαμεν τὴν ἕξιν μνήμην εἶναι· ἡ γὰρ
γιγνομένη κίνησις ἐνσημαίνεται οἷον τύπον τινὰ τοῦ αἰσθήματος, καθάπερ οἱ σφραγιζόμενοι τοῖς
δακτυλίοις.
37
The imagery of the seal being pushed into the wax not only recalls De anima ii 12, but indicates how the
cognition is preserved without its actuality (449b19). In De anima ii 12, the form is received without
matter. In De memoria the content of the cognition is received without the actuality: a likeness of actuality
without the actuality.
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there is retention without remembering, the latter is not reducible to the former or vice
versa. Hence, memory (mnêmê) may refer to retention (the capacity for remembering
past cognition) or to the activity of remembering (to mnêmoneuein) the past. Retention
and remembering relate to one another as do first and second actuality and both retention
and remembering relate to the same object, a phantasma that serves as a copy of past
perception. Remembering is an indirect perception of a sort of past cognition. Through
perception (of a sort) of a present proxy for past cognition, the soul remembers its past,
absent cognitions (ta mnêmoneuta). Retention is the holding on to such proxies, in virtue
of which remembering takes up past cognition indirectly.
The initial account of remembering in 449b9-23 is one of Aristotle’s
characteristically cryptic and compact initial overviews of the subject matter he intends to
explain: it summarizes all the central features of memory and remembering, but it is terse
and explains little when taken in isolation. The rest of chapter one of De memoria is
devoted to explaining, augmenting, and confirming the central features of memory and
remembering that Aristotle lays out at the beginning of the treatment. 449b9-23 has
several goals. (1) Identify the genus and differentia that pick out the object of
remembering. (2) Separate memory from perception and thinking and supposition and in
general (hupolêpsis, b24). (3) Indicate what it means to possess the object of memory
and gesture toward how it is possible to possesses it. (4) Explain what remembering
consists of in terms of its object and the temporal aspect that is recognized. In this
section, I argue that the genus of memory objects is ‘the thing that has happened’ (to
genomenon, b15) and the differentia is past cognition (cognition without the activity,
b19). To remember is to perceive the content of past cognition and to recognize (legein

47

tê psuchê, b22-3) that the content perceived has past aspect.
Aristotle works quickly to identify the memorables with what has come about (to
genomenon, 449b14), i.e., what has occurred in the past.
First, therefore, one ought to examine what sort the memorables (ta mnêmoneuta) are: for this often
deceives. For to remember (τὸ μνημονεύειν) what is to come (τὸ μέλλον) is not possible, but [what is
to come] is opinable and expectable…nor is [remembering] of what is present (τὸ παρόν), but
perception is: for through perception we recognize neither what is to come nor what has come about
(τὸ γενόμενον), but only what is present. But memory (μνήμη) is of what has come about. 38 (449b915)

The account assumes that there is a capacity for discriminating the past. Aristotle need
not offer proof that there is discrimination of things past from things present. There is
nothing more basic than the act of remembrance of the past from which remembrance of
the past can be demonstrated.39 The proof that there is discrimination of what has
occurred in the past is that we do it; the proof that there is discrimination of priority and
posterity in a temporal continuum is that we make these distinctions.40 In De memoria,
Aristotle nicely often employs εἴρηται or εἴπομεν (was said) to refer back to previous
thought in De memoria or in De anima, requiring the reader to remember or to recollect
and so perform what the treatise is about.41 Because discrimination of the past is evident,
there must be a capacity for it. Hence, the question is not whether memory is, but

38

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον ποῖά ἐστι τὰ μνημονευτά· πολλάκις γὰρ ἐξαπατᾷ τοῦτο. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ μέλλον
ἐνδέχεται μνημονεύειν, ἀλλ’ ἔστι δοξαστὸν καὶ ἐλπιστόν (εἴη δ’ ἂν καὶ ἐπιστήμη τις ἐλπιστική, καθάπερ
τινές φασι τὴν μαντικήν), οὔτε τοῦ παρόντος, ἀλλ’ αἴσθησις· ταύτῃ γὰρ οὔτε τὸ μέλλον οὔτε τὸ γενόμενον
γνωρίζομεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ παρὸν μόνον. ἡ δὲ μνήμη τοῦ γενομένου·
39
Cf. Physics ii 1, 193a3-8.
40
Consider Russell’s (1921) 159-160 five-minute hypothesis: “There is no logical impossibility in the
hypothesis that the world sprang into existence five minutes ago, exactly as it then was, with a population
that ‘remembered’ a wholly unreal past. There is no logically necessary connection between events at
different times; therefore, nothing that is happening now or will happen in the future can disprove the
hypothesis that the world began five minutes ago.” Because nothing a posteriori must be as it is, nothing
rules out the possibility that everything remembered before five minutes ago is false. Perhaps, then, it is
better to say that the proof that we experience ourselves remembering our actual past is that we have
experience of doing so. But Aristotle rejects such extreme modesty, for he distinguishes actual
remembering from false remembering (451a2-12, 452b23-29) in such a way as possibly to imply
disjunctivism in the case of memory acts.
41
εἴρηται: 449b26, 30, 51a15, 51b4-5, 52a12, 53a5. εἴπομεν: 450a20, 51b25.
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articulating accurately what it is and whether memory is something in its own right,
distinguishable from other capacities, i.e., distinguishable from perception and
supposition generally.
Aristotle distinguishes memory from opinion and sense perception by reference to
the range of temporal aspect these concern. Opinion (doxa) concerns the future,
perception the present, and memory the past. Memory does not cognize the future, but it
is possible to opine or expect the future. But certainly opinion concerns what is present
as well as what is past in addition to what is to come, so the argument must be that of the
possible modes of cognition only opinion and expectation concern the future. Because
remembering does not take up the future or the present, but only the past, remembering
cannot be opinion. Sense perception is a passive faculty unable to put itself to work and
is actualized by its objects.42 What has yet to occur, or what is absent because past,
cannot raise sense perception to actuality and so perception must concern only what is
present (b13-15). Hence, memory cannot be perception because memory deals with the
past, or, as Aristotle puts it, what has come about (to genomenon).43 Memory is of the
past (449b15, b27-28) and the memorable objects (ta mnmmoneuta) belong to the past,
not the present or future. The one who remembers in actuality perceives that the object
remembered is prior (proteron, 449b23, 50a21) to now and has already happened (to
genomenon).
Aristotle claims repeatedly that memory concerns what has come about (to

42

See DA ii 5, 416b33-17a20.
I translate to genomenon as “what has come about” or “the thing that has happened,” on the grounds that
(1) the article indicates that genomenon is to be treated as a substantive and (2) Aristotle, as I will argue
below, distinguishes between what is to genomenon and proteron (before, prior). Because what is past is
prior and before, to genomenon indicates something more than the past.
43
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genomenon, b15), and what is prior (proteron, b23), i.e., what occupies past temporal
position.44 Unlike nutritive capacity, sense perception, and thought, all of which are
defined in terms of their ability to relate to a particular class of objects, memory is
defined in terms of its relation to what occupies a particular aspect of time, namely, to
what occupies past temporal position. Why Aristotle approaches memory through past
temporal aspect is because memory relates to all past cognition, and so it cannot be
defined by any particular set of cognitive objects. The appropriate genus for memory
objects is thus a temporal aspect. Aristotle’s articulation of memory by way of the
temporal aspect attached to its objects is the first clue that memory is an affection of the
sense power (450a12-14, 51a14-17). Sense perception discriminates among proper
(restricted to a single type of sense), common (perceptible by all the senses), and
incidental sensibles (the being to which sensible quality happens to be attached) (DA ii
6). Time is a common sensible following on motion. Memory discerns what occupies
past time. Therefore, memory must be a function of the sense power. Consequently, the
order of priority of sensible objects is reversed for memory. The individual sense powers
are understood primarily in terms of their respective proper sensibles, whereas the
common and incidental sensibles are perceived (secondarily) through the proper. As
common to all the senses, the common sensibles do not mark out individual sense
powers. Memory is an ability of the sense power that discriminates what belongs to past
from present and future time. Because time is a common sensible, memory cannot be
defined in terms of any particular kind of sensible object. The primary or proper object
of memory is the common sensible of past time. And because human memory deals also
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449b15, b22-23, b27-28, 50a19-21, 51a2-5, a10-11.
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with past thought, memory cannot be marked off by its dealing with any particular class
of cognitional objects, either. Thus, what is decisive for memory is not that it relates to
this or that kind of object, but that it relates to its objects as belonging to the past.
Memory is directed to the past whether engaging with past sensibles or with past thought,
and so we recognize that discrimination of past temporal aspect distinguishes memory
more than a definite class of cognitional objects. Were memory to deal with a present
object, either sensible or intelligible according to actuality (449b21), the remembering
would be a perceiving or thinking.45
Having located the memorable objects in the temporal genus ‘what has come
about’ (to genomenon), Aristotle provides a non-temporal differentia. As to genomenon
indicates, memory is not just concerned with past temporal position (proteron), but also
with what occupies a past temporal position, namely, the things that have already
happened (ta genomena). But memory cannot concern all things past. Memory of what a
penguin was doing on Antarctica five million years ago is impossible. There could be
present evidence from which such past activity is inferred, but no memory because the
activity of the person or animal that remembers must figure into the object of memory.
The memorables are restricted to the past cognition of the remembering animal. “What
has come about” is the genus of memory objects and “cognition without the activity”
supplies the differentia.
But memory (μνήμη) concerns what has come about (τὸ γενόμενον). And no one would claim to
remember the present thing when it is present, for example, this white thing here when one sees it, and
not the contemplative object at the time when one happens to be contemplating or considering it. But
whenever one has the knowledge and the perception without their activity (ἄνευ τῶν ἔργων σχῇ), in
this way one recalls (μέμνηται) that one learned or contemplated the former, that one saw the latter or
heard it or something similar. For always whenever one is in actuality regarding remembrance (τὸ
45

Cf. R. A. H. King (2009) 28-9. We may gather that so-called procedural and semnatic memory need not
be about anything meant as past. Aristotle reserves the term memory (mnêmê) in the governing sense for
engaging one’s past.
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μνημονεύειν), in this way one says in soul that one heard, or perceived, or thought this before
(πρότερον).46 (449b15-23)

The object of remembrance is not restricted to the objects of past cognition, but to the
past cognition of some object, which Aristotle emphasizes repeatedly.47 One remembers
not merely some object or event, but that one saw or heard or considered something. The
implication of positing the remembering subject’s own past cognitive activity as the
object of remembrance is that remembering takes up or somehow indicates the mode of
cognition through which the one remembering formerly related to some object or event.
Such indication may be quite minimal or, in the case of humans, quite maximal and rich,
but whether minimal or rich, memory in the governing sense is episodic and
autobiographical according to Aristotle.48 In the case of humans, memory can be richly
episodic and autobiographical. Because the cognition remembered is past, it cannot be
occurring in actuality. Yet, because past cognition is the object of remembrance, it must
be present in some way. The past aspect of the memory object leads to the peculiar
condition that remembering takes up cognition that lacks present actualization. To recall

46

ἡ δὲ μνήμη τοῦ γενομένου· τὸ δὲ παρὸν ὅτε πάρεστιν, οἷον τοδὶ τὸ λευκὸν ὅτε ὁρᾷ, οὐδεὶς ἂν φαίη
μνημονεύειν, οὐδὲ τὸ θεωρούμενον, ὅτε θεωρῶν τυγχάνει καὶ νοῶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν αἰσθάνεσθαί φησι, τὸ δ’
ἐπίστασθαι μόνον· ὅταν δ’ ἄνευ τῶν ἔργων σχῇ τὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν, οὕτω μέμνηται [τὰς τοῦ
τριγώνου ὅτι δύο ὀρθαῖς ἴσαι], τὸ μὲν ὅτι ἔμαθεν ἢ ἐθεώρησεν, τὸ δὲ ὅτι ἤκουσεν ἢ εἶδεν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον· ἀεὶ
γὰρ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ κατὰ τὸ μνημονεύειν, οὕτως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λέγει, ὅτι πρότερον τοῦτο ἤκουσεν ἢ ᾔσθετο ἢ
ἐνόησεν.
47
Matters are complicated because Aristotle does not provide many or detailed, specific examples of
remembering. For language indicating that former cognition is the object of memory and remembering, see
449b20-21, b22-23, 50a19-21, 51a30-31, and 51b2-3. 450a27-32 suggests that what is stored in memory is
like a life-drawing of the asithêma. The aisthêma, predominately translated as ‘sense-impression’, is the
action produced in the percipient due to the sensible object during perception. 451a2-5 suggests that what
is stored in memory results from “the having perceived” (τὸ ᾐσθῆσθαι) and not merely from the object that
has been perceived. For language indicating that only the object of a former cognition serves as the object
of memory and remembering, see 450a12-13 (noêta, memory of intelligibles), 51b15-16 (idontes, but
without an article, so either “things seen” or “having-seens”), 52a3-4 (ta mathêmata, easy remembrance of
mathematical things), and 52b5 (onoma, remembering a name).
48
Julia Annas (1992) 297-311 argues that memory (mnêmê) refers to personal memory, recollection (to
anamimnêskesthai) to non-personal memory. Memory is certainly personal, but there is no reason to rule
out recollection of autobiographical memories.

52

(μέμνηται) is “to have (σχῇ) the perception or knowledge without their acts (ἔργων).” ‘To
possess X without the act’ is not a recurring formula in Aristotle’s writings. The phrase
captures how remembrance is about what is past and absent, but requires a present object.
The phrase is a prime example of one of Aristotle’s terse, but pregnant expressions and
captures three essential features of remembering. (1) It provides a non-circular
explanation of what it means to take up cognition as past. (2) It indicates that what the
soul gets ahold of when taking up its past cognition is the content of past cognition
without the actualization. (3) It shows that the activity of remembering is an indirect
perception of past cognition.
First, we should see that possession of cognition without its exercise is (1) a noncircular way to answer the question of what it means to possess past cognition. Having
(σχῇ) may mean retention of something or it may mean engagement with what one has.
In either case, “without the act” indicates past aspect without including temporal aspect in
the explanation. This is evident from the context. Aristotle moves from discussing
actually occurrent, exercised perception or contemplation (b15-18) to possessing the
perception or the knowledge without the activity when remembering (b19-20).
Remembering cannot take up perception or contemplation that is in actuality because this
would be to perceive or to contemplate, not to remember. Perception or knowledge
without the act taken up in remembering cannot refer to cognition with a present aspect,
that is, cognition currently actualized. Aristotle emphasizes that time must intervene
between actually occurrent cognition and any subsequent memory of that cognition
(449b25-26, 51a29-31). Nor can the perception and knowledge that remembrance
concerns refer to any future cognition; because future cognition has not occurred, there is
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none to take up. Cognition without the act indicates cognition that at some point was in
actuality (e.g., perception of some white thing or contemplation of a triangle), but which
when taken up in remembrance no longer possesses actuality. Such cognition is no
longer actual, but once was. Hence, possession of cognition without the act rules out
present and future cognition; only former cognition that is no longer active fits.
Eva Brann elegantly paraphrases cognition without the activity as “inactual”
cognition.49 The privative prefix in/ captures ‘without’ while ‘actual’ obviously
corresponds to ‘activity’. Following Brann’s lead, we can see that inactual is close to
inoperative: what was operative, but which no longer possesses operability. We can
compare inactual with the unactualized, where the prefix un- indicates unfulfilled
potential yet to be actualized. Inactual cognition, in contrast, is cognition that has run its
course. It has neither any potential for actualization left to fulfill nor any continuing
purchase on actualization. From here on, I use Brann’s translation to refer to cognition
without activity or exercise.
Possession of cognition as inactual answers the question of what it means to have
cognition as past, but remaining is the question of (2) what precisely the soul gets ahold
of by possessing inactual cognition. Clearly the soul does not take up its past cognition
in the flesh, as it were, which Aristotle stresses when pointing out that the cognition taken
up is without actuality. Not being actual, the cognition taken up is not simply the
original, past cognition, although the past cognition is precisely what the memory is
about. Aristotle summarizes the condition under which cognition is actualized in De
anima iii 4.
If what it is to think is like what it is to perceive, it would be a certain way of being affected by the
49

Eva Brann (1999) 52.

54

intelligible object or something similar. Therefore, it is necessary to be unaffected, but to be receptive
of the form and in potency be such as this but not be this, and similarly, as perception relates to the
sensibles, in this way the intellect relates to the intelligibles.50 (429a13-18)

Cognition is actualized when a faculty is moved by the activity of its correlative object.
Sense perception is passive insofar as it requires the presence of an external sensible, but
intellect can put itself to work after having acquired (i.e., learned) a universal. In either
case, the operation of the faculty is dependent on the presence of its correlative object
(whether the object is external to the soul in the case of perception or in the soul in the
case of intellection). In the absence of its object, a faculty cannot be raised to actuality.
To possess the perception of the white thing without the activity or the deduction from
premises (if scientific knowledge is the reference in 449b18-19) must mean, first of all,
that the correlative object of the faculty has departed or that the circumstances in which
the correlative object affected the faculty have departed (e.g., the object remains, but I
avert my attention to something else, occasioning a new perception). Second, Aristotle
must mean that although the object or circumstances of the engagement with the object
are departed, the animal or human still somehow possesses the cognition of the object
and the object cognized. The meaning cannot be that the one remembering possesses
perception or contemplation without a correlative object of the perception or thinking.
Cognition without an object is impossible or amounts to cognition according to
potentiality, but the possession of inactual cognition cannot mean that the remembering
subject takes up some cognition of X in potentiality. Were remembrance the possession
of some cognition merely in potentiality, memory would have no object at all. To
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εἰ δή ἐστι τὸ νοεῖν ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἢ πάσχειν τι ἂν εἴη ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον.
ἀπαθὲς ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι, δεκτικὸν δὲ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ δυνάμει τοιοῦτον ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁμοίως ἔχειν, ὥσπερ
τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητά, οὕτω τὸν νοῦν πρὸς τὰ νοητά.
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possess inactual cognition must mean to possess somehow the content of the past
cognition separated from the original conditions and object that occasioned the actuality
of the original cognition.
Aristotle does not mention in 449b9-23 how it is possible to possess cognition
without the actuality. The goal is to give an initial explanation of what the objects of
remembrance are and what remembrance and memory are, not how remembrance and
memory are possible. Possession of inactual cognition turns out to be possession of a
phantasma that functions as a likeness of former cognition (ζωγράφημα τοῦ αἰσθήματος,
450a29-32; εἰκών, 450b25-27).51 The features that enable a phantasma to function as a
likeness of past cognition are of great interest. “Having cognition without the activity”
(449b19) should be compared to 450b16-20: “The one who is at work with memory
beholds this [present] affection [i.e., a phantasma] and perceives this. So how thus does
one remember what is not present? For such would be to see and hear what is not
present.”52 To perceive what is not present is to have a hold of some cognition without
the activity, for, as we have seen, without activity indicates that the objects and
conditions necessary for the actualization of perception are not present. The phantasma
is a vehicle by which a higher level reality (cognition according to actuality) appears to
the one who remembers in a lower level of reality (the phantasma appearance that serves
as the likeness of the former, actualized cognition).
Aristotle does not provide a detailed description of what inactual cognition
contains (by contains, I mean the extent to which and how much of the original cognition
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Remembering is an indirect perception of the past by way of phantasmata.
ὁ γὰρ ἐνεργῶν τῇ μνήμῃ θεωρεῖ τὸ πάθος τοῦτο καὶ αἰσθάνεται τούτου. πῶς οὖν τὸ μὴ παρὸν
μνημονεύσει; εἴη γὰρ ἂν καὶ ὁρᾶν τὸ μὴ παρὸν καὶ ἀκούειν.
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is taken up: what features and how rich or how minimal). We are never given more than
the most minimal of descriptions of what it is like to remember. The one who remembers
in actuality asserts in soul that what is remembered was cognized before (449b22-23).53
Remembering is like seeing or hearing what is not present (450b19-20). Remembering is
like (ὥσπερ) viewing a painting as likeness of something previously seen (450b29-31).
Possession of inactual cognition is identified only generally with having remembered that
something was considered or perceived (449b20-23, 50a19-21, 51a30-31). Why
Aristotle says little is probably in order to allow for a broad range of memorable objects.
Remembering can be rich and “relive” the content of past cognitions in some detail. For
instance, one remembers seeing a particular scene from an act in a play, recalling seeing
the movements of the actors on stage and the backsides of heads in the audience from a
certain point of view. Or remembering can be quite minimal and merely of the fact that
such and such was cognized: “I was in the audience and saw the scene.” One remembers
the fact that one saw such and such a scene, but without recalling the speeches, and
movements, and colors, etc. If merely the fact of having seen or heard, then Aristotle can
account for memory that is focused more on objects and not so much on the cognition of
objects. Suppose one remembers the fact that the red bike was leaned on the side of the
house. The memory that the bike was red and that the bike was leaned on the side of the
house is necessarily a memory that the bike was seen as opposed to heard, but focus is on
the bike rather than the seeing.
Some will dispute my reading that the differentia marking out the memorable
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The quote precedes Aristotle’s announcement that beasts with a sense of time remember in 449b28-30.
After b28-30, Aristotle speaks of perceiving (rather than saying) that something was cognized before
(450a19-21).
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object from other species within the genus “what has come before” is restricted to past
cognition of objects or events.54 Surely remembering is often primarily focused merely
on X and not the mode of cognition through which X was previously encountered.
Whether it is right to restrict the object of remembering to the past cognition of X,
Aristotle’s considered view is that memory is never merely of a past object.55 Aristotle is
committed to the view that all memory is in some way of past cognitive engagements
with object or events. In other words, that which Aristotle calls mnêmê is episodic
memory in the governing sense. I believe that 449b15-23 and the frequency of memory
of past cognition of X talk versus memory of object X talk confirms that Aristotle’s
considered view is that the governing sense of memory object is past cognition of X.
And no one would claim to remember what is present when it is present, for example, this white thing
here when one sees it, and not the contemplative object at the time when one happens to be
contemplating or considering it. But whenever one has the knowledge and the perception without their
activity, in this way one recalls that one learned or contemplated the one thing, but that one saw the
latter or heard another thing or something similar. For always whenever one is in actuality regarding
remembrance, in this way one says in soul that one heard, or perceived, or thought this before. 56
(449b15-23)

No one would claim to remember the white thing at hand or the object of contemplation
at the time it is contemplated, but only to perceive and know these (449b15-17). Richard
Sorabji (2002, 68) says that this leads us to expect an explanation of the conditions under
which we remember the white thing or the thing learnt, but I do not see that this is the
obvious inference and, as Sorabji himself notes, remembrance of thing X is not what
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See Richard Sorabji (2004) 68 and David Bloch (2007) 83.
Aristotle does not emphasize a perception of time in connection to the objects of recollection (τὸ
ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι). If I can remember the first letter of someone’s name, time sense may not so much enter
into the recollection of the rest of the name.
56
τὸ δὲ παρὸν ὅτε πάρεστιν, οἷον τοδὶ τὸ λευκὸν ὅτε ὁρᾷ, οὐδεὶς ἂν φαίη μνημονεύειν, οὐδὲ τὸ
θεωρούμενον, ὅτε θεωρῶν τυγχάνει καὶ νοῶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν αἰσθάνεσθαί φησι, τὸ δ’ ἐπίστασθαι μόνον·
ὅταν δ’ ἄνευ τῶν ἔργων σχῇ τὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν, οὕτω μέμνηται [τὰς τοῦ τριγώνου ὅτι δύο
ὀρθαῖς ἴσαι], τὸ μὲν ὅτι ἔμαθεν ἢ ἐθεώρησεν, τὸ δὲ ὅτι ἤκουσεν ἢ εἶδεν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον· ἀεὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ
κατὰ τὸ μνημονεύειν, οὕτως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λέγει, ὅτι πρότερον τοῦτο ἤκουσεν ἢ ᾔσθετο ἢ ἐνόησεν.
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Aristotle goes on to show. In 449b15-17, Aristotle is not providing a positive explanation
of what the object of memory is, but a negative explanation of why the memory object is
not a thing present at hand, i.e., not the thing perceived or contemplated, and, hence,
explaining why remembering is not perception or knowledge. So 449b15-17 does not
imply that remembrance is merely of object X; it only tells us that remembrance cannot
be identified with perception or supposition. In b18 (“But whenever one has…”), where
Aristotle begins to introduce what remembering according to actuality is, he does not say
it involves the possession of object X without the act, but the possession of the cognition
(knowledge or perception) of an object without the act. A prior thought or sense
perception retained may be past only because it has been cognized before; without a
sense that what is retained was cognized before, the matter retained will not be perceived
as something past. Subsequently, Aristotle doubles (449b21-4) and triples down
(450a19-22), repeating that one remembers a mode of cognizing some object or event and
not merely some past object. All three instances (449b18, b21-4, 50a19-22) are temporal
clauses that function effectively as present general conditionals that express a general rule
(see ‘always’, aiei, in b21-4 and 50a19-22). Only once in the first chapter in which the
focus is devoted to memory and remembrance does Aristotle mention memory merely of
some object X where he mentions memory of the intelligibles (50a12,), but this is quickly
qualified by 50a19-22. It is not until the second chapter of De memoria devoted to
recollection (anamnesis) that Aristotle begins to mention with any frequency the recall of
objects without connection to past cognition (e.g., a name, 52b5). Recollection need not
involve such a strong connection to time. In the discussion devoted to memory and
remembering, the emphasis is exclusively on past cognition, save for the lone mention of
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memory of intelligibles in 50a12.
One reason why Aristotle limits memory objects to past cognition of objects is his
commitment that beasts with a sense of time have memory. Were the beasts to remember
objects too much divorced from the cognition through which they were cognized, the
beasts might get dangerously close to having universals in their souls.57 If a lion
remembers a gazelle, but not as something it saw or smelled or bit, then the lion may
seem to retain certain features of a gazelle in its soul without any temporal location. If
untethered to any prior cognition or sense of past time, the features retained lose much of
their particularity and may get close to resembling a universal notion of a gazelle.
Another reason why Aristotle limits memory objects to past cognition of objects
and events is because Aristotle understands memory to be a capacity for picking out what
occupies a past temporal position (to genomenon). Recalling an object completely
divorced from any mode of cognition through which the soul became acquainted with it
fails to grasp any sense of past aspect. Suppose we recall or bring to mind a telephone
number or a name. Surely we memorized the number or heard it or learned it or
something of the like previously or else we would not have present retention of the
number nor be able to call it to mind now. But suppose we just recall the number (for
whatever reason) alone by itself, isolated from any cognition through which we were
previously engaged with the number. For example, we recall our debit PIN at the grocery
store in order to enter the number into the payment terminal. If the PIN is recalled as
completely divorced from any past cognition of it, why is the recall in this instance an
instance of remembering something past? The PIN number is at present still our pin
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number. It is not an old, disused PIN number. All we have done is to call to mind a
number that we have retained. There is no past aspect attached to the PIN number when
this is recalled without connection to any previous thinking of it. According to Aristotle,
because the number as thought of is not perceived as a past object, it cannot serve as an
object of memory. In my example, one calls something to mind, but is not remembering
in the Aristotelian sense. It does not matter that the present calling to mind of the object
is made possible due to past cognitive engagement with the object, for that past encounter
is not what we call to mind when we call to mind the PIN number by itself, or the name
by itself, or whatever object by itself. We simply call to mind the object. In contrast, if
we call to mind a name or number or object with the awareness that we learned it
previously, however minimal or rich be the awareness of the prior engagement may be,
now, under this condition, there is awareness of past aspect attached to the object. (But
suppose I recall that Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 49 BC. Certainly this thought is
about an event that belongs to the past. But the thought is of an historical fact and the
fact itself has no past aspect unless it is attached to my having learned it or thought it
before, etc.)
Aristotle’s conception of time may also explain his commitment to including the
remembering subject’s own past cognitive activity in the memorable object. Time is a
number of the before and after connected to change (see Physics 219a34-b2). Where
there is no perception of change, there is no perception time. Hence, in order for an
object to be remembered as belonging to the rememberer’s past, the object must be
conceived as attached to a continuum of motions and it is the rememberer’s past
cognitive activity that supplies the needed motion. If an object of prior cognition is
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thought of by itself separately from any cognition through which it was engaged, the
object will be temporally positionless. The object will not be conceived as belonging to
any continuum of motions other than the present conception of it. It is our own cognitive
activity that provides the motion to which objects of cognition can be in relation to before
and after. Hence, memory merely of objects perceived rather than the perception of the
object would rule out memory of things as past. We should see that objects or events are
perceivable as possessing past aspect only when conjoined in awareness to some sense of
the former cognition through which they were engaged. To sum up the argument:
P1 Objects or events cannot be perceived with past aspect unless perceived as attached to past
cognition.
P2 Recognition of past aspect is a necessary condition of what Aristotle calls remembering.
 Therefore, objects thought of separated completely from past cognition cannot be objects of
memory.

I think that these textual and argumentative points show that the burden falls harder on
those who deny that Aristotle requires that past cognition be included in the memory
object than those who affirm it.
Any nervousness occasioned by Aristotle’s commitment to the inclusion of a past
cognition of X in memory objects should be assuaged by the realization that awareness of
past cognitive encounters in memory need not be at all rich or robust. All Aristotle need
be read as saying is that at least some awareness of a connection between past cognition
and object is necessary. Probably anything more than complete unawareness of past
cognition meets the requirement. When remembering, one remembers that (hoti, ὅτι) one
cognized such and such (449b23; 50a21). Hoti may indicate the fact of having cognized
X or a rich, detailed “replaying” or “reliving” of the past encounter of X, or anything
between. Because Aristotle conceives of the thinking and perceiving of objects as
occurring through the reception of the intelligible and perceptible forms of the object
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cognized, it is not easy to untangle the form received (the object cognized) from the
reception of the form (the cognition of the object). The activity of cognition and the
activity of the form on the faculty of cognition are not separable (see De anima 425b2526a9). For this reason, it will not be easy to untangle the remembrance of X from the
remembrance of the cognition of X. Again, suppose a memory is of a red bicycle leaned
against the house. Even if the past seeing is not thematized or the focus of the memory,
remembering the red bicycle is obviously something that we remember, even if the
seeing is not so much the focus of the memory. If hoti indicates minimally only the fact
of having seen something previously, remembering that the bicycle was red is not easy to
untangle from remembering the fact that the bicycle was obviously seen. Unless the
former seeing is in the background, the needed past aspect will not enter in. Richness of
memory depends on where our focus is directed, on the former cognition of X or on X
formerly cognized.
The chapter devoted to recollection in De memoria goes beyond the aim of this
dissertation, but it will be useful briefly to consider why examples seemingly devoted to
remembering objects with less or no connection to past time are confined to the
discussion of recollection. Recollection is a search initiated to call to mind a memory,
especially when the memory is not immediately accessible for recall. Recollection is
both the choice to recall something and the voluntary search initiated to uncover lost
memories. If we cannot recall a number or a name, we can initiate a search to recapture
the object we wish to bring to mind. Here the focus is exclusively on the object and not
the cognition. For example, when trying to remember the name of a face we do
remember seeing, we hunt for the associated name. In this case it looks as if the memory
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we uncover is more so of the object than the cognition of it. But I hasten to point out that
in this case recollection does not necessarily attempt to recall a lost name or number as
something past and this is precisely because the focus is not on the past cognition, but
just the object (so the successful recollection of X rather than the cognition of X ends in
proposition memory). Of course, we can recollect things as past, such as where we put
our car keys, where what is wished for is not the past cognition of the car keys, but the
last place they occupied, which we cannot now remember. (Even here, there is subtle
connection to cognition: we wish for the place where we put the keys and the putting
surely has minimal connection to the most recent perception of the keys.)
While the focus of memory often emphasizes the past X more than the past
cognition of X, we should see that the primary, governing object of memory is the past
cognition of X because remembering is about the past. In a secondary, derivative way,
we remember X as past because it was previously cognized, e.g., what someone’s name
was, or a telephone number, or the view of the Matterhorn from the south, or that the
bicycle against the house was red. Another way to view the emphasis on past cognition
of objects rather than past objects is as a presentation of the primary governing instance
of remembering, rather than a general definition meant to cover all remembering.
Although the context is practical rather than natural, Aristotle’s treatment of courage in
Nicomachean Ethics iii 5 is helpful. Courage in the most governing sense is facing a
noble death on the battlefield. Courage can manifest itself in lesser arenas, but the
genuine possession of courage is measured by the disposition one has toward death on the
battlefield. If one is afraid to die on the battlefield, when dying on the battlefield would
be a noble thing to do, then one does not have courage in the genuine sense, even if
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disdainful of danger in other arenas. In a similar way, perhaps not all memory is
thematically directed at the past mode of cognition through which an object was engaged,
but if an animal lacks the ability to perceive a past object as the past object of its own
cognition, then the animal will not be able to remember past objects either. The
“governing arena” and standard of genuine memory is perception of past cognition, but
memory is perhaps operable with more or less sense of past time.
Because Aristotle has the remembering subject’s past cognition as the object of
memory, Aristotle is a realist when it comes to memory. Memory (and remembrance), in
the genuine sense, gets at the remembering subject’s actual past. This fits with
Aristotle’s realism concerning sense perception. Sense perception is a capacity for taking
on the actuality of sensible objects insofar as they are sensible and memory is retention
and perception of that past activity. There is false remembrance and misremembering
(451a8-12, 52b23-29), but remembering according to actuality is an engagement with
one’s past cognitive activity. If it was not thought or sensed, it cannot be remembered
(memory arises only subsequent to sense perception or supposition of some sort).
449b18-23 The initial account of remembering.
I have argued that the memorable object is the remembering subject’s own past
cognitive activity. Remembrance takes up past cognition indirectly through the
possession of inactual cognition. Inactual cognition consists of the content of past
cognition separated from the conditions that occasioned the actuality of the past
cognition. How it is possible to have the content of previous cognition without the
actuality is through the presence of phantasmata in the soul-body composite that function
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as likenesses of past cognition. It is now possible to turn toward Aristotle’s initial
account of remembering.

Recall versus remembrance.
Understanding Aristotle’s account of remembering is complicated by the
appearance in De memoria of two different verbs related to memory, μεμνῆσθαι (recall)
and μνημονεύειν (remembrance). My position is that μεμνῆσθαι and μνημονεύειν refer
to distinguishable operations. Μέμνησθαι (recall) indicates the act of bringing to mind a
memory in the sense of calling it to mind, as opposed to having in mind a memory as
result of having already called it to mind. I argue that recall is the action in virtue of
which there is a transition from remembering in potentiality to remembering in actuality.
David Bloch rightly observes that μέμνησθαι appears only once in the first
chapter (449b20) in which μνήμη (memory) is the principle concern, while μνημονεύειν
(to remember) appears twelve times.58 Except for the lone appearance of μέμνησθαι in
449b20, μνημονεύειν is used exclusively as the verb for remembering in chapter one and
is the only verb that Aristotle explicitly connects to memory (μνήμη). Given the
exclusive correspondence of the verb μνημονεύειν to memory, we may ask why Aristotle
emphasizes that it is necessary to explain both memory and remembrance (μνήμη καὶ τὸ
μνημονεύειν, 449b4, 50a14, 53b8-9) in De memoria. Aristotle uses both the articular
infinitive and the noun interchangeably to refer to cognitive powers. For example, τὸ
αἰσθάνεσθαι and αἴσθησις both refer to perception. However, τὸ αισθάνεσθαι (the
articular infinitive) seems restricted to acts of perception, while αἴσθησις (the noun) has a

58

David Bloch (2007) 94. The following analysis of the text is my own. For Bloch’s, see op. cit. 99-109.
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broader range of usage. Depending on the context, perception (αἴσθησις) may refer to the
power, the act, the organ, or the organ-power composite. It is extremely rare for Aristotle
to join the noun and the articular infinitive with the conjunctive (καί) in a single phrase
when referring to a cognitive power as he does in the first line of De memoria (449b4)
and in the final, considered definition of memory in 451a14-16. Generally, Aristotle
picks either the noun or the articular infinitive.59 If the relation of τὸ αισθάνεσθαι to
αἴσθησις holds for μνήμη (memory) and τὸ μνημονεύειν (remembrance), then τὸ
μνημονεύειν refers to memory acts, while μνήμη may refer to an act (‘in operation with
memory’ [ἐνεργῇ τῇ μνήμῃ], 450a19), a disposition for entering into the operation
(449b25, 50a30, 51a16), and possibly the bodily arrangement (disposition) that underlies
the capacity for the act (450a27-b11). Yet, if the term μνήμη can mean the act of
remembrance (as αἴσθησις can mean the act of perception), it is unclear why Aristotle
should stress that it is necessary to explain both memory and remembrance; furthermore,
Aristotle says that both memory and remembrance are a hexis of the same thing, namely,
a phantasma (451b14-16). Why Aristotle may feel the need to speak of memory and
remembrance (μνήμη καὶ τὸ μνημονεύειν) is because, unlike with the noun αἴσθησις,
there are two verbs, not one, that correspond with the noun μνήμη: μνημονεύειν and
μεμνῆσθαι. The usage of μεμνῆσθαι and μνημονεύειν overlaps to a tremendous extent.
Both are used to mean to recall, to remember, to bring to mind, to call to mind, to remind,
etc. Overlap in usage is not surprising because both terms are built from the root μνα/
that forms nouns, adjectives, and verbs of memory. Perhaps mindful of the overlap,
Aristotle consistently emphasizes the correspondence of μνημονεύειν to memory
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There are no occurrences in De anima or De sensu, for instance. For one example, see Meta 1074b31: τὸ
νοεῖν καὶ ἡ νόησις.
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(μνήμη), but never conjoins μεμνῆσθαι to memory. Another indication of a difference in
meaning is that Aristotle goes out of his way to contrast recollection (ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι)
with remembrance (μνημονεύειν), but never directly contrasts recollection with
μέμνησθαι. And whereas μέμνησθαι figures quite prominently into Aristotle’s
explanation of the recollective process, μνημονεύειν is never invoked to explain how
recollection works. Finally, the definition of memory (and remembrance) and μέμνησθαι
appear to differ. Memory is a hexis of phantasmata that serve as likenesses of past
cognition (451a14-16) while μέμνησθαι is an inner moving power (δύναμιν τὴν
κινοῦσαν) of phantasmata (452a10-12). Still, because hexis can refer to a disposition
(first actuality) in virtue of which its possessor enters into an activity (second actuality),
the categorization of μέμνησθαι as capacity (dunamis) does not rule out its identification
with memory.
Nevertheless, it looks like Aristotle intends a distinction between μεμνῆσθαι and
μνημονεύειν. Lexically, both μεμνῆσθαι and μνημονεύειν can be used to indicate either
(1) the act of calling to mind a memory so as to commence remembering it or (2) the
engagement with a memory that results from having called it to mind. I find no evidence
in chapter one of De memoria that Aristotle ever refers to memory or remembrance as an
activity whereby a memory is brought to mind so as to be remembered in the first place.
The entire focus is on how it is possible to relate to a phantasma as representing
something past, not on how a phantasma is brought to presence. There is no discussion
in chapter one of how a phantasma is brought to mind in the first place.60 Aristotle speaks
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Cf. David Bloch (2007) 96: “From a present-day point of view, bringing forward the images is also
remembering (and this is true for ordinary Greek parlance), but from Aristotle’s point of view it is not,
since the definition of remembering does not involve bringing forth the internal objects.” I concur with
Bloch that for Aristotle remembrance (μνημονεύειν) does not include an activity of recalling something to
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of remembrance and memory according to actuality (449b22, 50a19, 50b17-18, 52b26),
but the activity described is a kind of perceiving of a phantasma, not a process or action
in virtue of which the phantasma comes to be perceived. Remembrance (μνημονεύειν) is
used exclusively to indicate perception (of a sort) of a phantasma (450a21, b14-20, 28).
The nearest Aristotle comes to describing an activity of bringing a memory to mind in
chapter one is 450b27-51a2, but there the discussion concerns how it is possible for the
soul to relate to a phantasma as a presentation of the remembering subject’s past; it is not
a discussion of how the soul comes to have a memory phantasma in view in the first
place. Here is the passage in which Aristotle first introduces remembering according to
actuality and recall.
No one would claim to remember (μνημονεύειν) the present thing (τὸ παρόν) when it is present (ὅτε
πάρεστιν), such as this white thing here when one sees it, and not the contemplative object when one
happens to be contemplating and considering it; rather one claims only to perceive the former and to
know the latter. But whenever one has the the knowledge and the perception without their activity,
then one recalls (μέμνηται), in the one case that one learned or contemplated, in the other case that one
heard or saw or some such thing. For always whenever one is in actuality regarding remembrance
(ἐνεργῇ κατὰ τὸ μνημονεύειν), then one says in soul that previously one heard or perceived or
considered this.61 (449b15-23)

No one would claim to remember a present thing when it is present. The present thing
(τὸ παρόν) refers to whatever is present as a possible object of cognition. “When it is
present” (ὅτε πάρεστιν) means that the thing present is present to cognition in actuality.
Why Aristotle qualifies “the present thing” (τὸ παρόν) with the temporal restriction
“when it is present” (ὅτε πάρεστιν) is because a possible object of cognition may exist

mind, but I do not think this denial can be inferred from the definition of memory. Such an inference
depends on accepting that ἕξις is not a developed capacity or second potentiality for entering into an
activity, which I do not.
61
τὸ δὲ παρὸν ὅτε πάρεστιν, οἷον τοδὶ τὸ λευκὸν ὅτε ὁρᾷ, οὐδεὶς ἂν φαίη μνημονεύειν, οὐδὲ τὸ
θεωρούμενον, ὅτε θεωρῶν τυγχάνει καὶ νοῶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν αἰσθάνεσθαί φησι, τὸ δ’ ἐπίστασθαι μόνον·
ὅταν δ’ ἄνευ τῶν ἔργων σχῇ τὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν, οὕτω μέμνηται [τὰς τοῦ τριγώνου ὅτι δύο
ὀρθαῖς ἴσαι], τὸ μὲν ὅτι ἔμαθεν ἢ ἐθεώρησεν, τὸ δὲ ὅτι ἤκουσεν ἢ εἶδεν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον· ἀεὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ
κατὰ τὸ μνημονεύειν, οὕτως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λέγει, ὅτι πρότερον τοῦτο ἤκουσεν ἢ ᾔσθετο ἢ ἐνόησεν.
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without being present for the faculty of cognition. An object may be sensible in
potentiality, e.g., a white object is white whether perceived or not, but is sensible in
actuality only while being perceived in actuality (see De anima iii 2, 426a20-27).
Because memory is about what is past (ἡ δὲ μνήμη τοῦ γενομένου, 449b15) and, hence,
absent (τοῦ δὲ πράγματος ἀπόντος μνημονεύεται, 450a26-27), “the thing present when it
is present” cannot be an object of remembrance. The point of the phrase“the thing
present when it is present” cannot be merely that in remembrance one does not perceive
the object remembered as being actually present at hand. When in actuality with
phantasia, one does not perceive what the object of phantasia represents to be actually
present at hand, either; in playful imagination, the imagining subject supposes that the act
of imagining is real, but not what the act of imagining presents.62 Recognition that the
object before the mind is not actually present does not distinguish remembrance from
phantasia. Just as one perceiving or supposing X in actuality would not claim to be
remembering X, so no one would claim to be remembering the object of fantasy at the
time when one is fantasizing it. Rather, the point must be that in remembrance, one does
not perceive what is remembered to be something that belongs to the present; thus, when
active regarding remembrance one asserts in soul of the memorable object that one
perceived or considered it before (πρότερον). In phantasia, the object fantasized is
present and taken to belong to the present even if one does not treat what the fantasized
object is about as something actually present. In remembrance, the memory is present,
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See De anima iii 3, 427b21-24: “Further, whenever we opine that something is terrible or frightful,
straightaway we undergo the corresponding feeling, and it would be similar with something daring. But
with phantasia we are in the same condition as if viewing terrible or daring things in a painting.” ἔτι δὲ
ὅταν μὲν δοξάσωμεν δεινόν τι ἢ φοβερόν, εὐθὺς συμπάσχομεν, ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν θαρραλέον· κατὰ δὲ τὴν
φαντασίαν ὡσαύτως ἔχομεν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ θεώμενοι ἐν γραφῇ τὰ δεινὰ ἢ θαρραλέα.
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but what the memory concerns is not considered to belong to the present nor actually to
be present.
Having the knowledge or perception without the activity (ἄνευ τῶν ἔργων σχῇ τὴν
ἐπιστήμην καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν, 449b19) is in opposition to what is present when it is present
(τὸ δὲ παρὸν ὅτε πάρεστιν, 449b15). To have cognition without the activity may appear
contradictory or paradoxical; for without actuality, there is no cognition to possess. But it
will turn out that what one possesses is a phantasma that represents a former cognition
(450a25-32). A phantasma is present to the one who remembers, but the subject matter
that the phantasma represents is not present in actuality (rather, the subject matter is
present, but in the form of a representation). Because the memory phantasma represents
past cognition, the phantasma can move its possessor to be put in mind of the possessor’s
absent past. Recall (μεμνῆσθαι) is a power to set in motion phantasmata such that one is
subsequently moved by the phantasmata set in motion.
But whenever one has (σχῇ) the the knowledge and the perception without their activity, then one
recalls (μέμνηται), in the one case that one learned or contemplated, in the other case that one heard or
saw or some such thing.63 (449b18-21)
For recall (τὸ μεμνῆσθαι) is the moving power present within, and this so as to be moved (κινηθῆναι)
by oneself, namely, by those motions (κινήσεων) which one possesses (ἔχει), as was said.64 (452a1012)

In both passages, possession (ἔχει, 452a12; σχῇ, 449b19) of a phantasma is a condition
for the realization of recall. In neither case is the meaning of “has” (ἔχει) spelled out.
“Has” could indicate retention, the persistence of a phantasma in the soul-body
composite. Alternately, “has” could mean some kind of active, cognitive relation with
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ὅταν δ’ ἄνευ τῶν ἔργων σχῇ τὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν, οὕτω μέμνηται [τὰς τοῦ τριγώνου ὅτι δύο
ὀρθαῖς ἴσαι], τὸ μὲν ὅτι ἔμαθεν ἢ ἐθεώρησεν, τὸ δὲ ὅτι ἤκουσεν ἢ εἶδεν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον·
64
τὸ γὰρ μεμνῆσθαι ἐστι τὸ ἐνεῖναι δύναμιν τὴν κινοῦσαν· τοῦτο δέ, ὥστ’ ἐξ αὑτοῦ καὶ ὧν κινήσεων
κινηθῆναι, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. I read καί in the last sentence as epexegetical.

71

the phantasma that is retained. Regarding 452a10-12, it is possible to set in motion and
in turn to be moved only by phantasmata that one retains. If there are no phantasmata
persisting in the soul-body composite, there can be neither a setting in motion of them,
nor any being moved by them.65 Alternately, it is when one is cognitively engaged with a
phantasma, and not merely retaining it, that one will take up what the phantasma
represents (as illustrated by 452a13-16) or be moved to take up a phantasma next in
association with the phantasma currently engaged (as 451b25-30 explains).
The passage at 449b18-22 differs from 452a10-12 in two key aspects. First, an
object of recall is given (one recalls that one learned or contemplated or heard or saw X),
although the relation of recall and the object is not spelled out. Second, the ὅταν
(whenever) and οὕτω (then) in 449b18-22 effectively function as markers for the protasis
and apodosis of a present general conditional.66 Whenever one has the knowledge and the
perception without their activity, then (under this condition) one recalls that one learned
or heard. Again, “has” could refer to retention or active engagement. Whenever one
retains a phantasma of the knowledge or the perception, then (given that one retains such
a phantasma) one recalls that one learned or heard. If retention (storage) is the right
reading, then the sense of the conditional is that one recalls under the condition that one
retains a phantasma that represents some former cognition (“whenever” would then mean
something like, ‘for as long as’.) Because retention is different from the engagement of
what is retained, the retention interpretation emphasizes a necessary condition for the
possibility of recall. As a general truth, one recalls only those things of which one retains

65

This is, I believe, the point of the statement in 452a6-7: if there is no phantasma representing the lost
item one wishes to recollect, nor any succession of phantasmata in association with each other and the lost
item, then one will no longer recall (οὐκέτι μέμνηται). Cf. J. I. Beare (1908) 451b5-10 n.1.
66
Observe that σχῇ must be a gnomic aorist, emphasizing a general truth.
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a phantasma. Alternately, “has” could mean some kind of active engagement with the
phantasma. If “has” means cognitive engagement with an object, then we are being told
something about the activity of recall and not only a condition necessary for its
possibility: if one engages somehow with former cognition without its activity, then
under this condition one will be recalling in actuality what the phantasma represents.
Above I urge that 450a10-1267 suggests that recall is a power to be put in mind of
what a phantasma represents as a result of having set in motion other associated
phantasmata. However, in 449b18-23, no mention is made of any associated
phantasmata and this is one reason why it is difficult to see a difference in meaning
between recall (μεμνῆσθαι) and remembrance (μνημονεύειν) in 449b18-23. The present
general condition in b18-22 is followed by another present general condition in b22-23
that mentions remembrance (μνημονεύειν) rather than recall (μεμνῆσθαι).
But whenever one has the knowledge and the perception without their activity, then one recalls
(μέμνηται), in the one case that one learned or contemplated, in the other case that one heard or saw or
some such thing. For (γάρ) always whenever one is in actuality regarding remembrance (ἐνεργῇ κατὰ
τὸ μνημονεύειν), then one says in soul that previously this (τοῦτο) one heard or perceived or
considered.68 (449b18-23)

The second conditional (b22-23), as γάρ (“for”) indicates, is introduced to justify
something about the first (b18-22). That there is recall that one did X whenever one
possesses X without the activity must be so because (γάρ) whenever one is remembering
in actuality, then one recognizes (says in soul) that one previously perceived or
considered this previously. What is the second conditional justifying or explaining about
the first? The two conditionals combine to form the following argument. When one is
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For recall (τὸ μεμνῆσθαι) is the moving power present within, and this so as to be moved (κινηθῆναι) by
oneself, namely, by those motions (κινήσεων) which one possesses (ἔχει), as was said. (452a10-12)
68
ὅταν δ’ ἄνευ τῶν ἔργων σχῇ τὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν, οὕτω μέμνηται [τὰς τοῦ τριγώνου ὅτι δύο
ὀρθαῖς ἴσαι], τὸ μὲν ὅτι ἔμαθεν ἢ ἐθεώρησεν, τὸ δὲ ὅτι ἤκουσεν ἢ εἶδεν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον· ἀεὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ
κατὰ τὸ μνημονεύειν, οὕτως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λέγει, ὅτι πρότερον τοῦτο ἤκουσεν ἢ ᾔσθετο ἢ ἐνόησεν.
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remembering in actuality, then under this condition one recognizes that one previously
cognized X. Because (γάρ) remembering includes a recognition of the prior cognition of
X, it follows that whenever there is possession of cognition of X without the act, one
recalls (μέμνηται) that one cognized X. That is, recall (μέμνηται) must be recall of some
past cognition (“that one learned or contemplated in the one case, that one heard or saw
in the other,” b20-21) because (γάρ) when remembering in actuality (ἐνεργῇ κατὰ τὸ
μνημονεύειν) there is a recognition that one has cognized X previously.
We want to understand why the remarks on recall (b18-22) are necessary given
what is posited about remembrance (b22-23). Aside from the different choice of memory
verb, the second conditional regarding remembrance differs from the first regarding recall
in two ways: (1) there is an explicit emphasis on actuality (ἐνεργῇ) that is not present in
the previous conditional and (2) there is mention of a recognition of past aspect attached
to what is remembered. The first difference is not particularly telling because the verb
μέμνηται already suggests activity as opposed to a capacity for entering into an activity.
Talk of remembering in actuality just reinforces that Aristotle’s current concern is to
explain the act of memory. The second difference is more decisive. When one recalls,
one recalls that one learned X or that one saw X. But Aristotle does not say that recall (of
having cognized X) includes any recognition that one cognized X previously. Indeed, if
recall that one had cognized X means that in recall one recognizes that one cognized X
before, then Aristotle would seem to be guilty of a tautology in the second conditional.
At any rate, he would seem to say the same thing twice. Furthermore, the conditional
referencing remembrance would fail to justify or explain anything about the previous
conditional referencing recall. The conclusion I draw is that recall (μεμνῆσθαι) does not
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include recognition that one cognized X previously, although recall is concerned with
prior cognition. Recall here probably means “to be put in mind of” or “be reminded” of
prior cognition, with the result that one enters into the activity of remembering a prior
cognition of X. If recall refers to the process whereby one is put in mind of or reminded
of one’s absent cognition, this would explain how recall concerns past cognition, but
without including any recognition that one previously cognized such and such. Recall is
not the activity of remembering prior cognition, but the action by which one transitions
from remembering in potentiality to remembering in actuality.
If my reading of the distinction between recall and remembrance is correct, then
we can see 449b18-23 as a teleological account in which μεμνῆσθαι (recall) is an action
that results in and is for the sake of remembrance (μνημονεύειν). We are not always
remembering our past in actuality (i.e., we are not always ἐνεργεῖ κατὰ τὸ μνημονεύειν).
There must be an act or cause in virtue of which there is a transition from remembering in
potentiality to remembering in actuality. If my interpretation is right, recall (μεμνῆσθαι)
looks to fill the role of the action in virtue of which one is put in mind of the absent past.
Recall is for the sake of (or, at any rate, results in) remembrance. Remembrance is a
particular way of relating to phantasma, namely, relating in such a way that one
recognizes that what the phantasma represents is something that one has cognized
previously. Recall is the process whereby one is put in mind of a phantasma that
represents the past cognition of the one who recalls. If recall is understood as an
instrumental action that results in remembrance, then we can understand how the second
conditional (449b22-23) pertaining to remembrance acts as a justification for the first
conditional (449b18-22) pertaining to recall. Because remembrance is an activity in
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which the one who remembers relates to a phantasma as a representation of one’s past
cognition, then recall as the action through which one enters into the act of remembrance
must also take up the phantasma that represents past cognition. Recall is to be
understood as the action of calling to mind or being put in mind of the phantasma that
remembrance takes up.69 Again, if recall is the action whereby the one who remembers is
put in mind of some memory currently absent to mind, this would explain why recalling
that one learned or saw X is not the same things as a recognition in soul that one learned
or saw X before. Finally, memory (μνήμη) turns out to be a hexis concerning a
phantasma that represents previous cognition (451a14-17). In the first conditional
(449b18-22), Aristotle gives as the condition of recall the possession (σχῇ) of the
knowledge of X or the perception of X without the activity (i.e., the possession of a
phantasma that represents prior cognition). Has (σχῇ) can mean (1) to retain cognition of
X so as to have it in mind in potentiality or (2) to have cognition of X in mind in
actuality. When one has phantasmata that represent previous cognition, then under this
condition of retention one recalls, i.e., one can be put in mind of these phantasmata and
being put in mind of such phantasmata results in remembrance. Recall is the action that
functions as a transition from a state of retention to a state of remembering what is
retained.
Aristotle makes good taxonomical use of the two memory verbs available to him
by reserving for each a different role in memory. The English term ‘remember’ can mean
either: (1) to have in one’s mind an awareness of something that happened in one’s past
or (2) the action of bringing to mind something that happened in one’s past. (2) results in
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Recall (μεμνῆσθαι) is middle-passive in voice: one can call something to mind for oneself or be put in
mind of something (reminded).
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(1). In nontechnical Attic Greek, both (1) and (2) may be expressed by both μνημονεύειν
and μεμνῆσθαι. On my reading, Aristotle disambiguates (1) and (2) by μεμνῆσθαι to (2)
and μνημονεύειν to (1). We are not always remembering (actively relating to what a
phantasma represents as a representation of the past). Remembrance requires the
presence of a phantasma acting on the subject who possesses it. Therefore, something
has to set the phantasma in motion so that the phantasma in turn moves its possessor to
remember (see 450b27-50a2). The requirement that a phantasma be in motion affecting
its possessor motivates the need for introducing recall into De memoria. There must be a
transition or shift from having a memory in mind in potentiality (= retention, ἕξις
φαντασμάτων) to having a memory before one’s mind in actuality (= remembrance,
ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὸ μνημονεύειν). Aristotle has reserved the term recall (μεμνῆσθαι) for
the activity in virtue of which there is a transition from having a memory in mind in
potentiality to having a memory before the mind in actuality.70
A final word about how recall looks to differ from remembrance will be helpful.
Aristotle emphasizes remembrance (τὸ μνημονεύειν) as an operation rather than a
capacity; remembrance is something with which one is in actuality (ἐνέργεῖ, 449b22,
50a19-20, 51b17-18, 52b24, b26). In contrast, Aristotle never refers to recall
(μεμνῆσθαι) as something with which one is in actuality, although the verbal form
indicates some sort of action. Because recall has a cognitive dimension, recall must be an
activity in some sense; it is a moving power of phantasmata and, as quasi-perceptible,
phantasmata have a cognitive dimension. Whereas remembrance is to be counted among
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I think that my analysis of the consecutive conditionals shows that recall and remembering are different
operations. However, if the reader wishes to see further textual evidence, I have attached an appendix to
the end of the dissertation, “Recall (τὸ μεμνῆσθαι) versus remembrance (τὸ μνημονεύειν),” that explores
more fully the role of recall in the second chapter of De memoria.
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the psychological activities, recall is more motion-like.
Let us consider motion (κίνησις) and activity (ἐνέργεια) for Aristotle, briefly.
Motion is an actuality of a potentiality as such, that is, an actuality of a being in
potentiality insofar as it is a potentiality (Physics iii 1, 201a9-11). What Aristotle’s
difficult phrasing tries to capture is the active transition from one form to another without
including any terms of motion in the definition (such as transition). Potentiality is here
the potentiality to take on a form in some category of being (let’s call this a potential to
be enformed). What the actuality of potentiality as such expresses cannot be only that
something actually has the potential to be enformed in some way merely as a property of
its nature. A glass sitting motionless on a table possesses the potential to be broken. Nor
can the actuality of potentiality as such refer to the material substrate. Matter is to form
as potentiality is to actuality. Matter qua matter is only potentially this or that sort of
being without form. The underlying matter of a fully enformed bronze statue is a statue
in potency only, but there is no motion. If there is no more potentiality to be enformed
left to be actualized, then the motion is over and the form has been fully realized. The
actuality of potentiality as such must refer to the action of taking on a form; motion ends
when there is no more potential left to be enformed in some way. The result of all this is
that motion (1) has an end beyond itself. Because motion ends when form is fully
realized, the form at which motion aims is beyond the motion itself. Thus, motion does
not contain its end within itself. (2) Because motion is for the sake of something beyond
itself and ceases to be upon the realization of the end toward which it goes, motion tends
toward its own destruction. (3) Finally, because the end of motion is beyond the motion
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itself and is realized only upon completion of the motion, motion must take time.71
In contrast to motion, an activity is its own end, as perception or thinking are for
their own sake. Because an activity is its own end, it is already complete at every
moment: the realization of an activity does not take time and so it is complete at every
moment. The possible objection that certain objects of perception are too large to take in
at once and take time fully to take in (e.g., the entirety of a mountain range or a tall
building from top to bottom) does not disprove the rule. The activity of perceiving any
given section does not take time to fill in or come to completion. Similarly, a temporally
extended object cannot be taken in all at once (e.g., a movie), but the perception of the
current moment is always fully complete. Containing its own end and complete at every
moment, an activity is in principle infinitely continuable because an activity does not aim
at its own negation as is the case with motion. For example, perception is continuable
until fatigue, sleep, or disease intervenes.
I have interpreted recall as an act in virtue of which there is a transition from
having a memory before one’s mind in potentiality to having a memory in mind in
actuality. Recall works through the association that phantasmata have with each other
and thought and sense perception. When a phantasma is set in motion so that it comes
before the mind, this is recall. I think we must stop short of categorizing recall as a
motion simply. For one, recall involves movement among phantasmata and phantasmata
are possible objects of cognition because they are, in a qualified sense, perceivable
(450b11-51a2). Also, because recall is an action whereby a memory comes before the
mind in actuality, recall is in some respects cognitive and cognition is an activity, not a
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See Metaphysics ix 6, 1048b18-36. Myles Burnyeat (2008) 219-291 disputes the authenticity of the
passage on the grounds that it is missing from the best manuscripts.
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motion. But recall is dubiously complete at every moment, dubiously continuable, and
does not contain its end within its operation. We can see from linguistic consideration
that recall does not contain its end as we cannot be said to be recalling and at the same
time be said to have recalled. For to have recalled is to have before one’s mind in
actuality some memory, whereas the act of recall is the action that leads to having a
memory in mind in actuality. Once a memory is before the mind in actuality, then we
can be said to have recalled, but once a memory is before the mind in actuality, we are no
longer said to be recalling a memory to mind; rather than recalling or calling a memory to
mind that is not yet before the mind in actuality (but is only before the mind in
potentiality), we now have it before the mind.
Thus, recall is not continuable, but self-terminating insofar as it has as its end
something beyond itself. Recall is similar to other motion-like cognition: one cannot be
(with respect to the same thing and at the same time) in a state of learning and
simultaneously in a state of having learned, for the latter is the completion and the former
is on the way to completion.72 So with recall, one cannot be (with respect to the same
memory) in a state of calling X before the mind that is not yet in mind and in state of
having already called X to mind. In contrast, it is possible to know and at the same time
be in state of having known (e.g., having known the principle on which an equilateral
triangle is derivable from a radius and at the same time actively contemplating that same
principle and demonstration).
In contrast to recall, remembrance (μνημονεύειν) understood as the perception of
one’s past is fully an activity, a status that Aristotle emphasizes by referring often to
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Aristotle gives understanding as an example of an activity and learning as an example of a motion in
Metaphysics ix 7.
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remembrance and memory as something with which a subject is in actuality (ἐνεργεῖ,
449b22, 50a19-20, b17-18, 52b24, b27).73 Motion also is a kind of actuality, but
remembrance does not have the motion-like characteristics of recall. The status of
remembrance as activity is hardly surprising. Remembrance is an affection (πάθος) that
follows upon sense perception (449b24-25) and remembrance according to actuality is
itself a kind of quasi-perception (450a19-21; 50b11-20; b27-51a2). In the course of any
remembering, one remembers X and at the same time one is in the state of having
remembered this very thing. That the present tense and perfect tenses can be conjoined
and attributed to the same act of remembrance is suggestive that remembrance is an
activity that contains or is its own end: as complete at every moment, there is no
difference in the course of active remembrance. In a single act of remembering X
(however long it may be), remembrance of X at time t1 and t2 does not differ in terms of
completeness. The reason why is because remembrance is the perception of what a
phantasma represents as a likeness of something the remembering subject did in the past.
Either the subject perceives what a phantasma represents as a presentation of subject’s
past or not. Completeness at every moment is especially obvious in the case where
remembrance is minimal and is merely that (i.e., of the fact that) one did or cognized X
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David Bloch (2007) 96-99 argues that the phrase ἐνεργεῖ κατὰ τὸ μνημονεύειν / τῇ μνήμῃ is a special
phrasing for μεμνῆσθαι and means to actualize memory in the sense of “moving towards remembering.”
He argues for this transitional reading of ἐνεργεῖ based on a dubious interpretation of De motu animalium
701a29-30 that makes ἐνεργεῖν a “goal-directed” action. Even were Bloch’s interpretation of De motu
701a29-30 accepted, there is no reason to suppose that ἐνεργεῖν always signifies a striving toward realizing
a telos. First, this would destroy the distinction between motion and activity because on Bloch’s reading,
anything in energeia would be on the way to a goal rather than already fully realized. Second, Magna
Moralia ii 6, 1201b11ff. uses the same phrasing (ἐνεργεῖ τῇ X) Bloch cites from De motu, but it obviously
contradicts Bloch’s assertion that to be ἐνεργεῖν is to be on the way to a goal (in Magna Moralia ἐνεργεῖν is
contrasted with potentially knowing in such a way that actual knowing must be the sense). Finally, and
most problematic for Bloch, when one is ἐνεργεῖ κατὰ τὸ μνημονεύειν, one recognizes that what the
phantasma presents belongs to one’s past. But that is not a being on the way to remembering. That is
precisely what it is to remember.
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previously. Just as with perception of temporally extended events, rich remembrance in
which one “relives” in some fashion a former cognition of X where the presentation of
the former cognition of X unfolds over time, still, in this rich case, the state of
remembrance is fully realized at every moment; remembrance does not require that the
rich memory of X be fully unfolded before there is a fully realized state of remembrance
any more than sense perception requires a temporally extended object to be fully
unfolded before perception is fully realized. No matter what point in reliving the
memory the one who remembers happens to be in, there is fully realized remembrance at
all points just as perception is fully realized at every point when taking in a mountain
range too large to behold in a single gaze or a movie that is extended over a time period.
In what sense should we say that remembrance is its own end? Why do beasts
and humans remember? One possible answer is supplied by Aristotle: because we
perceive and have a sense of time. Remembrance is a hexis and an affection (πάθος) that
follows upon sense perception (449b24-25). Perception contains its end in its operation
and remembrance follows upon perception. As the preservation of sense perception that
is complete and containing its own end, remembrance in operation looks to be a kind of
reiteration of the previous activity containing its own end. Further, cognition generally is
an activity and remembrance is a quasi-kind of perception and supposition (i.e.,
remembrance is cognition of former cognition). Remembrance can serve ends beyond
itself (e.g., learning, deliberation concerning right action), but certainly remembering is
for its own sake, too. Often nothing results from remembering but the remembering
itself: a memory “pops” into mind, it is attended to for whatever length of time, and then
it is let go. In contrast, recall is not something complete at every moment; it is only a
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process that leads into remembering. The status of remembrance as activity that contains
its end may be one reason why Aristotle reserves his discussion of recall until after
memory and remembrance have been discussed. As end, memory and remembrance
must be discussed prior to recall and recollection that is for the sake of memory and
remembrance because the lower and the means are not understood except in reference to
the higher and the end.

The initial articulation of remembering according to actuality.
The way is prepared to devote full attention to the initial account of remembrance
according to actuality. Aristotle carefully identifies remembering as an activity in which
the subject is aware of its own past cognitive activity.
For always whenever one is in actuality according to remembrance, then [under the condition that one
is remembering in actuality] in the soul one says that one previously heard or perceived or considered
X (τοῦτο).74 449b22-23

Aristotle does not give an explanation for how remembering is possible or how it works;
the initial aim is to articulate what remembering is. Three features are of primary
interest. First, it is the subject who remembers that is in actuality, not memory. Second,
the subject who remembers recognizes (says in soul, 449b22-23) some cognition both as
past and as the subject’s own. Third, the subject who remembers recognizes that there is
past aspect attached to the memorable object. The inclusion of recognition of past aspect
is especially important because it will help secure a distinction between remembrance
(second actuality) and retention (first actuality) of memorable objects.
First, Aristotle carefully notes that memory and remembrance do not themselves
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ἀεὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ κατὰ τὸ μνημονεύειν, οὕτως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λέγει, ὅτι πρότερον τοῦτο ἤκουσεν ἢ
ᾔσθετο ἢ ἐνόησεν.
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enter into second actuality; rather a human or beast is in actuality according to memory or
remembrance. Aristotle’s careful phrasing reflects the principle secured in De anima
408a34-b18 that the soul is not the subject to which activities are attribtued, but the
principle and cause of the activity in which the ensouled being engages.
To assert that the soul angers is like if someone would say that the soul weaves or builds a house: it is
better perhaps to say not that the soul pities or learns or thinks over something, but rather that the
human in virtue of the soul [does these things], and this not as of motion being in the soul, but at times
motion goes up to the soul, at other times from the soul. For example, perception is from the things
before one, but recollection is from the soul to the motions or the things abiding in the sense organs. 75
(408b11-18)

The plant or the beast or the human engages in activity (metabolizing, growing,
perceiving, or thinking) due to soul, but it is not the soul that undergoes the activity. The
concern is that were the soul to serve as subject rather than cause of activities, the soul
might look to be in motion, which Aristotle wishes to avoid.76 Motions terminate at the
soul, as with perception (reception of sensible form), or can proceed from soul and on
account of soul, as with recollection where the wish to search out a missing item sets
phantasmata in motion. Remembrance is a kind of mirror image of perception; in
remembrance the motion of phantasmata retained in the soul-body composite terminate
at the soul, i.e., in remembrance, the soul “perceives” a phantasma. Aristotle’s claim that
the soul perceives memory phantasmata (450b28) should not be taken flatly; it is a way
to announce that the perception is not of the normal variety. It is the human or beast, as
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τὸ δὴ λέγειν ὀργίζεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ὅμοιον κἂν εἴ τις λέγοι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑφαίνειν ἢ οἰκοδομεῖν· βέλτιον γὰρ
ἴσως μὴ λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλεεῖν ἢ μανθάνειν ἢ διανοεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῇ ψυχῇ· τοῦτο δὲ μὴ ὡς
ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῆς κινήσεως οὔσης, ἀλλ’ ὁτὲ μὲν μέχρι ἐκείνης, ὁτὲ δ’ ἀπ’ ἐκείνης, οἷον ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις ἀπὸ
τωνδί, ἡ δ’ ἀνάμνησις ἀπ’ ἐκείνης ἐπὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις κινήσεις ἢ μονάς.
76
Aristotle’s predecessors argue that there is soul on the grounds that some beings clearly move themselves
and such motion needs a principle. The predecessors, however, suppose that the soul is a moved mover, a
mover of the body in virtue of being in motion itself. If soul moves by being in motion, the soul looks to be
a body because only body can be in motion in a strict sense. So the soul might be fire or air or some other
highly mobile source that could be throughout the body. Aristotle argues that the soul cannot be a body
and therefore cannot be in motion. Soul is doubtfully body on the grounds that bodily motion by itself has
a difficult time accounting for all operations.
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Aristotle repeatedly emphasizes, that is at work with memory perceiving a phantasma,
not the soul.
How does the soul serve as the motionless principle in virtue of which the
ensouled remembering subject is at work with memory? Perception is due to soul and
memory follows on perception. Also, probably we are to see that an animal enters into
acts of remembrance due to retention that is not itself at work or in motion. Memory
(μνήμη) is a hexis (ἕξις) of perception and supposition (449b24-25). Remembrance of
past cognitive activity is predicated upon the development in the remembering subject of
a dispositional retention (hexis) of a likeness (phantasma) of the past cognitive activity
remembered. Retention is not just a state of holding onto (hexis) phantasmata, but is also
a disposition that has its possessor relate to the phantasma in accordance with the manner
of the disposition possessed. For instance, there can be long-lasting or brief retention,
retention of phantasma that is accurate or inaccurate, retention that is detailed or vague,
and retention that tends toward holding onto some things, but not others. The
remembering subject can be moved to perceive the phantasma retained, much like an
artist enters into artistic activity due to the knowledge in the soul. Similarly, retention of
phantasmata serves as an unmoved mover of remembrance for the ensouled being. Also,
the perceptions, desires, and (if human) thoughts that are due to soul may trigger
remembrance due to association with phantasmata. Character provides another kind of
analogue. Character is a disposition of soul concerning passions and desires in virtue of
which the human enters into actions indicative of the character disposition. Courage is
not itself in motion, but it is a principle of action in virtue of which the one who
possesses it reacts in various ways and chooses to do various things in response to the

85

circumstances at hand. Likewise, due to the sort of memory hexis a subject develops, the
subject may tend to retain certain things more than others or tend to remember certain
memories in response to certain situations.
The second feature emphasized in 449b22-23 is a recognition of self in the object
remembered. The remembering subject is featured in the past cognition that is
remembered. The subject who is in actuality according to remembrance says in soul that
the subject heard or perceived or considered X before (the verb for actuality in the
protasis is in the third person singular, as are the verbs of cognition that follow in the
apodosis). The remembering subject recognizes some instance of the subject’s past
cognitive activity and recognizes that the past cognitive activity is the subject’s own.
Why the subject who remembers recognizes a personal connection to the past cognition is
of great interest, for besides a recognition of past aspect, the kind of personal connection
recognized in the memorable object is a crucial difference between phantasia and
remembrance. In acts of imagination, at least for humans that do not so much treat their
imaginings as perceptions, imagination is always a kind of “as if” perceiving.77 But in
remembrance, the one remembering does not perceive what is remembered “as if” it
happened. Rather, the remembering subject perceives a real personal connection with
what is remembered: “I did or experienced this.” The remembering subject perceives and
recognizes its cognitive history and engagements as its own; the soul perceives its past
self in relation to the object remembered, e.g., seeing the object from whatever point of
view or feeling some passion in relation to some event. How perception of the self in

77

Cf. De anima 427b21-24. The human who is in actuality according to constructive phantasia looks upon
frightening things as one looks upon frightening things in a painting. Kenneth Turnbull (1994) 321
observes that phantasia “pictures what is sensed by putting a frame around it” such that it renders what is
pictured as “unconvincing.”
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inactual cognition is possible is perhaps because we perceive that we perceive (De anima,
425b12-13). If some trace of the self-awareness that is built into cognition according to
actuality is retained by the memory phantasma, then this self-awareness may somehow
be indicated by the phantasma so that humans and certain animals can return to this selfawareness in memory.78
Third, the subject who remembers recognizes that what is remembered belongs to
the remembering subject’s past. Recognition of past aspect is intimately connected to the
recognition that memory is of the remembering subject’s own cognitive activity.
Suppose that before a subject’s mind is a presentation of some instance of the subject’s
past cognitive activity. Now suppose that the subject perceives no past aspect attached to
what presents itself before the subject’s mind. What will the subject make of the
intended object in such a case? Rather than remembering, something like daydreaming
would result. If we exclude cases of hallucination where phantasmata are perceived as if
they are proper sensibles, the presentations of daydreaming and inventive fantasy are not
perceived by the subject of these acts to be actual perceptions belonging to the subject.
In remembering, however, the subject perceives that some cognition is an instance of the
subject’s own past cognitive activity.

78

How the self is recognized in a memory is a real puzzle. Self-awareness belongs on the noetic side of
things, not the noematic. How would a phantasma that lies on the noematic side indicate self-awareness to
the remembering subject? Phantasmata are presentations of phantasia. So phantasmata are analogous to
aisthêmata or noêmata insofar as the phantasmata serve as the correlative objects of a cognitive activity,
phantasia. If phantasmata are presentations that appear in virtue of phantasia, then there is phantasia
occurring whenever phantasmata appear before the mind. Perhaps we are to see that the indication of selfawareness belongs to the phantasia activity that is similar to sense perception according to actuality. If
phantasia is similar to sense perception and the latter includes self-awareness, then phantasia may contain
some resemblance of the self-awareness built into the sense perception from which it derives. Tony Roark
(2011) 167 asserts of the memory phantasma that it “retains an assertoric character” in “virtue of its causal
history”; as derived from perceptions that contain an assertoric character, the memory phantasma also will
possess an assertoric character.
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That there is a relationship between the recognition of past aspect and the
recognition that the cognition to which the past aspect is attached is clear, but the nature
of that relationship is not; and Aristotle hardly spells it out. Recognition of past aspect is
not a sufficient condition for remembrance. We realize that all sorts of things have past
aspect, but we do not for that reason suppose they belong to our own cognitive history.
To return to a previous example, we might think that Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 49
BC. The recognition that Caesar’s crossing took place in the past is not accompanied by
any realization that the crossing belongs to our own perceptual history, but we do take the
referent of our thought (Caesar’s actions) to have past aspect. Aristotle speaks to the
relationship between recognition of past aspect and the cognition remembered only twice.
Interestingly, the perception of past cognitive activity is not the same as the perception
that the past cognitive activity has past aspect.
For always whenever one is in actuality regarding remembrance, in this way one says in soul that one
heard, or perceived, or thought this before. 79 (449b22-23)
For always whenever one is in actuality with memory, just as was also said before [viz. 449b22-23],
that one saw this or heard or learned, one perceives-in-addition (προσαισθάνεται) that [it was] before. 80
(450a19-21)

In the initial articulation of remembrance (449b22-23), we are told only that when
remembering one recognizes (says in soul) that one cognized something previously. The
remembered object and the past aspect attached to it are not distinguished, but they are
separated in the second articulation of remembrance (450a19-21). The key term is
perceives-in-addition (προσαισθάνεται), which makes its sole appearance in the
Aristotelian corpus here and is probably an Aristotelian neologism coined for making the
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ἀεὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ κατὰ τὸ μνημονεύειν, οὕτως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λέγει, ὅτι πρότερον τοῦτο ἤκουσεν ἢ
ᾔσθετο ἢ ἐνόησεν.
80
ἀεὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ τῇ μνήμῃ, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴπομεν, ὅτι εἶδε τοῦτο ἢ ἤκουσεν ἢ ἔμαθε,
προσαισθάνεται ὅτι πρότερον·
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desired point in 450a19-21.81 The subject in actuality with memory not only perceives an
instance of the subject’s cognitive history, but perceives-in-addition that the instance
belongs to the subject’s past. On the one hand, there is the perception of a phantasma
that resembles a cognition (e.g., seeing, hearing, learning, or opining of X). On the other
hand, there is a perception of the past temporal aspect attached to the cognition that
serves as the memorable object. The implication of the term “perceives-in-addition” is
not altogether clear. Does Aristotle mean that there are two separate perceptions that
arise and converge in remembrance or only that perception of past cognitive activity
includes an awareness of the temporal aspect? We might wonder how perception of past
aspect can be in addition to and not the same as the perception of an instance of one’s
past cognitive activity. For if one perceives an instance of one’s past cognitive history, it
might seem to follow that one must perceive that this instance belongs to one’s past. If
perception of past cognitive activity must include perception of the past temporal aspect,
then the temporal location of the past cognition and what the past cognition consists of
(by consists of, I mean whether the cognition is a seeing X, or hearing X or learning X,
etc.) are inseparable; but this is not the position that Aristotle embraces.
An important passage confirms that Aristotle’s considered view is that the
memory phantasma neither includes nor serves as a token for the past aspect perceived in
remembrance.
Therefore, whenever the motion [the phantasma] regarding the deed (πράγματος) and the motion
regarding the time arise together, then one is in actuality with memory (τῇ μνήμῃ ἐνεργεῖ). But if one
supposes [so] without doing it, one supposes one remembers (μνημονεύειν). For nothing prevents one
from being mistaken somehow and seeming to remember while not remembering (μνημονεύειν μὴ
μνημονεύοντα). But not to suppose [so] while one is at work with memory (ἐνεργοῦντα τῇ μνήμῃ),
but rather to fail to notice when being put in mind (μεμνημένον) is not possible: for recall (μεμνῆσθαι)
81

Perceives-in-addition (προσαἰσθάνεσθαι) does not appear in any extant text prior to Aristotle and appears
only four times after: twice in Sophonias’ paraphrase of De memoria and twice in the paraphrase of
Michael of Ephesus, both of whom merely repeat Aristotle’s own usage.
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is this very thing. But if the motion of the deed arises separately from the motion of the time, or the
latter separately from the former, then one does not recall. 82 (452b23-29)

Aristotle posits two kinds of motion that must arise together for remembrance to occur, a
phantasma that represents or signals a past cognition and a motion that indicates the
temporal location of what the phantasma represents. (The announcement of a motion
pertaining to time in addition to a motion pertaining to the memorable object follows a
complicated and disputed passage concerning how relative temporal distance among
memorable objects is judged.83) Evidently, the presence of a phantasma before the mind
in actuality is not enough to secure perception of the temporal aspect that belongs to what
the phantasma represents; an additional motion indicating the time is needed. Were the
phantasma on its own enough, there would be no need to bring in a time motion. Further,
it would be better (less complicated and more economical) were the phantasma on its
own good enough to indicate past aspect; the positing of an additional motion requires a
coordination of motions that wants an explanation, which explanation would be
unnecessary were the temporal aspect accountable in virtue of the phantasma by itself.84

82

ὅταν οὖν ἅμα ἥ τε τοῦ πράγματος γίγνηται κίνησις καὶ ἡ τοῦ χρόνου, τότε τῇ μνήμῃ ἐνεργεῖ. ἂν δ’ οἴηται
μὴ ποιῶν, οἴεται μνημονεύειν· οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει διαψευσθῆναί τινα καὶ δοκεῖν μνημονεύειν μὴ
μνημονεύοντα. ἐνεργοῦντα δὲ τῇ μνήμῃ μὴ οἴεσθαι ἀλλὰ λανθάνειν μεμνημένον οὐκ ἔστιν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν
αὐτὸ τὸ μεμνῆσθαι. ἀλλ’ ἐὰν ἡ τοῦ πράγματος γένηται χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ χρόνου ἢ αὕτη ἐκείνης, οὐ μέμνηται.
83
It is important that Aristotle speaks of “judging” (κρίνει, 452b8) temporal distances because this allows
for intellectual, but also perceptual discernment of temporal distances. Were estimation of location in past
time limited to intellectual activity alone, the beasts would be afforded no ability to order events, but the
beasts must be able in some minimal capacity to judge that the content represented in their memory
phantasma is before the present moment.
84
Tony Roark (2011) 147 agrees that Aristotle’s vehicle for past aspect differs from the memory
phantasma. Roark criticizes Julia Annas (1992, 305) for attributing to the phantasma the power to
represent past temporal aspect. Roark argues that the introduction of the phantasma “concerning time
would be utterly redundant if the phantasm representing the event itself possessed representational content
that is temporal in character” (147). In Annas’ defense, she claims only that a “representational image”
represents “my past seeing,” which need not mean that the phantasma represents to the soul the past
temporal aspect of the past seeing. Because the phantasma is a likeness of the original act of cognition that
occurred earlier, then by definition the phantasm represents the past cognition because that of which the
phantasma is a likeness occurred in the past. Still, Roark is quite right concerning how we ought to read
Aristotle: the memory phantasma does not appear to contain past temporal aspect.
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Why does Aristotle posit a vehicle for indicating past aspect (the motion of time)
different from the vehicle that represents the past cognition (the phantasma)? Aristotle
gives no reason, but it is probably due to Aristotle’s understanding of how memory
works. Memory is possible because phantasmata are established in the soul-body
composite that are likenesses of some original sense activity (450a25-32). Although
Aristotle does not say it, as likenesses of original sense activity, these phantasmata would
doubtfully contain an indication of the past temporal aspect attached to past cognition
they represent. If the memory phantasma includes any marker for temporal aspect, the
phantasma would represent the sort of temporal aspect present in the original act from
which the phantasma is derived. Because the original perception contained a present
temporal aspect and the memory phantasma is a likeness of the original perception, it is
unclear how the phantasma through its own powers, representational or otherwise, should
indicate anything about the temporal location of what it represents. The memory
phantasma should represent something with present, not past aspect. Hence, the
perception that what the phantasma represents belongs to past time must arise from
something other than the memory phantasma.
Returning to 452b23-29, when the motion that represents past cognition and the
motion that serves as the indication of the past temporal location of the past cognition
represented arise together, then under this condition is one in actuality with memory (τῇ
μνήμῃ ἐνεργεῖ, 452b24). Talk of motion of the thing remembered and of the time
indicate that the one who remembers is acted on by what is in motion, where acted on
means to perceive and to be aware. To be in actuality with memory is to perceive what a
memory phantasma represents and to have a sense of the past temporal location of what
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the phantasma represents. Aristotle claims that, “when one is in actuality with
memory…that one saw this, or heard or learned it, one perceives-in-addition that it [one’s
cognition of X] was before (πρότερον): and the before and after (ὕστερον) are in time
(χρόνῳ)” (450a19-22).85 Before means before now (see 449b25-26). The sense of time
that enters is a discrimination by sense that the cognition of X indicated by the
phantasma is prior to now, prior to the present remembering. The assertion that before
and after are in time announces that the primary sense power discriminates the temporal
location of memories. The primary sense power picks out and discriminates the temporal
location of memories relative to the now and, in animals with more advanced phantasia,
the temporal location of memories relative to each other. Aristotle posits in the soul
motions of phantasia that are proportionate to actual passages of time that are indexed to
various phantasmata of past cognition, e.g., motions proportionate to two weeks, three
months, five years, etc.86 But all that is needed to remember (or misremember) is for the
remembering subject to be moved by a motion indicating some time elapsed that is
indexed to a phantasma that represents past cognition. (How and why movement of time
and movement of phantasma come together is not said; Aristotle seems to treat their
conjunction as something necessary to accept.)
The proportional movements of times elapsed can be present without the
movement of the phantasma and vice versa. This explains how we may misremember:
when one conjoins a movement of time lapse to a phantasma that does not represent an

85

ἀεὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ τῇ μνήμῃ, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴπομεν, ὅτι εἶδε τοῦτο ἢ ἤκουσεν ἢ ἔμαθε,
προσαισθάνεται ὅτι πρότερον· τὸ δὲ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστίν.
86
The discrimination of the temporal distance or a memory relative to the now and the relative temporal
distance between memories is the subject of the difficult passage at 452b7-22. The best treatments of this
difficult passage can be found in John Sisko (1997) and Tony Roark (2011, chapter nine). I have not yet
worked out the details to my satisfaction.

92

actual past cognition, one supposes oneself to remember while not actually remembering
(452b24-26). Aristotle mentions the delusional Antipheron who treats as presentations of
past cognition phantasmata that do not represent any actual past cognition (451a8-12);
past aspect is conjoined to a phantasma that is not a likeness or indicator of past
cognition (unless past aspect is conjoined, what the phantasma represents cannot be
perceived as a presentation of past cognition). If the motion of a phantasma arises
without being conjoined to the relevant motion indicating past aspect, then one will
suppose oneself merely to be day dreaming or imagining something. Alternately, if the
motion of a time lapse comes about divorced from any phantasma, then we think about a
certain previous point in time, e.g., last autumn, but not what we happened to be doing
during that time (452b28-29).
The account of misremembering and appearance before the mind of the
phantasma or the motion that indicates past aspect in isolation from the other includes
some important details about the sort of self-awareness that figures into acts of
remembrance. To remember is to be aware that one is remembering.
But not to suppose [so] while being in actuality with memory (ἐνεργοῦντα τῇ μνήμῃ), but rather to fail
to notice when being put in mind (μεμνημένον) is not possible: for recall (μεμνῆσθαι) is this very
thing.87 (452b26-28)

To recall something is to become aware of what is recalled. Hence, it is not possible to
be at work with memory and not suppose oneself to be remembering. That we perceive
that we perceive seems to be an indemonstrable principle for Aristotle (see the first lines
of De anima iii 2). Likewise, there cannot be remembrance without an awareness that
one is remembering. Aristotle has said previously that the one who remembers says in

87

ἐνεργοῦντα δὲ τῇ μνήμῃ μὴ οἴεσθαι ἀλλὰ λανθάνειν μεμνημένον οὐκ ἔστιν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν αὐτὸ τὸ
μεμνῆσθαι.
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soul that one cognized such and such before (449b22-23). We may see that “says in
soul” is an affirmation that one is remembering; what is said must be in reference to
something of which the speaker has become aware. The beasts do not say things in their
souls but because perceiving has perceiving of the perceiving built in, the more complex
beasts may perceive that they remember. It is not possible for a phantasma to be before
the mind in actuality without awareness of what the phantasma represents. However, if a
phantasma that represents a past cognition presents itself before the mind without the
subject being aware that what the phantasma represents is an instance of the subject’s
past cognitive activity, then remembrance cannot result. Remembrance is the unification
of a representation of past cognition (phantasia) with some sense of past aspect (time
sense). Unless one perceives (or says in soul) that there is such a union between a sense
of past aspect and a cognition presented before the mind, remembrance cannot result.
Hence, one cannot fail to be aware that one remembers and self-awareness must be built
into remembrance.
It is possible also to suppose oneself to be remembering when really one does not.
Genuine remembering means that the one who remembers joins a phantasma that
actually represents a past cognition to a sense of past aspect. But nothing prevents the
conjoining of a motion representing time elapsed to a phantasma that does not represent a
past cognition, resulting in an awareness that one is remembering (452b25-29). It is
possible to be unaware that one remembers falsely, but it is not possible to be unaware
that one remembers genuinely or to be unaware that one seems to oneself to be
remembering genuinely. Self-awareness that one is remembering does not imply that one
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remembers truthfully.88 Should we be troubled that it is possible to suppose oneself to
remember when really one does not? Yet, misremembering is notoriously ubiquitous. In
both remembering and misremembering something now appears before the mind,
seeming to present the subject’s past cognitive activity. Remembrance is selfdiscriminating; it picks out from among things past what belongs to the subject’s own
cognitive history. However, unlike discrimination of proper sensibles by the senses, it is
possible to misremember. The reason why is that remembrance involves a conjunction of
two separate terms (time sense and a phantasia presentation) and these may be combined
inappropriately.
Before turning to the initial definition of memory, I want to address a tension
some see between Aristotle’s comment that when remembering one says in soul that one
cognized such and such previously (449b22-3) and the comment that animals with a
sense of time possess memory (b28-30). Because the beasts do not possess speech,
attributing asserting things in soul to them is problematic. The tension is readily
resolvable and there is no reason to read “says” as meaning anything other than “being
aware.” First, 449b22-3 precedes Aristotle’s announcement that beasts with time
awareness are able to remember (b28-30). As is his usual way, Aristotle starts with what
is more familiar and proceeds to the less familiar but more explanatory and more
embracing. Naturally, Aristotle begins by speaking about what the reader is most
familiar with, the reader’s own human memory. The mention of saying in soul follows
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It is unclear whether Aristotle embraces disjunctivism in the case of remembering and false
remembering. The cognitive process is the same and indistingushable for both insofar as the remembering
subject attaches past aspect to a phantasma in either case. Aristotle would maintain that remembering and
false remembering differ insofar as remembering involves a phantasma that is a copy of past cognition,
whereas false remembering involves a phantasma that is not a copy. Also, Aristotle seems commmited to
the idea that through introspection it is possible to determine whether a phantasma presents genuine
memory content (see 451a2-8). Cf. Kourken Michaelian (2016) 63-64.
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on Aristotle’s appeal to the way we humans speak (b16, 18) about memory and
remembering. It may be that memory according to actuality in humans is always
accompanied by or can be accompanied by assertion, but that does not mean that human
memory is intrinsically doxic or propositional. Richard Sorabji (2004) 9-10 reads “says
in soul” as indicating judgment, lamenting that it is difficult for Aristotle to square
attribution of memory to beasts with the requirement that memory must include a
judgment in soul. Tony Roark (2011) 167-8 suggests that memory, in part, includes
“assent or belief” about phantasmata and is “formally a judgment,” also looking to
449b19ff. Roark is led to this position not only because of Aristotle’s talk of saying
things in soul, but also because Roark sees hoti (ὅτι, ‘that’) in b23 as indicating that all
memory contains propositional content (145).89
Two considerations tell against reading Aristotle as categorizing memory as
essentially (and not incidentally) doxic. First, he treats remembrance as a sort of
perception. Second, Aristotle flatly denies that memory is a form of supposition. After
announcing that beasts with time sense can remember, Aristotle exchanges “says in soul”
for “perceives-in-addition.”
For always whenever one is in actuality regarding remembrance, in this way one says (λέγει) in soul
that one heard, or perceived, or thought this before. (449b22-23)
For always whenever in actuality with memory, just as was also said before, that one saw this or heard
or learned, one perceives-in-addition (προσαισθάνεται) that it was before. (450a19-21)

The parallel construction between 449b22-23 and 450a19-21 shows that 450a19-21
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In correspondence, Tony Roark has clarified that he does not think that Aristotle regards memory as
being an intrinsically doxic state, so beasts can remember. However, Roark has urged me to consider that
remembering when something occurred in a precise sense (with mêtro, 452b29-53a4) is doxic on the
grounds that such an act requires deliberative phantasia, which is absent in beasts, but present in human
beings. The presence of deliberative phantasia in humans, as well as the capacity for humans to remember
with precision, moves Roark to posit that memory in humans either is or is accompanied by a doxic state. I
would protest that because Aristotle allows for remembrance without a precise measure of time (453a2-4),
remembrance, even in humans, need not be doxic.
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echoes 449b22-23 (no similar phrasing appears between the two passages). After
announcing that beasts remember, Aristotle appropriately substitutes perceiving that such
and such a cognition occurred before for “saying in soul” because the beasts cannot do
any speaking. The perception of previous cognition covers both humans and beasts
because the examples of previous cognition perceived include learning, but also seeing
and hearing. Animals that perceive time are able to remember and “they do so through
that by which they perceive” (449b28-30).90 The claim is not limited to beasts, but
includes all animals that perceive time, among which are humans. Further, Aristotle
straightaway asserts that memory is neither perception nor supposition following 449b2223.
For always whenever one is in actuality regarding remembrance, in this way one says (λέγει) in soul
that one heard, or perceived, or thought this before. Therefore, memory is neither perception nor
supposition (ὑπόληψις), but a hexis or affection of one of these.91 (449b22-25)

Supposition (hupolêpsis) includes knowledge (epistêmê), opinion (doxa), and practical
judgment (phronêsis) (see DA, iii 3, 427b24-6). Were “saying in soul” meant to indicate
that remembering is intrinsically doxic, Aristotle would not go on immediately to posit
that memory is not supposition. Also, if human remembering involves a saying in soul
that such and such was cognized previously, this saying must be founded on a more
primary perception of the past aspect and the past cognition indicated by a phantasma.
Opinion about the past must be predicated on access to the past. Finally, and most
problematic for reading into Aristotle a necessary doxic condition of memory, is the
rather strong claim that memory belongs to the primary sense power (450a12-14).
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ὥσθ’ ὅσα χρόνου αἰσθάνεται, ταῦτα μόνα τῶν ζῴων μνημονεύει, καὶ τούτῳ ᾧ αἰσθάνεται.
ἀεὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ κατὰ τὸ μνημονεύειν, οὕτως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λέγει, ὅτι πρότερον τοῦτο ἤκουσεν ἢ
ᾔσθετο ἢ ἐνόησεν. ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ μνήμη οὔτε αἴσθησις οὔτε ὑπόληψις, ἀλλὰ τούτων τινὸς ἕξις ἢ πάθος.
91
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Remembrance requires a sense of time and time is perceived by the same faculty that
perceives magnitude and motion, namely, the sense power. The discrimination of past,
present, and future time is an act of perception, even if remembering temporal location
with precision requires recollection and deliberation. Further, remembrance involves the
awareness of phantasmata that are affections of the sense power (450a13-14). Aristotle
flatly claims that memory connects to intellect incidentally, but in its own right, memory
belongs to the primary sense power (450a13-14).92 Hence, opinion can accompany
memory in humans, but memory is not a power of supposition.93 Saying in soul that
something has been previously perceived is only an allusion to the human self-awareness
built into remembering.
A lot of ground has been covered and it is good to pause here and to list the main
points secured about remembrance. (1) Remembrance (μνημονεύειν) refers only to the
cognitive engagement with a memory in actuality. Recall (μεμνῆσθαι) is reserved to
designate the action by which a memory appears before the mind and in virtue of which
there is a transition from remembering in potentiality to remembering in actuality. (2) It
is not memory that enters into activity but the subject who has memory remembers in
virtue of the memory that the subject possesses. (3) To be in actuality with memory or
remembrance is for a subject to perceive a presentation or indication of the subject’s own
past cognition as the subject’s own and to perceive in addition that the cognition
indicated belongs to the subject’s past.
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ὥστε τοῦ νοῦ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἂν εἴη, καθ’ αὑτὸ δὲ τοῦ πρώτου αἰσθητικοῦ.
The view that memory is not a kind of supposition (449b24) and that remembering is through the power
of perception (b30) creates a problem: if remembering is a power of perception, how are human beings able
to remember past intellectual cognition? This is what motivates the discussion contained by 449b3050a25: there is no thinking without phantasmata but because memory operates by means of phantasia in
conjunction with the primary power of perception, there is incidentally memory of thought (50a23-25).
93
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449b24-28 The initial definition of memory.
The memorable object (to mnêmoneuton) in the governing sense is the
remembering subject’s own past cognitive activity. Remembering (μνημονεύειν) is the
activity in virtue of which there is an awareness of one’s past cognitive activity, both as
one’s own and as past. The awareness of past cognitive activity as one’s own and as past
occurs through the perception of a phantasma that functions as a copy of the past
cognition from which it derives and through the simultaneous perception of a motion
representing the temporal location of what the phantasma represents.94 Having articulated
the memorable object and the corresponding memory activity, Aristotle turns to an initial
characterization of the memory as a hexis or affection (pathos) of sense perception and
cognition. Hexis may refer to memory according to first actuality (retention) or second
actuality (remembering).
Therefore, memory is neither perception nor supposition, but concerning a certain mode of one of
these a hexis or an affection, whenever time happens. But there is no memory of the now in the now,
just as was said before, but perception concerns the present, expectation concerns the future, and
memory is of the past.95 (449b24-28)

Memory cannot be perception because perception is restricted to the present alone,
whereas memory concerns only the past. Memory differs from supposition because
memory deals only with the past. Unlike perception, it would seem that supposition can
deal with the present and the past (we have belief about the past, present, and future). If
memory is other than supposition because memory deals with the past, this must be
because memory deals only with the past and in a way in which supposition cannot.
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The function of the motion proportionate to the time is more fully explored in chapter four.
ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ μνήμη οὔτε αἴσθησις οὔτε ὑπόληψις, ἀλλὰ τούτων τινὸς ἕξις ἢ πάθος, ὅταν γένηται
χρόνος. τοῦ δὲ νῦν ἐν τῷ νῦν οὐκ ἔστι μνήμη, καθάπερ εἴρηται [καὶ πρότερον], ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν παρόντος
αἴσθησις, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γενομένου μνήμη·
95
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Supposition (ὑπόληψις) includes demonstrative knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), practical
judgment (φρόνησις), and opinion (δόξα) (see DA 427b24-26). Demonstrative or,
perhaps more broadly, contemplative knowledge concerns unchanging objects that lie
outside of time. These objects are principles that are atemporal, necessary and incapable
of being otherwise (for example, the properties of a triangle) or which hold for the most
part (essential features of natural beings; e.g., dogs have four legs for the most part unless
something interferes). Being necessary and unchanging, contemplative truths are not in
time (see Physics 221b3-7 and NE 1139b18-24). Aristotle has already pointed to the
manner in which the contemplative object is present; the act of contemplation relates to
its object as something in actuality and extant, whereas remembrance takes up its object
as something inactive and past. Practical judgment also concerns present and future
circumstances, even if these are judged in light of past circumstances. Memory is of the
past alone.
Opinion is the most problematic form of supposition to disentangle from memory.
The future is opined, whereas memory is of the past alone (44910-15), but the argument
cannot be that opinion does not consider the past. Rather, the claim must be that while
opinion can concern the future, memory is limited to the past alone and because opinion
is not so limited, opinion and memory must be different. For example, one can have the
opinion that the person one saw was this or that friend. Further, much of human
remembering will include at least some implicit doxic state concerning the authenticity of
the remembering, whether the remembering is actually authentic or not. The presence of
belief (doxa) about the authenticity of remembering is, I suppose, not only the point of
Aristotle’s remark that saying in soul that one cognized such and such before features in
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human remembering (449b22-23), but also the point of Aristotle’s remark that it is not
possible to suppose (οἴεσθαι) one is not remembering while engaged in the act of
remembering (452b26-28). Why Aristotle claims that the future is opinable and
expectable (οὔτε γὰρ τὸ μέλλον ἐνδέχεται μνημονεύειν, ἀλλ’ ἔστι δοξαστὸν καὶ ἐλπιστόν,
449b10-11) is probably because if one truly expects that X will happen, one necessarily
believes that X will come to pass. Likewise, if one remembers that one cognized X, there
is some implicit belief that one formerly cognized or did X. Still, memory is not
reducible to opinion for one primary reason: opinion is always about something supplied
by a more primary act of cognition. It is possible to opine or hold beliefs about one’s
past, but only under the condition that the past is made available for doxic consideration
in the first place—namely, made available through memory. Likewise, there is opinion
about the present, but, again, only under the condition that something present has been
furnished for doxic consideration—namely, furnished by perception or thought. And
without memory of what has occurred in the past, there can be no basis for inference or
opinion about what will occur in the future concerning similar things. Thus, we can see
why Aristotle would keep memory separate from supposition for reasons beyond his
commitment to memory in beasts (which cannot have opinions).
The initial definition for memory provides a genus and a difference. The broader
genus into which memory falls is “hexis or affection” (ἕξις ἢ πάθος, 449b25). The
disjunction (hexis or affection) is surely inclusive, but also fitting because the definition
is preliminary. The proximate genus is “hexis or an affection concerning some mode of
sense perception or supposition” (ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ μνήμη οὔτε αἴσθησις οὔτε ὑπόληψις,
ἀλλὰ τούτων τινὸς ἕξις ἢ πάθος, b24-25). Because memory deals with the past, memory
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cannot be a hexis or affection belonging to sense perception or supposition according to
actuality, as the remark about passage of time following perception or supposition
emphasizes (ὅταν γένηται χρόνος, b25).96 Memory is a hexis or affection concerning
sense perception and supposition that arises only after time has occurred since the
cessation of the cognition the memory concerns. Hence, we must read “of a certain mode
of one of these [sense perception or supposition]” (τούτων τινός, 449b24-25) as a
genitive of source or relation and not a genitive of possession. Memory cannot belong to,
relate to, or hold onto ongoing, cognition currently in actuality. Because memory cannot
be of sense perception or supposition according to actuality, it must be some kind of hexis
in relation to and derived from past, completed cognition. Thus, the difference (within
the genus “hexis or affection of cognition”) is supplied by “whenever time arises” (ὅταν
γένηται χρόνος, 449b25), meaning whenever time has come about since the cognition
which memory concerns has ceased to be in actuality.97
Because memory follows from the activity of sense perception and supposition, it
is fitting to call memory an affection of perception or supposition. Memory can refer (1)
to the capacity for remembering, (2) to the act of remembering, or (3) to a memory that is
retained or remembered.98 Memory in all its senses is an affection (pathos) that arises due
to sense perception or supposition. As a result of sense perception, phantasmata are
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The phantasmata that serve as the vehicle for memories are affections from sense perception that are
concurrent to sense perception in actuality, but memory of sense perception cannot develop until after the
act of sense perception has ended. Phantasmata do not become memory phantasmata until the perception
from which they arise has ended. There is not memory of sense perception that is ongoing.
97
There is no explicit mention of time in the final, considered definition in 451a14-17, but we may see that
it’s inclusion of the phrase “phantasma as a copy” indicates that the cognition of which the phantasma is a
copy is complete so that the phantasma can be a copy of it.
98
Aristotle occasionally speaks of the phantasmata motions derived from sense perception as memories.
See 451a2-5 where Aristotle describes how it is possible to be unsure whether a motion (phantasma)
persisting in us is a mnêmê.
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produced that may be retained. From the dispositional retention of phantasmata one is
moved to enter into acts of remembrance of those things for which the phantasmata
retained serve as copies. The memory hexis that arises is an affection due to the activity
of previous sense perception. The phantasma (that serves as the vehicle for memories) of
which the subject who remembers is aware is an affection generated by the past activity
of sense perception. Another reason for referring to memory as hexis or affection may be
found in Categories viii. Discussion of affections (pathê) in the Categories figures into
an account of qualities. Qualities in the governing sense are changed with difficulty and
stable (dyskinêtos kai paramonimos, 9b20-1). Affections in a strict sense are fleeting and
short-lived. Something is not said to be of a certain sort in a primary sense due to a
fleeting affection.
But as many [occurrences] as come about from affections easily dispersed and that return swiftly are
called affections: for we are not said to be of a certain sort according to these things. For neither is the
one who reddens on account of shame said to be ruddy, nor the one who goes pale from fear said to be
fair-skinned, but rather [one is said] to have suffered something. For this reason such things are called
affections (πάθη), but not qualities (ποιότητες). 99 (9b28-33)

Someone is said to be ruddy in one of two senses, either as a stable or a temporary
condition. Only those affections that “are not easily removed or even endure throughout
life” (b25-7) are qualities in a primary sense. Affections that are fleeting do not qualify
their subject and are mere affections. One who takes on a ruddy hue from embarrassment
is said to be ruddy at the time, but is not said to be a ruddy sort on the grounds that the
ruddiness is from fleeting embarrassment and not complexion. The distinction between
stable affections that qualify their subject and fleeting affections that do not fits well with
memory in its application as the retention of phantasmata. Retention can be long-term
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ὅσα δὲ ἀπὸ ῥᾳδίως διαλυομένων καὶ ταχὺ ἀποκαθισταμένων γίγνεται πάθη λέγεται· οὐ γὰρ λέγονται
ποιοί τινες κατὰ ταῦτα· οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ἐρυθριῶν διὰ τὸ αἰσχυνθῆναι ἐρυθρίας λέγεται, οὔτε ὁ ὠχριῶν διὰ τὸ
φοβεῖσθαι ὠχρίας, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι τι· ὥστε πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ποιότητες δὲ οὔ.
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and stable or short-term and fleeting.100
Because Aristotle drops affection (πάθος) from the final considered definition of
memory and remembrance (451a14-17), the governing genus of memory is hexis. I have
transliterated hexis to retain the ambiguity between disposition (first actuality) and
activity (second actuality). The standard translations of hexis as condition, disposition, or
state is misleading because these all suggest first actuality exclusively. Aristotle
articulates the ambiguity hexis has between first and second actuality in Metaphysics v
20. While the Metaphysics deals with first philosophy and (ultimately) motionless being
rather than natural being in motion and the principles of motion, Aristotle uses an
example of health to illustrate the explanation of hexis and so we may be confident that
the explanation is not restricted to first philosophy.
A hexis (ἕξις) means in one way a certain actuality (ἐνέργεια) of what has and of what is had, just like
a certain action or motion (for whenever one thing acts and another is acted on, there is a doing
between: in this way also there is a hexis between the one having on clothes and the clothes being had
on).101 (1022b4-8)

In one sense, a hexis is the shared actuality between what has and what is had. When
clothes are on in actuality, there is the having-on of the clothes that belongs to the wearer
and the being-had that belongs to the clothes. In Theaetetus 197B-C, Socrates
distinguishes between the kind of actuality that belongs hexis from that which belongs to
ktêsis (ownership). One can possess (ktêsis) a cloak without having (hexis) it on in
actuality. Similarly, someone can possess (ktêsis) knowledge without having (hexis) the
knowledge in mind in actuality (here the distinction is between possessing knowledge
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Thomas Aquinas (Sententia de memoria, 309) sees a correspondence between short-lived retention and
pathos on the one hand and long-term retention and hexis on the other.
101
Ἕξις δὲ λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον οἷον ἐνέργειά τις τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ ἐχομένου, ὥσπερ πρᾶξίς τις ἢ κίνησις
(ὅταν γὰρ τὸ μὲν ποιῇ τὸ δὲ ποιῆται, ἔστι ποίησις μεταξύ· οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐσθῆτα καὶ τῆς ἐχομένης
ἐσθῆτος ἔστι μεταξὺ ἕξις).
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and using the knowledge one possesses). Action and motion in actuality might be kinds
of hexis or merely similar to hexis depending on how ὥσπερ (just as) is taken. Action is
shared by the agent that does the action and the patient that receives it. Likewise, motion
is shared by mover and the moved where mover is cause and the moved is that which
receives the motion. The implication of memory as a hexis that is a second actuality
shared between what has and what is had is that memory may refer to the capacity or to
the act of remembering. The remembering subject holds a phantasma in awareness in
actuality rather than in potentiality. One might object that the initial definition of
memory dubiously covers the remembering activity on the grounds that there is no direct
mention of a sense of time. Memory in its application as retention does not require time
sense, but neither memory in its application as retention nor as the act of remembering
occurs until after time has passed since the cessation of the cognition which the retention
or remembrance concerns. The final, considered definition (451a14-17), in any case, is
less ambiguous: memory and remembrance both are a hexis. Hence, even if the initial
definition is primarily focused on memory in its application as retention and capacity, the
dual sense of hexis as a capacity and an activity is confirmed in the final, considered
definition.
The Metaphysics further articulates hexis as first actuality that disposes its
possessor well or poorly toward a class of objects.
But another way hexis is meant is as a disposition (διάθεσις) in virtue of which what is disposed is
disposed well or badly, either in relation to itself or in relation to another; for example, health is a
certain hexis, for it is such a condition. Furthermore, hexis is meant if a portion of such a disposition is
meant. Hence, the excellence of the parts is also a certain disposition. 102 (1022b10-14).
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ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἕξις λέγεται διάθεσις καθ’ ἣν ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς διάκειται τὸ διακείμενον, καὶ ἢ καθ’ αὑτὸ ἢ
πρὸς ἄλλο, οἷον ἡ ὑγίεια ἕξις τις· διάθεσις γάρ ἐστι τοιαύτη. ἔτι ἕξις λέγεται ἂν ᾖ μόριον διαθέσεως
τοιαύτης· διὸ καὶ ἡ τῶν μερῶν ἀρετὴ ἕξις τίς ἐστιν.
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Hexis is a disposition in virtue of which what possesses it is well or poorly disposed,
either in relation to some aspect of itself or in relation to other things. Aristotle uses
health as an example. For the ancient Greeks, health is the proper arrangement or
ordering (diathesis) of the body. If the body’s parts and humors are in proper proportion
and arrangement, then the body relates well to itself and to outside influences, i.e., the
body is not easily affected by cold or heat or dryness or moistness or other affections that
could give rise to sickness. Courage is a hexis that disposes its possessor well toward
confidence and fear-inspiring things and temperance is a hexis that disposes its possessor
well toward pleasures of touch and contact. Intriguingly, memory as a good or bad
disposition toward memorable objects fits well with De memoria. First, Aristotle
mentions that it is not the same sort who is good at memory and good at recollection
(449b6-8). The sort good at recollection and the sort good with memory do not relate
equally well to memorable objects in the same way. Second, those with bodily
conditions too fluid (the young) or too sclerotic (those quite advanced in age) or too
dense (dwarf-like builds) do not retain well the phantasmata needed for remembering the
absent, past memorable objects (450a32-b11; 53a31-b7). Those with the appropriate sort
of bodily condition are better disposed toward retention of phantasmata. Third, it is
possible to improve memory with repeated exercises, which suggests that with practice it
is possible to alter one’s relation to memorable objects for the better (451a12-14). These
passages suggest that memory in one of its applications is a disposition in virtue of which
the possessor both has and is well or poorly disposed toward a certain class of affections
(pathê), namely, the reception, retention, and engagement with phantasmata that serve as
the vehicle for the memorable objects (past cognition). Due to the retention of
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phantasmata (first actuality) the subject who has memory is moved by the phantasma
retained into acts of remembering what the phantasmata represent (second actuality) in
better or worse ways depending on the quality of the retention. Hence, as hexis, memory
refers both to dispositional retention and to the act of remembering.
Because there are various hexeis and affections concerning sense perception and
supposition (the genus), it is necessary to supply a species difference peculiar to memory.
What separates memory from other hexeis or affections of cognition is that memory is a
hexis derived from cognition, but which holds on to (retention) and beholds
(remembrance) the very cognition from which it is derived, although in a modified form.
Seeing X may be accompanied by the affection of fright or the condition of near or
farsightedness in vision or the seeing may be accompanied by phantasia, but memory is a
hexis concerned with the act of seeing X after this act is no longer actual. The phrase
“whenever time comes about” (ὅταν γένηται χρόνος, 449b25) supplies the difference
separating memory from other hexeis and attributes of sense perception and supposition.
Memory arises only when time arises following the sense perception or supposition that
memory concerns (phantasia is produced and concurrent with perception in actuality and
may persist after, but memory only arises after the perception of which it is the memory
has ceased). Therefore, memory is a hexis for retaining and relating to sense perception
or supposition that is no longer active.
The phrase “time comes about” (γένηται χρόνος, 449b25) also enters Aristotle’s
understanding of how time is generated in the Phsyics.
But certainly we recognize even time whenever we mark out the motion, by means of marking out the
before and after: then we claim that time has come to be (γεγονέναι χρόνον), when we take up
perception of the before and after in the motion. And we distinguish them [the before and after] by
grasping one and another and something other between them. For whenever we conceive the extremes
are other than the middle and the soul says the nows are two, the one prior and the other posterior, then
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also we say this is time.103 (219a22-29)

The before and after in motion give rise to before and after in time. Motions are
distinguished by perception of the before and after in motion. The before and after are
not distinguishable from one another when each is considered in isolation from the other.
Both the before and after are each a now that is either before or after relative to another
now. What marks off priority and posteriority in motion is a difference in nows and time
arises due to the perception of the before and after in motion. A difference in nows is
generated by the realization of form in some category of being. Nows are distinguished
through cognizance of their respective differences in distance from privation of form or
acquisition of form. For example, in locomotion from point A to point B, nows are
distinguished by their relative distance from A to B or their priority and posteriority to
being at A or B. In this case, one now differs from another now in motion in relation to
privation or acquisition of form according to place. Time arises from the difference
(perceived) in nows generated by motions. Where there is no perceived distinction
among nows, no time seems to arise for the percipient. When Aristotle speaks of
memory as a hexis or affection of cognition whenever time has come about, he means
that the cognition regarding which memory is the hexis has ceased. The time that comes
about is relative to the cognition that memory concerns and for time to come about there
must be distinction between nows that is generated by motions or cognition subsequent to
the earlier cognition a memory concerns. Hence, time having come about means that the
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ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸν χρόνον γε γνωρίζομεν ὅταν ὁρίσωμεν τὴν κίνησιν, τῷ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον
ὁρίζοντες· καὶ τότε φαμὲν γεγονέναι χρόνον, ὅταν τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου ἐν τῇ κινήσει αἴσθησιν
λάβωμεν. ὁρίζομεν δὲ τῷ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ὑπολαβεῖν αὐτά, καὶ μεταξύ τι αὐτῶν ἕτερον· ὅταν γὰρ ἕτερα τὰ
ἄκρα τοῦ μέσου νοήσωμεν, καὶ δύο εἴπῃ ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ νῦν, τὸ μὲν πρότερον τὸ δ’ ὕστερον, τότε καὶ τοῦτό
φαμεν εἶναι χρόνον·
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cognition of which memory is the hexis has ended. Of the now in the now there is no
memory, so memory only concerns former cognition and in order for cognition to be
former, it can no longer be occurent. As soon as cognition ceases, time occurs insofar as
the old cognition is replaced by new cognition or some other motion that follows it.
Time must follow the cognition memory concerns prior to memory of the cognition
arising or else there can be no prior cognition for memory to take up.
Additional details are provided in chapter two of De memoria that are helpful for
fleshing out the implications that follow from memory being a hexis or affection of sense
perception or supposition once time has come about. Here is Aristotle’s initial
argumentation in the second chapter of De memoria.
Of memory, recollection is neither the taking hold again (ἀνάληψις) nor the taking hold (λῆψις). For
whenever one learns or undergoes [something] in the first place, neither does one seize again any
memory (because there is no memory preceding [προγέγονει])… 104 (451a20-23)

Recollection is not the taking hold again (recovery) of memory because whenever (ὅταν
γὰρ, a21) one learns or undergoes X initially, there is no preceding memory of X to take
up. Recollection is said not to be the recovery of a memory of X on the grounds that
there is no memory of X prior to learning or experiencing X initially. The implication of
recollection not being the recovery of memory on the grounds that no memory preceded
initial learning of X is that recollection is identified with learning. Recollection is not the
recovery of a memory because learning is not the recovery of a memory. Aristotle is
working against the mythical Platonic accounts of recollection in the Meno and Phaedo.
Otherwise, it is unclear why what is true of learning in relation to memories should
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οὔτε γὰρ μνήμης ἐστὶν ἀνάληψις ἡ ἀνάμνησις οὔτε λῆψις· ὅταν γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον μάθῃ ἢ πάθῃ, οὔτ’
ἀναλαμβάνει μνήμην οὐδεμίαν (οὐδεμία γὰρ προγέγονεν)…
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explain what is true of recollection.105 Aristotle alludes to the question begging involved
in recollection as learning: if all learning is recollection of previous knowledge, then how
was the previous knowledge initially obtained? Initial learning or experiencing (πρῶτον
μάθῃ ἢ πάθῃ, 451a21-22) cannot be the recovery of what was previously obtained
because there is no memory of the thing learnt or experienced prior to the initial learning
or experiencing of it.
Having denied that one recovers or takes up again a memory of X when one
initially and first learns or experiences X, Aristotle next denies that one takes up a
memory of X from the beginning when one first and initially learns.
Of memory, recollection is neither the taking hold again (ἀνάληψις) nor the taking hold (λῆψις). For
whenever one learns or undergoes [something] in the first place, neither does one seize again any
memory (because there is no memory preceding [προγέγονει]) nor does one seize memory from the
beginning: for whenever the hexis or the affection (πάθος) comes to be, at that time (τότε) there is
memory, with the result that when the affection (πάθος) arises, the memory does not arise with [it]. 106
(451a20-25)

When one first learns or experiences X, there is no taking hold of a memory of X from
the start (thus, learning as recollection is not the establishment of memory). The reason
why there can be no taking hold of a memory from the start is because a hexis or
affection of what is learned or experienced must first arise and only then is there memory.
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Richard Sorabji (2004) 89 insists that Aristotle is not concerned with distancing himself from Plato’s
treatment of learning as recollection: “The word ‘for’ in 451a21 shows that what follows is meant to be
relevant to the claim that recollection is not the recovery or acquisition of memory. This rules out the idea
that Aristotle’s main purpose in 451a21-31 is to attack the theory of recollection of a former life in Plato’s
Meno and Phaedo.” I do not see that Sorabji adequately secures his position. The ‘for’ certainly signals
the start of the explanation for why recollection cannot be the recovery or acquisition of memory, but the
explanation is given in terms of learning and not recollection itself. In short, recollection is not the
recovery of memory because learning is not the recovery of memory. If recollection is not being identified
with learning, then it is unclear why what is said of learning furnishes any kind of insight into recollection.
Sorabji’s concern is that Plato treats learning as recollection as the recovery of knowledge, not memory.
But Aristotle speaks of knowledge in the one who remembers and recollects at 451a26-27. It is not really
knowledge, but a phantasma of our contemplating or learning some knowledge. G. R. T. Ross (1906) 259260 reads it my way. But J. I. Beare (1908) is in agreement with Sorabji.
106
οὔτε γὰρ μνήμης ἐστὶν ἀνάληψις ἡ ἀνάμνησις οὔτε λῆψις· ὅταν γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον μάθῃ ἢ πάθῃ, οὔτ’
ἀναλαμβάνει μνήμην οὐδεμίαν (οὐδεμία γὰρ προγέγονεν) οὔτ’ ἐξ ἀρχῆς λαμβάνει· ὅταν γὰρ ἐγγένηται ἡ
ἕξις ἢ τὸ πάθος, τότε μνήμη ἐστίν, ὥστε μετὰ τοῦ πάθους ἐγγινομένου οὐκ ἐγγίνεται.
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Memory of the experience does not arise together with the experience (μετὰ τοῦ πάθους
ἐγγινομένου οὐκ ἐγγίνεται, 451a24-25). The claim that memory does not arise together
with the experience that the memory concerns alludes to the initial definition of memory:
memory is neither perception nor supposition, but is a hexis or affection that concerns
some mode of one of these, whenever time has come about (449b24-25).107 Learning or
undergoing something is not the initial taking up of memory, but it does give rise to a
hexis or affection that is said to be memory. Because memory does not arise until a hexis
or affection of the cognition with which the memory is concerned has been fully
established, learning cannot be the initial taking up of memory or its recovery. Hence, if
recollection is identified with learning, recollection cannot be the taking up of memory or
its recovery.
Having established that memory does not arise until after a hexis or affection of
the cognition memory concerns is established, Aristotle next argues that remembrance
(τὸ μνημονεύειν) is subsequent to the formation of memory (μνήμη). From 451a20-25,
memory is mentioned twice (a20, 22). A new argument is introduced (announced by ἔτι)
from 451b25-31 in which only remembrance (τὸ μνημονεύειν, b28, 29, 30, 31) is
mentioned. Here is the argument that concerns remembrance.
Further, when for the first time it [memory] has come about (ἐγγέγονε) in the indivisible and the
ultimate thing, on the one hand, the affection (πάθος) is already present within the one who
experienced it and the knowledge (if it is necessary to call the hexis or the affection knowledge; but
nothing prevents incidentally also remembrance of some of the things of which we have knowledge):
but, on the other hand, to remember in its own right is not present until time passes (πρὶν χρονισθῆναι).
For one remembers presently what one saw or suffered before (πρότερον), but that which one just now
suffered (ὃ νῦν ἔπαθε), one does not presently remember. 108 (451a25-31)

107

ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ μνήμη οὔτε αἴσθησις οὔτε ὑπόληψις, ἀλλὰ τούτων τινὸς ἕξις ἢ πάθος, ὅταν γένηται
χρόνος.
108
ἔτι δ’ ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἐγγέγονε τῷ ἀτόμῳ καὶ ἐσχάτῳ, τὸ μὲν πάθος ἐνυπάρχει ἤδη τῷ παθόντι καὶ ἡ
ἐπιστήμη, εἰ δεῖ καλεῖν ἐπιστήμην τὴν ἕξιν ἢ τὸ πάθος (οὐθὲν δὲ κωλύει κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ μνημονεύειν
ἔνια ὧν ἐπιστάμεθα) · τὸ δὲ μνημονεύειν καθ’ αὑτὸ οὐχ ὑπάρχει πρὶν χρονισθῆναι· μνημονεύει γὰρ νῦν ὃ
εἶδεν ἢ ἔπαθε πρότερον, οὐχ ὃ νῦν ἔπαθε, νῦν μνημονεύει.
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The passage contains some difficulty. First, the subject of ἐγγέγονε (“has come about”)
in 451a25 is unannounced. The two candidates: either memory or the experience
(pathos) which the memory hexis concerns. J. I. Beare (1908) 451a25-30, Richard
Sorabji (2004) 53, Joe Sachs (2001) 173, David Bloch (2007) 37, and R. A. H. King
(2009) 75 all take pathos (the experience) in line a24 to be the subject. Only G. R. T.
Ross (1906) 109 takes memory to be the subject. Both are grammatically permissible
and probably they amount to the same thing if by memory one understands retention of
phantasmata. Second, there is some dispute over whether the indivisible and ultimate
thing (τῷ ἀτόμῳ καὶ ἐσχάτῳ, 451a25-26) refers to the primary sense organ (the heart) or
the ultimate instant of time at which retention is established or an experience is complete,
but it does not much matter for my present concerns: whether the reference is to time or
to the organ, the meaning is that something has become complete. If experience (pathos)
is the subject of “has come about,” then we have:
When the experience has come about, then already the affection (pathos) and the knowledge are
present in the one who has been affected.

If memory is the subject, then we have:
When memory has come about, then already the affection (pathos) and the knowledge are present in
the one who has been affected.

I am inclined to side with G. R. T. Ross against the majority in taking memory as the
subject for two reasons. First, memory is the last true nominative subject to appear prior
to ἐγγέγονε (has come about). Aristotle gives no indication of a change in subject.
Second, if the knowledge and the affection are already fully present in the subject, then
there is retention (hexis) of them. But even if we take experience as the subject of
ἐγγέγονε, the upshot is much the same: as soon as the experience is complete (has come
about), already there is abiding in the subject the knowledge or affection from the
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experience and such abiding is memory in its application as retention. Memory in its
application as retention may develop immediately following cognition. The reason why
is that phantasia is generated during cognition and as soon as the cognition is over the
phantasia that is a likeness of the cognition is already present in the soul-body composite.
If the phantasia is retained dispositionally and does not break up, the abiding phantasia
can subsequently move the subject who retains it to remember the cognition of which the
phantasia is a likeness and copy. (Aristotle hesitates to call knowledge a hexis or pathos.
The knowledge in this context is really phantasia of having learned or contemplated X.)
As soon as an act of perception is completed, the phantasia motion that has been
accompanying the perception is now present in the soul-body composite so that retention
is realized.
The possibility that the generation of retention follows contiguously on the
completion of the cognition with which the retention is concerned does not contradict the
assertion that memory (μνήμη) occurs only after time has occurred (ὅταν γένηται χρόνος,
449b25) since the cognition with which memory is concerned. J. I. Beare (1908) is the
only translator that gives a robust commentary on 451a25-29. His analysis misses the
mark, but the mistake is instructive. Here are Beare’s remarks.
When the once the πάθος or ἐπιστήμη has been perfectly engendered, thereupon or therein the
foundation of memory—the immanence of the πάθος or ἐπιστήμη—has been laid. The πάθος or
ἐπιστήμη does not pass away, but abides as ἀρχή in the mind, which is the force of ἐνυπάρχει. But
memory itself is not there yet: time must first elapse” (451a25-30 f. 4).

Beare does not seem to realize that the abiding of the πάθος or ἐπιστήμη (ἐπιστήμη is
soon clarified to be a phantasma) is a hexis and holding on to of the learning or
perceiving just experienced. As soon as the perception or cognition is complete and a
new act of cognition begins, already there is time generated.
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In contrast to memory in its application as retnention, memory in its application as
remembrance (τὸ μνημονεύειν) does not occur until after some time has passed from the
establishment of the hexis or the affection of which retention consists. So memory in its
application as an act of remembering looks to be subsequent to memory in its application
as retention of phantasmata. The reason why remembrance is subsequent upon retention
is that there is no remembrance of what was suffered right before the present now (ὃ νῦν
ἔπαθε, 451a31). Aristotle probably has in mind something like the specious present.
Through phantasia, an animal may hold onto what has just past and expect what is just to
come. It is only after what has just been experienced is no longer a present object of
cognition that remembrance of it may occur. This is because remembrance is of what is
prior to present cognition and the just past may still be present due to ongoing phantasia.
So there may be retention of past cognition that has not fully lost contact with present
awareness. Once the cognition just past is no longer contained by present cognition, it
can be something remembered and not only retained.
When Aristotle declares that all memory concerns time (449b28), memory may
indicate memory according to retention or to remembrance of some memory or the
declaration may refer to the temporal aspect of the memorable object. Memory as
retention concerns past time because it holds on to something that belongs to the past.
Memory and remembrance as activity concern time because a perception of past aspect is
a necessary condition of the act.
But there is no memory of the now in the now, just as was said before, but perception concerns the
present, expectation concerns the future and memory is of the past. Hence, all memory concerns time.
So as many as perceive time, these alone among animals remember, and they do so by means of that
by which they perceive. 109 (449b25-30)
109

τοῦ δὲ νῦν ἐν τῷ νῦν οὐκ ἔστι μνήμη, καθάπερ εἴρηται [καὶ πρότερον], ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν παρόντος αἴσθησις,
τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γενομένου μνήμη· διὸ μετὰ χρόνου πᾶσα μνήμη. ὥσθ’ ὅσα χρόνου
αἰσθάνεται, ταῦτα μόνα τῶν ζῴων μνημονεύει, καὶ τούτῳ ᾧ αἰσθάνεται.

114

Without a sense of past aspect in relation to what memory retains, remembrance would
differ little or not at all from imagination: something would appear before the mind, but
not as something that belongs to an animal’s past cognitive activity. Because
remembering requires a recognition of past aspect attached the memorable object, only
those animals that perceive time are able to remember. To remember is to be aware of
something one has done previously along with a sense that it was done previously.
Interestingly, Aristotle carefully notes that only animals with a sense of time remember
(μνημονεύει), but he does not say that only animals with a sense of time have memory
(μνήμη), although all memory concerns time. We might wonder whether some animals
possess retention of past cognition and the ability to be affected by what is retained, but
without the ability to recognize that the past cognition retained belongs to the past.
Perhaps some animals have memories, but lack a robust enough sense of time to relate to
their memories as memories. Some animals do have a sufficient perception of time and
perceive past aspect attached to their memories. These alone of the animals remember.
Remembrance (τὸ μνημονεύειν) means activity rather than dispositional storage. If the
proper object of memory is the remembering subject’s own past cognition, then only
animals capable of perceiving time (past aspect) can perceive presentations of their past
cognitive activity as being past. Retention of past cognition cannot function as a
disposition for remembrance unless the possessor of the retention is capable of relating to
what is retained as belonging to its own cognitive past. The perception of memories as
presenting cognition that belongs to the past rather than the present shows that
remembrance is critical and discriminating. If attribution of a critical sense of past time
to beasts bothers us, Aristotle emphasizes that remembrance does not require precise
115

discriminations. Human beings can measure time (count the befores and afters of
motion) with standard units and thus measure events rather precisely. However, all that
is needed for remembrance is some sense that the memory presents something that
occurred before (see 452b29-53a4). All that is needed for time sense is the perception of
motion. The beasts need not discriminate with much precision when something was
perceived in the past relative to other past perceptions. All that is needed is the
discrimination that the memory presents something prior to the present now.
Aristotle ends the first section of the treatise with the assertion that remembrance
occurs through that by means of which one perceives (449b28-30); remembrance and
memory belong to the perceptive power of the soul. Because Aristotle has marked out a
proper set of objects for memory, it might seem that memory is an independent faculty in
the soul, but Aristotle does not think so. Memory is a function of the sense power. One
motivation for attributing memory to the perceptive power is so that beasts may have the
ability to remember. Were memory too intellectual, beasts would be unable to remember.
However, Aristotle cannot point to memory in beasts as proof that memory belongs to the
perceptive power; one could always deny that beasts remember. Rather, beasts with a
sense of time should be able to remember because memory is a function of the sense
power. If memory is a function of the sense power and all beasts possess the power of
sense, then some beasts will be able to remember.110 We may see that memory has
already been implicitly tied to the sense power. Motion is a common sensible (see DA
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As we will see in chapter four, if memory is a kind of opinion or judgment, a possibly insurmountable
impasse arises. The one who remembers relates to a phantasma as a presentation of its past activity. If the
remembering subject must judge that its phantasma is an appearance of its past, it is unclear why the
subject should do so. Further, under this condition, any phantasma appearance becomes a memory so long
as it is judged to be so: memory becomes completely arbitrary.
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418a16-20) and time is the before and after counted of motion (see Phys. 219a34-b8).
Time is a number of motion and because number is included among the common
sensibles, time is probably a common sensible. We need not assume that beasts count
before and after of motion; all that is needed is cognizance of a multiplicity of different
nows. If cognizance of time is by means of motion and all memory and remembrance
requires a sense of time, then memory and remembrance must belong to the sense power.
The key ingredient in memory other than a sense of time is phantasia, also due to the
sense power.
Aristotle has explained that (1) the proper object of memory is the animal’s own
past cognitive activity, that (2) the one remembering in actuality is cognizant of a
presentation or indication of an instance of the rememberer’s own past cognition along
with a sense that what is presented or indicated is the rememberer’s own cognition and
that it occurred before, that (3) memory is a hexis concerned with prior cognition or an
affection derived from prior cognition after time has passed since the cessation of the
cognition which memory concerns, and that (4) because awareness of time and phantasia
are affections of the primary sense power and because memory requires a sense of time
and phantasia to preserve past cognition, memory must belong to the primary sense
power. Having laid out the initial articulation of what memory is and the part of the soul
to which memory belongs, Aristotle turns to the causes of memory.
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Chapter Three: Memory as retention of phantasmata and remembrance as indirect
perception.

The account of the causes of memory and remembrance centers around two
impasses that arise from Aristotle’s own commitments. First, Aristotle insists that the
object of memory is the rememberer’s own past cognition. Remembrance, like all
cognition, takes up some present, intentional object. The question arises how
remembrance can have past cognition as its object when the object it engages is present.
Aristotle’s solution is to argue that remembrance is a kind of indirect perception: past X
is remembered by means of the perception of a present phantasma Y because Y is a
likeness to X. I use the phrase ‘indirect perception’ to stick to Aristotle’s language of
perception, but it is clear that Aristotle advocates a form of representational or indirect
realism regarding remembrance: genuine remembering gets at the remembering subject’s
actual past, but not directly. A present affection stands in for and represents the absent,
past cognition and serves as a present proxy. The proxy is a likeness, but not an exact,
isomorphic copy; the one remembering does not mistake the proxy for an actual, present
act of sense perception or supposition. The solution to the first impasse explains how
memory arises in its application as retention (storage) of past cognition.
The commitment to indirect perception in the case of memory leads to a second,
related impasse that goes to the heart of Aristotle’s theory of remembrance. Even
granting that there is something like a present proxy for past cognition, what causes the
remembering subject to perceive the present proxy as presenting or indicating the
rememberer’s past cognition? The proxy appears in the present, so even if the proxy is in
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fact a likeness of former cognition, why is it perceived as such a likeness? I argue that
Aristotle’s solution is to model remembrance on sense perception. Aristotle is a
proponent of direct realism: sense perception gets at the sensible features in things
directly and without representation. Aristotle conceives of remembering as analogous to
sense perception. Sense perception is not at work in virtue of itself, but must be raised to
activity by a sensible object. When acted upon, the sense becomes such as its sensible
object is in actuality. The sense faculty has also a capacity to assimilate to the activity of
a phantasma actualized as a likeness of some past perception. When the sense faculty is
assimilated to this actuality, the sense faculty becomes such as the likeness is. The soul
thus perceives its past by means of a present phantasma and remembers. The solution to
the second impasse explains how memory in its application as remembrance of past
cognitive activity arises.
Above I said that Aristotle puts forward a form of representational or indirect
realism in the case of memory; remembrance works through the cognizance of a present
proxy that represents or indicates the remembering subject’s past. However, this does not
mean that the remembering subject experiences her or his perception of the past as
something indirect. Although Aristotle invokes an analogy of looking at a painting that
serves as a likeness of an acquaintance and then thinking of the time one saw an
acquaintance, this is only an analogy (450b29-51a2). Aristotle never suggests that the
remembering subject looks upon the present proxy for past cognition as anything other
than a presentation of her or his past cognitive activity. The argument is not that the
remembering subject first perceives an inner proxy and is then subsequently put in mind
of its past cognition in addition to the proxy. Aristotle’s account is that the perception of
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the present proxy along with a sense of the time is itself remembrance. There need be no
second step, no judging or inferring from or interpreting of the proxy and in the case of
beasts there cannot be. The mechanism for remembrance is indirect, but the experience
of remembering is a direct engagement with the past. The one who is at work
remembering does not “say in soul” (449b22-23) that a proxy X before the mind
represents something else Y to which the rememberer’s mind is subsequently directed.
Rather, one at work with remembrance says in soul of what presents itself “that before
one heard or perceived or considered this,” where “this” is whatever the proxy presents or
indicates. Aristotle’s theory is that the present proxy is not treated as a reminder, but a
direct presentation of the remembering subject’s past.
Regarding sense perception, Aristotle argues forcefully for a form of direct
realism and Aristotle appears to desire realism in the same spirit in the case of memory.
The object of remembrance is said not to be the present phantasma (the vehicle for
memory content, mnêmoneuma), but the past cognition (the memorable object,
mnêmoneuton). It would be misleading to characterize Aristotle’s theory of memory as a
form of indirect realism in which the perceiver is cognizant of an internal object that is
caused by an external object but where the internal object need not or little resembles the
external object (e.g., Descartes has the heat that occurs to us have little to do with the
properties inherent in fire). Aristotle wishes to maintain that the proper object of memory
(τὸ μνημονευτόν, the memorable object) is not an internal image or idea, but the
rememberer’s own past cognition. In order to argue for direct realism in sense
perception, Aristotle has the sense power become such as its sensible object is qua
sensible. However, the sensible object sensible in actuality is something present to the
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percipient; Aristotle cannot appeal to the presence of the memorable object, for in order
to be memorable, the object of concern must be absent because it is past. Something
other than the memorable object must be present, but which possesses properties such
that remembrance can be about the absent memorable object. In effect, Aristotle argues
that remembrance is directed at the past cognitive activity of the remembering subject by
way of an internal likeness of that past cognition. Aristotle does not distinguish between
outer primary qualities and internal secondary qualities that may or may not bear much
resemblance to their cause. Although not an isomorphic copy, the likeness that figures in
memory and remembrance shares features with and resembles the former cognition; we
might say that the memory phantasma has sufficient enough likeness to its cause such
that that being directed at the likeness is the functional equivalent of being cognizant of
the original, former cognition. The likeness turns out to be a kind of image in the water,
as it were, of the original cognition.
450a25-32 The first impasse: how is it possible for memory to concern the past?
Aristotle insists that the proper object of memory is the remembering subject’s
own past cognitive activity. This realist approach to memory raises a problem. If
memory takes up past cognition, how is past cognition accessed? The act of
remembrance occurs in the present and takes up a present, intentional object. How can
memory be about past cognition when the object that remembrance engages is something
present?
And one might be at a loss over how one remembers what is not present (τὸ μὴ παρόν) because the
affection is present (τοῦ πάθους παρόντος), but the deed is absent (τοῦ πράγματος ἀπόντος).111
111

ἀπορήσειε δ΄ ἄν τις πῶς ποτε τοῦ μὲν πάθους παρόντος τοῦ δὲ πράγματος ἀπόντος μνημονεύεται τὸ μὴ
παρόν.
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(450a25-27)

The deed (pragma) is the remembering subject’s past cognitive activity.112 Past cognition
is absent, but not in respect of location. What is past is absent from the present and such
absence is more absolute than spatial absence. If something exists some place, one can,
in principle, go to it. But those things that have slipped into the past cannot be got back
in the flesh. The object of memory is something absent, both spatially and temporally,
but is nonetheless something of which the remembering subject is cognizant. The present
affection refers to the correlative object of remembrance, but what is meant by object of
remembrance must be understood carefully. Phantasmata are set up directly by sense
perception, and memory arises from the phantasma previously set up. It is by perceiving
the present phantasma, previously set up by past sense perception, that the remembering
subject is directed to its past perception. Is the object of memory the present phantasma
or what the present phantasma represents? Memory should look through the present
phantasma to the absent past that the phantasma represents.
In 449b19, Aristotle argues that recall and remembrance follow upon the
possession of previous sense perception or supposition without the actuality and says of
memory in b24-25 that it is the hexis or affection of perception or supposition after the
passage of time. The affection turns out to be a phantasma that arises due to sense
perception in actuality. Aristotle has argued that memory requires a sense of time
(449b28-30) and that time is perceived by that in virtue of which magnitude and motion
are perceived, namely, by the primary power of sense (450a9-12). Thus, the sense of
time that enters into remembrance is a function of the sense power. Further, memory
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Deed (πρᾶγμα) further emphasizes that memory concerns past cognition of objects rather than past
objects of cognition.
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cannot be without phantasmata, which are affections of the common sense power (a1213). Why there can be no memory without phantasmata is revealed in 450a25-32: a
present proxy is needed to stand in for the absent past. The assertion in 450a27-32 that
the present affection arises due to sense perception and in the part of the body that
contains it is a reminder that all memory involves phantasia. The affection that
constitutes memory turns out to be a phantasma that serves as a likeness of previous
cognition.
In 450a25-32, Aristotle begins to discuss some of the features of memory as an
affection of sense perception or supposition, i.e., of memory as a phantasma. Because
the affection that remembrance deals with has present aspect, it is unclear how
remembrance can be about past, absent cognition. Because the past, absent cognition
cannot be had in the flesh, Aristotle must embrace a form of indirect realism:
remembrance is about the rememberer’s past, but a present affection must stand in for the
absent past.
And one might be at a loss over how one remembers what is not present because the affection is
present, but the deed is absent. For clearly it is necessary to conceive the sort of thing that comes
about due to perception in the soul and in the part of the body containing perception to be a sort of lifedrawing, the affection concerning which we call memory the hexis: for the motion arising from the
sense-affection stamps in a sort of impression, just like those do who affix seals with their signet
rings.113 (450a25-30)

It is necessary to conceive of an affection as functionally analogous to a life-drawing of
the sense activity from which it derives precisely because the past cognition memory
concerns cannot itself be present. Because the cognition of concern to memory cannot
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ἀπορήσειε δ’ ἄν τις πῶς ποτε τοῦ μὲν πάθους παρόντος τοῦ δὲ πράγματος ἀπόντος μνημονεύεται τὸ μὴ
παρόν. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι δεῖ νοῆσαι τοιοῦτον τὸ γιγνόμενον διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τῷ μορίῳ τοῦ
σώματος τῷ ἔχοντι αὐτήν—οἷον ζωγράφημά τι [τὸ πάθος] οὗ φαμεν τὴν ἕξιν μνήμην εἶναι· ἡ γὰρ
γιγνομένη κίνησις ἐνσημαίνεται οἷον τύπον τινὰ τοῦ αἰσθήματος, καθάπερ οἱ σφραγιζόμενοι τοῖς
δακτυλίοις.
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persist in the present, it is necessary to posit something abiding and present that stands in
for the absent past cognition. Further, whatever the act of remembrance engages with
must be something that persists in the present. If remembrance relies on and engages
with a present affection rather than directly with the absent past, how is any realism in
memory maintained? Aristotle says that the affection is a sort of life-drawing
(ζωγράφημα τι) and an impression of a sort (οἷον τύπον τινα) of the sense-affection (τοῦ
αἰσθήματος) from which it derives of which memory is the hexis. (The sense-affection is
the action of the sensible object on the percipient.) The present affection is a phantasma
and likeness derived from the activity of the very cognition of which it is the likeness.
Why the affection is a likeness of the sense activity is because the sense activity is what
gives rise to it and the affection must resemble its cause in certain respects. In De anima
iii 3, Aristotle observes that it is necessary for phantasia to resemble sense perception
because phantasia arises as a result of sense perception according to actuality. Hence,
memory phantasmata will resemble the cognitive act from which they derive and not just
the object formerly cognized. Because the affection with which remembrance engages is
a likeness of the past cognition from which it derives, remembrance can be about the
rememberer’s past cognition indirectly. Realism is maintained to the extent that the
present proxy is both dependent upon and derived from some past cognition and because
the proxy is like the cognition from which it derives. The abiding, present affection is
caused by the perception or cognition at which the act of remembrance is directed and the
affection is like the cognition that gave rise to it. Thus, when the remembering subject
engages with the present affection with an awareness (aisthêsis) that what the affection
presents belongs to the rememberer’s past, then there is an indirect perception of the past

124

cognition. The affection is like the past cognition from which it is derived and the
awareness that what is presented belongs to the past allows the present affection to stand
in for the absent past cognition of which it is a likeness. (Likeness does not mean strict
structural isomorphism, but there must be enough relevant similarity so that cognizance
of the affection functions as remembrance of the past cognition when combined with a
sense of past time).
Why it is useful to call memory an affection (449b24-25) is now clearer: memory
as an affection is a phantasma that represents or indicates former cognition. Memory
phantasmata function as the correlative corresponding objects of acts of remembrance;
memory phantasmata function as memories. As a sort of “life-drawing” and
“impression” of absent, former cognitive activity, the memory phantasma answers the
question of how it is possible to possess former perception or supposition of X without
the activity. The phantasma that enters into memory is a likeness. Aristotle refers to the
memory phantasma as a thing remembered (μνημόνευμα, see 450b25-27 and b30-51a2).
How memory is a hexis concerning sense perception or supposition after the passage of
time also is now explained. Memory is a hexis of former cognition because memory
preserves a likeness derived from the former cognition. Memory as a hexis includes
retention. As in 449b24-25, there is no mention in 450a25-30 of any sense of time in the
articulation of memory. The considerations that follow 450a25-30 concern the condition
of the body and how bodily condition affects the quality and preservation of the memory
phantasma. The absence of any mention of time sense combined with the attention
Aristotle gives to the conditions affecting the preservation of the memory phantasma
suggest strongly that memory has an application as storage and retention. Memory is the
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dispositional retention of phantasmata that function as proxies for former cognition.
Aristotle invokes a rich set of metaphors in order to stress what sort of
resemblance the phantasma has with its cause. Later Aristotle will explain that the
memory phantasma is a likeness (450b20-51a2), but it is only in 450a27-32 that Aristotle
explains what sort of likeness the memory phantasma is. Aristotle is cautious and
reserved in his employment of metaphors. Each metaphor is conjoined with an indefinite
adjective (ζωγράφημα τι, τύπον τινα), indicating that we are not to take the metaphors
literally or flatly. The account of the memory phantasma concentrates on its function;
memory phantasma have a function analogous to paintings, but we are not to suppose
that there are tiny pictures impressed into the primary sense organ.
All phantasia resembles sense perception, but not all phantasia will furnish
memory phantasmata. Aristotle nicely refers to the memory phantasma as a life-drawing
of a sort (ζωγράφημα τι). The noun ζωγράφημα is from ζωγραφεῖν, to paint from life.
Just as phantasia resembles sense perception according to actuality, a life-drawing
captures a particular living thing and presents it in a lower form of reality. The
comparison of a memory phantasma to a life-drawing shows that the memory phantasma
does not merely resemble sense perception according to actuality, but resembles some
particular, previous sense activity. Much phantasia is false and need not resemble any
actual prior sense activity, although all phantasia resembles sense activity. Phantasia is
set up by sense perception in actuality and resembles perception as a result, but not all
phantasia will be of the sort that is present in genuine remembrance. I can have
phantasia of a purple fire-breathing elephant that chews gum while riding a unicycle in
Topeka, Kansas, but such phantasia cannot be a likeness to any actual, prior cognition.
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Crazies, like Antipheron of Oreus (451a8-12), may end up having their fire-breathing
elephant phantasia conjoined to a sense of past time and so seem to themselves to
remember seeing a fire-breathing pachyderm (see 451a8-12 and 52b23-29). Hence,
saying of the memory phantasma that it is a sort of life-drawing supplies an implicit
differentia for the memory phantasma. All phantasmata are phantasia presentations of
sense-like activity and are causally derived from past acts of perceiving, but only memory
phantasmata both arise due to sense activity and resemble the sense activity from which
they derive. (We should not be misled by Aristotle’s comparison of the memory
phantasmata to a sort of life-drawing into supposing that all memory phantasmata and
phantasia presentations generally are pictorial or imagistic.114 Probably this is one reason
why Aristotle is careful to say that memory phantasmata are a life-drawing of a sort.)
In what sense do memory phantasmata resemble the sense activity from which
they derive? Aristotle analogizes the memory phantasma to a life-drawing and then
provides an explanation for why the comparison is suitable. Aristotle employs sigillary
metaphors that recall both Plato’s treatment of memory in the Theaetetus and Aristotle’s
own treatment of sense perception in De anima ii 12.
For the emergent motion (ἡ γὰρ γιγνομένη κίνησις) marks in as a seal (ἐνσημαίνεται) an imprint of a
sort of the sense-affection (αἰσθήμα), just as those who affix seals with their signet rings do. 115
(450a30-32)

The emergent motion (ἡ γιγνομένη κίνησις) is probably a reference to what emerges in
the percipient in sense perception due to the action of the external sensible object on the
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Richard Sorabji (2004) xi-xix and David Bloch (2007) 67-70 in particular are too much influenced by
Aristotle’s use of picture imagery in De memoria. Memory can be of things heard or smelled and a picture
can hardly be like something smelled or heard. In any case, phantasia resembles sense perception
according to actuality, not sight according to actuality.
115
ἡ γὰρ γιγνομένη κίνησις ἐνσημαίνεται οἷον τύπον τινὰ τοῦ αἰσθήματος, καθάπερ οἱ σφραγιζόμενοι τοῖς
δακτυλίοις.
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percipient. The aisthêma (sense-affection) is whatever motion arises in the percipient
due to the action of the sensible and this motion produces a kind of imprint of the
aisthêma into the physiological seat of perception. The ‘for’ (γάρ) signals the
introduction of an explanation of how the affection (viz. the life-drawing) of which
memory is the hexis arises. The imprint of a sort (οἷον τύπον τινά) is in apposition to the
affection (life-drawing). It is the affection that functions as a life-drawing and imprint of
a particular act of sense perception that solves the impasse raised in 450a25-27 over how
remembrance can be about the absent past by dealing with a present affection. The
affection, life-drawing, and imprint all refer to the memory phantasma that functions as a
likeness of the remembering subject’s prior cognitive activity (450b20-51a2).
Because the imprint is a phantasma, the emergent motion that stamps in the
phantasma could refer either to phantasia or to the aisthêma. The identification of the
emergent motion with the aisthêma makes more sense. In De anima, phantasia is said to
be “that in virtue of which a phantasma arises for us” (428a1-2)116 and “seems to be a
motion of a sort” arising from the sense perception according to actuality and, hence, “it
is necessary for this [phantasia] to be similar to perception” (DA 428b11-14).117
Phantasia is a motion of a sort similar to sense perception according to actuality in virtue
of which a phantasma arises for us. Phantasia and its phantasmata presentations cannot
be motions simply because the presentation of phantasmata is an activity involving soul.
The one who engages in phantasia does not undergo alteration, but realizes a capacity.

116

εἰ δή ἐστιν ἡ φαντασία καθ’ ἣν λέγομεν φάντασμά τι ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι καὶ μὴ εἴ τι κατὰ μεταφορὰν
λέγομεν…
117
ἡ δὲ φαντασία κίνησίς τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως γίνεσθαι ἀλλ’ αἰσθανομένοις καὶ ὧν
αἴσθησις ἔστιν, ἔστι δὲ γίνεσθαι κίνησιν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ταύτην ὁμοίαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι
τῇ αἰσθήσει.
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Still, the treatment of phantasia and phantasmata as motions that are moved movers is
quite useful for Aristotle: sense perception sets in motion phantasmata that can in turn
affect (i.e., “move”) their possessor in ways similar to sense perception (428b30-29a8).
Memory phantasmata are motions which when actualized can move the animal to
perceive them (DM 450b26-51a2). The activity of recollection (restricted to humans)
involves setting in motion associated phantasmata until the recollecting subject is moved
by a phantasma that stands in an ultimate association with the wished-for missing term.
Phantasma covers a broad range of appearances. Because Aristotle distinguishes
phantasia from supposition and sense perception (see DA iii 3), phantasmata do not refer
to the becoming apparent of proper sensible objects or thoughts for us. On the one hand,
the phantasma is a perceptual-like presentation as with dream images, perhaps
afterimages, memory of perceptions, and playful imagination. Such phantasmata are
quasi-perceptual presentations that can appear before the mind in the absence of sense
perception according to actuality. On the other hand, the phantasma is an appearance
separate from things sensed, but which accompanies the perception of a sensible object.
These phantasmata are the way sensible objects appear. An example for which Aristotle
has some fondness is how the sun appears to be a foot wide (DA 428b3-4, De insomn.
460b16-20). Such phantasia or phantasmata may refer to illusory appearances (reason
says that the sun is bigger than the known world) or mistaken appearances as when the
bush appears to be a human being from some distance in the dark. The metaphorical
sense of phantasia probably refers to the application of language describing appearing
where something does not literally appear to us. For example, we say that an argument
appears sound, but the soundness of an argument is not something that literally appears
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before us; soundness is not a physical attribute. We should see that all phantasmata are
related to sense.
The memory phantasma that is like a life-drawing of a sort or an imprint (of a
sort) of the aisthêma belongs to the kind of phantasmata that can appear in the absence of
sense perception according to actuality. Aristotle argues that phantasia is not a critical
power that discriminates among a class of cognitive objects; phantasia is not sense
perception and not any form of supposition (opinion, knowledge, or thinking things
through). If phantasia is not critical, but is that in virtue of which a phantasma arises for
us, phantasia must be a presentative faculty of appearances. Whereas a sense power
discriminates among its objects in virtue of being a mean condition in relation to its
sensible objects and whereas thinking and knowing pick out what something is,
phantasia is a power that presents phantasmata.
There is perhaps some corroboration of this reading of phantasia as a
presentational power rather than a critical faculty from terminological considerations. In
Aristotle’s writings, the nouns aisthêma, noêma and mnêmoneuma are the technical
correlates of the verbal adjectives aisthêton (the sensible object), noêton (the intelligible
object), and mnêmoneuton (the memorable object). However, there is no verbal adjective
phantaston (the “imageable” object) that serves as the correlate to the noun phantasma.
The verbal adjectives appear to signify cognitive objects external to the percipient,
whereas the nouns signify how the external cognitive objects affect or act on the
percipient. Grasping what is intelligible of some intelligible object results in thoughts
(noêmata) and universals (ta katholou) forming in the soul. The form is in the thing, but
the thought or universal is in the soul. The external sensible object acts on the sense
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medium and the percipient’s organ of sense and the aisthêma is the action of the external
sensible object in the perceiver (the external sensible object “moves” the perceiver and
the aisthêma is the “motion” that takes place in the perceiver).
If my interpretation of the –ton and –ma endings is correct, the mnêmoneuton (the
memorable object, 449b9, 50a24) is the former cognition (perception or supposition) that
produces in the subject a mnêmoneuma (450b25-27, 51a2), a memory phantasma of the
former cognition. The mnêmoneuton is “external” to the remembering subject because it
is past and absent, but the memory impression derived from it persists, “in relation to
which memory (μνήμη) is the hexis” (450a30). There is no verbal adjective phantaston
(“the imageable” object) that corresponds to the noun phantasma.118 Sense perception
and intellect discriminate among objects external to the soul.119 Memory (as
remembrance) picks out and discriminates cognition that is past (and so “external”) from
what is present for the remembering subject. In all these cases the external object of
cognition is referenced by the verbal adjective with the –ton ending. Were phantasia
discriminatory, we should expect some verbal adjective that references that at which
phantasia aims as with the other critical capacities.
Further, the -ton verbal adjectives refer to the external object that acts on the
subject so that discrimination of the external object results: the sensible object (aisthêton)
acts on the percipient where the action is the aisthêma whereby sense perception occurs;
the intelligible object (noêton) affects the thinker such that a noêma of the intelligible
object is formed in the soul; the original cognition (mnêmoneuton) gives rise to a memory
presentation (mnêmoneuma) in the soul. We should see that sense perception and mind
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But see phantasta (φάνταστα) in MS E 450a24.
Intellect picks out the essence of external things.
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are put to work by the objects which they discriminate. Phantasia lacks a class of
external objects for which it is a discriminating power: it has no external phantaston, but
only internal phantasmata. This makes sense if phantasia is not critical and is only
presentative.
Finally, we should see that the –ton verbal adjectives give rise to the –ma nouns in
the subject that the former affect. Because phantasia is caused by the activity of sense
perception, phantasia is not put to work by its own special, external object even if it is
that in virtue of which a phantasma occurs to us. Rather, phantasia is set up by sense
perception. Hence, the ultimate efficient cause of phantasmata is the activity of sense
perception.120 Why phantasia is presentational rather than discriminatory is because it is
a motion derivative of the activity of sense perception rather than a faculty put to work by
a special class of objects. Unlike sense perception that is put to work by a sensible
object, phantasia is not raised to actuality by any external phantaston. It is a motion of a
sort set up by sense perception that presents sense-like appearances (phantasmata).
Why phantasia is said to have an object (phantasma) correlative with the
operation of phantasia is because phantasia is a sort of motion that presents something
where phantasmata are the presentations “internal” to the subject who engages in
phantasia. In this way phantasmata are analogous to the internal aisthêmata or noêmata.
While phantasia is said to be a motion of a sort, it must be stressed that Aristotle is quite
reserved and hesitant in his language: phantasia seems (dokei) to be a motion of a sort
(tis) (DA 428b11). Because phantasia has a cognitive dimension, it is not a motion or
change in the regular sense; phantasia is an activity of soul. Aristotle stresses that
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For an alternative interpretation for why there is phantaston for phantasia, see Ronald Polansky (2007)
415.
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phantasia is similar not to sensibles, but to sense perception (428b14, 29a5). Hence,
phantasia is similar not to X perceived, but to the perception of X. How phantasia
differs from sense perception is that unlike the latter, phantasia is neither discriminating
of any class of objects nor is it raised to actuality by a special class of external objects.
Phantasia gives rise to an awareness of X where X is whatever the phantasia motion
presents. The motion of phantasia is an action in virtue of which some phantasma
presents itself to the subject; phantasia is an “as-if” perceiving. In De memoria, Aristotle
emphasizes that the soul perceives the memory phantasma (450b28). Strictly speaking,
the soul does not perceive, but the ensouled animal perceives in virtue of the soul faculty
for sense perception (see DA i 4, 408b13-18). Saying of the soul that it, and not the
animal or human in virtue of it, perceives indicates that the perception being discussed is
not of the standard, normal sort; rather, what is indicated is an awareness (i.e., something
similar to perception of X) of a phantasma presentation, i.e., phantasia. This is
Aristotle’s way of saying saying something appears before the mind in the way that we
speak of mental images before the mind. Remembrance is a special case of the
convergence of phantasia and perception of time. Insofar as remembrance involves the
occurrence of phantasmata derived from sense perception to the remembering subject,
remembrance is presentative and non-discriminating. A presentation of the remembering
subject’s past cognitive activity appears to the remembering subject. Yet insofar as
remembrance distinguishes the past temporal aspect attached to what is presented by the
phantasma in memory from present time in which the act of remembrance and
concomitant perceptions take place, remembrance is discriminating and perceptual.
Because the memory phantasma serves as the link to and the proxy for the past
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and because the memory phantasma is derived from the aisthêma that enters perception,
we must understand what the aisthêma is in order to understand how the phantasma is
able to function as a likeness and proxy for past cognition. Aristotle leaves us mostly on
our own to determine what the aisthêma is, but De insomniis suggests that the aisthêma is
whatever motion with which the percipient is moved by the sensible object acting on the
percipient.
What the dream is, and how it comes about, one may see especially from the things that happen along
with sleep. For the sensibles (τὰ αἰσθητά) proper to each organ of sense produce sense perception in
us, and the emergent affection (πάθος) due to them [the sensibles] not only persist in the organs of
sense when the perceptions are in actuality, but after they [the sensibles] depart. 121 (459a24-28)

Dreams arise because affections from perception remain after perception has ceased and
continue to affect their subject during sleep when the discriminating faculty is unable to
oppose the appearance produced by the abiding affection. Affection (πάθος) in the
passage quoted could refer either to aisthêmata or to phantasmata. All Aristotle needs to
do at the outset of his discussion on dreams is to secure that something resembling sense
activity remains after sense perception has ceased in order to account for dreams. The
succeeding passages (459a28-60a32) explain how there can be abiding resemblances of
perception in the percipient and provide examples of abiding resemblances. After giving
some examples of persisting perceptual resemblances and explaining how such
resemblances may persist, Aristotle discusses more fully the affection mentioned in
459a24-28. Having secured how and that there is a persisting affection from perception,
Aristotle refers to the persisting affection more precisely as an aisthêma.
Regarding the starting point of the inquiry, let one thing be posited, which is plain from what has been
said, that the aisthêmata remain, being perceptible, even when the external sensible object (τοῦ
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Τί δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνύπνιον, καὶ πῶς γίνεται, ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸν ὕπνον συμβαινόντων μάλιστ’ ἂν θεωρήσαιμεν.
τὰ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ καθ’ ἕκαστον αἰσθητήριον ἡμῖν ἐμποιοῦσιν αἴσθησιν, καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ὑπ’ αὐτῶν πάθος οὐ
μόνον ἐνυπάρχει ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις ἐνεργουσῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπελθουσῶν.
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θύραθεν αἰσθητοῦ) has departed.122 (460b1-3)

The language here carefully recalls 459a24-8. “Even when the external sensible has
departed,” indicates that the aisthêma is an affection present during sense perception in
actuality, but which persists also after the external sensible object has departed and sense
perception is no longer actual. The sense is in potency what the external sensible
(quality) is when in actuality (DA ii 5, 418a36) and the action of the sense and that of the
external sensible are one in number, but the action issues from the external sensible and
takes place in that on which the sensible acts, namely, the sensible medium and the sense
itself (DA iii 2, 425b25-a6). The action that emerges in the percipient as a result of being
acted upon by the external sensible object is called an aisthêma, often translated as
“sense-impression,” but is better translated as “sense-affection” to avoid contamination
with thoughts of Hume or sense-data. Aristotle is clear that the object at which sense
perception is directed and of which the perceiver is aware is the external sensible quality.
Sense perception in general is the reception of the sensible form of the sensible object
without the matter (DA ii 12, 424a16ff.), but an aisthêma remains after the sensible object
departs and no longer acts upon the sense, hence, after the sense ceases to receive a
sensible form in actuality.
The aisthêma cannot refer to the sensible form received. Perception is the
reception of the sensible form of the external sensible object, but the aisthêma remains
after perception of the external sensible object is over (when the sensible object has
ceased to act on the sensible medium and percipient). If the aisthêma is identical with the
sensible form and remains after the external sensible object departs, perception should
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πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς σκέψιν ὑποκείσθω ἓν μέν, ὅπερ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων φανερόν, ὅτι καὶ ἀπελθόντος
τοῦ θύραθεν αἰσθητοῦ ἐμμένει τὰ αἰσθήματα αἰσθητὰ ὄντα.
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continue in the absence of the external sensible object. Because perception does not
continue in the absence of the external sensible object, the aisthêma cannot be identified
with the sensible form received. Rather, the aisthêma must refer to whatever stimulations
occur in the percipient due to the action of the sensible object on the percipient, which
stimulations gives rise to the reception of sensible form and perception of the external
sensible object. As De anima iii 2 indicates, the perceiver is moved with the activity of
the external sensible object; the aisthêma refers to the motion from the external sensible
object by which the percipient is moved that gives rise to perception of the external
sensible object (i.e., that gives rise to reception of sensible form).
Some argue that perception of the external sensible object (aisthêton) is through
awareness of the aisthêma, effectively saddling Aristotle with a kind of indirect realism.
Stephen Everson (1997) 177 writes, “The external object acts on the sense organ so as to
produce an aisthêma, which is then transmitted to the central organ. The subject
perceives the external object because he is aware of that aisthêma.”123 Jessica Moss
(2012) 51 urges that, “To become aware of the aisthêma is to exercise perception—to
perceive the external object.” In a footnote, Moss, following Everson, adds, “to say that
one is aware of the aisthêma is not to say that it is the object of one’s perception; rather,
one perceives the external perceptible object by being aware of the aisthêma.”124 The
position here is that the percipient experiences perceiving external object X in virtue of
being aware of internal object Y that is produced by X. If perception of the external
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Everson elaborates in footnote (loc. cit.): “Wedin (1988), 37, comments that ‘Ordinarily, I am not aware
of the perceptual state, or aisthêma, but only of the truck.’ This, however, confuses what it is to be an
object of awareness with what it is to be an object of perception. Ordinarily I will perceive the truck but
will do so in virtue of being aware of the aisthêma. What is represented as being in front of me is the truck
and that is indeed what I shall have beliefs about if I assent to the perception. This is quite consistent with
the fact that it is the aisthêma which is the object of awareness.”
124
Loc. cit.
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sensible is through awareness of the aisthêma produced by the external sensible object,
then there is not direct perception of the external sensible object. Everson seems led to
this position due to De Insomn. 460b2-3125: “after the departure of the external sensible
object, the aisthêmata remain within, being perceptible” (ὅτι καὶ ἀπελθόντος τοῦ θύραθεν
αἰσθητοῦ ἐμμένει τὰ αἰσθήματα αἰσθητὰ ὄντα).” Certainly Aristotle says that the
aisthêmata are perceptible beings (αἰσθήματα αἰσθητὰ ὄντα). Everson’s point seems to
be that when the external sensible object is presently affecting the percipient, the
awareness of the affection constitutes perception of the external sensible object, but when
the sensible departs, the affection remains as something perceptible, but in an altered
form as a phantasma. Everson writes,
The aisthêma is the affection of the aisthêtikon produced by the sense-object and it is this of which the
subject is aware in perception. For such awareness to occur, it is not in fact necessary that the affection
should be produced by an external object, although when it is not, it is a phantasma rather than an
aisthêma. Indeed, it seems that when the affection is not due to the continued activity of the senseobject on the organs, it then becomes a phantasma.126

Pace Everson, if the aisthêma remains and is perceptible after the departure of the
sensible object and perception of the sensible object is due to awareness of the aisthêma,
then why does not awareness of the aisthêma after the departure of the sensible object
yield a continued perception of the now departed sensible object? For the aisthêma of
which there can be perception remains (460b2-3), but the sensible object has departed.
Aristotle plainly asserts that the aisthêma remains as an aisthêma after the departure of
the sensible object. Sense perception in general is the reception of the sensible form and
it is the sensible form of which the percipient becomes aware. If my argumentation is
correct, the aisthêma cannot be identifiable with the sensible form because the aisthêma
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Everson (1997) 177: “Aristotle takes the aisthêmata themselves to be aisthêta, objects of perception
(460b2-3).”
126
Everson (1997) 175.
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remains when the sensible object has ceased to act on the sense medium and sense organ.
The sensible form is the aisthêton that is the sensible object in the governing sense, while
the aisthêma is the affection occurring in the percipient such that the perception of the
sensible object occurs. Generally, in sense perception it is the aisthêton that is perceived
and of which the percipient is aware. In Everson’s defense, Aristotle also clearly affirms
that the aisthêma is something perceptible, but when this occurs, probably it is an
experience parasitic on perception, such as when we turn away from looking at
something bright and “see” an afterimage for some little while (see De insomn. 459b7-20
for examples). The aisthêma can become perceptible under certain conditions, but it is
when sense perception is disrupted. Under normal conditions, the aisthêma involved
with the perception of the sensible object is obscured by the perception of the sensible
object. It may be that the aisthêma alters upon the departure of the sensible object such
that the aisthêma becomes a phantasma. But if awareness of the aisthêma is that in
virtue of which one perceives external sensibles and the aisthêma remains unaltered and
perceptible after the departure of the sensible, then perception of the aisthêma would
yield perception of the departed sensible, which circumstance does not obtain for
Aristotle. Even if Everson is granted his thesis (which I do not) that perception of the
external sensible is obtained indirectly through an awareness of the internal aisthêma, the
aisthêma and phantasma cannot be identified simply as one and the same on the grounds
that awareness of phantasmata does not amount to perceiving.
Aristotle’s account in De anima iii 3 suggests that sense perception according to
actuality, rather than an external phantaston (which does not exist in Aristotle’s writings),
is responsible for the emergence of phantasmata in us. More precisely, in De insomniis,
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Aristotle claims that phantasmata come about due to aisthêmata. Robert Bolton (2005)
231-33, citing De Insomniis 461a18-19, urges that the phantasma is an element of the
aisthêma on the grounds that the aisthêma is said to persist as a phantasma, but I do not
read the passage on which Bolton relies the same way (the passage speaks of a persisting
motion derived from the aisthêma; the passage does not say that the motion persisting is
the same things as the aisthêma). There is no passage where Aristotle directly states that
the aisthêma itself persists as a phantasma. It must be admitted that Aristotle never
defines just what an aisthêma is. The fact that the aisthêma is said to remain after the
departure of the sensible object certainly makes it sound as if the aisthêma and
phantasma may be synonyms depending on the context. But it seems clear enough that
however long aisthêmata persist after the departure of the sensible object, phantasmata
last longer. For instance, phantasmata, not aisthêmata, are said to serve as the vehicle
for memory content. Bolton reads the term aisthêma as referring broadly to a
“perceptual state,” meaning, presumably, whatever goes on in the percipient during
perception.127 Citing De anima 428b17-30, Bolton argues that because phantasia enters
not only into the perception of common and incidental sensibles (regarding which
falsehood and misperception is possible), but also is concomitant with the veridical
perception of the proper sensibles, that phantasia is required for veridical perception,
reading phantasia as a “presentation to me of the sensory appearance of something.”128
Hence, because phantasia accompanies sense perception according to actuality,
phantasmata presentations of phantasia will be included in the aisthêma (the perceptual
state). But just because phantasia is concomitant with veridical perception of proper
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Bolton (2005) 232.
Ibid., 230-1.
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sensibles need not imply that phantasia is an essential ingredient of the aisthêma that
features in the perception of proper sensibles. The concomitant status of phantasia with
sense perception is easily enough explained by Aristotle’s commitment to the necessity
that what is in motion must be in contact with and moved by a mover. Sense perception
as mover gives rise to phantasia as what is moved. Further, there are several passages in
De Insomniis suggesting that the phantasmata are produced by and separate from the
aisthêma.
From these things it is clear that not only are the motions that arise from (ἀπό) the aisthêmata…129
(460b28-30)
So too in sleep the phantasmata and the other residual motions, the ones that arise from (ἀπό) the
aisthêmata…130 (461a18-19)
When the blood in the sanguineous has settled and separated off, the preserved motion of the
aisthêmata in each of the sense organs makes the dreams connect together. 131 (461a25-27)
Each of these [phantasmata], as has been mentioned, is a remnant of the aisthêma in actuality…132
(461b21-22)
[The dream is] the phantasma, the one from (ἀπό) the motion of the aisthêma…133 (462a29-30)

These passages suggest that phantasmata are derived from, but become separate from
aisthêmata. Aristotle’s use of apo (ἀπό) makes probable the reading that the phantasma
is (at least eventually) separate from and not a property of the aisthêma. The reason why
is that apo indicates not just a relation to something as a source and origin, but also
separation and departure from the source (see Smyth §1684). Bolton rightly emphasizes
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Ἐκ δὴ τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἐγρηγορότων αἱ κινήσεις αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθημάτων γινόμεναι τῶν τε
θύραθεν καὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος ἐνυπάρχουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅταν γένηται τὸ πάθος τοῦτο ὃ καλεῖται ὕπνος,
καὶ μᾶλλον τότε φαίνονται.
130
οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῷ καθεύδειν τὰ φαντάσματα καὶ αἱ ὑπόλοιποι κινήσεις αἱ συμβαίνουσαι ἀπὸ τῶν
αἰσθημάτων ὁτὲ μὲν ὑπὸ μείζονος οὔσης τῆς εἰρημένης κινήσεως ἀφανίζονται πάμπαν.
131
καθισταμένου δὲ καὶ διακρινομένου τοῦ αἵματος ἐν τοῖς ἐναίμοις, σῳζομένη τῶν αἰσθημάτων ἡ κίνησις
ἀφ’ ἑκάστου τῶν αἰσθητηρίων εἰρόμενά τε ποιεῖ τὰ ἐνύπνια.
132
τούτων δὲ ἕκαστόν ἐστιν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὑπόλειμμα τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ αἰσθήματος.
133
ἀλλὰ τὸ φάντασμα τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως τῶν αἰσθημάτων, ὅταν ἐν τῷ καθεύδειν ᾖ, ᾗ καθεύδει, τοῦτ’
ἐστὶν ἐνύπνιον.
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that these passages do not mean that phantasmata are not present concomitantly with
aisthêmata.134 But the concurrence of phantasmata with aisthêmata does not mean that
phantasmata are not the result of and separate from aisthêmata. Once the effect (motion)
has been produced by the cause (mover), cause (mover) and effect (the moved) can exist
concomitantly as boiling water is separate from but exists concomitantly alongside the
flame that moves the water with its heat. In De anima iii 3, Aristotle distinguishes
phantasia from sense perception (which includes the aisthêma), but has phantasia present
during sense perception according to actuality. De insomniis indicates more precisely
that the aspect of sense perception according to actuality that is productive of phantasia
presentations (phantasmata) is the aisthêma, the action of the sensible object on the
percipient. Phantasmata are not modified aisthêmata, but rather phantasia presentations
that are generated due to aisthêmata. The aisthêma is the action (whatever shaking or
moving of the organ or afterimage that arises and lingers) that is produced in the
perceiving subject due to the sensible object acting on the percipient. Phantasmata are
sense-like presentations that arise due to the aisthêma. Aisthêmata as the actions of
perceiving in the percipient are not phantasmata inasmuch as phantasmata are not
actions of perceiving in its own right, but sense-like presentations that arise in the
percipient as a result of the activity of perceiving.135
The way is now prepared to appreciate better the extent to which memory
phantasmata resemble the sense activity from which they arise. De anima provides
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Ibid., 233 f. 17
Ronald Polansky suggested to me the helpful distinction between an action of sense perception and a
presentation of it. De insomn. 461a25-27 can be read to indicate the persistence of the motion that belongs
to the aisthêma rather than a motion that persists from the aisthêma (the genitive is ambiguous). However,
the subsequent passages, especially 461b21-22, suggest something that remains after the aisthêma has
departed. See my commentary on De anima 432a7-10 in the next paragraph for corroborating evidence.
135
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further evidence that the aisthêma and phantasma differ, while providing additional clues
about their relation and similarity.
And on account of this the one who perceives nothing would not learn and not be aware of anything,
and whenever one contemplates, it is necessary to contemplate some phantasma: for the phantasmata
are just as the aisthêmata, except without the matter.136 (432a7-10)

Because the intelligibility of things is in or with the perceptible forms (432a3-6), it is
possible to learn about and gain knowledge only of that of which one has had perception.
Aristotle is explaining how phantasmata figure into learning and contemplation of
intelligible forms. If intelligibility is embedded in the sensible forms, then all thinking
will be dependent on sense perception or a vehicle capable of presenting what has been
sensed. Phantasmata are especially suitable for learning if phantasmata of what has been
sensed are retained long after sense perception is over. Phantasmata differ from
aisthêmata because the phantasmata are present without the matter, whereas aisthêmata
are not. Without the matter cannot mean that phantasmata are immaterial or
unenmattered. De memoria speaks of the phantasma as something impressed into the
organ of sense (450a27-32), as affected by physiological conditions (a32-b11), and as
things possessing something like motion according to place in the body (453a20 ff.). De
insomniis indicates that phantasmata are in the sense organs (461a25-27, 62a8-11) and
are carried around in the blood (461b10-15). Because the soul is cognizant of
phantasmata, these cannot be normal sorts of motion, but the passages cited make it clear
that phantasmata have a physiological location and are subject to physiological
influences within the body. The aisthêmata are also identified closely with the organs of
sense (459a25-28, 59b6-7, possibly 61a25-27). Hence, phantasmata and aisthêmata are
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καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανόμενος μηθὲν οὐθὲν ἂν μάθοι οὐδὲ ξυνείη, ὅταν τε θεωρῇ, ἀνάγκη ἅμα
φάντασμά τι θεωρεῖν· τὰ γὰρ φαντάσματα ὥσπερ αἰσθήματά ἐστι, πλὴν ἄνευ ὕλης.
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not distinguished by physiological dependence. Rather, the mention of matter must be a
reference to the external, embodied sensible object that acts on the percipient.137 Whereas
the aisthêma is dependent on the presence of an external, sensible object, the phantasma
produced by the aisthêma may persist long after the departure of the sensible object.
De insomniis 460a32-b3 puts pressure on the reading that the aisthêma is
dependent on the presence of an external object because there it is said that aisthêmata
persist even after the departure of the external sensible. But we should see that the
aisthêma is the action of the sensible object on the perceptual system, that is, the motion
in the percipient involved in the reception of the sensible form. The proximate cause of
the phantasma is the aisthêma motion, whereas the proximate cause of the aisthêma is
the external sensible object. Even if the aisthêma persists for some time, the aisthêma
does not re-actualize after the departure of the external sensible object or affect the
percipient anew. Eventually, it fades away. Phantasmata, especially memory
phantasmata, are retained and can affect their possessor in the absence of the external
sensible objet. Memory phantasmata can affect their possessor over and over anew in
the absence of the external sensible objects and aisthêmata from which they originated.
Caused by the aisthêma, the phantasma is similar to the aisthêsis which the aisthêma
accompanied. The phantasma affects the percipient in ways similar to the aisthêma (“for
the phantasmata are just as the aisthêma, except without the matter”). The persistence of
phantasmata in the absence of sensible objects is crucial for learning and thinking
because the continued presence of phantasma allows for sustained examination and
contemplation things sensed. Were contemplation of the intelligible features of natural
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In this conclusion, I am in agreement with Bolton 2005 (232 f. 16) and Ronald Polansky (2007) 498.
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beings possible only during active perception, learning would be severely handicapped
and practical deliberations would likewise suffer. Freedom from particular sensible
objects enables phantasmata to allow for generalization in thought (the phantasma can be
either a presentation of an actual particular instance of a kind previously sensed or it can
be a presentation of a generic example of a kind). Being less tied to particular sensibles,
phantasmata allow for thinking in universal as well as particular terms.
In De anima iii 7, phantasma and aisthêma are also compared where the context
concerns practical thinking. For the power of the soul that thinks over things, the
phantasmata are present in the way the aisthêmata are.
Being pleased and being pained is the actuality of the mean state in the sensitive power in relation to
the good and the bad as such. And the actuality of pursuance and avoidance are the same thing, and
neither is the pursuant power different from aversive power, neither from each other nor from the
sensitive power: but they differ in being. And for the soul that thinks things over the phantasmata are
present as are the aisthêmata. And whenever one affirms or denies good or bad, one avoids or
pursues.138 (431a10-16)

When the sensitive power is affected by things good or bad, pleasure and pain arise.
Aristotle cannot mean that whatever appears pleasant is good for the percipient because it
appears pleasant. Rather, what is perceived as good is accompanied by pleasure.
Aristotle’s thesis is that pleasure results from being acted on by what is good relative to
the current condition the sensitive power happens to be in. For example, if the sense
power is currently cold, heat is pleasant. If exceedingly hungry, any kind of food may be
pleasant. The details, however, are not important for my present concerns. What we
should see is that sense perception of objects as good and bad relative to the current state
of the mean condition in the sensitive power gives rise to pleasure and pain. Talk of the
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καὶ ἔστι τὸ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τὸ ἐνεργεῖν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ᾗ
τοιαῦτα. καὶ ἡ φυγὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις ταὐτό, ἡ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν, καὶ οὐχ ἕτερον τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν καὶ τὸ φευκτικόν,
οὔτ’ ἀλλήλων οὔτε τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ· ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι ἄλλο. τῇ δὲ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ τὰ φαντάσματα οἷον
αἰσθήματα ὑπάρχει, ὅταν δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν φήσῃ ἢ ἀποφήσῃ, φεύγει ἢ διώκει·
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pursuant and aversive powers suggests that the pleasure and pain can be physiological or
psychological. The crucial lines are, “And for the soul that thinks things over the
phantasmata are present as are the aisthêmata. And whenever it affirms or denies as
good or bad, one avoids or pursues” (τῇ δὲ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ τὰ φαντάσματα οἷον
αἰσθήματα ὑπάρχει, ὅταν δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν φήσῃ ἢ ἀποφήσῃ, φεύγει ἢ διώκει, 431a1416). Phantasmata are necessary for thinking in general (see DA 431a16-17 and DM
449b31), but the emphasis here on pleasure and pain makes the context practical. The
aisthêma is the affection produced in the percipient by the action of the external sensible
object. If this affection is preservative or agreeable to the current mean condition of the
sensitive power, there will be pleasure felt, but if destructive, pain will be felt. For the
soul that thinks things through, the aisthêma that produces or is accompanied by pleasure
or pain is the source of a decision to pursue or flee from the sensible object responsible
for the aisthêma. Deliberation concerning a present aisthêma may be in reaction to
present pleasure or pain, but may also involve anticipatory pleasures and pains, as when
one judges from the perception of the movement of fire in the distance that this is the fire
signal of the enemy approaching (431b5-6). Phantasmata are present to the dianoetic
power in the same way that aisthêmata are for the sensitive or dianoetic power. Crucially,
Aristotle notes,
For the noetic power thinks the forms in the phantasmata, and because the things of pursuit and
avoidance are demarcated for the power in the phantasmata, and apart from sense perception,
whenever the noetic power is [concentrating] on phantasmata, it is moved.139 (431b2-4)

Here the reference to forms includes the intelligible and the sensible. Because the
phantasma is a presentation of sensible forms even apart from sense perception, the
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τὰ μὲν οὖν εἴδη τὸ νοητικὸν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ, καὶ ὡς ἐν ἐκείνοις ὥρισται αὐτῷ τὸ διωκτὸν καὶ
φευκτόν, καὶ ἐκτὸς τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ὅταν ἐπὶ τῶν φαντασμάτων ᾖ, κινεῖται·
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phantasma can move the soul in ways similar to sense perception. This means that
phantasmata are productive of states similar to the aisthêmata. Why the phantasmata is
productive of similar states is because the phantasmata are caused by the aisthêmata.
Caused by an aisthêma, a phantasma will have features that necessarily resemble an
aisthêma and the phantasma will be capable of affecting (moving) its possessor in similar
ways. Hence, Aristotle claims that phantasmata are just like aisthêmata, except without
the matter (without the presence of the external sensible object). As similar to the
aisthêma, the memory phantasma can return the remembering subject to the perception
that produced the aisthêma.
Aristotle speaks very carefully in De memoria when he has the memory
phantasma be a likeness of the aisthêma. Were the memory phantasma an impression
merely of the object sensed (an impression of the sensible form received alone), then
memory would be of objects perceived only. There is perhaps some textual corroboration
in De memoria for the position that the memory phantasmata resemble former states of
perception and not just sensible objects.
Sometimes when motions of this sort [memory phantasma] arise in the soul from prior sense
perception (τοῦ αἰσθέσθαι), we do not know whether the motions come about due to having sense
perceived (τὸ ᾐσθῆσθαι), and we are in doubt whether it is a memory or not. 140 (451a2-5)

The passage suggests that phantasmata come about due to the perception of the sensible
objects. The cause of the memory phantasma is a prior perception brought about by an
external sensible object. Were memory only of objects perceived rather than of the
perception of objects, memory could not be of things as past because the cognition of
time requires cognizance of before and after according to motion. In order for an object
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καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐνίοτ’ οὐκ ἴσμεν, ἐγγινομένων ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοιούτων κινήσεων ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰσθέσθαι
πρότερον, εἰ κατὰ τὸ ᾐσθῆσθαι συμβαίνει, καὶ εἰ ἔστι μνήμη ἢ οὔ, διστάζομεν·
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to be remembered as past, the object must be conceived as attached to a motion and it is
the rememberer’s past cognitive activity that supplies the needed motion. If an object of
cognition is conceived separately from any former cognition of it, the object will be
temporally positionless. The object will not be conceived as belonging to any continuum
of motions. Hence, Aristotle carefully has the memory phantasma as an impression of
the aisthêma of past perception; that is, the memory phantasma is an impression of the
action by which the sensible form is received. In this way the memory phantasma
resembles the perception of the sensible object and not just a likeness of the object
perceived. I have stressed that the aisthêma is the action whereby the sensible form is
received by the sense power. If the aisthêma consists of whatever action that features in
perception of the sensible form, then the phantasma that arises from this action will
resemble it. Presumably, Aristotle allows for a range of resemblance. Some
remembrance is merely that one cognized X before, whereas at other times remembrance
is quite rich and relives that past cognition in some detail. What is required of a memory
phantasma is that it indicate or resemble past cognition (i.e., that the memory phantasma
be a sort of life-drawing of previous cognition).
In De memoria, Aristotle compares the relation of the memory phantasma and the
aisthêma from which it derives to the relation between a design pressed into wax from a
ring with a design etched into it. The metaphor is taken directly from the treatment of
memory in Theaetetus.
Socrates: Grant for me for the sake of the argument a block of wax in our souls, larger for some,
smaller for others, and of purer wax for some, but dirtier for others, and of more sclerotic wax for
some, of more fluid for others, but for some of due proportion. — Theaetetus: I grant it. — Socrates:
We might see it to be a gift from the mother of the Muses, Mnemosyne, and into this [wax], of the
things we have seen or heard or considered that we wish to remember, holding the wax under our
perceptions and considerations, we stamp in an impression, just like we mark in a signet relief from
rings: and that which is impressed, one remembers and knows so long as the image of it persists
within. But that which gets wiped away or does not become impressed, one forgets and does not
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know.141 (191c8-e1)

Aristotle substitutes the physical seat of perception for wax, but otherwise keeps the
imagery. Aristotle borrows the same verb for the stamping into the organ the phantasma
impression of the aisthêma that Plato uses to describe the stamping in of a signet design:
ἐνσημαίνεσθαι. Also borrowed from Plato is the reference to a tupos (τύπος), an
impression or hollow mold (Plato speaks of the act stamping in an impression
(ἀποτυποῦσθαι). The metaphor of impressing the design from a signet ring into wax
recalls also the discussion of the reception of sensible form without the matter in De
anima ii 12. As the wax receives the design of the signet without the matter of the signet,
so the organ receives a phantasma of the aisthêma that features in an act of perception.
For the emergent motion (ἡ γὰρ γιγνομένη κίνησις) marks in (ἐνσημαίνεται) an imprint (τύπον) of a
sort of the sense-affection (αἰσθήμα), just as those who affix seals with their signet rings do. 142
(450a30-32)

If my reading is correct, the emergent motion refers to the aisthêma, the action of the
sensible object on the perceptual system. Hence, the metaphor has the aisthêma stand in
relation to the phantasma as the enmattered signet design stands in relation to the
impression stamped into wax or some other suitable material fit to receive the impression.
The metaphor is complicated. The reception of an impression of the signet design by a
suitable substrate recalls De anima ii 12.
About all sense perception in general, it is necessary to grasp that the sense is receptive of the
sensible form without the matter, just as the wax receives the design from the ring without the
iron or the gold, and takes up the golden or bronze design, but not insofar as it is gold or
141

{ΣΩ.} Θὲς δή μοι λόγου ἕνεκα ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν ἐνὸν κήρινον ἐκμαγεῖον, τῷ μὲν μεῖζον, τῷ δ’
ἔλαττον, καὶ τῷμὲν καθαρωτέρου κηροῦ, τῷ δὲ κοπρωδεστέρου, καὶ σκληροτέρου, ἐνίοις δὲ ὑγροτέρου,
ἔστι δ’ οἷς μετρίως ἔχοντος. {ΘΕΑΙ.} Τίθημι. {ΣΩ.} Δῶρον τοίνυν αὐτὸ φῶμεν εἶναι τῆς τῶν Μουσῶν
μητρὸς Μνημοσύνης, καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ὅτι ἂν βουληθῶμεν μνημονεῦσαι ὧν ἂν ἴδωμεν ἢ ἀκούσωμεν ἢ αὐτοὶ
ἐννοήσωμεν, ὑπέχοντας αὐτὸ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ ἐννοίαις, ἀποτυποῦσθαι, ὥσπερ δακτυλίων σημεῖα
ἐνσημαινομένους· καὶ ὃ μὲν ἂν ἐκμαγῇ, μνημονεύειν τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἕως ἂν ἐνῇ τὸ εἴδωλον αὐτοῦ· ὃ δ’
ἂν ἐξαλειφθῇ ἢ μὴ οἷόν τε γένηται ἐκμαγῆναι, ἐπιλελῆσθαί τε καὶ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι.
142
ἡ γὰρ γιγνομένη κίνησις ἐνσημαίνεται οἷον τύπον τινὰ τοῦ αἰσθήματος, καθάπερ οἱ σφραγιζόμενοι τοῖς
δακτυλίοις.
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bronze.143 (424a17-21)

Sense perception is the reception of the sensible form without the matter as the wax
receives the design from the signet ring without the underlying material of the ring.
Without the matter means that the sense does not take on the underlying matter of the
sensible object and that the sense is not altered by the underlying matter of the sensible
object; the sense is affected only by the sensible form. The sensible object acts on the
sense medium and sense (the organ and the power) insofar as the sensible object is
sensible and not as something enmattered. In one sense, the wax is necessarily acted on
by the underlying matter of the signet design, showing the limits of the analogy. It is
only because the design is enmattered that it can be pushed into the wax. But we are
probably to see that the matter of the wax as waxen is not affected: the wax does not
become gold or golden or iron or iron-like. The wax is only affected by the matter
insofar as the matter enmatters a design. Further, even if the wax enmatters the design,
the change is hardly irreversible or permanent. The wax can be melted down and
impressed anew, all the while remaining wax. Were sense to enmatter the form in the
organ literally, this would prevent the reception of other forms and would cause great
difficulty for accounting for the simultaneous reception of many different sensible forms
within the same genus, as when we discriminate among many different colors
simultaneously in the field of vision.
This brief sketch of De anima 424a17ff. is hardly adequate, but only a crude grasp
of the details is necessary for analyzing the metaphor as employed in De memoria. To
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Καθόλου δὲ περὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ἡ μὲν αἴσθησίς ἐστι τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν
ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, οἷον ὁ κηρὸς τοῦ δακτυλίου ἄνευ τοῦ σιδήρου καὶ τοῦ χρυσοῦ δέχεται τὸ σημεῖον, λαμβάνει
δὲ τὸ χρυσοῦν ἢ τὸ χαλκοῦν σημεῖον, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ᾗ χρυσὸς ἢ χαλκός·
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set up retention of memories, the physical seat of perception receives an impression
(tupos) of the aisthêma as wax receives the design of a signet ring without the underlying
matter of the ring. The phantasma imprinted into the physical seat of the sense is “like a
tupos of a sort of the aisthêma’ (οἷον τύπον τινά τοῦ αἰσθήματος). The inclusion of both
“like” (οἷον) and “of a sort” (τινά) shows that Aristotle’s hesitation to identify the
phantasma too closely with a tupos is great. The comparison of the phantasma to a tupos
is important because the tupos is supposed to explain how the phantasma relates to the
sense organ and the aisthêma. In De anima ii 12, the signet metaphor is used to show
that in perception there is no permanent change or alteration to the sense due to
perceiving: as the wax receives the signet design without assimilating to the matter of the
ring, so the sense receives the form of the sensible quality without permanently
enmattering the form or assimilating to the matter of the sensible object. To set up
retention, however, something like a tupos is impressed into the soul and the physical seat
of perception and, depending on physiological conditions, is enmattered and persists.144
Tupos has a wide range of meaning, but the signet ring metaphor narrows the
possibilities: the tupos stamped in by a ring is an impression that serves as the matrix for
a design. Ronald Polansky emphasizes the importance in De anima ii 12 of the inverse
relation between the signet design and the impression it makes.145 The design matrix was
typically engraved (intaglio). This means that the wax does not literally enmatter the
very design of the signet, but takes on the design inversely as a relief (en cameo), higher
or lower depending on the depth of the engraving into the signet ring; inversion indicates
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Cf. R. A. H. King (2009) 70.
Ronald Polansky (2007) 342-5.
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that the design is not literally enmattered.146 Thus, the tupos is the inverse or mirror
matrix left by the ring in the wax into which the ring has been impressed (if the signet
matrix is intaglio, the impression it makes will be a raised relief and vice versa).
Aristotle’s considerable hesitation in 450a31 (the phantasma is only like a tupos and a
tupos of a sort at that) shows that the alteration the organ of sense undergoes by receiving
the phantasma is not a crude, physical change, i.e., the organ is not taking on tiny little
design matrices of aisthêmata.147 The alteration involved is some kind of qualitative
change.
Although not explicitly mentioned, the presence of the signet ring analogy in De
memoria implies that an analogue to the reception of form without matter discussed in De
anima ii 12 is in play because the wax gets the form of the signet design without
assimilating to the underlying material of the ring. The analogy is complex. The soul
and the physical seat of perception correspond to wax (the phantasma comes about in the
soul and the physical set of perception due to the activity of sense perception) (450a2829); the phantasma corresponds to the design (tupos) as stamped into the wax without the
matter of the signet ring; the aisthêma corresponds to the signet that is pressed into the
wax. Intriguingly, Aristotle adds another layer to the analogy that is absent from De
anima ii 12: those who set seals with their rings (οἱ σφραγιζόμενοι τοῖς δακτυλίοις,
450a32). The signet ring is mentioned in DA ii 12, but the owner or user of the ring is
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If Polansky is correct that the inversion is a critical feature of the metaphor in De anima ii 12, should we
be troubled that the design taken on by the wax (relief) is not the isomorphic equivalent of the design on the
signet (intaglio)? Is perception thus the reception of something slightly different from the sensible form
itself? Is some realism in sense perception lost by too much emphasizing the inversion? But we should see
that even if the analogy has the design matrix inversed when received by the wax, the form presented by the
design does not differ: whether the matrix is intaglio or in relief, the form of what is depicted remains the
same. Only the matrix changes.
147
Julia Annas (1992) 304 says that Aristotle’s talk of pictures is “crudely literal,” even while defending
Aristotle’s theory, overlooking the heavy presence of indefinite articles and adverbs signaling comparison.
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neither mentioned nor emphasized as in De memoria. The one who sets the seal is the
mover of a signet ring, the efficient cause on account of which the ring is stamped into
the wax. The signet design is used to authenticate that what it marks belongs to or comes
from the hand of the one who owns the ring.148 Crucially, the signet design impressed
into wax sealing a document grants the document the authority to speak on behalf of the
absent owner of the ring. The signet design authenticates that what it marks issues from
the owner of the ring. The mover of the aisthêma is either the external sensible object or
the sense perception that belongs to the percipient as the action of the sensible object and
that of sense perception is one in the same (see De anima iii 2, 425b25 ff.). Because the
aisthêma is likened to the signet ring, Aristotle nicely has the memory phantasma
function as the authenticating seal of the past, absent mover of the aisthêma, the sensible
object and the sense perception of this (see 450a26-27 where Aristotle emphasizes that
remembrance is of the absent affair): the memory phantasma has the authority to stand in
for and serve as the absent perception. Likening the memory phantasma to a signet
design surely puts pressure on any notion that the memory phantasma is just like any
other phantasma.149 Only memory phantasmata have the authority to speak for past
perceptions.
As the wax is receptive of the signet design without assimilating to the material of
the ring, so is the soul and the physical seat of perception receptive of the phantasma of
the aisthêma without the material of the aisthêma. A prominent hermeneutic challenge in
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Here I follow Ronald Polansky 2007 (341) in citing John Boardman (2001) 13: “The basic purpose of
sealing is to secure and identify property by so marking the sealing material that, if it is broken, it can be
replaced only with the use of the same signet with its distinctive device. As a result of such usage either the
signet or its device may acquire a special significance as the identification of the owner, and by gift of a
signet authority may be delegated to a steward, messenger or subordinate officer.”
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Pace David Bloch (2007) 82.
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dealing with the signet analogy in De memoria is to grasp what corresponds to the matter
of the aisthêma and what to the form. Clearly the phantasma is the “form” of the
aisthêma received without the matter, but what is the matter? Matter of the aisthêma may
be read in two ways. First, the phantasma is just like the aisthêma, but without the matter
(τὰ γὰρ φαντάσματα ὥσπερ αἰσθήματά ἐστι, πλὴν ἄνευ ὕλης, DA 432a9-10). Because
the phantasma and the aisthêma are both partly physiological affections, without the
matter must refer the presence of the external, enmattered sensible quality that gives rise
to the aisthêma in the percipient. Whereas the phantasma can persist in the absence of
the external, enmattered sensible object, the aisthêma cannot (at least not for long).
Second, because the aisthêma is an affection of the perceptual system, the
aisthêma is an affection of the physical sense organ. Because the sensible form is
received without the matter of the external, sensible object, the aisthêma produced by the
external sensible object is already in the percipient without the matter of the external
sensible object.150 But the aisthêma is not immaterial because it is an affection of the
sense organ. The aisthêma is enmattered for as long as the external sensible continues to
act on the percipient. When the enmattered, sensible object departs, the aisthêma cannot
persist in the perceptual system and begins to fade away. (Enmattered must here refer to
a kind of non-permanent qualitative change in the organ.) For as long as the aisthêma
remains in the perceptual system due to the presence of the sensible object, there is
reception of sensible form and perception according to actuality. Without the matter of
the aisthêma may mean without the presence of an external, enmattered sensible object
producing the aisthêma or without the aisthêma at work in actuality in the perceptual
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system. Both senses of matter here are co-implicatory; the negation of one implies the
negation of the other. Were the setup for retention the reception of the form of the
aisthêma with the matter, this reception would be effectively a re-instantiation and
continuation of the perceptual state; phantasia would be a kind of persistence of an act of
perception rather than something similar to it. Without the matter must mean without the
presence of the aisthêma in actuality in the perceptual system due to the sensible object.
Hence, retention involves a kind transference of what the aisthêma is (the form) without
its enmattered condition into the aspect of the soul and the part of the body responsible
for sense perception.
Likened to the design (tupos) received from the signet, the phantasma is an
analogue to the “form” of the aisthêma. The analogy expands on 449b18-20: “Whenever
one has the knowledge and the perception without the activity (ἄνευ τῶν ἔργων), under
this condition one recalls.” Without the activity, at least for perception, would mean
without the action of the sensible object on the perceptual system that gives rise to
reception of the sensible form. The action involved that gives rise to reception of the
sensible form is the aisthêma. The phantasma is a tupos of the aisthêma without the
enmattered state of the latter. To have perception without the act is to possess something
that resembles the former perceptual state, which is precisely what Aristotle says of
phantasia (DA 428b14, 29a5). Elsewhere, phantasmata are said to be as and to affect
their possessor as do aisthêmata (DA 431a14-15, 32a9-10). Why phantasia is similar to
perception and why the subject that undergoes phantasia is affected in ways similar to
how subjects are affected by perception is because the objects presented by phantasia, the
phantasmata, are like the aisthêmata. The aisthêma is the action in virtue of which there

154

is reception of sensible form and the phantasma is like the aisthêma. Crucially, the
phantasma is similar to the action of the reception of the sensible form and not just
similar to the sensible form and in virtue of its similarity to the action involved in the
reception of sensible form, the phantasma mimics sense perception and not just sensible
objects. Hence, the phantasmata present to their possessor something similar to what
aisthêmata accomplish, which is the reception of a sensible form. As Victor Caston has
forcefully argued, phantasmata can affect their possessor in ways that are similar to what
happens when one undergoes an aisthêma only under the condition that the phantasma
possesses causal powers similar to those included in an aisthêma.151 Because an aisthêma
is an action produced in the percipient by an external sensible object and the phantasma
is similar to the aisthêma, the phantasma must have the power to present something like a
perceptual action, i.e., something similar to the action involved in the reception of a
sensible form. Form without the matter in the case of phantasmata means the ability to
present a state similar to that produced by the aisthêma, but without the presence of the
external sensible object producing an aisthêma in the percipient.
Phenomenally, phantasia presentations that figure into remembering are not the
same as acts of perception and this is one reason Aristotle is careful not to speak of the
phantasma as the form of the aisthêma outright, but instead calls the phantasma a
tupos.152 The only time phantasia is confused with the perception (at least) of proper
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Victor Caston (1998) 272-5.
My conclusion on what form without the matter means should be compared closely to Victor Caston
(1998) 278: “A phantasma, then, has the same power to affect the central organ as the object would by
being perceived. But that is just to say that the phantasma has causal powers exactly like a sensory
stimulation produced by the object in those environmental conditions… Phantasia and thought have ‘the
power of objects’ (τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων δύναμιν), because they have the ability to affect us the way the
objects would if perceived. This, I would suggest, is precisely what it means to have the form of the objects
‘without the matter’: the forms involved in cognition are ‘similar’ to the objects represented because such
cognition has similar causal powers and so can produce effects such as fear and trembling.” I think that
152
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sensibles is when the discriminating faculty is impaired with disease or by sleep and
dreams (see De insomn. 460b16 ff.). Phantasmata are not high-definition sensory
presentations, but traces that possess similar causal powers to the sense perception that
gives rise to them. Nevertheless, there is enough similarity between phantasmata and
aisthêmata that phantasmata are capable of affecting the subject that possesses them in
ways similar to how a subject is affected by perceiving something. And because the
memory phantasma is a likeness to a previous aisthêma of an act of perception, the one
who possesses a memory phantasma can return to that previous act of perception by
standing in the right relation to the memory phantasma. Because the aisthêma is the
action in virtue of which the sensible form is received, the memory phantasma that is a
likeness to and derived from the aisthêma can return us not just to the object perceived,
but to our perception of the object; and as a likeness of the action by which a sensible
form was perceived, the memory phantasma allows for temporal placement along a
continuum of motions. When the subject who possesses a memory phantasma is moved
by this to focus on the past cognition the memory phantasma presents, then there is
remembering.
Another detail of significance that 450a25-32 establishes is why Aristotle would

Caston may push phantasia too close to perception and phantasmata too close to aisthêta (sensible
objects). Phantasmata cannot have the same power as objects because then phantasmata would produce
sense perception and not phantasia. Phantasmata can produce fright or anger (701b17-22), but
phantasmata cannot produce perception of the objects that give rise to fright or anger. Contra Caston,
phantasia is not phenomenally indistinguishable from perception (at least) of proper sensibles unless there
is disease or the critical faculty is otherwise impaired as happens in sleep and dreams (see De insomn.
460b16 ff.). Caston is right that phantasia and phantasmata possess powers to effect states similar to those
effected by sense perception because phantasmata arise from and must be similar to sense perception.
Phantasmata can produce fear or anger because these can mimic the relevant aspects of sense perception of
frightful or enraging objects. But the possession of form without the matter must be taken to mean
different things in different contexts. The form without matter received in perception is not similar to the
sensible object qua sensible, but is itself the sensible quality. Caston comes close to ruining Aristotle’s
realism as well as collapsing phantasia into sense perception. For a similar caution, see Polansky (2007)
345 f. 14.
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say of memory in the preliminary definition (449b24-25) that it is a pathos. As 450a2532 makes clear, the pathos turns out to be a retained phantasma that is both derived from
and a likeness of the aisthêma from previous cognition. Hence, the phantasma is a bearer
of content that serves as a memory of which memory is the dispositional retention (hexis,
450a30). Aristotle soon will refer to the memory phantasma as a memory object
(μνημόνευμα, 450b27, 51a2) and likeness (εἰκών, 450b21-22, 27, 51a2): the memory
phantasma is the stuff that serves as the content for memories because it is a likeness of
past cognition (past cognition is the memorable object, τὸ μνημονευτόν). So memory
(μνήμη) can refer both to a dispositional tendency, the operation, or a memory affection
(μνημόνευμα). Aristotle elsewhere speaks of the memory phantasma as a memory
(μνήμη).
And on account of this sometimes when motions of this sort [memory phantasma] arise in the soul
from prior sense perception, we do not know whether the motions come about due to having sense
perceived, and we are in doubt whether it is (ἔστι) a memory (μνήμη) or not.153 (451a2-5)

There is no doubt that the subject of ἔστι in 451a5 is the phantasma (the motion) with
memory as its predicate nominative: we can be unsure whether the phantasma
presentation is a memory or not, i.e., whether the phantasma is a presentation of a past
cognition or not. Memory is a pathos when memory refers to a memory that one retains.
450a32-50b11 The physiological and psychological conditions of retention.
The explanation of how retention of a likeness of past cognition is set up (how
memories are stored) supplies a solution to the first impasse concerning how memory of
absent, past cognition is possible. One remembers the absent past by means of a present
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καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐνίοτ’ οὐκ ἴσμεν, ἐγγινομένων ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοιούτων κινήσεων ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰσθέσθαι
πρότερον, εἰ κατὰ τὸ ᾐσθῆσθαι συμβαίνει, καὶ εἰ ἔστι μνήμη ἢ οὔ, διστάζομεν·
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phantasma that, due to its origins, contains the power to serve as a proxy for the absent
past. Why remembrance of the absent past should occur through a present proxy must
still be explained. Prior to providing the rest of his explanation, Aristotle first enters into
a discussion of the physiological features that affect the quality and longevity of memory
phantasmata. The discussion provides an account of the material causes of memory in its
application as retention.
Hence, in those in whom there is much change (κινήσει) due to affection (πάθος) or age, memory
(μνήμη) does not arise, just as if the motion and signet were to fall upon running water. But in others,
on account of being worn down, just like the old parts of buildings, and on account of a sclerotic
physiology of the part that receives the affection, the impression does not take. Hence, both the
extremely young and the extremely old are without memory (ἀμνήμονες). The former are in flux
because of growth, but the latter on account of decay. 154 (450a32-b7)

Memory here may refer either to retention (hexis, 450a30) or to a memory stored. The
young who are much in motion due to rapid growth cannot hold onto memory
phantasmata. In one sense, motion refers to growth (450b7) and growth is an affection
(πάθος) of youth. Running water suggests that Aristotle probably has in mind the very
young that undergo rapid growth and development. Rapid growth causes too much
change in physiology so that any memory phantasma stamped into the organ of sense is
soon destroyed. But in another sense, motion may refer also to the condition of the souls
of infants and toddlers due to their physiological condition. In Physics vii 3, 247b1848a6,155 Aristotle speaks of disorder (ταραχή, which may refer to physiological or mental
disturbances) and motion (κίνησις) in the souls of the young that prevent the sort of
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διὸ καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐν κινήσει πολλῇ διὰ πάθος ἢ δι’ ἡλικίαν οὖσιν οὐ γίγνεται μνήμη, καθάπερ ἂν εἰς ὕδωρ
ῥέον ἐμπιπτούσης τῆς κινήσεως καὶ τῆς σφραγῖδος· τοῖς δὲ διὰ τὸ ψήχεσθαι, καθάπερ τὰ παλαιὰ τῶν
οἰκοδομημάτων, καὶ διὰ σκληρότητα τοῦ δεχομένου τὸ πάθος οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται ὁ τύπος. διόπερ οἵ τε σφόδρα
νέοι καὶ οἱ γέροντες ἀμνήμονές εἰσιν· ῥέουσι γὰρ οἱ μὲν διὰ τὴν αὔξησιν, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὴν φθίσιν.
155
διὸ καὶ τὰ παιδία οὔτε μανθάνειν δύνανται οὔτε κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ὁμοίως κρίνειν τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις·
πολλὴ γὰρ ἡ ταραχὴ καὶ ἡ κίνησις. καθίσταται δὲ καὶ ἠρεμίζεται πρὸς ἔνια μὲν ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς, πρὸς
ἔνια δ’ ὑπ’ ἄλλων, ἐν ἀμφοτέροις δὲ ἀλλοιουμένων τινῶν τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῆς χρήσεως καὶ
τῆς ἐνεργείας, ὅταν νήφων γένηται καὶ ἐγερθῇ.
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learning and inference from sense perception of which adults are capable. Hence, the
pathos producing motion may refer also to passions in the soul and the very young are
especially dominated by passion.156 Just as passion may prevent the sort of condition
suitable for optimal learning, passion may prevent ability to concentrate or focus well,
preventing retention from taking: we fail to retain what we fail to notice or notice only
poorly. (Conversely, while passion will prevent retention of some things, probably we
should see that intense passion will help cement others, as with trauma.)
How young are those young in age? Aristotle does not discuss what extremely
young (οἵ σφόδρα νέοι) means. Among infants and toddlers there is a rapid acquisition,
expansion, and retention of language, even if not much spoken, but Aristotle would
probably attribute language to nature or knowledge rather than memory disposition.
Memory (μνήμη) for Aristotle means episodic memory (memory of past cognitive
activity). We hold onto fewer episodes in infancy and this suggests that the extremely
young are toddlers or younger. The elderly and those with a sclerotic physiology have
the opposite problem: as the body dries out and becomes hardened, the organ of sense
loses some ability to receive the memory imprint. Retention of new things becomes more
difficult to take in. Hence, the old tell the same tales over and over to the same people.
Retention of having already told them does not take, but those things already retained are
kept until decay (450b7) and diminution from old age begin to destroy memory imprints.
Aristotle says of both the extremely young and the extremely old that they are
amnêmones (ἀμνήμoνες). The lexicon suggests that amnêmôn means ‘forgetful’ or ‘not
mindful’.157 Amnêmôn is a compound of the adjective mnêmôn with an alpha privative.
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Philip J. van der Eijk (2005) 228 translates pathos as ‘disease’.
LSJ (1996) 84-5.
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Someone who is mnêmôn is said to be ‘mindful’ or ‘remembering’ of things. Amnêmôn
may mean ‘unmindful’ or, more literally, ‘memory-less’ or ‘without memory’. Neither
the extremely young nor the extremely elderly are able to develop well retention of
memories and so are either forgetful and poor with memory or are without memory.
Without retention of memory phantasmata, there cannot be good remembering of past
cognitive activity.
Too much change in physiology, either from growth or decay, prevents good
retention; the body must be in a stable condition to support good memory. But Aristotle
also suggests that the quality of a stable physiological condition impacts retention. The
extremely elderly are more sclerotic than is fitting for the function, while the young are
too fluid, as the comparison to running water implies. Thus, a proper bodily condition is
needed for memory: neither too hard nor too fluid.
Similarly, neither the exceedingly quick nor the exceedingly slow exhibit good memories: for the
former are more fluid than what is wanted and the latter are too sclerotic: therefore, the phantasma
does not remain in the souls for the former and does not fasten for the latter. 158 (450b7-11)

Aristotle’s remarks provide some justification for 449b6-8: “Those who are good with
memory and recollecting are not the same, but, for the most part, the slow are better with
memory while those who are quick and for whom learning is easy are better with
recollection.”159 Now Aristotle supplies the quality that connects slowness and quickness
at reasoning to facility with memory and recollection, respectively. The quick are more
fluid in physiology, while the slow are more sclerotic. Why hardness connects to
slowness and fluidity to quickness in learning is probably because of the role that
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ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ λίαν ταχεῖς καὶ οἱ λίαν βραδεῖς οὐδέτεροι φαίνονται μνήμονες· οἱ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν
ὑγρότεροι τοῦ δέοντος, οἱ δὲ σκληρότεροι· τοῖς μὲν οὖν οὐ μένει τὸ φάντασμα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τῶν δ’ οὐχ
ἅπτεται.
159
οὐ γὰρ οἱ αὐτοί εἰσι μνημονικοὶ καὶ ἀναμνηστικοί, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ μνημονικώτεροι μὲν οἱ βραδεῖς,
ἀναμνηστικώτεροι δὲ οἱ ταχεῖς καὶ εὐμαθεῖς.

160

intellectual phantasia plays in thinking. Thinking of intelligibles is provoked by
phantasmata (see DA 431a14-15, b2-5, 32a9-14 and DM 449b30-50a1). According to
PA ii 19, learning involves the acquisition of universals in the soul. When there is a
sufficient amount of phantasmata retained pertaining to some class of sensible objects,
the soul is then able to pick out universal qualities or forms among the differences.
Because the phantasmata are in the blood and impressed into the organ of sense, thinking
will be impacted by any condition of the body that impacts on phantasmata. Hardness
and fluidity in physiology connects to efficacy in thought and learning for two reasons.
First, concerning thinking things through, a too dense or too hard physiology may prevent
easy actualization of the phantasmata needed to provoke thinking; also, if the
phantasmata are embedded in an organ of sense that is sclerotic, easy movement through
associated phantasmata will be frustrated, impeding the ability to make quick
connections. In contrast, a fluid physiology would allow for rapid movement among
associated phantasmata so that thinking things through and drawing inferences may
happen more quickly. Second, the more sclerotic the physiology is, the more difficult it
will be for the phantasma to get stamped into the organ of sense. Because learning
occurs through the acquisition of experience from which notions of universals are
established in the soul, the sclerotic will have more trouble and take longer to build up a
sufficient stock of phantasmata from which universals may be inferred than will the more
fluid. Those who are too fluid or too sclerotic will have trouble learning because both
conditions will prevent retention of phantasmata.160
We may see that the slow are better with memory because of their sclerotic
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physiology, while the quick are better with recollection because of their fluidity. Once
the sclerotic acquire a memory phantasma, they retain it well because their rigidity
prevents the phantasma from being rubbed out. However, rigidity prevents excellence
with recollection because this prevents easy cycling through associated phantasmata to
which a lost memory is connected. In contrast, the fluid are more prone to lose memory
phantasmata they acquire and so they do not retain their memories as well, but the more
fluid are better at recollection due to the ease with which they can quickly cycle through
phantasmata that are still retained.
Aristotle appears hesitant to link excellence at memory or recollection either with
fluidity or rigidity simply. Too much rigidity or too much fluidity will ruin facility with
memory (450b7-10). If the slow are better than the quick with memory due to rigidity of
body, still, the slow cannot be too rigid or else the memory phantasmata will not take.
Conversely, if the quick are better than the slow with recollection due to fluidity of body,
still, the quick cannot be too fluid or else the memory phantasmata will quickly be
deformed and destroyed. Hence, excellence with memory and recollection must depend
on possessing an appropriate physiological mean between excess rigidity and fluidity.
Those better with recollection than with memory are more fluid than rigid and while
those better with memory are more rigid than fluid. But too much rigidity or fluidity will
ruin facility with memory and recollection (450b7-11).
The realization that Aristotle argues for a mean range between excessive rigidity
and fluidity necessary for memory answers the objections to Aristotle’s account of the
physiological conditions of memory proposed by Richard Sorabji. Sorabji observes that
(1) because recollection ends in remembering, it is problematic to assert of the quick (and
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fluid) that they are good at recollecting, but not with memory. Further, (2) the fluidity of
the quick impedes the retention of memory phantasma needed for recollection (Sorabji
cites 450b7-11); the very fluidity underlying excellence at recollection would seem to
impede excellence at recollection.161 Sorabji’s solution is to draw a distinction between
the physiological condition one receives by nature and the condition one is capable of
developing by practice and art. The naturally fluid are not naturally retentive, but
practice with mnemonic techniques and repeated engagement with a phantasma (451a1214) helps the fluid to preserve memories better.162 Recollection requires possession of
memories or else finding the memory that an act of recollection seeks would not be
possible. But Aristotle’s assertion that the slow possess more excellence of memory
(μνημονικός) than the quick need not mean that the quick are unable to remember or do
not possess memory. The naturally fluid will have memories unless they are excessively
fluid, in which case neither memory nor recollection will be possible. Because the quick
are better at recollection than the slow, and because recollection requires retention of
memories, the quick Aristotle speaks of at 449b6-8 cannot be the same as the excessively
fluid (ὑγρότεροι τοῦ δέοντος, 450b9). The naturally more fluid will not retain memories
as well as the naturally more rigid. But the more fluid will surpass the more rigid in
recollection of the memories that the more fluid happen to possess. Between the
excessively quick who are more fluid than is appropriate for memory storage and the
excessively slow who are more rigid than is appropriate (450b7) is a mean range of
physiological condition that allows for better and worse memory.163
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Aristotle’s treatment recalls the wax analogy in the Theaetetus. If the wax is too brittle or too soft, it
will not accept imprints of good or lasting quality (191C-E and 194C-195B).
162

163

The account of the impact of physiological condition on the retention of memory
phantasmata indicates why it is useful for Aristotle to refer broadly to memory initially
as a hexis or a pathos: memory can be stable and long-term or unstable and short-lived.
According to Categories viii, a hexis refers to a stable disposition from out of which the
possessor is not easily moved (9a4-10). Hexis in the sense of a stable disposition is a
quality predicated of its possessor. In contrast, a pathos is short-lived. Being fleeting, a
pathos is not something in virtue of which a subject is said to be qualified in some way,
e.g., a person who becomes red through shame is not said to be ruddy (9b19-33). If
retention of a memory phantasma is long-lasting and stable, it is a hexis (what we might
call ‘long-term memory’), but if the memory is short-lived and we do not long hold onto
it, then the retention of the memory phantasma is a pathos (what we might call ‘shortterm’ memory).164
Aristotle’s account of memory in its application as retention fits well with the
categorization in Physics vii 3 of hexeis as relations (ta pros ti, things toward something).
A hexis may be of the body (246b3-6) or of the soul (246b20-47a3).
Further, we say that all excellences consist in holding a certain relation (τῷ πρός τι πὼς ἔχειν). For
those of the body, such as health and fitness, we place in the blending (κράσει) and due measure
(συμμετρίᾳ) of the hot and the cold, either of themselves in relation to themselves in the things within,
or in relation to their surroundings; and similarly with beauty and strength and the other excellences
and defects. For each consists in holding a certain relation, and disposes the thing having it well or
badly toward its [proper objects (οἰκεῖα)], proper being those by which [the excellence] by nature
comes into being or is destroyed. Because, then, relations are not themselves alterations (ἀλλοιώσεις),
nor is there alteration of them, nor becoming, nor in general any change at all, it is clear that neither
[dispositions (ἑξεῖς)] nor the losing or taking on of [dispositions] are alterations, though in order that
they come into being (γίγνεσθαι) or be destroyed it is perhaps necessary that some things be altered,
exactly as with form or with shape, such as the hot and the cold, or the dry and the moist, or those
things in which these happen first to be present. For each defect or excellence is spoken of in relation
to those things by which the thing having the [excellence or defect] is of such a nature as to be altered;
for the excellence makes [its possessor] be either unaffected or subject to be affected in just a certain
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Thomas Aquinas takes memory in 449b24-25 to refer to a relation to past cognition, either in the manner
of a hexis if the memory is lasting (permanens) or in the manner of a pathos if it is a transient impression
(impressio transiens). See Sententia de memoria, editio Leonina (1985, vol. XLV.2), 106b.
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way, while the defect makes [its possessor] contrarily subject to be affected or unaffected. 165 (246b320)

Health is the disposition (hexis) that arises from the relation between the hot and the cold
within the body (hot and cold surely are examples of just one of the contraries that
features in the relation that gives rise to health). If the relation between the hot and the
cold is appropriate (in due measure), the subject possessing such a relation is well
disposed toward elements external to the body, i.e., the healthy subject is not easily
affected by elements external to the subject. Health as a disposition (hexis) of the body
comes into being when the parts of the body alter, taking on the hot or the cold to some
degree. A hexis disposes its possessor well or badly toward the proper objects of the
hexis. The proper objects are those things by means of which the hexis is itself produced
or destroyed. Health comes into being as a result of the due measure of the hot and the
cold and the like and it is toward the hot and the cold and the like in one’s surroundings
that the one who possesses good health is well disposed. Because a relation is an
arrangement between relata, the arrangement itself does not undergo alteration or motion
in its own right, but only incidentally due to change that belongs to one (or more) of the
relata in its own right.166 The relation comes into being due to alterations of the
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Translation by Joe Sachs (1995) 179. Brackets and parentheses indicate my changes and insertions.
ἔτι δὲ καί φαμεν ἁπάσας εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς ἐν τῷ πρός τι πὼς ἔχειν. τὰς μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σώματος, οἷον ὑγίειαν
καὶ εὐεξίαν, ἐν κράσει καὶ συμμετρίᾳ θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν τίθεμεν, ἢ αὐτῶν πρὸς αὑτὰ τῶν ἐντὸς ἢ πρὸς τὸ
περιέχον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ κάλλος καὶ τὴν ἰσχὺν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς καὶ κακίας. ἑκάστη γάρ ἐστι τῷ
πρός τι πὼς ἔχειν, καὶ περὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα πάθη εὖ ἢ κακῶς διατίθησι τὸ ἔχον· οἰκεῖα δ’ ὑφ’ ὧν γίγνεσθαι καὶ
φθείρεσθαι πέφυκεν. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ πρός τι οὔτε αὐτά ἐστιν ἀλλοιώσεις, οὔτε ἔστιν αὐτῶν ἀλλοίωσις οὐδὲ
γένεσις οὐδ’ ὅλως μεταβολὴ οὐδεμία, φανερὸν ὅτι οὔθ’ αἱ ἕξεις οὔθ’ αἱ τῶν ἕξεων ἀποβολαὶ καὶ λήψεις
ἀλλοιώσεις εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι μὲν ἴσως αὐτὰς καὶ φθείρεσθαι ἀλλοιουμένων τινῶν ἀνάγκη, καθάπερ
καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν μορφήν, οἷον θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν ἢ ξηρῶν καὶ ὑγρῶν, ἢ ἐν οἷς τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι
πρώτοις. περὶ ταῦτα γὰρ ἑκάστη λέγεται κακία καὶ ἀρετή, ὑφ’ ὧν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι πέφυκε τὸ ἔχον· ἡ μὲν γὰρ
ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ ἢ ἀπαθὲς ἢ ὡδὶ παθητικόν, ἡ δὲ κακία παθητικὸν ἢ ἐναντίως ἀπαθές.
166
In Physics v 2, 225b11-13, Aristotle says that no relation as relation undergoes change in its own right:
“Nor indeed is there [motion (κίνησις)] of relation: for it is possible when one of two things changes
(μεταβάλλοντος) for the other of the two not to change, so that motion of relations is incidental.” In Plato’s
Theaetetus 155b-c, Socrates without changing in his own right comes to be shorter than Theaetetus, who,
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constituent relata; e.g., health arises when the underlying matter of the parts of the body
become hot and cold in due measure.
Because it is cognitive, memory is not solely the product of relations among
physiological elements as with health or strength. Further, memory is common to the
body and to the soul. We should expect the relations of which memory consists to be
quite complex as between physiological and psychological elements. Memory is said to
be a hexis of memory phantasmata (450a27-30, 51a14-16) that come to be both in the
soul and in the part of the body responsible for perception (“It is necessary to consider
that what comes about in the soul due to perception and in the part of the body that
contains perception to be a sort of life-painting, the affection regarding which we claim
memory is the hexis is memory,” 450a27-30167). The memory hexis is in respect of a
memory phantasma that is both physiological (in body) and psychological (in soul). The
proper objects of memory are the memorable objects. Excellence of memory will have
its possessor well-disposed both toward the storage of memories of past cognition
(retention of memory phantasmata) and the remembrance of past cognition (through
memory phantasmata and a sense of the past aspect attached to what these represent).
Like health, memory consists of a suitable relation or proportion among bodily
qualities. The ability to retain phantasmata arises from a due proportion of rigidity and
fluidity in the organ of sense. Actual retention, however, arises only when a phantasma
is received into the organ. Hence, retention consists of a relation of bodily qualities in

growing, does undergo change. Socrates changes, but only incidentally because relatively to Theaetetus.
Relative change is always incidental and due to some non-incidental change that belongs to one or more
relata of the relation. Hence, relative change is not a change in its own right.
167
δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι δεῖ νοῆσαι τοιοῦτον τὸ γιγνόμενον διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τῷ μορίῳ τοῦ
σώματος τῷ ἔχοντι αὐτήν—οἷον ζωγράφημά τι [τὸ πάθος] οὗ φαμεν τὴν ἕξιν μνήμην εἶναι·
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relation to a phantasma. If the proportion of rigidity to fluidity is in a mean range, then
the possessor of such a bodily condition is disposed to retain phantasmata, better
disposed if the proportion is closer to the mean, worse disposed the more the proportion
leans toward one or another of the extremes.168 Retention arises due to two sorts of
alterations: first, when the organ of sense becomes suitably fluid or rigid and, second,
when a phantasma that serves as a likeness of a past cognition is impressed into the
organ. Strictly speaking, the formation and reception of phantasma in the organ of sense
is not an alteration (phantasia is the realization of a nature, rather than an alteration), but
it is analogous to the alterations in body that give rise to health. That the phantasma
cannot be impressed into an organ too rigid in nature or remain in an organ too fluid in
nature indicates that the phantasmata are somatic to some extent, but Aristotle says
nothing directly on the subject, and accounts for phantasmata primarily in terms of
function. Aristotle emphasizes that the phantasmata are moved movers in De insomniis
(459a28-b7), likened to qualitative changes that are passed along from one object to
another as fire heats a pot and the pot the water. The analogy between phantasmata
motions and qualitative change allows that the reception of phantasmata is a change (the
organ of perception and the soul receive a phantasma that neither had previously), but not
a standard alteration.
The psychological component of the relation that makes up retention is the soul’s
relation to the memory phantasma. Aristotle says little of the soul’s involvement in
storage of memory phantasma, yet retention is unlikely merely a physical state. Aristotle
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Recalling that those more on the rigid side of the mean range will have more difficulty in developing
retention of memory phantasmata, but will have better retention of what is developed, while those on the
more fluid side will more easily develop retention, but also have more difficulty retaining what is
developed.
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claims of memory that it belongs to body and to soul. And the memory phantasma is
retained both in the soul and in the body (450a27-30). Further, retention is too selective
to be reduced to a physical condition. While bodily condition is determinative of general
efficacy in retaining memories, the mere arrangement of body seems too crude to explain
why we tend to retain some things, but not others. We tend to retain things that matter to
us more or that strike us more strongly, and these considerations are hard to account for
in terms of the body’s rigidity and fluidity. Rigidity or fluidity is unlikely to explain why
someone tends to retain certain classes of things, but not others (e.g., why one might tend
to retain things heard better than things read or vice versa). There is perhaps some
allusion in De memoria ii to the psychological role in retention of finding something
particularly striking.
But it happens that some [phantasmata] set in motion just once are habituated (ἐθισθῆναι) more than
others often set in motion. Hence, although having seen some things only once, we remember them
more than others seen often.169 (DM 451b14-16)

Aristotle quite rightly realizes that some things encountered only once are better
remembered than some things often encountered. The reference to habituation indicates
that some phantasmata set up by an act of sense perception are from the start more
disposed to be activated than others and, hence, to move their possessor to remember.
Why some things seen only once are better remembered than some things often seen
requires some explanation. Something seen often suggests repetition of the act of seeing,
either the same thing at different times or different instances that belong to the same kind
at different times. Seeing something over and over may dispose one to be easily moved
into remembering perceptions of this (repetition leads to habituation). Here the idea is of
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συμβαίνει δ’ ἐνίας ἅπαξ ἐθισθῆναι μᾶλλον ἢ ἑτέρας πολλάκις κινουμένους· διὸ ἔνια ἅπαξ ἰδόντες
μᾶλλον μνημονεύομεν ἢ ἕτερα πολλάκις.
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a contrast between something seen only once that is more remembered (μᾶλλον
μνημονεύομεν) than something seen often. Two possibilities suggest why something
seen only once would give rise to a stronger disposition to remember than something seen
often. First, the thing seen once may make a stronger impression on us and the resulting
phantasma that is retained is much more easily activated. Such phantasmata will require
less force of association to be triggered and a broader array of things will remind us,
whereas phantasmata retained with less vigor might require more determinate
associations to be triggered. For example, if someone suffered through a horrible
collision, anything to do with cars may remind, whereas memory of a fender bender will
require more specific items of association to be triggered. Alternately, Aristotle may
mean that some things need only be seen once to set up a phantasma that will dispose its
possessor to remember the act. Other things may require that we encounter them
multiple times before retention of a phantasma of the encounter is established. Those
things that are little noticed and not so much the focus of our attention are not easily
retained. They do not strike us with enough force or make enough of an impression, even
when the bodily setup is in the mean range of fluidity and rigidity. Other things may
strike us enough so that they are retained, but for not very long. Surely character impacts
much on the soul’s relation to memory phantasmata. The things that cause great pleasure
or great pain are likely to make a much greater impression and so are more likely to be
retained. Those things that make a stronger impression are more thoroughly stamped in
and retained.
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Chapter Four: The second impasse confronting the indirect perception model of
remembrance and its solution.

Although the affection it takes up is present, remembrance nonetheless concerns
the past because because there is retention of a memory phantasma that serves as a proxy
for the past absent cognition. Because the memory phantasma is an impression of the
aisthêma generated in previous perception, the memory phantasma possesses causal
powers similar to the aisthêma from which it derives. To engage the memory phantasma
is to be affected in a manner similar to being affected by the past aisthêma from which
the phantasma is derived. Hence, remembrance returns the remembering subject to its
absent past indirectly through the memory phantasma. But why should the present
phantasma return the remembering subject to its past and not just focus the remembering
subject’s mind on the present phantasma? Hence, another impasse arises.
450b11-20 The second impasse: why does the remembering subject perceive the
present phantasma to be a proxy for its past cognition?
The fact that the memory phantasma is an impression of a past cognition and
affects its possessor in ways similar to the past cognition from which it derives does not
explain why the remembering subject should perceive the memory phantasma as the
proxy that it in fact happens to be.
But if such is what occurs regarding memory, which of the two does one remember, this affection [the
present phantasma] or that from which the affection came about [the past cognition of X]? For if it
this affection, we would remember none of the absent matters [past cognitions of X]. But if it is that
absent matter, how by perceiving this present affection do we remember that which we do not
perceive? Even if there is something like an impression or picture in us, on account of what would
perception of this be memory of the other rather than perception of this very thing? For the one in
actuality with memory beholds this affection and perceives this. Therefore, how will one remember
what is not present? For it would be to see and to hear what is not present. Or is it somehow possible
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for this to occur?170 (450b11-20)

Aristotle’s commitment to indirect realism in the case of memory has the subject
remember its past by means of a retained, present phantasma. If remembering is an
engagement with a preserved phantasma, an impasse arises: the object remembered
should be a past act of perception, but, when remembering, the soul perceives a present
phantasma. Aristotle raises a series of connected questions that require close attention.
But if such is what occurs regarding memory, which of the two does one remember, this affection [the
present phantasma] or that from which the affection came about [the past cognition of X]?

If memory is the retention of a present memory phantasma derived from a prior act of
cognition, does the remembering subject take up the present memory phantasma itself as
its intentional object or the past act of cognition from which the present memory
phantasma derives? Aristotle next raises problems that arise from embracing either
alternative.
For if it this affection [the present phantasma], we would remember none of the absent matters [the
past cognitions of X]. But if it is that absent matter, how by perceiving this present affection do we
remember that which we do not perceive?

The proper of object of remembrance (the memorable object) is supposed to be the
remembering subject’s own past cognitive activity. If remembrance takes up the present
memory phantasma itself, there is an engagement with a present phantasma and not with
past cognitive activity. If, as Aristotle maintains, remembrance does in fact take up the
remembering subject’s absent, past cognitive activity, it is unclear how this should
happen. Because the remembering subject’s past cognitive activity is absent, something
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ἀλλ’ εἰ δὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ συμβαῖνον περὶ τὴν μνήμην, πότερον τοῦτο μνημονεύει τὸ πάθος, ἢ ἐκεῖνο
ἀφ’ οὗ ἐγένετο; εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο, τῶν ἀπόντων οὐδὲν ἂν μνημονεύοιμεν· εἰ δ’ ἐκεῖνο, πῶς αἰσθανόμενοι
τοῦτο μνημονεύομεν οὗ μὴ αἰσθανόμεθα, τὸ ἀπόν; εἴ τ’ ἐστὶν ὅμοιον ὥσπερ τύπος ἢ γραφὴ ἐν ἡμῖν, ἡ
τούτου αἴσθησις διὰ τί ἂν εἴη μνήμη ἑτέρου, ἀλλ’ οὐκ αὐτοῦ τούτου; ὁ γὰρ ἐνεργῶν τῇ μνήμῃ θεωρεῖ τὸ
πάθος τοῦτο καὶ αἰσθάνεται τούτου. πῶς οὖν τὸ μὴ παρὸν μνημονεύσει; εἴη γὰρ ἂν καὶ ὁρᾶν τὸ μὴ παρὸν
καὶ ἀκούειν. ἢ ἔστιν ὡς ἐνδέχεται καὶ συμβαίνειν τοῦτο;
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else must stand in, namely, the present memory phantasma that is retained. But if
remembrance is a perception of the present phantasma, then remembrance would have as
its intentional object something present, not past. Hence, the memory phantasma insofar
as it is a present affection cannot be the object of remembrance. The remembering
subject must look through the present phantasma to the absent past it represents.
Nonetheless, remembrance does perceive the present phantasma because the phantasma
is what appears to and moves the remembering subject in acts of remembrance. So the
question arises why perception of something present amounts to perception of what is
absent and past. The tempting answer is to say that the present phantasma is a
representation of the absent past. This is the indirect realism model Aristotle has
suggested. Now he raises an impasse the indirect model must surmount.
Even if there is something like an impression (tupos) or picture (graphê) in us, on account of what
would perception of this be memory of the other rather than perception of this very thing? For the one
in actuality with memory beholds this affection and perceives this.

Memory concerns past cognition, but this is absent. So something present must stand in
for the absent past (= indirect realism). The problem of indirect realism in the case of
memory is to understand how perception of something present should constitute
remembrance of something absent and past. Because the phantasma is all that is present
to the remembering subject, it must be the phantasma that enables the subject to
remember. If the phantasma is viewed merely as a present phantasma (as with the
objects of constructive imaginings), one will not remember any absent, past cognition.
Aristotle reminds us that the present phantasma is like an impression of a sort and a
painting of a sort that represents the previous cognition. Hence, the memory phantasma
must provoke remembrance of the absent past by means of its representational powers,
but how? What the memory phantasma represents runs off in the present for the
172

remembering subject, so why should perception of this be a perception of something
past? The problem poses a major threat to the position of indirect realism in the case of
memory. Unless a solution can be offered as to why engagement with a present
phantasma gives rise to remembrance of one’s past cognition, Aristotle’s position is in
real difficulty.
Therefore, how will one remember what is not present? For it would be to see and to hear what is not
present. Or is it somehow possible for this to occur?

Aristotle mentions that because it takes up past, absent cognition, remembrance is like
perceiving something that is not present (450b19-20). Remembrance is due to a present
affection, the phantasma, but remembrance does not focus on the phantasma insofar as it
is something present. Rather, remembrance perceives what the present phantasma
presents as being a presentation of the rememberer’s absent past. The idea that
remembrance is like a perception of what is absent is important because it tells us
something about what Aristotle takes the experience of remembering to be like: the
subject who remembers takes him or herself to be perceiving something that is not
present in actuality precisely because what is presented is perceived as belonging to the
past. So time sense must enter somehow.171 Talk of perceiving what is not present recalls
449b18-20: when one has the perception of X without the activity, then one is able to
recall the past perception of X. Having the perception of X without the activity is in
contrast to perception of something present when it is present: “but the present thing
when it is present, such as the white thing when one sees it, no one would claim to
remember” (449b15-16). In perception, one perceives an object that is both extant and
present to the one who perceives it. In remembrance, one perceives something that is not
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See 452b23-29.
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actually present because it belongs to the past. Aristotle is using the notion of perception
(aisthêsis) in a broad sense and not strictly as sense perception.172 One has the former
perception and this means one has the former perception without its actuality; as former,
it cannot be according to actuality. Rather, in remembrance one perceives a
representation of one’s past cognition. The puzzle Aristotle must solve is how the
present memory phantasma moves the remembering subject to perceive what the
phantasma presents as presentation of the remembering subject’s absent past.
450b20-27 Solution to the second impasse part one: the status of the memory
phantasma both as by itself and as from another.
Aristotle has previously referred to the memory phantasma as the perception
without the activity (449b19), an affection of sense perception and supposition when time
has passed (449b24-25), a painting of a sort (450a29-30, 50b16), and an impression of a
sort of the aisthêma that emerges due to the action of the sensible object on the percipient
(450a30-32, 50b16). Now Aristotle compares the phantasma to a figure drawn on a
board that is at once a figure (ζῷον) and a copy (εἰκών) of some particular original
(450b21-23).173 Because the phantasma is a copy, it is a mnêmoneuma (μνημόνευμα), a
memory presentation. Because Aristotle has previously referred to the memory
phantasma as a painting and impression of the prior cognition and raised an impasse
concerning why the perception of a present phantasma that has the causal power to
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In 450b28, Aristotle refers to the soul perceiving the phantasma. Strictly speaking, the soul is principle
of perception in virtue of which the animal or the human perceives X. Talk of the soul perceiving tells that
perception here is not normal sense perception.
173
Previously I have referred to the eikôn (εἰκών) as a likeness, but because both a figure and an eikôn are
representations and resemblances of that of which they are the representations, I will in this section refer to
the eikôn strictly as a copy rather than a likeness.
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function as a painting of the past cognition, the account of the memory phantasma as a
copy is supposed to add something new that solves the impasse.
For example, the figure drawn (γεγραμμένον) on a board (πίνακι) is both a figure (ζῷόν) and a copy
(εἰκών), and one and the same thing is both, but the being is not the same for both, and it is possible to
behold it both as a figure and as a copy; and in this manner it is necessary to grasp that the phantasma
in us is both something by itself (καθ’ αὑτό) and derived from another (ἄλλου). Insofar as it is
something by itself, it is a thing beheld or a phantasma, but as from another, it is a certain copy and a
memory impression (μνημόνευμα).174 450b20-27

A πίναξ (board) served as a surface used both for painting and for etching figures;
γράφειν primarily refers to writing and drawing, but may also indicate scratching or
inscribing marks into a tablet. Hence, the figure may be something drawn, painted, or
engraved into a tablet. Thus, the reference to a πίναξ and γράφειν allows for some
continuity with the previous analogy between signet ring and wax on the one hand and
aisthêma and phantasma on the other. The memory phantasma will now be compared to
a figure painted onto a board, or possibly engraved.175
The distinction between a figure and a copy is not immediately obvious. Both
figure and copy serve as representations of something, as a painting depicts a human, but
a copy depicts some actual (or once actual), particular original being. A figure need not
be a copy and depiction of any actual, particular being, but just a generic token of a kind.
The distinction between a copy of an original, actual, and particular instance of some
kind and a representation of a generic token of a kind is indicated by Aristotle’s reference
to a phantasma that is considered either as something by itself or as something of another
(ἄλλου, 450b25). There is a dispute over how to read the distinction between ᾗ καθ’
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οἷον γὰρ τὸ ἐν πίνακι γεγραμμένον ζῷον καὶ ζῷόν ἐστι καὶ εἰκών, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἄμφω,
τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν ἀμφοῖν, καὶ ἔστι θεωρεῖν καὶ ὡς ζῷον καὶ ὡς εἰκόνα, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν
φάντασμα δεῖ ὑπολαβεῖν καὶ αὐτό τι καθ’ αὑτὸ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλου [φάντασμα]. ᾗ μὲν οὖν καθ’ αὑτό, θεώρημα
ἢ φάντασμά ἐστιν, ᾗ δ’ ἄλλου, οἷον εἰκὼν καὶ μνημόνευμα.
175
Although a board is surely rigid and excessive rigidity ruins memory, we may see that the board analogy
is still fitting. A board too soft or brittle will not well retain what is etched into it and a board too hard will
not easily accept any engraving.
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αὑτό (as something by itself) and ᾗ ἄλλου (as of another). Some read ἄλλου as meaning
being of (i.e., a representation of) something as a painting of a human is of a human,
while others read ἄλλου as a genitive of source, meaning derived from another as a
portrait of Coriscos is derived from Coriscos. I am convinced that the right reading is to
take ἄλλου as a genitive of source. 176 The reasons are as follows.
First, unless the figure is meant as an intersection of lines and colors abstracted
from the picture-representation (which is unlikely), the figure is surely a representation of
something. The most natural and immediate way to render ζῷόν is as a representational
“figure,” which would not mean something like a Jackson Pollock or Rothko painting to
a fourth century BCE Greek. A ζῷόν is not merely a collection of abstracted lines and
colors, but a representation of something. Indeed, the term for figure is also the term for
“animal” (ζῷόν). A picture or figure by definition (for the ancient Greek mind)
represents something. The copy is also a representation of that of which it is the copy.
Unless a copy is derived from some actual, particular individual, the copy will not differ
from a figure that is a representation because both copy and figure are representations.
Second, the figure that is at once a figure and copy is introduced to deal with the
impasse just raised concerning what remembrance takes up: either the phantasma itself as
something presently occurrent or that from which the phantasma came about (ἀφ’ οὗ
ἐγένετο, 450b13). The distinction between figure and copy on the one hand and the
analogous distinction between phantasma by itself and phantasma as of another (ἄλλου)
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For those who take ἄλλου as meaning of or about another, see Richard Sorabji (2004) 51, 84, who,
however, does distinguish between a picture that is a picture and a picture that is a copy, Joe Sachs (2001)
171, David Bloch (2007) 32 n. 17, 69-70, R. A. H. King (2009) 58. For those who take ἄλλου to mean
being derived from another, see Michael Wedin (1988) 139-40, Stephen Everson (1988) 195-96 who
translates ‘of something else’, but argues that both figure and copy, the phantasma by itself and as ‘of
another’ are representational, i.e., about something), Victor Caston (1998) 281-82, 281 f. 80 who urges that
we translate ἄλλου as genitive of source.
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on the other hand are both in apposition to the distinction between the phantasma itself as
something presently occurrent and that from which the phantasma came about. Aristotle
introduces the notion of a copy and a phantasma as from another (ἄλλου) in order to
show how being engaged with a present phantasma can constitute an intention of the
absent cognition from which the phantasma came about. Hence, ἄλλου in 450b25 is in
apposition to ἀφ’ οὗ ἐγένετο (that from which the phantasma affection came about) back
in 450b13.177
The being of figure and copy is the same inasmuch as both are representations of
something; their being differs because the copy is derived from some actual, particular
instance, whereas a figure need not be so derived. Not all figures are copies, but all
copies are figures. Failure to see the genus-species relation between figure and copy has
led to some misunderstanding of Aristotle’s example. Aristotle says of the figure drawn
on a board that it is both a figure and a copy. Thus, the example Aristotle uses of the
figure drawn or etched onto a board that is at once both a figure and a copy must be in
essence a copy. Only a copy can be both a figure (genus) and a copy (species) because
not all figures are copies. Aristotle proceeds to discuss how a figure that is both a figure
and a copy can be considered (θεωρεῖν, 450b23) by the one who views it. The distinction
between viewing the figure as a figure or as a copy is not, as one commentator has it,
between that of viewing the figure merely as a collection of abstract lines and colors or
viewing those lines and colors as a representation of something.178 Victor Caston (1998)
281 f. 80 sums up the decisive consideration nicely: “To consider [θεωρεῖν] the picture
[ζῷον] as a picture [ὡς ζῷον] is already to consider it representationally; to consider it as
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See also 451a2-5.
R. A. H. King (2009) 58.
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a copy is to add the notion that this representation somehow derives from or is causally
linked to the object it represents.” Whether viewed as figure or as copy, the figure is
viewed as a representation. The difference is whether one views the figure as a generic
token or as a copy derived from some particular, actual individual. A figure that is not a
copy can mistakenly be considered to be a copy, but this possibility is not what Aristotle
wishes to emphasize. Aristotle is considering a figure that is in fact a copy and, hence,
also a figure. It is possible to look upon what is in fact a copy as merely a figure. For
instance, we look upon Leonardo da Vinci’s Vitruvian Man not as a portrait of some
particular individual human, but as a generic token of the kind. Alternatively, if we know
the figure is a representation of a particular individual, then we look upon it as a copy in
addition. It is possible to look upon a portrait that is a copy merely as a figure of a
human rather than a copy of, say, Abraham Lincoln.
The realization that Aristotle’s example is at once a figure and a copy because it is
a copy is crucial for understanding what is necessary to grasp about “the phantasma in
us” (450b24).179 As a copy that is at once a figure and a copy can be viewed either as a
figure or a copy, “so also in this manner (οὕτω) must one grasp that the phantasma in us
is both something by itself (καθ’ αὑτό) and something derived from another (ἄλλου)”
(450b24-25). The phantasma under discussion is both something by itself and at once
something derived from another. Hence, regardless of however it is taken by its
possessor, the phantasma under discussion is in its being both something by itself and
something derived from another. It is possible to regard phantasmata that are not copies
as though they were (see 451a8-11), but Aristotle is here concerned only with
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Observe that Aristotle speaks of one phantasma, not multiple phantasmata in us. The kind of
phantasma under consideration is something that is itself at once a copy and by itself.
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phantasmata that are in fact at once both copies and something in their own right. Τhe
phantasma that Aristotle here considers is of the sort that enters into memory and
remembrance. Just as not all figures are copies, regardless of how they are taken, not all
phantasmata will be those that enter into genuine memory and remembrance, regardless
of how they are taken. The memory phantasma can be viewed as something by itself, but
it is causally derived from another.
There is here a parallel with the distinction between figure and copy. Just as all
copies are figures, but not all figures are copies, so every phantasma that is derived from
another is something by itself, but not every phantasma that is something by itself is
derived from another. What it means to be a phantasma by itself is not that it is a mere
physical change in the central organ as we might view a painting not as a representation,
but a mere collection of lines and colors. Rather, a phantasma by itself is something
resembling sense perception according to actuality. Just as both figure and copy are
representations of something, so all phantasma, at least those that are in relation to sense
perception of proper sensibles, will resemble sense perception. I can have phantasia of a
purple fire-breathing elephant that chews gum while riding a unicycle in Topeka, Kansas,
but such phantasia cannot be a copy of an actual, prior cognition. All phantasmata are
phantasia presentations of sense-like activity and are causally derived from past acts of
perceiving, but only memory phantasmata both arise due to sense activity and resemble
the particular sense activity from which they derive and this, I think, is how we must to
read ἄλλου (from another).
Insofar as a memory phantasma is something by itself, it resembles sense
perception, but not an actual, prior, and particular act of sense perception. As something
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by itself and not a copy, the phantasma is said to be a theôrêma (an object of thought) or
a phantasma. But insofar as it is derived from another, the memory phantasma is a copy
and a memory object (mnêmoneuma). The categorization of the memory phantasma
insofar as it is something by itself as a theôrêma or a phantasma on the one hand and the
categorization of memory phantasma insofar as it is derived from another as a copy and
memory object on the other hand confirms the correctness of identifying ‘by itself’ (καθ’
αὑτό) with phantasia presentations more broadly. If as by itself, the memory phantasma
impressed into the organ of sense is a phantasma just as the figure drawn on the board is
a figure if not derived from an actual, specific individual. But if as derived from another,
the phantasma is a memory object as the figure drawn on the board is a copy if derived
from an actual, specific individual. Calling the phantasma by itself a phantasma suggests
consideration of the phantasma in an unqualified sense, i.e., taken simply as a phantasma
or simply as something resembling sense perception. Calling the phantasma derived
from another a memory object suggests consideration of the phantasma in a qualified
sense, i.e., as being a certain sort of phantasma, namely, a memory phantasma. Because
the memory phantasma belongs to the broader genus phantasma, its being contains those
features that belong to all phantasmata as such, as well as those features that are peculiar
to memory phantasmata. Hence, the memory phantasma possesses the being of the
species and the genus of the species at once.
Surely the disjunctive in “theôrêma or phantasma” is inclusive. Why Aristotle
includes theôrêma in the categorization of memory phantasma by themselves is probably
motivated by two closely related concerns. First, all thought is provoked by
phantasmata. If a memory phantasma is actualized as something by itself, this may be
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accompanied by a thought as when we imagine lines when contemplating triangles but
without remembering any previous working out of a theorem or proposition. A theôrêma
is a thing thought or contemplated. The proximal association of phantasmata to thoughts
puts phantasmata in close association with certain theôrêma. When we consider a
triangle or a theorem concerning one, we look through lines to the being of the triangle.
Similarly, we may look through the phantasma to the theôrêma that it provokes. Second,
by itself, the phantasma is unconnected to any particular, prior act of sense perception or
cognition. Unconnected to particular past acts of perception, and so rather resembling a
type of perception of X, the phantasma is less particular and more universal, making it
more like a universal object of thought.
Aristotle does not give an explanation of what the term mnêmoneuma
(μνημόνευμα) indicates, so the meaning must be inferred from context. The
mnêmoneuma is the correlate of mnêmoneuton as aisthêma and noêma are the correlates
of aisthêton and noêton, respectively. The –ton terms refer to external objects that act on
the subject possessing the capacities to be affected by these such that internal objects
corresponding to the –ma terms are produced in the subject due to the action of the
external objects. The proper, external object of memory are the memorables
(mnêmoneuta), the remembering subject’s past cognition (449b9-23). The past cognition
is external to the subject in the sense that it no longer exists. But past cognition sets up
phantasmata in the perceiving or thinking subject and these may be retained.
Phantasmata that are copies are the memory phantasmata. Aristotle now formally labels
the memory phantasma in its capacity as a copy to provoke remembrance of the past
cognition of which the phanatasma serves as a copy a mnêmoneuma. The phantasma
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functions as a reminder insofar as it provokes its possessor to remember its past, but the
phantasma is not perceived as a reminder! What the phantasma presents is perceived as
one’s memory in the act of remembrance. As the aisthêma is a term for the “contents”
that make up a perceptual experience, so the mnêmoneuma is a term for one’s “memory
contents.” The remembering subject does not perceive a memory phantasma and then
get reminded of some content beyond or different from what the memory phantasma
presents. Some over translate μνημόνευμα as “reminder,” but this runs the risk of
misreading Aristotle’s position.180 A reminder could be construed as being one thing X
that puts the one remembering in mind of something Y that is other than the reminder X.
For example, when one looks at a photograph of a friend and is then led to remember
something one did with the friend in the photograph. Going from reminder X to Y that is
other than X involves two acts: the perception of the photograph and then the thinking of
the friend prompted by the photograph. Aristotle never suggests that one is led by the
phantasma to think of something other than what the phantasma itself presents. The
phantasma is the very vehicle through which the remembering subject’s past cognitive
activity appears to it. That the phantasma not only provokes remembrance of past
cognition, but is the very thing that presents the past cognition to the remembering
subject is confirmed by 451a2-8.
And on account of this sometimes when motions of this sort [memory phantasma] arise in the soul
from prior sense perception, we do not know whether the motions come about due to having sense
perceived, and we are in doubt whether it is a memory (μνήμη) or not. But sometimes it happens that
we consider and recollect that we heard or knew something. And this occurs whenever from viewing it
[the phantasma] as itself one changes perspective (μεταβάλλῃ) and views it as derived from another.181
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See Richard Sorabji (2004) 7, 51, 84 and Joe Sachs (2001) 171-2.
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐνίοτ’ οὐκ ἴσμεν, ἐγγινομένων ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοιούτων κινήσεων ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰσθέσθαι
πρότερον, εἰ κατὰ τὸ ᾐσθῆσθαι συμβαίνει, καὶ εἰ ἔστι μνήμη ἢ οὔ, διστάζομεν· ὁτὲ δὲ συμβαίνει ἐννοῆσαι
καὶ ἀναμνησθῆναι ὅτι ἠκούσαμέν τι πρότερον ἢ εἴδομεν. τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει, ὅταν θεωρῶν ὡς αὐτὸ
μεταβάλλῃ καὶ θεωρῇ ὡς ἄλλου.
181
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Sometimes we are in doubt whether the memory phantasma is a memory and whether it
is derived from prior sense perception. The memory phantasma is the memory, not
merely the reminder of it. And sometimes we are unsure whether what a phantasma
presents is derived from a previous perception or not and so we are in doubt whether the
phantasma is itself a memory. Upon recollecting, we may find that we did indeed engage
in what the phantasma presents to us. Talk of reminding should refer to what puts the
remembering subject in mind of the memory phantasma and what this presents to its
possessor when activated. Whatever the memory phantasma presents is precisely what is
remembered. Furthermore, a reminder need not resemble that of which it serves as a
reminder. For example, a lyre often used by Cebes reminds of Cebes, but it is not a copy
of Cebes (see Plato’s Phaedo 73c-74b). As copies, all memory phantasma resemble the
previous sense perception from which they were derived. Richard Sorabji criticizes
Aristotle’s insistence that remembrance requires a phantasma that functions as a copy of
a past cognition on the grounds that remembrance can be provoked by things in
association with a past cognition that are not copies of the past cognition. Sorabji gives
the example of a phantasma of an elephant, which gets us to remember a particular
Indian man.182 What Sorabji describes is not a case of remembrance (as Aristotle
understands it), but a case either of recollection or an association that leads to
remembrance.183
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Richard Sorabji (2004) 3.
Here I am in agreement with David Bloch (2007) 71, f. 80.
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450b27-51a2 Solution to the second impasse part two: memory as assimilation to
memory phantasmata.
After articulating what the memory phantasma is, Aristotle gives an explanation
of how the memory phantasma comes to be perceived as a copy and a memory of the
past, rather than as a present resemblance of sense perception. A memory phantasma can
be perceived by itself as depicting something similar to sense perception, such as happens
in day dreams. When perceived as by itself there is no sense of personal connection to
what the phantasma presents. On the other hand, the phantasma can be perceived as a
copy of a past perception and then it is an object of memory (450a24-51a2). One
recognizes a personal connection to what the phantasma presents. One might object that
if the phantasma is the object remembered, then memory is not of past cognition. But
because past cognition is absent, something present must serve as the object of
remembrance. The phantasma is the present proxy by which the soul perceives its absent
past. This is the reason for insisting that the phantasma is a copy of an actual, past
cognition: perception of a present X that is a copy to absent Y allows for indirect
perception of Y because X is a functional equivalent to Y. To take the phantasma as a
copy is to be aware that what is presented derives from a past experience. What we wish
to see are the conditions that govern when the memory phantasma is perceived as a
memory and when as something by itself. Why does the remembering subject perceive
the present phantasma as a copy and presentation of the absent past?
The standard reading of Aristotle’s solution to the impasse is that remembering
occurs if the soul regards a phantasma as a copy of past perception (or thinking).
Richard Sorabji finds that Aristotle has two responses to the question of why the soul
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should treat a phantasma as a copy. First, the phantasma, factually, is a copy of the past
perception. Second, “one can regard a [phantasma] as a thing by itself, or as being of,
i.e., as being a copy of something. The latter is what one does when remembering.”184
Victor Caston reaches a similar conclusion.
The phantasma possesses content however it is taken. The difference solely concerns the type of
memorial state that results: it is only when we take this affect to derive from an earlier experience that
we seem to remember—in such cases we “say in our soul that we have seen or heard or thought it
before” —and if it actually does so derive as well, then we genuinely remember. 185

Because the phantasma is similar to past cognition, it can represent it. But to remember,
the soul must take the phantasma to be such a representation. And if the phantasma
really is derived from previous cognition, then genuine memory results. If this is all there
is to Aristotle’s account, it is hardly satisfying. Aristotle specifically raises an impasse
regarding why perception of a present phantasma should yield memory of past cognition.
If the solution is that the soul can perceive the phantasma as a copy and sometimes does,
then we are left wondering why the soul ever does. And if we grant Aristotle his premise
that there is a memory phantasma that is a copy, why does the soul regard the phantasma
that is a copy as a copy? If Aristotle’s answer is that the soul can take the memory
phantasma as copy because the phantasma happens to be a copy, then Aristotle fails to
provide a solution to the impasse. Aristotle raises the question of why the subject who
remembers should perceive the phantasma that happens to be an impression (tupos,
450a31, 50b16) or picture (zôgraphêma, 450a29-30; graphê, 450b16) of the previous
cognition as such. The ability of the remembering subject to take its phantasma as a
copy is not a solution to the impasse: what is needed is an account that explains why the
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281-2, David Bloch (2007) 70-1, R.A.H. King (2009), 78-80.
185
Victor Caston (1998) 282.

185

remembering subject is moved to take its memory phantasma to be a copy. Attributing to
a phantasma the status of being a copy of past cognition does not remove the difficulty of
the fact that the phantasma that functions as a copy is something present rather than past.
One possible solution that must be ruled out is that one somehow compares the
memory phantasma to one’s past so as to conclude that the phantasma is a copy. When I
recognize that a photo of my friend is a copy of my friend, it is because I can compare the
photo to a memory or perception of the friend. To recognize that the memory phantasma
is a copy of some past cognition, I cannot compare the phantasma to the past cognition.
That would beg the question: the soul views its phantasma as a copy to remember, but
the soul must compare the phantasma to the past perception in order to take the
phantasma as a copy.186 Furthermore, Aristotle clearly allows that beasts remember. The
necessary implication is that remembrance is not by way of opining or judging that a
memory phantasma is a copy against some standard. First, the standard would be the
absent past and if one has this, one is already remembering. Second, although opinion
accompanies much remembering in humans, the beasts cannot opine or judge. And
remembering is not a form of supposition (Aristotle repeatedly emphasizes that the
memory phantasma is something perceived, not opined). Finally, if we reflect on the
experience of our remembering, we find that we doubtfully make comparisons. So what
must happen?
I do not think Aristotle’s account is merely that the soul remembers if it happens
to take its phantasma as a copy. Aristotle crucially has remembrance analogous not to
supposing X as such and such, but to sense perception. Sense perception is not in
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actuality in virtue of itself, but in virtue of its sensible object. When acted upon, a sense
becomes such as its sensible object is in actuality. My thesis is that the sense power has a
capacity to assimilate to the activity of a phantasma actualized as a copy of past
cognition. When the sense power is assimilated to this activity, the soul becomes such as
the copy is and perceives the copy for what it is, a copy. Remembering occurs whenever
a phantasma in actuality as a copy acts on the sense power insofar as the phantasma is a
copy. I make my case in three stages. First, I establish that awareness of memory
phantasmata is a kind of perceiving. Second, I provide a brief overview of how the sense
power relates to its objects. How the sense power relates to its objects provides the
foundation for the third stage where I argue that remembering according to actuality is an
assimilation to memory phantasmata.

Stage one: awareness of phantasmata is a kind of perceiving that belongs to the
aisthêtikon.
Because there is awareness (aisthêsis, 450b14-18, 28; theôria, 450b18, 32, 51a7,
12) of the memory phantasma, there must be a capacity in virtue of which one is aware of
the memory phantasmata. Because phantasia is that in virtue of which phantasmata
emerge, it seems that phantasia should be the faculty in virtue of which there is
awareness of phantasmata, but Aristotle never says as much. Aristotle asks whether
phantasia is a faculty (dunamis) or hexis that discriminates or is correct or incorrect such
as with sense perception and the various modes of supposition. The answer is no.
Phantasia is not discriminative and Aristotle nowhere affirms that phantasia is a
dunamis. Perhaps we are to see that not only is phantasia not like faculties that
discriminate among a proper class of objects, but that phantasia is not a faculty.
187

Phantasia is a motion-like activity that derives from and resembles sense perception
according to actuality; phantasia is presentative (of sense-like appearances) rather than
discriminatory. Accordingly, Aristotle emphasizes that phantasia as a kind of motion in
virtue of which phantasmata become present to an animal.
But because it is possible when one thing has been moved for another to be moved by this, and because
phantasia seems to be a motion sort of (τις) and not to occur without sense perception, but in beings
that perceive and to be of things regarding which there is perception, and because it is a motion that
arises from the activity of sense perception and it is necessary for it to be similar to sense perception,
then the motion would be possible neither without sense perception nor for it to be present in those
beings that do not sense perceive, and the being that possesses it would do and undergo many things
according to it, and it is both true and false. 187 (428b10-17)
Therefore, if it is nothing but phantasia that has things that have been mentioned (and this is what has
been claimed) phantasia would be a motion that occurs due to sense perception according to
actuality.188 (428b30-a2)

Having sense perception as its cause, phantasia is a motion necessarily similar to sense
perception. Aristotle emphasizes that phantasia is a motion that resembles the activity of
sense perception from which it derives. Because phantasia is similar to sense perception
according to actuality, phantasia will affect its possessor in ways similar to sense
perception. The status of phantasia as a motion generated by and resembling sense
perception has important implications. Phantasia is not a relation to an external class of
objects that act on phantasia, raising it to actuality, and among which phantasia
discriminates. As a motion set up by and resembling sense perception, phantasia
presents sense-like appearances, to which Aristotle gives the name phantasmata. Hence,
phantasia is presentative, rather than discriminatory. Unlike the faculty of sense

187

ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ ἔστι κινηθέντος τουδὶ κινεῖσθαι ἕτερον ὑπὸ τούτου, ἡ δὲ φαντασία κίνησίς τις δοκεῖ εἶναι
καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως γίνεσθαι ἀλλ’ αἰσθανομένοις καὶ ὧν αἴσθησις ἔστιν, ἔστι δὲ γίνεσθαι κίνησιν ὑπὸ
τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ταύτην ὁμοίαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τῇ αἰσθήσει, εἴη ἂν αὕτη ἡ κίνησις οὔτε ἄνευ
αἰσθήσεως ἐνδεχομένη οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανομένοις ὑπάρχειν, καὶ πολλὰ κατ’ αὐτὴν καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν τὸ
ἔχον, καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ.
188
εἰ οὖν μηθὲν ἄλλο ἔχει τὰ εἰρημένα ἢ φαντασία (τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ λεχθέν), ἡ φαντασία ἂν εἴη κίνησις ὑπὸ
τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ’ ἐνέργειαν γιγνομένη.
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perception that is raised to actuality by its sensible objects such that there is awareness of
the sensible object, phantasia is a motion that resembles sense perception and of which
there is awareness under the right conditions.
Because phantasia affects animals in ways similar to sense perception, phantasia
is cognitive and involves awareness of cognitive objects, namely, phantasmata.
Phantasia is a motion, but, insofar as it is cognitive, phantasia is a motion “seemingly”
and “of a sort” (kinêsis tis dokei, 428b11). The combination of tis together with dokei
shows that Aristotle’s hesitation to identify phantasia as a motion simply is considerable:
phantasia only seems to be a motion and only a motion of a sort at that. Surely the
hesitation is due to the status of phantasia as a cognitive activity. Because phantasia is
presentative of phantasmata of which there is awareness, phantasia looks to have an
object, but the relation between phantasia and its objects requires some unpacking.
If phantasia is that in virtue of which we mean that some phantasma occurs for us (ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι) and
if we do not mean it according to metaphor, then is it some one among those things that is a power
(δύναμις) or disposition (ἕξις) by which we discriminate and are in truth or wrong? 189 (428a1-4)

Phantasia is a sort of motion in virtue of which phantasmata “occur for us.” The
metaphorical sense refers to a metaphorical appearing when something does not actually
appear before us as when we say that an argument appears sound to us.190 Because
phantasmata occur through phantasia, phantasia is nominally distinguished from the
other faculties that do not have as their objects phantasmata. Considered in isolation, the
phrase “some phantasma occurs for us” (428a1-2) is ambiguous. “For us” translates the
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εἰ δή ἐστιν ἡ φαντασία καθ’ ἣν λέγομεν φάντασμά τι ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι καὶ μὴ εἴ τι κατὰ μεταφορὰν
λέγομεν, <ἆρα> μία τις ἔστι τούτων δύναμις ἢ ἕξις καθ’ ἃς κρίνομεν καὶ ἀληθεύομεν ἢ ψευδόμεθα;
190
Alternately, Ronald Polansky (2007) 414 suggests that the metaphorical usage is the speaking of
phantasia as anything whatsoever that appears (φάνεται) to us “so that phantasia would include any
cognition whatsoever,” a meaning so broad that phantasia would no longer be something in its own right
distinguishable from other faculties.
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dative of the first person plural pronoun and “occurs” translates the present infinitive for
the verb ‘come to be’ (γίγνεσθαι). The first person dative pronoun could indicate place,
in which case phantasia is that in virtue of which phantasmata emerges (γίγνεσθαι) in us.
If phantasia is that through which the phantasma comes to be in us, phantasia looks to be
an efficient cause generative of phantasmata. Alternately, the dative could be a dative of
manifestation: phantasia is that in virtue of which phantasmata becomes present to us, in
which case phantasia would be that in virtue of which a phantasma manifests itself to us
(i.e., becomes an object of which we are aware).
My position is that phantasia is the vehicle for phantasmata appearances, not
their producer. Here is the evidence. In De insomniis (459a23-28) we learn that the
ultimate efficient cause of phantasmata is the sensible object.191 In De memoria (450a3032) the phantasma is said to be a change (kinêsis) that arises from the aisthêma present in
the percipient due to the action of the sensible object. Hence, sense perception, not
phantasia, is the ultimate cause of phantasmata. If sense perception, and not phantasia,
is the generating cause of phantasmata then “some phantasma occurs for us” would
mean “appears (φάνεται) to us” in the sense of comes to be present for us. On the other
hand, Aristotle does speak of “maker” imagination. “For it is possible to make something
(ποιήσασθαι) before the eyes, just like those image-makers who place something into a
memory scheme” (427b18-20).192 Make (ποιήσασθαι) could mean generate or construct,
but if this is the sense, it is unlikely to mean to generate from scratch. But it may be that
phantasia is merely the vehicle for the actualization of the appearances and their
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To say that the phantasma arises due to the action of the external sensible object is tantamount to saying
that the phantasma is generated by sense perception according to actuality insofar as the action of the
sensible and sense perception is the same as between agent and patient (see De anima iii 2, 425b26 ff.).
192
πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶ εἰδωλοποιοῦντες,
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combinations before the eyes, not that it generates the appearances themselves.
Phantasia is a motion set up by sense perception according to actuality and therefore
similar to sense perception according to actuality. What is more likely is that “maker
imagination” is the vehicle for the actualization of appearances before the mind and that
it serves as the vehicle for combining phantasmata in various ways. Another sense of
make (ποεῖν) is to do something. Maker imagination causes phantasmata to be placed
before the mind and to combine phantasmata in various ways. Phantasia is a motion in
virtue of which phantasmata appear to the possessor of phantasia, not a power that
generates phantasmata. Aristotle says that phantasia gets its name from light (phaos)
because without light it is not possible to see (429a2-4). Light does not cause objects to
be colored nor does light serve as the faculty in virtue of which we are aware of color.
Rather, light enables color to appear to us so that color can be perceived. The implication
of the comparison to light is perhaps that phantasia is neither the maker of phantasmata
appearances nor the perceiver of them, but the vehicle in virtue of which the phantasma
appearances appear to us.
We should see that phantasia is emphasized as a presentative power in De anima
iii 3. Phantasia is presentative both in the sense that it is that in virtue of which a
phantasma presents itself to the possessor of phantasia (428a1-4) and in the sense that
phantasia is a motion presentative of content similar to sense perception according to
actuality (428b10-17, b30-a2). Probably we are to see that the phantasma is the
appearance that phantasia motion gives off to its possessor. Conspicuously, nothing is
said in De anima iii 3 or elsewhere in De anima about that in virtue of which there is
awareness of phantasmata. If phantasia is not a faculty in virtue of which there is
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awareness of phantasmata appearances, it makes sense that the discussion devoted to
what phantasia is would not give an account of how awareness of phantasmata occurs.
Admittedly, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, but the textual evidence is
suggestive. Awareness of sensibles is due to sensibles acting on a sense medium and the
medium acting on the organ of sense such that there is a reception of the sensible form.
Reception of sensible form is what all sense perception in general is (DA ii 12, 424a1719). Phantasia is not said to be raised to actuality from potentiality by a special class of
external objects (although phantasiai motions and phantasmata are said to be actualized;
see DM 450b27-28 and De insomn. 461b15-18). Phantasia is not said to be the reception
of anything. Rather, phantasia is said only to be a motion derived from, corresponding
to, and similar to sense perception according to actuality. Further, Aristotle sometimes
speaks of phantasia in the plural (phantasiai).193 Intriguingly, after articulating the
considered definition of phantasia, Aristotle ends the investigation into phantasia in De
anima iii 3 by referring to phantasia in the plural, rather than in the singular: “Therefore,
about phantasiai, what it is and on account of what it is, let so much be said” (περὶ μὲν
οὖν φαντασίας, τί ἐστι καὶ διὰ τί ἐστιν, εἰρήσθω ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον, 429a8-9). Unless there are
multiple phantasia faculties, we may suppose that phantasiai are merely presentative
motions where the phantasma is the appearance that the motion gives off to the subject
that possesses it. Aristotle does distinguish between rational (λογιστική) and perceptual
(αἰσθητική) phantasia (see DA iii 10, 433b29-30), i.e., phantasia that enters into
perceptual or rational operations, but this does not mean that there are multiple parts of
the soul responsible for phantasia. Rather, it indicates that phantasia figures into a wide
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array of cognitive operations. If phantasia is only a “maker” motion in the sense that it is
the vehicle for the presentation of appearances (phantasmata), then phantasia is not
responsible for the awareness of the appearances. Phantasia would be a change or a
motion in the soul-body composite that is presentative of content rather than a cognitive
faculty in virtue of which there is awareness of the appearances for which phantasia
motion serves as the vehicle.
Still, the mentioning of phantasiai could be a reference to the motions of a
phantasia capacity for the emergence of such motions. Perhaps phantasia is a power to
present phantasiai motions derived from and similar to sense perception. The emphasis
on phantasia as a motion and maker or presenter of phantasmata does not rule out
phantasia as a power in virtue of which there is awareness of phantasiai motions. It may
seem strange to speak of a motion presentative of content similar to sense perception
according to actuality that is aware of the content that it presents, but it must be kept in
mind that the motion in question is not crude, physical alteration. Phantasia is an
affection of the soul. As a cognitive movement, phantasia could refer both to a motion
that presents content and to an awareness of the content presented. For example,
speaking of perception in De anima ii 5, Aristotle says that perception consists in being
moved and undergoing something and seems to be an alteration sort of (ἡ δ’ αἴσθησις ἐν
τῷ κινεῖσθαί τε καὶ πάσχειν συμβαίνει, καθάπερ εἴρηται· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἀλλοίωσίς τις εἶναι,
416b33-35). The activity of perception is an alteration of a sort and this alteration
includes the awareness of sensibles. Sense perception is at once that in virtue of which
the sensibles manifest themselves to us and that in virtue of which there is awareness of
the sensibles. Because it is a motion with a cognitive dimension, I do not rule out the
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possibility that phantasia is a motion in virtue of which there is awareness of the very
appearances that the motion itself presents.
Nevertheless, (1) the total absence of any discussion of the awareness of
phantasia in De anima iii 3, how such awareness occurs, and to what faculty it belongs,
combined with (2) the emphasis on phantasia as a non-discriminating presentative
motion parasitic on and derivative from sense perception, and (3) lacking a class of
objects that puts phantasia to work all suggests strongly to my mind that phantasia is not
a separate, independent faculty or part of the soul in virtue of which there is awareness of
phantasmata. Indeed, the phantasmata seem to be nothing more than the appearance the
phantasia motions give off to their possessor. Phantasia, at least as it is discussed in De
anima iii 3, seems much more a kind of motion in the soul-body composite of which one
can be aware rather than a motion in the soul-body composite in virtue of which one is
aware of a cognitive object proper to the motion. Phantasia is a motion that functions as
a bearer of appearances rather than a faculty in virtue of which one is aware of the
appearances.
If my reading is right, how do we become aware of phantasiai motions? Aristotle
mentions an imaginative power (phantastikon) only five times in his writings, once in De
anima iii 9 and four times in De insomniis. The –ikon ending is common in Aristotle’s
psychological works and refers to the part (μόριον) of soul that serves as the principle or
faculty (δύναμις) for an operation (for use as a reference to a part of soul, see DA
413b11-16; as a reference to a power and faculty of soul, see DA 414a29-32). We have
the threptikon for the nutritive power of the soul (414a31), the aisthêtikon for the power
of sense perception (a31-32), and the noêtikon for the intellective power (428b28-31).
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That Aristotle refers to a faculty of phantasia would seem to run counter to my claim that
phantasia is not a faculty in its own right. Two considerations allow for compatibility
between my reading and the appearance of phantastikon in De anima and De insomniis.
First, phantasia is parasitic on sense perception, although differing from it. As I have
argued, phantasia is neither raised to actuality by nor an operation that engages with an
object external to and distinguishable from the phantasia motion itself. The phantasma
looks to be a sense-like appearance that the phantasia motion gives off to its possessor.
Second, and crucially, in De anima iii 9 (432a31-b3) Aristotle says of the phantastikon
that it differs in being (meaning function) from all the other parts of the soul, but that
whether it is different from or the same as another part is an impasse. The impasse is
surprising because phantasia was distinguished from sense perception and the various
forms of supposition in De anima iii 3. However, the question of whether the
phantastikon is a part separate from all the others is not bothersome if Aristotle’s concern
is not whether the activity of phantasia is distinguishable from that of sense perception
and supposition, but whether the part of the soul that engages in and becomes aware of
phantasia is distinguishable from other parts of soul. Before I mentioned the
conspicuous absence of any discussion of how awareness of phantasia is obtained in De
anima iii 3 and Aristotle’s mention of the phantastikon in iii 9 may lead us to suppose
that there is a part distinguishable and separate from other parts of the soul in virtue of
which there is awareness of phantasia presentations. Aristotle does not give an answer in
iii 9 or anywhere else in De anima. The answer is provided only in De insomniis: the
phantastikon is not a separate, distinguishable part of the soul. It is the same as the
power for sense perception, although it differs aspectually in being. Hence, the part of
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the soul responsible for awareness and use of phantasia is the part of the soul responsible
for perception.
Now because what concerns phantasia has been said in the writings on the soul, and because the part
that engages in phantasia (τὸ φανταστικόν) is the same as the perceptive part (τῷ αἰσθητικῷ), but the
being for the imaginative and for the perceptive is different, and phantasia is a motion emergent due to
sense perception in actuality, and the dream appears to be a phantasma (for we call the phantasma
within sleep a dream, whether it occurs simply or with respect to a certain condition), so it is clear that
to dream belongs to the perceptive part, but belongs to this insofar (ᾗ) as it is imaginative.194 (459a1422)

The part of the soul that is responsible for dreaming is the perceptive faculty of the soul
insofar as this is imaginative (phantastikon). Aristotle gives a clear answer to the
question posed in De anima iii 9 of whether the imaginative capacity of soul is different
from the other parts: the imaginative part is the same as the part responsible for
perception. The primary hermeneutic issue is understanding how the phantastikon should
be the same as the aisthêtikon and yet different in being.
De insomniis supplies details of how the awareness of phantasiai motions comes
about, details that are missing from the account in De anima iii 3 and which help account
for why the perceptive faculty of the soul is the same as the imaginative. Phantasmata
are remnants of the aisthêmata (461b11-22) present during perception due to the action
of the external sensible on the percipient. During sleep, the phantasmata present in the
blood are carried to the heart, giving rise to perception of them.
When the blood in the sanguineous animals has settled and separated off, the preserved motion of the
aisthêmata in each of the sense organs makes the dreams connect together, and something presents
itself and one supposes to see on account of the movements from eyesight carried down, and to hear
because of the movements from hearing, and similarly from the other sense organs. For it is by the
motion coming from the organs of sense (ἐκεῖθεν) to the starting source of perception even when
awake that one supposes to see and to hear and to perceive… 195 (461a25-b1)
194

ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ φαντασίας ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ψυχῆς εἴρηται, καὶ ἔστι μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ τὸ φανταστικόν,
τὸ δ’ εἶναι φανταστικῷ καὶ αἰσθητικῷ ἕτερον, ἔστι δὲ φαντασία ἡ ὑπὸ τῆς κατ’ ἐνέργειαν αἰσθήσεως
γινομένη κίνησις, τὸ δ’ ἐνύπνιον φάντασμά τι φαίνεται εἶναι (τὸ γὰρ ἐν ὕπνῳ φάντασμα ἐνύπνιον λέγομεν,
εἴθ’ ἁπλῶς εἴτε τρόπον τινὰ γινόμενον), φανερὸν ὅτι τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ μέν ἐστι τὸ ἐνυπνιάζειν, τούτου δ’ ᾗ
φανταστικόν.
195
καθισταμένου δὲ καὶ διακρινομένου τοῦ αἵματος ἐν τοῖς ἐναίμοις, σῳζομένη τῶν αἰσθημάτων ἡ κίνησις
ἀφ’ ἑκάστου τῶν αἰσθητηρίων εἰρόμενά τε ποιεῖ τὰ ἐνύπνια, καὶ φαίνεσθαί τι καὶ δοκεῖν διὰ μὲν τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς
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The preserved motion in the organ of sense is the phantasma or phantasia motion. When
the phantasma is carried down to the primary organ and source of sense (the heart), the
phantasma appears, and under the right conditions one will suppose oneself to see or to
hear. Aristotle draws a parallel between the phantasmata and the action of the sensible
on the percipient during perception. When awake, one supposes oneself to see or to hear
because the action of the external sensible on the sense organ affects the heart, and also
phantasmata that affect the heart appear to the subject in whom this occurs (cf. 460b3-8).
The phantasmata are derived from and possess similar powers to the action of the
sensible from which they derive. Phantasmata that persist may be carried down to the
primary organ of sense (the heart) and affect their possessor in ways similar to the action
of a sensible. One reason why the imaginative part (phantastikon) and the perceptive part
(aisthêtikon) are the same is because awareness of phantasmata occurs due to phantasiai
motions moving the primary organ of sense in ways similar to how the organ is moved by
aisthêmata. Aristotle elaborates further in the subsequent passage.
For whenever one is asleep, as most of the blood sinks down to the starting-point, the movements
present within it — some [in potentiality], but some [in actuality] — go down with it. They are so
disposed (οὕτω ἔχουσιν) that in any given movement of the blood, one movement will rise from it to
the surface; and if that one perishes, then another will [rise]. In fact, relative to one another, they are
just like those frogs that float upwards in the water as the salt dissolves — just so, the movements are
there [in potentiality], but they [actualize] as soon as what impedes them is removed. Upon being
released, they move in the little blood remaining in the sense organs, while [having resemblances], as
cloud-formations do, which people liken now to men and now to centaurs as they change rapidly.
Each of these, as has been said, is a remnant of [an aisthêma in actuality].196 (461b11-22)
ὄψεως καταφερόμενα ὁρᾶν, διὰ δὲ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀκοῆς ἀκούειν, ὁμοιοτρόπως δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων
αἰσθητηρίων· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖθεν ἀφικνεῖσθαι τὴν κίνησιν πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ ἐγρηγορὼς δοκεῖ ὁρᾶν καὶ
ἀκούειν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι…
196
Translation by David Gallop (1996) 99-100. Brackets indicate my emendations. ὅταν γὰρ καθεύδῃ,
κατιόντος τοῦ πλείστου αἵματος ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν συγκατέρχονται αἱ ἐνοῦσαι κινήσεις, αἱ μὲν δυνάμει αἱ δὲ
ἐνεργείᾳ. οὕτω δ’ ἔχουσιν ὥστε ἐν τῇ κινήσει τῃδὶ ἥδε ἐπιπολάσει ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἡ κίνησις, ἂν δ’ αὕτη φθαρῇ,
ἥδε. καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλας δὴ ἔχουσιν ὥσπερ οἱ πεπλασμένοι βάτραχοι οἱ ἀνιόντες ἐν τῷ ὕδατι τηκομένου τοῦ
ἁλός—οὕτως ἔνεισι δυνάμει, ἀνειμένου δὲ τοῦ κωλύοντος ἐνεργοῦσιν, καὶ λυόμεναι ἐν ὀλίγῳ τῷ λοιπῷ
αἵματι τῷ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις κινοῦνται, ἔχουσαι ὁμοιότητα ὥσπερ τὰ ἐν τοῖς νέφεσιν, ἃ παρεικάζουσιν
ἀνθρώποις καὶ κενταύροις ταχέως μεταβάλλοντα. τούτων δὲ ἕκαστόν ἐστιν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὑπόλειμμα τοῦ
ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ αἰσθήματος·
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In 461a25-b1, Aristotle mentions phantasiai motions that persist in the individual sense
organs that may be carried to the heart during sleep, whereupon something appears to the
sleeper. Now Aristotle provides an explanation of why something appears. As blood
from the peripheral sense organs sinks down to the heart, phantasmata present in the
peripheral organs are carried down to the heart in the blood (the reference to remnant
motions from active aisthêmata in 461b21-22 confirms that phantasmata or phantasiai
are the sort of motions under discussion), some in potentiality, while others are in
actuality.
The comment that there are phantasmata both in potentiality and in actuality in
the blood that sinks down requires some interpretation.
For whenever one sleeps, when the greater amount of the blood goes down to the source, the motions
present in it go down with it, some in potentiality (αἱ μὲν δυνάμει), but some in actuality (αἱ δὲ
ἐνεργείᾳ). (461b11-13)

On the one hand, Aristotle may be saying that as the blood begins to sink down to the
heart (the source) from the peripheral sense organs, the phantasmata present in the blood
potentially may be carried down in the blood from the organ to the heart. Some actually
go down with the blood, while some do not. On the other hand, Aristotle may be saying
that there are phantasmata motions in the blood that sinks down to the heart in sleep and
some of these are motions in potentiality, while others are motions in actuality. Because
“some are in potentiality, some in actuality” (αἱ μὲν δυνάμει αἱ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ) directly
follows “the motions present in the blood go down with it” (συγκατέρχονται αἱ ἐνοῦσαι
κινήσεις, αἱ μὲν δυνάμει αἱ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ), neither option can be ruled out on syntactic
grounds. Probably both senses are in play. The phantasiai motions are not pure
possibilities. So something left over from the aisthêmata active during perception
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remains in the blood, and this can be in motion according to potentiality or in motion
according to actuality.
Aristotle mentions that the motions are disposed (οὕτω ἔχουσιν, 461b13) so that
the movement of the blood causes phantasmata to actualize. Hence, in the case of
sleeping states at least, we are to see that the movement of the blood can activate a
dormant phantasia motion. The activation of dormant phantasia motions is one thing
that the analogy to the toy frogs is meant to show. Toy frogs are embedded in a salty
matter at the base of a container. When water (analogous to blood) is added, the salt is
dissolved and the frogs rise to the surface of the liquid. Like the frogs that hold
themselves ready to rise, the phantasia motions are disposed (οὕτω ἔχουσιν) to be
actualized under the right conditions (οὕτως ἔνεισι δυνάμει, ἀνειμένου δὲ τοῦ κωλύοντος
ἐνεργοῦσιν, 461b16-17). The motions contain likenesses or resemblances (ἔχουσαι
ὁμοιότητα, 461b19) as clouds do. When the dormant phantasia motion is activated, it
can affect the sleeper by giving off an appearance.
Although devoted to a discussion of how dream phantasmata manifest themselves
to a sleeping subject, the passage contains important implications for phantasia broadly
and for memory more particularly. Phantasia is a motion set up by sense perception, but
De insomniis suggests that we need not conceive of phantasia motions as in actuality
perpetually. Does phantasia refer only to phantasia motion that is perceived by its
possessor in actuality or does phantasia refer also to motions dormant that are ready to
give off appearances once activated? In De anima iii 3, phantasia is said to resemble
sense perception according to actuality and so we may suppose phantasia is restricted to
such motion that is actually perceived. But De insomniis seems to speak of phantasia
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motion that is in potentiality, as well as actuality, actually affecting its possessor. When
in actuality, the phantasia motions take on likenesses to things (461b18-21), but it is
unclear whether being in actuality as a resemblance is co-implicatory with being
perceived. For instance, the sensible quality (qua sensible) in actuality is co-implicatory
with being perceived in actuality. Being in motion in actuality as having resemblance
need only mean having the power to be perceived as a likeness. (Elsewhere Aristotle
mentions phantasia motions in actuality that are not perceived because drowned out by
more vigorous cognitive activity; see De insomn. 460b28-61a8). As there are universals
already present in the soul that are thinkable in potentiality, so there is dormant phantasia
motion already present in the soul-body composite that is perceivable in potentiality.
These passages in De insomniis fit well with Aristotle’s talk of the times when
(ὅταν) the motion of memory phantasmata are actualized (450b27-28). If phantasia can
lie dormant, this would explain how there is retention of past cognition and why we are
not continuously and perpetually affected by memories. Memory in its application as
retention is the disposition (hexis) of dormant memory phantasmata, disposed ready to
move their possessor to remember. Memory phantasmata can be activated (“released”)
either by sense perception of something similar to or in association with the dormant
memory phantasma or by associated memory phantasmata that have already been
actualized. Memory phantasmata need not be perpetually in motion in actuality. And in
the account of recollection, Aristotle speaks of phantasia motions set in motion by other
motions, indicating that phantasmata need not always be in motion in actuality (DM
451b10-22).
Aristotle adds further details concerning how the dreamer relates to phantasiai
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motions in actuality. The awareness of dream phantasmata is a perceiving of a sort. We
have been readied to receive the assertion that dreaming is a perception of a sort by the
earlier mention of phantasia motions traveling to the heart, whereupon something
presents itself (460b3-8; 461a27-b1). The part of the soul that is aware of the dream
phantasmata is the same part that is aware that it is perceiving according to actuality.
Each of these [phantasmata], as has been said, is a remnant of the aisthêma in actuality: and it exists
within when the true aisthêma has departed, and it is true to say that the phantasma is such as
Coriscos, but it is not Coriscos. But when one was perceiving, the authoritative and discriminating
part was not saying [that the aisthêma was] Coriscos, but because of this [the aisthêma] that the person
there (ἐκεῖνον) was the true Coriscos. That which says this while perceiving, if it is not simply held
back by the blood, is moved (κινεῖται) by the motions [the phantasmata] in the sense organs as though
this part were perceiving, and one supposes (δοκεῖ) what is like to be the very thing itself. 197 (461b2129)

The aisthêma is the action of the external sensible on the percipient through which there
is perception of the sensible object. Because the phantasma is derived from the aisthêma,
the former has powers resembling those of the aisthêma. In the perception of Coriscos,
the sensible qualities involved act on the percipient through a medium, giving rise to a
perception of Coriscos. The phantasma that is derived from the aisthêma of Coriscos
possess the power to affect its possessor in ways similar to the aisthêma through which
there was perception of Coriscos. Hence, the phantasma will resemble the perception of
Coriscos, but the phantasma is not Coriscos. While wakefully perceiving Coriscos, the
primary sense faculty does not say that the aisthêma affecting it is Coriscos, but that thing
perceived in virtue of the aisthêma is Coriscos. The sense faculty does not so much
perceive the motion produced in the percipient by the sensible, but perceives the sensible
object; it is only under special conditions that the aisthêma is much noticed, as with
197

τούτων δὲ ἕκαστόν ἐστιν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὑπόλειμμα τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ αἰσθήματος· καὶ ἀπελθόντος
τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἔνεστι, καὶ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι τοιοῦτον οἷον Κορίσκος, ἀλλ’ οὐ Κορίσκος. ὅτε δὲ ᾐσθάνετο,
οὐκ ἔλεγε Κορίσκον τὸ κύριον καὶ τὸ ἐπικρῖνον, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο ἐκεῖνον Κορίσκον τὸν ἀληθινόν. ὃ δὴ καὶ
αἰσθανόμενον λέγει τοῦτο, ἐὰν μὴ παντελῶς κατέχηται ὑπὸ τοῦ αἵματος, ὥσπερ αἰσθανόμενον τοῦτο
κινεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν κινήσεων τῶν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις, καὶ δοκεῖ τὸ ὅμοιον αὐτὸ εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές·
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afterimages (“motions”) in the eyes. But in sleep, when the sense faculty in its
application as the discriminating power is held in check and only phantasmata are
affecting the heart and the faculty, the phantasma that resembles the perception of
Coriscos causes the perceptual part to suppose (δοκεῖ, 461b29) itself to be having a real
perception of the true Coriscos rather than a likeness.
Crucially, the sense faculty in sleep is moved by the phantasia motions lingering
in peripheral organs (κινεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν κινήσεων τῶν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις, 461b28-29).
The sense faculty becomes aware of the phantasma only when the latter moves and
affects the former. We are not to suppose that the sense faculty is actually altered, but the
phantasmata are moved movers that move the sense faculty with their motion. Motion is
from the the mover but takes place in what is moved. So the sense faculty receives the
motion of the phantasma such that it becomes aware of the phantasma. The comparison
to perception cannot mean standard perception, but clearly the sense faculty is in play and
its being moved by a motion of phantasia is the action in virtue of which there is
awareness of a phantasma. Awareness of phantasmata is an affection of the sense
faculty in two ways. First, the phantasma motions of which the sense faculty can become
aware arise due to and resemble its own perceiving activity. Second, awareness of
phantasmata is a perceiving of a sort insofar as the awareness occurs through the
reception of the motion of the phantasma by the sense faculty.
In De insomniis 459a14-22, the imaginative part (phantastikon) of the soul is said
to be the same as the perceptive part (aisthêtikon), though different in being. Subsequent
passages show that the sense faculty is that in virtue of which there is awareness of
phantasmata. The aisthêtikon is that through which there is awareness of phantasia
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motions. Hence, the aisthêtikon is the same in number as the phantastikon. However,
the operations are different in being. Phantasia is not discriminatory. It is a motion that
presents perception-like appearances of which the sense faculty becomes aware under the
right conditions. If there is discrimination of phantasia by the sense faculty, it is a
discriminating of phantasia presentations from actual perceptions. It is not my concern
here to provide a detailed analysis of the activities of the aisthêtikon that can be described
as acts of phantasia. It has been enough to show that awareness of phantasmata is a kind
of perceiving. This applies to memory phantasmata as well as dream phantasmata.
The passages that I have analyzed in De insomniis fit well with my reading that
remembrance is a perception of a sort. In De memoria, Aristotle attributes memory to the
primary sense faculty of the soul (450a12-14) on the grounds that memory is not possible
without phantasmata.198 Memory is due to the primary sense faculty in a double sense.
First, retention is of phantasmata that are produced by the activity of perception. Second,
as De insomniis indicates, awareness of phantasmata is in virtue of the sense faculty.
Hence, remembrance that is an engagement with memory phantasmata is an application
of the sense faculty. There is textual confirmation that the activity of remembrance is an
application of the primary sense faculty. Prior to asserting that the primary sense power
is responsible for memory, Aristotle states that the one remembering says (λέγει) in soul
that X was perceived or thought before (449b22-4). After asserting that memory is an
affection of the primary sense power and attributing memory to certain beasts, Aristotle
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450a12-14: Memory, even memory of intelligibles, is not possible without a phantasma, and the
phantasma is an affection of the common sense, so that memory would belong to the intellect incidentally,
but in its own right, memory belongs to the primary sense faculty. ἡ δὲ μνήμη, καὶ ἡ τῶν νοητῶν, οὐκ ἄνευ
φαντάσματός ἐστιν, <καὶ τὸ φάντασμα τῆς κοινῆς αἰσθήσεως πάθος ἐστίν>· ὥστε τοῦ νοῦ μὲν κατὰ
συμβεβηκὸς ἂν εἴη, καθ’ αὑτὸ δὲ τοῦ πρώτου αἰσθητικοῦ.
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carefully rewords the point about saying things in the soul.
For always when one is active with memory, just as we also said earlier, that one saw this, or heard or
learned, one perceives-in-addition (προσαισθάνεται) that it was before: and the before and later are in
time.199 (450a19-22)

Saying in soul that X was perceived before is replaced by perceiving.200 Remembrance
occurs when there is both a perception of the phantasma of prior cognition and in
addition a perception (προσαισθάνεται) of the temporal context to which what the
phantasma represents belongs. Time is a number of before and after with respect to
motion and motion is a common sensible grasped by the common sense power; hence,
time is discriminated by means of the common sense (450a10-11). The emphasis on
perception of phantasmata and perception of temporal aspect indicates that remembering
is a function of the sense power. Aristotle employs a verb of perception eight times to
describe the soul’s engagement with its memory phantasmata.201 Memory, even in
humans, is primarily perceptual, not doxic. Aristotle asks, “How will one remember
what is not present? For it would be to see and to hear what is absent” (450b18-20.)
Remembrance cannot be standard perception of a present sensible, but because
remembrance belongs to the sense faculty, it is a perception of a sort.

Stage two: the sense power assimilates to the activity of its objects.
This brings me to the second stage of my account. The part of the soul that is
aware of the memory phantasma and perceives it as copy is the perceptive part (to
aisthêtikon). To understand why the soul perceives the memory phantasma as a copy, I
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ἀεὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ τῇ μνήμῃ, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴπομεν, ὅτι εἶδε τοῦτο ἢ ἤκουσεν ἢ ἔμαθε,
προσαισθάνεται ὅτι πρότερον· τὸ δὲ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστίν.
200
Cf. saying in soul in De memoria 449b22-23 with talk of the sense faculty saying things in De insomniis
461b22-29.
201
See 450a21, 40b14, b15, b16, b18, b19-20, 28 and 30 (by parallel construction with b28).
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will make a brief examination of De anima ii 5 and iii 2. In De anima ii 5, Aristotle
distinguishes between sensing in potentiality and sensing in actuality. The sense power
has being as a potency to be in actuality in some way. Because there are states where
sense perception is not at work (e.g., sleep, or total darkness preventing sight), the sense
power cannot be at work in virtue of itself, but requires an external mover to put it to
work (DA 417a6-14). Aristotle articulates the relation of the sense faculty to its object
and mover that is telling for how remembering works. I emphasize the relation sense has
to its object rather than the details of how sense perception works.
The sense power is in potentiality what sort the sensible is already in actuality, just as mentioned.
Therefore, the power is acted upon when not being like [the sensible], but having been acted upon, the
sense power is made like that [sensible] and is what sort that [sensible] is. 202 (DA ii5, 418a3-6)

The sense power is a potency for becoming such as its sensible object is in actuality. If
the sensible is already in actuality as sensible, then it must be being perceived in
actuality. So Aristotle emphasizes that the sense power is a potency to be what sort of
thing the sensible is when the sensible is actually being perceived. Why sensation is a
potency for being what sort the sensible is in actuality requires some explanation. The
sensible acts on a non-percipient body such that the non-percipient body becomes
perceivable in potentiality due to the sensible that affects it. But the sensible acts on the
sense power such that the sensible is perceived in actuality. For example, green paint
applied to a wall causes the wall to be perceivable, but not percipient. The color acts on
the wall insofar as the color is perceivable in potentiality (to be colored is not the same as
to be sensed). The wall acted on has the potential to be such as the sensible is qua
sensible only in potentiality, potentially sensed. Whereas non-percipient magnitudes
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τὸ δ’ αἰσθητικὸν δυνάμει ἐστὶν οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἤδη ἐντελεχείᾳ, καθάπερ εἴρηται. πάσχει μὲν οὖν οὐχ
ὅμοιον ὄν, πεπονθὸς δ’ ὡμοίωται καὶ ἔστιν οἷον ἐκεῖνο. (418a3-6)

205

become perceivable when acted on by sensibles, the sense power becomes percipient,
perceiving the sensible feature affecting it. Hence, when the sense power is unaffected
by the sensible, the sense is unlike the sensible. Once acted upon, the sense power
becomes what sort the sensible is as actually sensible.
Aristotle elaborates in De anima iii 2, 425b26-26a5. The actuality of perceiving
is one in number and concurrent with the actuality of the sensible object insofar as it is
sensible. But the actuality of the perceiving and the sensible perceived differ in aspect as
does the activity shared between an agent and a patient. Motion belongs to a mover as
agent, but takes place in what is moved as patient. The sense acted on by the sensible
serves as the patient that receives the action of the sensible. Aristotle thus emphasizes
that the sense is a potency for being assimilated to the activity of the sensible. In
perception, sensibles are not assimilated to the activity of the sense; the sense faculty is
assimilated to the actuality of the sensible and this is just what it is to perceive. In a
similar way, the sense faculty in its operation as imaginative is assimilated to the activity
of the phantasmata that remain in the soul-body composite when these act, presumably,
on the heart (see De insomn. 461b11-21).203

Stage three: remembrance is an assimilation of the sense power to the activity of the
memory phantasma insofar as it is from another.
Here are the main points so far established. The phantasma is the memory object
because it is perceived as a presentation of the remembering subject’s past cognition and
awareness of phantasmata is through the sense power (to aisthêtikon). The sense power
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Speaking strictly, only living beings have activity. Because the phantasma is a cognitive object and a
motion, activity may be attributed to phantasmata inasmuch as phantasmata enter into the activity of
cognition.
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is a capacity to assimilate to the actuality of the sensible object insofar as it is sensible
and the phantasmata are perceived in a qualified way. We are ready to appreciate how
the sense power relates to the memory phantasma in remembering. Here is the crucial
passage that details the soul’s engagement with the relevant phantasma when
remembering.
By itself (ᾗ καθ’ αὑτό), the phantasma is a thought or a phantasma, but as from another (ᾗ ἄλλου), it is
a copy (εἰκών) and a memory (μνημόνευμα). Hence also, when the motion (κίνησις) of the phantasma
is in actuality (ἐνεργῇ), if the soul perceives the phantasma (αὐτοῦ) in this way (ταύτῃ) in which the
phantasma is by itself (ᾗ καθ’ αὑτό ἐστι), then the phantasma appears to come upon [the soul] as a
thought or phantasma. But if [the soul perceives the phantasma in this way] in which the phantasma
is from another (ᾗ ἄλλου) and just as in the case of the painting one views as a copy and, when one has
not viewed Coriscos, as of Coriscos, then the affection of this viewing and when one views [a painting]
as a drawn figure are different, in the soul, too, the one phantasma motion (τὸ μέν) occurs as a thought
(νόημα) only, but the other phantasma motion (τὸ δέ), like the painting viewed as copy, because it is a
copy, occurs as a memory (μνημόνευμα).204 (450b25-451a2).

Aristotle is explaining the conditions under which there is perception of the memory
phantasma either as a non-autobiographical presentation or as a presentation of a
memory. The phantasma that enters into memory is one in number, but two in being, as
the one figure drawn on a board is both a figure and a copy. Because the memory
phantasma is a copy of a past perception, it can serve as a figure that depicts something
to which there is no personal connection or it can serve as a memory (μνημόνευμα).
Attribution of motion to the phantasma reminds us that it is a presentation of phantasia.
Aristotle says, “When (ὅταν, 450 b27) the motion of the phantasma is in actuality…” The
“when” indicates that the phantasma motion is not continuously in actuality such that the
soul perceives the phantasma. This implication that the motion of the memory
phantasma is not continuously in actuality fits nicely with De insomniis, as does the

204

ᾗ μὲν οὖν καθ’ αὑτό, θεώρημα ἢ φάντασμά ἐστιν, ᾗ δ’ ἄλλου, οἷον εἰκὼν καὶ μνημόνευμα. ὥστε καὶ
ὅταν ἐνεργῇ ἡ κίνησις αὐτοῦ, ἂν μὲν ᾗ καθ’ αὑτό ἐστι, ταύτῃ αἰσθάνηται ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτοῦ, οἷον νόημά τι ἢ
φάντασμα φαίνεται ἐπελθεῖν· ἂν δ’ ᾗ ἄλλου καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ὡς εἰκόνα θεωρεῖ καί, μὴ ἑωρακὼς τὸν
Κορίσκον, ὡς Κορίσκου, ἐνταῦθά τε ἄλλο τὸ πάθος τῆς θεωρίας ταύτης καὶ ὅταν ὡς ζῷον γεγραμμένον
θεωρῇ, ἔν τε τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ μὲν γίγνεται ὥσπερ νόημα μόνον, τὸ δ’ ὡς ἐκεῖ ὅτι εἰκών, μνημόνευμα.
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suggestion that the soul perceives the phantasma when this is actualized. Phantasia is
not always affecting us, such as in deep sleep or alert perception that blocks it out, and so
we do not say of phantasmata that they are always affecting or moving the soul.
Retained memory phantasmata lie dormant until activated due to some associated
motion, either a sense perception or a passion in relation to something similar to what the
dormant phantasia motion represents, or by other associated phantasiai already activated
(see DM 451b10-22).
We should see that phantasmata are moved movers. Phantasmata set up by prior
sense perception are in potentiality to affect the soul with the sort of motion they possess.
When the phantasma is in motion according to actuality and moves the soul under the
right conditions, the soul perceives the phantasma. The soul is moved by the phantasma
such that the soul perceives the phantasma. Because being moved results in perception,
surely it is the sense faculty that is in play in its application as imaginative (phantastikon)
(see De insomn. 461b21-29). In De anima i 4, 408b13-18, Aristotle remarks that because
the soul is not a motion (some motions proceed from the soul while others terminate at
the soul), it is better to conceive of the soul as the principle in virtue of which the
ensouled being engages in various motions and activities. Strictly speaking, the animal
or the human perceives in virtue of the soul; it is not the soul that perceives. Talk of the
soul perceiving indicates that the perception in question is not of a standard sort (I
examine more precisely what this non-standard perception entails below). When
remembering, the sense faculty is not raised to actuality by one of the external sensibles
for which a sense serves as a discriminating mean. Rather, the primary sense faculty (and
the heart) alone is affected by an internal phantasma. The condition of the soul
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remembering according to actuality is that it is acted on by an internal phantasma. If this
is right, remembering looks passive to a certain extent: one remembers when the soul (the
aisthêtikon) is moved by a phantasma actualized with the relevant motion. This passivity
is decisive for solving the impasse concerning why perception of something present that
functions as copy of past cognition should be perceived as a presentation of one’s past
cognition, rather than merely as some present object of phantasia.205 Because
remembrance is a kind of perception, what happens is that the soul takes on the kind of
activity that the phantasma happens to possess when the phantasma acts on the soul. The
soul perceives the present memory phantasma to be a memory because the aisthêtikon is
acted on by the phantasma in accordance with the kind of actuality that the phantasma
possesses—and the memory phantasma is in actuality a copy. I will now explore what it
means for the aisthêtikon to become such as the memory phantasma is in actuality.
The importance of the present general conditions in the passage has been under
appreciated. Aristotle emphasizes that the actuality of the motion is of two sorts:
actualized either as something by itself (ᾗ καθ’ αὑτό, 450b28) or as a copy derived from
past cognition (ᾗ ἄλλου, 450b30). Depending on the manner (ταύτῃ, 450b28) of the
motion according to which the phantasma is perceived by the soul, the phantasma will
appear either as a mere thought (or a mere phantasma) or as a memory.
When the motion (κίνησις) of the phantasma is in actuality (ἐνεργῇ), if the soul perceives the
phantasma in this manner (ταύτῃ) as it is by itself (ᾗ καθ’ αὑτό ἐστι), the phantasma appears to come
on the soul as a thought (νόημα) or phantasma.206 (450b27-29)
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This is not to say that phantasmata are never actualized due to choice or wish in humans. Humans can
choose to remember, but often do remember from choice. Probably beasts are always caused to remember
by something due to association. My present point is that the sense faculty is raised to actuality by the
phantasma that affects it; the sense faculty does not in virtue of itself enter into remembrance.
206
ὥστε καὶ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ ἡ κίνησις αὐτοῦ, ἂν μὲν ᾗ καθ’ αὑτό ἐστι, ταύτῃ αἰσθάνηται ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτοῦ, οἷον
νόημά τι ἢ φάντασμα φαίνεται ἐπελθεῖν·
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Τhe phantasia motion may be in actuality such that the phantasma presented is
something by itself rather than something derived from another. The “if” (ἄν, 450b28)
indicates that the phantasia motion can be in actuality and yet not be perceived. Hence,
phantasia motion according to actuality need not mean that the phantasia motion is
affecting the aisthêtikon. The strength of other cognition may obscure the phantasia
motion or the phantasia motion may not yet have moved the perceptual part of the soul
(perhaps the motion is in the blood, but has not yet been carried to the heart; see De
insomn. 460b28-61a8). Of crucial importance is the assertion that the manner in which
the phantasia motion is actualized determines how the phantasma is perceived. Aristotle
employs a standard present general condition: ἄν + the subjunctive (αἰσθάνηται) in the
protasis, followed by a present indicative (φαίνεται) in the apodosis.207 Some read the
passage so that it could indicate an arbitrary perception on the part of the soul: when the
motion of the phantasma is actualized, if the soul perceives the phantasma as by itself,
then a thought or phantasma appears to come upon it. If read this way, no explanation is
given for why the soul should perceive the phantasma as by itself and as a mere
phantasma rather than as a memory. Aristotle neither suggests that the way in which the
soul perceives the phantasia motion is arbitrary nor fails to provide an account for why
the soul perceives the phantasma as by itself or as from another. Rather, Aristotle
suggests that the perception of the phantasma as a thought or mere phantasma is due to
the kind or manner of motion the phantasma happens to have. Two considerations
suggest that how the phantasma is perceived is due to the motion with which the
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Because ἄν is not used with present indicatives (Smyth §1794), the protasis cannot be ἄν + ἐστι. Could
ἄν take a present indicative, then we would have a present general with two apodoses: if the phantasma is
active by itself, then the soul perceives it this way, [and then] a thought or phantasma appears to come
upon it.
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phantasma happens to be actualized: 1) syntax and grammar and 2) the passage fails to
supply a solution to the impasse the passage is meant to solve if the motion of the
phantasma does not determine the perception of the soul.
First, the syntax suggest the motion determines how the phantasma is perceived.
The phrase “if it [the phantasma] is as by itself” (ἂν μὲν ᾗ καθ’ αὑτό ἐστι) in the protasis
immediately follows the phrase “when the motion of the phantasma is in actuality” (ὅταν
ἐνεργῇ ἡ κίνησις αὐτοῦ) that directly precedes the protasis. A more literal rendering of
the word order gives: when the motion of the phantasma is in actuality, if as it is by itself
(ᾗ καθ’ αὑτό ἐστι) in this way (ταύτῃ) the soul perceives it, the phantasma appears to
come upon the soul as a thought or phantasma. “As” (ᾗ) in “as it is by itself” (ᾗ καθ’
αὑτό ἐστι) and “in this way” (ταύτῃ) are both adverbial forms indicating manner. “As it
is by itself” refers to one of the two manners of being of the memory phantasma
previously posited (namely, as by itself or as from another; see 450b24-27). The “being
something by itself” or the “being derived from another” is said to be a manner of the
motion of the phantasma when (ὅταν, 450b27) this motion is in actuality. “In this way”
(ταύτῃ) refers to the manner of the phantasma just described (i.e., as by itself, ᾗ καθ’
αὑτό ἐστι) so that ταύτῃ does not refer to the manner of the perception, but to the manner
and way in which the phantasma is actualized. Hence, the sense is not that the
phantasma appears to the soul as a thought or phantasma if the soul perceives the
phantasma as it is by itself. The aisthêtikon is a power in virtue of which there is
discrimination among different perceptible objects. That discriminating power may be
applied to different sorts of internal motions as well as external (i.e., the actuality of
sensibles). The distinction between by itself and from another is between non-memory
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phantasia and memory phantasia, but these also differ from the activity of sense
perception. When acted on by phantasia motion active as by itself or as from another,
the aisthêtikon discriminates either of these as other than perception, but also as different
from each other due to the sort of actuality the phantasia motion happens to possess.208
The soul perceives the phantasma as by itself under the condition that the motion of the
phantasma is actualized in just this way.
We may now consider how things stand if the proper function of ταύτῃ is missed.
Despite the fact that ταύτῃ appears in all of the manuscripts, many recent interpreters and
translators render 450b28-29 as though ταύτῃ were not present.209 Such omission is fatal
for the account because the omission leaves the reader with the impression that all
Aristotle says is that the phantasma appears before the soul as a thought or phantasma if
the soul perceives the phantasma as something by itself. On this reading, Aristotle does
not give a reason for why the soul should perceive the phantasma as something by itself
so that the phantasma appears as a thought or mere phantasma. And because the crucial
phrasing in 450b28-30210 is clearly meant to be inserted into “But if from another” (ἂν δ’
ᾗ ἄλλου) in 450b29-30, the initial failure to appreciate the role of ταύτῃ compounds the
error: the soul remembers if it perceives the memory phantasma as from another.
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It is not that the aisthêtikon in its application as the perceiver of phantasia discriminates among objects
of phantasia, but that the aisthêtikon discriminates the activity of imagination from remembrance and both
of these from sense perception.
209
The grammar is difficult and very nearly anacoluthic. See Richard Sorabji (2004) 51 and the
commentary to which his failure to realize the importance of ταύτῃ leads on page 10. David Bloch (2006)
33 gets into similar trouble. Joe Sachs (2001) 171 better captures the sense: “And so, whenever the motion
is at work that belongs to it [the phantasma] insofar as it is something in its own right, if the soul perceives
it by this motion, a certain sort of thought or image seems to come before it.” Sachs (without comment)
appears to transpose ἂν (“if”) from its position in front of μὲν ᾗ καθ’ αὑτό ἐστι (insofar as it is something in
its own right) to after. Sachs differs from me by taking ταύτῃ as an instrumental dative feminine pronoun
that references motion (κίνησις, 450b27).
210
Hence also, when the motion (κίνησις) of the phantasma is active (ἐνεργῇ), if the soul perceives the
phantasma (αὐτοῦ) in this way (ταύτῃ) in which the phantasma is by itself (ᾗ καθ’ αὑτό ἐστι), then…
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But why should the soul perceive a phantasma as from another rather than as
something by itself? If Aristotle’s explanation is only that the soul remembers under the
condition that it perceives its phantasma as from another, then Aristotle fails to provide a
solution to his impasse, a solution which the passage under discussion is supposed to
supply. What is supposed to be explained is not that the one who remembers can
perceive a phantasma as something derived from another, but on account of what (449b4)
the perception of a present phantasma amounts to a perception of one’s past. On my
reading, Aristotle has at least the beginning of such an explanation, for I have him saying
that the soul perceives the phantasma (αἰσθάνηται ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτοῦ) according to the
manner in which the motion is actualized. The sense of the passage is that if the soul
perceives the phantasma motion in the way in which it is actualized as by itself, then
under this condition, the phantasia motion appears to come upon the soul as a mere
thought or phantasma, and not as a memory. When the phrasing concerning the manner
of actuality that belongs to the phantasma is transposed to ἂν δ’ ᾗ ἄλλου in 450b29-30,
we then understand that if the motion of the phantasma is actualized as from another and
the soul is affected by this motion, then under this condition the soul perceives the
phantasma as a memory. Only with this reading does Aristotle actually begin to provide
a solution to the impasse.
After establishing that the phantasmata that provokes remembering is perceived
in accordance with the sort of actuality it happens to possess at the time when it is
perceived, Aristotle moves to discuss the conditions under which there is perception of
the memory phantasma as a memory. The explanation again takes the form of a present
general condition, but it is complicated by the insertion of a complex comparison to
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viewing a painting as a representation of a generic figure and viewing it as portrait or
copy of someone.
But if as from another (ἂν δ’ ᾗ ἄλλου) and just as one looks into a painting as a copy and, when one
has not been viewing (μὴ ἑωρακώς) Coriscos, as of Coriscos, then the affection (τὸ πάθος) of this
viewing and when one views [it] as a painted figure are different, also in the soul the one case occurs
as a thought only (νόημα μόνον), but the other case, like that other, because it is a copy (εἰκών), occurs
as a memory (μνημόνευμα). (450b29-51a1)

As before, Aristotle draws an analogy, on the one hand, between perceiving a phantasma
as a copy derived from some actual particular thing and perceiving a phantasma as
something by itself and, on the other hand, between viewing a figure in a painting as a
copy of an actual, particular person (Coriscos) and viewing a figure merely as painted
figure of some man. In the example, a single thing, a painting (γραφή, 450b30), may be
viewed either as a copy of a particular man, Coriscos (ὡς εἰκόνα θεωρεῖ καί ὡς
Κορίσκου, 450b30-31), or as a painted figure (ζῷον γεγραμμένον, 450b32). The painting
is a nexus of lines and colors that represent something. In Aristotle’s example, a
particular painting may be viewed as a representation that is a copy of Coriscos or as
merely a painted male figure. Previously (450b24-29), Aristotle referenced (1) the
motion of the phantasma, (2) the phantasma as by itself, and (3) the phantasma as
derived from another. Now (450b29-31) he mentions three things in an example meant
to illustrate the perception of the phantasma as derived from another: (1) a painting
(γραφή), (2) a copy (εἰκών) and (3) a painted figure (ζῷον γεγραμμένον). The painting
observed in actuality corresponds to the actualized phantasia motion that presents a
phantasma to the soul, whereas the viewing of the painting as either (i) a painted figure
or (ii) a copy corresponds to the soul perceiving the phantasma as (i) a thought and mere
phantasma or as (ii) a memory, respectively. Because both copy and painted figure are
viewed as a representation of a male figure, the difference must lie in the viewer’s
214

relation to the male figure depicted (the viewer looks upon what is depicted as a male
figure whether this is viewed as a copy or a painted figure). The copy is not viewed as of
some (any) particular man, but as of a certain, particular named man, Coriscos.
Aristotle could have the copy be of some particular man (τινος ἄνδρός) and
contrast this with a painting viewed as a generic token representation of the male figure
(e.g., the Vitruvian Man). The difference in this latter case is between viewing a painting
as a portrait of an actually (or once actually) existing person with whom we have no
acquaintance and viewing a painting as a representation of a generic token of the male
form. However, because the distinction between viewing a painting (1) as a copy or (2)
merely as a painted figure is supposed to illustrate the distinction between (1) perceiving
a phantasma as a memory of past cognition and (2) perceiving a phantasma as a thought
or mere phantasma, Aristotle gives as an example the viewing of a painting that depicts a
man whose name is known to the viewer (or to the readers to whom De memoria would
have been distributed). The viewer not only looks upon the painting as a copy (ὡς εἰκόνα
θεωρεῖ) and portrait, but looks upon the painting also as of Coriscos in particular (ὡς
Κορίσκου), not merely of some particular man (τινος ἄνδρός). The implication is that the
viewer has previously seen or been acquainted with Coriscos. It is only because the
painting matches up with the viewer’s memory of previous dealings with Coriscos that
the viewer will view the painting as indeed a copy of the Coriscos. If Aristotle only
intends the painting to be something one views as a copy of some unknown man, he
makes this point difficult to grasp by supplying a name. Were the point that one views
the painting as copy of some actual but unknown man, there would be no reason to
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mention the man’s name, which would be unknown to the viewer in any case.211 Further,
if the viewer has no personal connection to what the painting depicts, the case, which is
supposed to illustrate how one relates to one’s memory, is less like remembering than is
the case where one has previous dealings with what the painting depicts. If I am right
that the viewer in Aristotle’s example is meant to be understood as having seen Coriscos
before, then “has not seen Coriscos” (μὴ ἑωρακώς τὸν Κορίσκον) means that the viewer
has not been seeing Coriscos for some time.212 If there is no personal connection to what
the painting depicts, then the viewer will look upon the painting not as of Coriscos, but as
merely a painted figure, presumably of some man to whom there is no personal
connection.
Now, in what sense is the viewing of the portrait as a copy of Coriscos like
viewing a memory phantasma as a copy (eikôn) and a memory (mnêmoneuma)? Richard
Sorabji is no doubt led to translate mnêmoneuma as “reminder” because of the
comparison of the memory phantasma to the painting that functions as a likeness of
Coriscos.213 Certainly the painting that is a copy of Coriscos will serve as a reminder of
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W. D. Ross (1955) 239 says of Coriscos that he was a member of the Academy with whom Aristotle
associated while in Assos. Based on Aristotle’s mention of Coriscos in the Lyceum in Physics 219b20-21,
Ross conjectures that Coriscos had become a member of Aristotle’s school. Assuming De memoria was
discussed among the Peripatetics, Coriscos would have been known to those reading and discussing the
present passage.
212
Jack M. Greenstein (1997) 16 rightly argues that no prior knowledge of Coriscos is needed to view the
painting of him as a copy on the grounds that a viewer may look upon a portrait as a copy of the person it
depicts without ever having come into prior contact with the depicted. Hence, Greenstein urges that we
read μὴ ἑωρακὼς τὸν Κορίσκον as “never seen Coriscos” rather than “has not been seeing Coriscos.”
However, if the viewer has never seen Coriscos, the viewer cannot view the painting depicting Coriscos as
a copy of the Coriscos. The viewer could view the painting as a likeness of some man, but not of the
Coriscos. Hence, the viewer cannot view the painting as a copy and as of Coriscos if the viewer has never
seen or has no previous acquaintance with Coriscos. The viewer who has never seen Coriscos before can
look upon a painting as a copy of some particular man, but not as a copy of the particular man called
Coriscos. But the phrase ὡς εἰκόνα θεωρεῖ καί…ὡς Κορίσκου indicates that the viewer not only looks
upon the painting as a copy, but as a copy of Coriscos specifically.
213
Richard Sorabji (2004) 7, 51, 84.
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previous dealings with Coriscos for the viewer who has had previous dealings. But I
think Sorabji may be drawing the wrong lesson from the analogy. In the example of
viewing the painting, Aristotle’s focus is on viewing the painting either as a copy of
Coriscos or merely as a painted figure. In order for the viewer to view the painting as
being a copy of the Coriscos, the painting must match up with the viewer’s personal
acquaintance with Coriscos. And because Aristotle has said that the viewer has not now
been viewing Coriscos, there is only one standard from which the painting can be viewed
as being a copy: the viewer’s own memory of previous dealings with Coriscos. The
painting reminds the viewer of the previous dealings because the viewing of the painting
is a “motion” similar to the phantasiai of previous dealings with Coriscos: viewing the
painting triggers memory of dealing with Coriscos. But the viewing of the painting of
Coriscos (when he is not present for comparison with the painting) as a copy derived
from Coriscos depends on recognizing that painting that has triggered a memory of
Coriscos is a likeness to the Coriscos that our memories present to us.
What (1) viewing a painting as a copy and (2) perceiving a phantasma as a copy
and memory have in common is not that both are reminders or triggers for entering into
remembrance, but that both involve the awareness of a prior personal acquaintance with
what each represents. As the painting is taken to be a copy of the absent Coriscos
because we have had prior dealings with Coriscos to which the painting matches up, so
the memory phantasma is perceived to be a presentation of our prior cognitive
engagement with X: when remembering, one says in soul that one cognized X previously.
If there is no personal connection to what the phantasia motion presents, then just as a
painting depicting a figure with which the viewer has no prior acquaintance is perceived
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as a representation of some unknown person or a generic token, so will a phantasia
motion be perceived as a presentation of a mere phantasma or thought. Why the one who
remembers perceives the phantasma to be a memory of previous cognition is because the
remembering subject perceives a past, personal connection to what the phantasma
presents.
That personal connection brings us to the heart of the matter: what causes the soul
to perceive a personal connection to what the memory phantasma presents? Talk of
perception suggests that the perceptual faculty of the soul is in play. Perception works by
assimilation to its object and Aristotle has the soul perceiving the memory phantasma in
accordance with the sort of motion with which the phantasma is actualized, either as
something by itself or as something derived from another and as a copy. Motion talk is
useful for Aristotle because remembering surely involves a change in the animal,
although it is not a standard alteration or destruction as phantasia is a motion, but only of
a sort (see DA 428b11): there is a transition from remembering in potentiality to
remembering in actuality, or from fantasizing in potentiality to fantasizing in actuality.
The soul does not become other than itself in some way, but instead (as aisthêtikon)
realizes a capacity to assimilate to the activity of a phantasia motion present in the soulbody composite. There is here an implicit genus-differentia definition for remembrance.
The genus is phantasma affecting the soul in actuality. Were the phantasma moving the
soul in potentiality, nothing would occur. The motion is actual and producing perception
of a sort, so the phantasma is a moving cause. The soul can be moved either to fantasy or
to remember. Because one and the same phantasia motion can move the soul to fantasy
or to remember, the phantasia motion must be derived from and possess the power to
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serve as a copy of a previous cognition. A phantasia motion that presents a purple firebreathing elephant that rides a unicycle while chewing gum in Topeka, Kansas is not
derived from any actual, previous instance of cognition (although the constituent
components may be). The phantasia motion that pertains to memory is capable of
serving as a memory object and so it must be derived from and capable of serving as a
copy of an actual, previous instance of cognition. When in motion as a copy of a past
cognition, the phantasma moves the soul to remember. When in motion as something by
itself, it moves the soul merely to fantasy.
We still require an account that explains how the activity of the phantasia motion
that presents a phantasma as by itself differs from the phantasia motion that presents a
phantasma as a memory. I will argue that the difference is the presence of a motion of
time together with the motion of the phantasma. I have argued that the one who
remembers perceives a personal connection to what the phantasma presents. The
memorable object is the remembering subject’s past cognition and the one remembering
“says in soul that previously (πρότερον) one heard or perceived or considered this”
(449b22-23). The perception of a personal connection (“that one did X”) already
contains a perception of past aspect. Setting aside cases of remembrance that may occur
in sleep, wakeful remembrance occurs alongside sense perception and (in humans)
thinking. The phantasma one perceives in remembrance is not a presentation of what the
remembering subject currently perceives or thinks or has yet to think. Hence, the
personal connection must be in relation to content possessing past aspect: “For always
whenever one is in actuality with memory, just as we said, that one saw or heard or
learned this, one perceives-in-addition that [it was] earlier (πρότερον)” (450a19-21). The
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case of viewing the painting as a copy of Coriscos is analogous to remembering precisely
because the viewing of the painting as a copy involves the perception of a past, personal
connection to what the painting depicts: because one has a past, personal connection with
what is depicted, one views the painting as a copy of the Coriscos one has dealt with
previously. Although Aristotle does not mention time explicitly when speaking of the
two sorts of phantasma motions and the viewing of the painting, the viewer’s implied
past personal connection to what the copy depicts already includes a temporal dimension.
When remembering, one perceives oneself to be remembering precisely because one
perceives a past, personal connection to what is presented in the memory. The
autobiographical connection distinguishes remembering from other sorts of phantasia.
Just as a viewer who has no past, personal connection to the absent Coriscos does not
view the painting of Coriscos as a copy of the Coriscos, so the perceiver of phantasia
motion actualized as something by itself perceives the resulting phantasma as something
to which the perceiver has no autobiographical connection. The reason why is that the
phantasia motion actualized as something by itself has no past aspect attached to it.
Without past aspect attached, the phantasia motion cannot present a phantasma as
derived from prior cognition. The sort of motion with which the phantasma is actualized
when it is serves as a memory must somehow include past aspect.
Aristotle needs to explain the conditions under which a present phantasma will be
perceived as a representation of something past if the commitment to indirect realism in
the case of memory is to be maintained. If the motion with which the memory
phantasma is actualized when it is perceived as a memory includes past aspect and the
soul is moved with this motion, then this would help explain why a presently appearing
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phantasma should be perceived as representing something past. In a later passage,
Aristotle indicates that a motion concerning time is included in the act of remembering.
Therefore, whenever the motion [the phantasma] regarding the deed (πράγματος) and the motion
regarding the time arise together, then one is in actuality with memory (τῇ μνήμῃ ἐνεργεῖ). But if one
supposes [so] without doing it, one supposes one remembers (μνημονεύειν). For nothing prevents one
from being mistaken somehow and seeming to remember while not remembering (μνημονεύειν μὴ
μνημονεύοντα). But not to suppose [so] while being active with memory (ἐνεργοῦντα τῇ μνήμῃ), but
rather to fail to notice when being put in mind (μεμνημένον) is not possible: for recall (μεμνῆσθαι) is
this very thing. But if the motion of the deed arises separately (χωρίς) from the motion of the time, or
the latter separately from the former, then one does not recall. 214 (452b23-29)

The passage is important for several reasons. Not only is there mention of a motion
belonging to time that enters into remembering, but also an explanation of how there can
be mistaken memory, for which any theory of memory must provide an account. The
positing of a motion connected to time allows Aristotle to explain two birds with one
stone: (1) how a present phantasma can serve as a representation of the past and (2) how
mistaken memory arises. The condition for genuine remembrance is that the motion of
the deed (πρᾶγμα) arises together (ἅμα) with a motion of the time (κίνησις τοῦ χρόνου).
The motion of the deed is the phantasma. The motion of the time may be a precise
measure of the temporal distance from the present or it may be unmeasured and imprecise
(see 452b29-53a2). Together (ἅμα) is at least in terms of time, but remembrance requires
that the motion of the time and the motion of the phantasma coincide and jointly affect
the soul. When one of the two motions occurs separately (χωρίς) from the other, there is
no remembrance. I take this to be strong evidence that the motion of the phantasma
perceived as a copy is together with a motion that indicates past aspect. For the
phantasia motion to be actualized as a copy means for the motion to be in actuality
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ὅταν οὖν ἅμα ἥ τε τοῦ πράγματος γίγνηται κίνησις καὶ ἡ τοῦ χρόνου, τότε τῇ μνήμῃ ἐνεργεῖ. ἂν δ’
οἴηται μὴ ποιῶν, οἴεται μνημονεύειν· οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει διαψευσθῆναί τινα καὶ δοκεῖν μνημονεύειν μὴ
μνημονεύοντα. ἐνεργοῦντα δὲ τῇ μνήμῃ μὴ οἴεσθαι ἀλλὰ λανθάνειν μεμνημένον οὐκ ἔστιν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν
αὐτὸ τὸ μεμνῆσθαι. ἀλλ’ ἐὰν ἡ τοῦ πράγματος γένηται χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ χρόνου ἢ αὕτη ἐκείνης, οὐ μέμνηται.
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together with a motion indicating past aspect.
Aristotle compares the discrimination of temporal locations to the estimation of
relative distance among objects closer and further from the viewer (452b7-22). The
viewer’s location is analogous to the present moment and objects closer to and further
from the viewer are analogous to events closer to and further past from the present
moment. I have not arrived at a satisfactory working hypothesis of how exactly Aristotle
supposes time estimation works, but some basic features are discernible.215 Aristotle
suggests that phantasmata produced during perception are proportional to the matters
perceived from which the phantasmata are derived. The primary sense faculty judges the
relative distance among objects perceived by means of the phantasmata that preserve the
proportions of the things perceived (νοεῖ γὰρ τὰ μεγάλα…καὶ πόρρω ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀνάλογον
κινήσει, 452b9-12). That which discriminates time is the same part of the soul that
discriminates magnitude, the primary sense faculty (452b7-9; cf. 450a9-12). Temporal
distances from past to present motions perceived or between various past events
perceived are likened to extended magnitudes. Just as perception of magnitudes sets up
perceptual phantasmata that preserve the relative proportions of the magnitudes
perceived, so are there motions of time (temporal phantasmata) set up from the
perception of the passage of time that are proportionate to the passage of time relative to
motions perceived. Time is the recognition (measure) of the before and after connected
to motion that belongs to cognition or to perceivable magnitudes in motion. Probably we
are to see that retention of phantasia set up from the perception of the passage of time in
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For a thorough analysis of the motion concerning the time and its connection to the memory phantasma
see chapter nine (“Time and the common perceptibles”) in Tony Roark (2011) Aristotle on Time: a Study of
the Physics.
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connection with things perceived serves as a token that represents the temporal distance
(“magnitude”) between things perceived. The motions of time (“time phantasmata”) are
proportionate to the temporal distance between things that have been perceived. As the
sense faculty judges how big or far off one magnitude is relative to other magnitudes, so
the sense faculty discriminates temporal distance in time by means time phantasmata
proportionate to the actual passage of time. The proportionality of the temporal
phantasia would explain why there can be a sense of the temporal distance an event
perceived has from the present that does not require reliving everything that has
happened from the perceived event up until the present moment. As perceptual
phantasmata serve as proportionate tokens of the distance among the perceptual objects
perceived relative to the perceiver, so temporal phantasmata in the animal serve as
proportionate tokens of the temporal distance for the matters of concern relative to
present moment inhabited by the animal.
The motion of the time (κίνησις τοῦ χρόνου, 452b23-24, 29) is a phantasia that
represents passage of time. The motion could refer to the duration of the deed that the
memory phantasma represents or to the temporal distance of the deed to the present
moment or relative to other memories. Because the memory phantasma is derived from
the past deed (cognitive activity), it may preserve the duration of the deed proportionally
(we do not have to relive the event remembered in its entirety to have some sense of how
long it lasted). Probably the motion of the time refers to a token that presents some
proportional distance into the past from the present. If trying to recollect the precise time
of an event, time motions that preserve the temporal location will be needed that have a
high degree of precision. To remember, all that is needed is a sense that what the
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memory phantasma presents belongs to the past. We should not expect the beasts to
remember with much precision; probably the beasts perceive that the memory presents
something prior to the present moment without much sense of when this was. Perception
(awareness) of past aspect arises in what a phantasma represents whenever a motion
proportionate to some temporal distance from the now jointly moves the sense faculty.
The time token can be a precise proportion of the time elapsed, e.g., the event happened
three days ago. In such a case the time token precisely preserves the proportion of time
elapsed relative to other things that have happened prior to the event and after. In this
way, the one remembering or recollecting picks out when something happened not only
relative to the present moment, but relative to other things that happened in the past. On
the other hand, there may be only a sense that what the memory presents happened some
time ago if the time token does not well preserve the proportions of distance among
things. The memory is sensed as past but its location relative to other things in the past is
poorly preserved. If unable to situate a memory temporally in relation to other memories,
there will be only a sense that it happened previously as opposed to when it happened
previously.
Does Aristotle have an answer to the question of why the propionate motion of
time should be co-actualized along with the motion of the deed? Time is a measure of
motion and the memory phantasma is a representation of past cognition that was itself a
motion of a sort. Hence, the original cognition (motion) occasioned a past awareness of
the passage of time for the one who had the cognition. Perhaps we are to see that the
actualization of the memory phantasma moves the temporal phantasia (or vice versa?)
that was set up by and represents the sense of time associated with the original cognition.
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This is a central question for further research.
The presence of a time motion indicates that remembering is a special case of the
convergence of phantasia and perception of time. Insofar as remembering involves the
occurrence of phantasmata derived from sense perception, remembrance is presentative
and non-discriminating. The primary sense faculty is merely moved to perceive a
presentation of sense-like (or cognition-like) activity. Yet insofar as remembrance
distinguishes past temporal aspect (that is attached to what the memory phantasma
represents) from the present time in which the act of remembering and concurrent
perceptions occur, remembrance is discriminating. Further (at least in a wakeful and
healthy state), the sense faculty discriminates between the perceptions concurrent with
the remembering and the act of remembering itself; perception concerns what is present
whereas memory concerns what has past aspect. Because memory contents have past
aspect, they cannot belong to any current perception, but must be copies of perception
instead. The discrimination of past from present time and of memory from perception
gives rise to self-awareness that one is remembering.
Aristotle says, “For always whenever one is in actuality with memory, just as we
said, that one saw or heard or learned this, one perceives-in-addition that [it was] earlier
(προσαισθάνεται ὅτι πρότερον)” (450a19-21). We have now seen Aristotle’s answer to
the question of how the additional sense of past time enters into remembrance. A motion
that serves as a proportional token of the amount of time elapsed since the event that the
memory phantasma presents combines with the motion of the memory phantasma. I
have also emphasized the personal connection to the memory remembered. The
remembering subject recognizes that such and such was cognized previously by the
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remembering subject. Not only is the content presented in memory a copy of previous
cognition, but the content is perceived to be the remembering subject’s very own (and
thus perceived to be a copy). A little more needs to be said about this personal
connection and how it arises.
Surely the attachment of past aspect is one reason for perceiving a personal
connection to what memories present. The past aspect attached to memories
distinguishes remembrance from sense perception and supposition, but also from modes
of phantasia such as day dreaming and constructive imagination. The one who engages
in constructive imagination does not consider the fantasized object to be real or actually
to have occurred before. It is possible to imagine that something occurred before, but in
this case, it is the subject who imposes the temporal frame, which, for lack of better
language, always has a counterfactual halo hovering around it. In remembrance, the
memory contents are perceived as having past aspect, but the past aspect is not perceived
as having been imposed on the memory by the remembering subject. The awareness of
past aspect that enters into memory is something that happens to the one who remembers
as an affection; the awareness is something that the remembering subject undergoes as a
patient rather than something the subject imposes as an agent. Having time sense in
memory be due to a motion of time by which the remembering subject is moved fits with
the experience of remembering where the sense of time is not something actively
imposed, but passively felt. Setting aside cases of illusion induced by disease, physical
or mental, fatigue, or extreme passion (one may suppose the bush is a man in wait if in a
state of fright or panic), phantasia of the constructive sort involves the awareness that the
fantasizing subject has a role in causing the contents fantasized. The experience of
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remembering, as well as false remembrance, is passive in ways that fantasy is not. One
may choose to initiate an act of remembrance, but once initiated, the contents
remembered exhibit a resistance and fixity that the contents of fantasy do not.
For instance, I can imagine a purple fire-breathing elephant that rides a unicycle
while chewing gum in Topeka, Kansas. I can make the elephant smaller or bigger, make
it peddle the unicycle faster or slower. But this feels directed by myself and, because
directed, it does not feel like something I have actually experienced. (Is past aspect ever
attached to the fantastical among those considered sane?) But if I remember the elephant
I saw at the zoo a month ago, there is only so much I can play with the memory contents
before it ceases to feel like a memory. My memory tells me that the bull elephant was
facing me, chewing grass. If I turn the elephant around, it no longer feels as much like a
memory because viewing the back of the bull does not feel like something I perceived
formerly. Only when the bull is facing me does the presentation feel like something with
past aspect. Too much liberty with the deed portrayed in memory destroys the sense of
past aspect, destroys the sense that one is remembering something one actually did. In
contrast, there is no amount of liberty that destroys the sense that one is fantasizing. On
the contrary, the more liberty taken, the stronger is the awareness that one is fantasizing.
Hence, there seems to be an intimate connection between perceiving a personal
connection to memories and perceiving memories to present something that has past
aspect. Once the personal connection is severed, so is the sense of past aspect.
Due to the intimate connection between the sense of past aspect and the perceived
personal connection to memories, it is tempting to propose that one of the two, the sense
of past aspect or the perceived personal connection, gives rise to the other. But probably
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the sense of past aspect and personal connection can each give rise to the other in
different circumstances. Aristotle’s comments on mistaken memory look to confirm this.
Aristotle twice speaks of being mistaken that one remembers.
The opposite also occurs; for example, it happened to Antipheron of Oreus and others who were out of
their minds (ἐξισταμένοις): for they were speaking of their phantasmata as things that occurred and as
though they were remembering [their phantasmata]. This happens whenever one beholds what is not a
copy as though it is a copy.216 (451a8-12)

Those who are out of their minds may treat their phantasmata as though they present
things that actually happened and take themselves to be remembering when they
contemplate these phantasmata. Being out of mind suggests that the phantasmata are
fantastical or the products of delusion, but certainly Aristotle was aware that those of
sound mind have false memories (see 452b25-26). Those out of their minds speak of
their phantasmata as having occurred, so they attach past aspect to them, see a personal
connection to them, and speak of them as memories. Wrongly speaking of phantasmata
representations as having occurred is dependent on falsely remembering what they
represent. The condition under which one speaks (i.e., believes) that a phantasma
represents what actually happened is that one supposes oneself truly to remember what
the phantasma presents. Aristotle gives what looks to be the condition under which the
mistakes mentioned should occur. The mistake (‘this’, τοῦτο) happens when (τοῦτο δὲ
γίγνεται ὅταν, 451a11) the unstable perceive phantasmata to be copies of prior cognition
that are not copies. ‘This’ (τοῦτο) is ambiguous because two intimately related mistakes
are mentioned: (1) wrongfully supposing of the phantasma that it represents something
that actually occurred (τὰ γὰρ φαντάσματα ἔλεγον ὡς γενόμενα, 451a10-11) and (2)
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γίγνεται δὲ καὶ τοὐναντίον, οἷον συνέβη Ἀντιφέροντι τῷ Ὠρείτῃ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐξισταμένοις· τὰ γὰρ
φαντάσματα ἔλεγον ὡς γενόμενα καὶ ὡς μνημονεύοντες. τοῦτο δὲ γίγνεται ὅταν τις τὴν μὴ εἰκόνα ὡς
εἰκόνα θεωρῇ.
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wrongfully supposing oneself genuinely to remember (ἔλεγον…ὡς μνημονεύοντες,
451a11). The mistake (τοῦτο) could refer to both mistakes or to the nearer of the two in
word order, the supposing oneself genuinely to remember. Probably ‘this’ refers to both
because to remember is to relate to a phantasma as a copy with a sense of past time.
Remembering and considering a phantasma to be a copy of something prior are
inseparable. Therefore, one wrongly remembers and wrongly considers phantasma
representations as having occurred when (i.e., under the condition that) one beholds a
phantasma that is not a copy of prior cognition as though it were a copy (τοῦτο δὲ
γίγνεται ὅταν τις τὴν μὴ εἰκόνα ὡς εἰκόνα θεωρῇ, 451a11-12)
Still, Aristotle does not mention why a phantasma that is not a copy of one’s prior
cognition would be viewed as though it were. To perceive a phantasma to be a copy of
one’s prior cognition requires that one both recognize a personal connection to what the
phantasma represents and to perceive it as belonging to the past! Aristotle does not so
much explain why false remembrance happens in his discussion of Antipheron and others
like him, that is, why one should take what is not a copy to be a copy in the first place. 217
Rather, he explains what false remembrance is: it is perceiving as copy what is not a
copy. The reason for false remembering and why one should take what is not a copy as a
copy is given only later, when Aristotle introduces the motion proportionate to the
passage of time and connects this motion to false remembrance.
Therefore, whenever the motion [the phantasma] regarding the deed (πράγματος) and the motion
regarding the time arise together, then one is in actuality with memory (τῇ μνήμῃ ἐνεργεῖ). But if one
supposes (οἴηται) [so] without doing it, one supposes one remembers (μνημονεύειν). For nothing
prevents one from being mistaken somehow and seeming to remember while not remembering…But if
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In this regard Aristotle appears to track the discussion of the wax block in Theaetetus 191c-195b.
Socrates explains that false judgment occurs when a percipient misapplies a memory imprint to a current
perception, but fails to explain why such misapplication occurs in the first place. Aristotle says
misremembering occurs when one takes what is not a copy to be a copy, but fails to provide an account for
why such a mistake should happen.
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the motion of the deed arises separately (χωρίς) from the motion of the time, or the latter separately
from the former, then one does not recall. 218 (452b23-26, b28-29)

“In actuality with memory” (τῇ μνήμῃ ἐνεργεῖ, 452b24) means genuinely remembering
and not merely supposing so. When a motion proportionate to the passage of time occurs
together with a phantasma that is truly a copy of some prior instance of cognition, then
one remembers truly. But if one fails to put (μὴ ποιῶν, b24) the phantasma together with
the motion proportionate to the passage of time, then one will only suppose oneself to
remember. Aristotle cannot mean that one may suppose oneself to remember if one is at
work with one of the two motions alone, either the phantasma alone or the proportionate
motion of time. One might entertain a memory phantasma without any motion
proportionate to any passage of time, but in such a case the phantasma will not be
perceived to possess past aspect; but the subject in actuality with memory perceives a
presentation of the subject’s having cognized X and perceives-in-addition that this
happened previously (450a19-21). Conversely, one cannot suppose oneself to remember
if one entertains a motion proportionate to a passage of time independently from a
phantasma of some past deed. Aristotle mentions that the motion proportionate to the
passage of time may be actualized separately from the phantasma of the deed. This may
mean independently from any phantasma representing cognition whatsoever, whether a
genuine memory phantasma and copy of prior cognition or not. For example, we might
be occasioned to wonder what we were doing two days ago and so we have a sense of
some distance into the past from the present moment, but not in connection to any
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ὅταν οὖν ἅμα ἥ τε τοῦ πράγματος γίγνηται κίνησις καὶ ἡ τοῦ χρόνου, τότε τῇ μνήμῃ ἐνεργεῖ. ἂν δ’
οἴηται μὴ ποιῶν, οἴεται μνημονεύειν· οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει διαψευσθῆναί τινα καὶ δοκεῖν μνημονεύειν μὴ
μνημονεύοντα. ἐνεργοῦντα δὲ τῇ μνήμῃ μὴ οἴεσθαι ἀλλὰ λανθάνειν μεμνημένον οὐκ ἔστιν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν
αὐτὸ τὸ μεμνῆσθαι. ἀλλ’ ἐὰν ἡ τοῦ πράγματος γένηται χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ χρόνου ἢ αὕτη ἐκείνης, οὐ μέμνηται.
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specific event and so there is not remembrance of any prior cognitive activity. We
merely think of some temporal distance prior and relative to our present cognition.
Alternately, because the possible separation of the motion of time is said in relation to the
deed, having the motion of the time separately from the phantasma may mean separately
from a genuine copy of actual, prior cognition. If a motion proportionate to some
passage of time is combined with a phantasma that is not a copy, then in such a case
nothing will prevent the one who has done so from supposing oneself to remember.
Because there can be no remembrance, either genuine or not, without both a perception of
some likeness to a cognition of X and a perception of past aspect attached to the former,
we see that mistaken remembrance occurs when a motion proportionate to some passage
of time is combined with a phantasma that is not actually a copy derived from prior
cognition.
Those out of their minds, like Antipheron, may be in such a condition that
motions proportionate to a passage of time get combined with fantastical phantasmata.
Those in possession of themselves probably do not so much suffer from attaching past
aspect to fantastical phantasmata on the grounds that the fantastical does not fit well with
other memories. A well-functioning faculty of reason prevents the association of past
time with the fantastical because the fantastical does not fit within the course of normal
experience and what effects are associated with what causes (e.g., the effect of fire does
not issue from the mouths elephants). But regarding phantasia presentations that fit with
other memories, probably it is possible to fit these presentations with motions
proportionate to the passage of time relative to the other memories with which these fit
well. We insert plausible phantasia into the nexus of genuine remembrance.
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Aristotle’s comments on mistaken memory show that a perceived personal
connection to false memories cannot arise unless past aspect is attached to the false
memory. Without past aspect attached to the phantasia, the subject will suppose her or
himself to be imagining rather than remembering. In acts of constructive imagination or
self-aware day dreaming, the subject does not take the phantasia presentations to be real.
The counterfactual halo that hovers around the activity prevents the sort of personal
connection to the phantasma presentation that is present in remembering.
Probably what happens in cases of mistaken memory among those in possession
of their wits is that a motion proportionate to the passage of time gets attached to
plausible phantasia giving rise to the perception of a personal, past connection to the
phantasma. By plausible phantasia I mean phantasia that fits with other memories. The
purple fire-breathing unicycle-riding elephant does not fit well into any train of
memories.219 If a subject fantasizes a plausible phantasma, this may trigger memories
that have past aspect attached that are similar to the plausible phantasia. The
remembering subject may perceive a personal connection to the plausible phantasia due
to its similarity to the other memories. The plausible phantasia is then fitted in with the
other memories and attaches to motion proportionate to the lapse of time fitted to the
other memories. For example, I may start out fantasizing about an elephant and this may
trigger memory of the elephant I actually saw at the zoo. I then mistakenly see a personal
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In the sixth meditation, Descartes observes of the difference between waking and sleeping life that,
“dreams are never linked by memory with all the other actions of life as waking experiences are. If, while I
am awake, anyone were suddenly to appear to me and then disappear immediately, as happens in sleep, so
that I could not see where he had come from or where he had gone to, it would not be unreasonable for me
to judge that he was a ghost, or a vision created in my brain, rather than a real man. But when I distinctly
see where things come from and where and when they come to me, and when I can connect my perceptions
of them with the whole of the rest of my life without a break, then I am quite certain that when I encounter
these things I am not asleep but awake” (CSM II, 61-2).
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connection in the plausible phantasia of the elephant due to its similarity to memory and
attach it to the motion of time of the genuine memory. If the plausible phantasia fits with
or is not contradicted by other content that precedes, or is current, or comes after, then a
perceived personal connection arises. Why a personal connection would arise is that the
attachment of past aspect shows that what the phantasma presents happened previously.
The counterfactual halo is dissolved.
We might further observe that phantasia in general is similar to sense perception
according to actuality and sense perception includes self-awareness that one perceives
(see De anima iii 2). This explains why all that is needed for false memory is the
attachment of past aspect to phantasia. As similar to sense perception according to
actuality, phantasia presentations will have some analogue of the self-awareness that
figures into sense perception. If past aspect is attached to phantasia that includes selfawareness, then the falsely-remembering subject will perceive a past, personal
connection. The analogue of self-awareness may be stronger in phantasia presentations
that are genuine copies of actual, past cognition. Because the memory phantasma is
derived from and a copy of an actual cognition (or set of cognitions), the phantasma may
somehow serve to return us to the self-awareness that was included in the original act of
cognition. If the phantasma is a trace and likeness of an actual prior act of cognition on
the part of the remembering subject, perhaps the phantasma somehow contains an
indication of that self-awareness. But we should see that phantasia in general is similar
to sense perception according to actuality, which includes self-awareness. This explains
why all that is needed for false memory is the attachment of past aspect to phantasia that
fits with other memories.
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We are now in a position to see fully Aristotle’s solution to the impasse.
Aristotle’s theory of remembrance commits him to an indirect realism theory of
remembrance. Because the proper object of memory is the remembering subject’s own
past, absent cognitive activity, a present proxy must stand in for the absent past cognition,
namely, a memory phantasma that serves as a copy. However, if the phantasma the
remembering subject deals with is something present, then even if it is a likeness and
copy of the absent past, it is unclear why perception of the present phantasma will be
perceived as a representation of the subject’s own past cognition. For what is perceived
in remembrance is the present phantasma, not the absent past. In stage one of my
account of Aristotle’s solution to the impasse, I showed that the part of the soul
responsible for being aware of the memory phantasma is the primary sense faculty and
that awareness of memory phantasmata is a perception of a sort. In the second stage of
my account, I showed that an animal becomes aware of sensibles because the sense
faculty is assimilated to its sensible objects. Finally, in the third and present section, I
have argued that the sense faculty is assimilated to the activity of the memory phantasma
and that the activity of the memory phantasma includes a motion proportionate to some
distance into past time from the present moment (or relative to other memories) and that
it, perhaps, includes some analogue to the self-awareness that is built into perception.
Aristotle compares our relation to the two actualities of motion to the experience of (1)
viewing a painting as a representation without connection to a particular original and (2)
viewing a painting as a copy of an actual, particular original to which the viewer has
some prior connection. If the memory phantasma is in motion as something by itself,
then it does not have past aspect attached to it. When the memory phantasma that arises
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separately from a motion of time acts on the soul, it moves the sense power with such a
motion as it has and the soul perceives a mere phantasma. But if the phantasma is in
motion as a copy of a past cognition, then it both resembles an actual, prior cognition and
it is combined with a motion of time. If the memory phantasma that acts upon the soul
along with some motion proportionate to passage of time, then the sense power is raised
to actuality and becomes what sort the phantasma motion is in actuality: a copy of a past
perception combined with a proportionate representation of passage of time. Because the
sense power works by assimilation to its object, remembering is an assimilation of the
sense power to a phantasma in actuality as a copy (in actuality as like the perception from
which it is derived and with a motion proportionate to the passage of time of the event of
which the phantasma is a copy). As sense perception is not always at work, but requires
a sensible to act upon it, so it is with remembering. Were the capacity to remember at
work in virtue of itself, we should be always remembering. Something memorable in
actuality must move the soul to remember. Hence, remembrance is a passive potency of
the sense power to become what sort of thing the memorable object is in actuality
whenever this moves the soul. We should see that the soul does not arbitrarily or without
reason take a phantasma as a copy and memory: the soul is assimilated to the sort of
actuality the memory phantasma happens to possess at the time when the phantasma acts
on the soul such that the soul becomes aware of the phantasma.
451a2-8 A consequence of the dual role of the memory phantasma as both by itself
and from another.
Prior to the final, considered definition of memory and remembrance, Aristotle
draws out the consequence that results from the dual status of the memory phantasma as
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both something by itself and as a copy derived from another. Because the memory
phantasma can affect the soul with or without a sense of time, there can arise doubt over
whether the phantasma is a memory or not.
And on account of this, sometimes when motions of this sort arise in the soul from prior sense
perception, we do not know (ἴσμεν) whether the motions come about due to having sense perceived,
and we are in doubt (διστάζομεν) whether it is a memory or not. But sometimes it happens that we
consider and recollect that we heard or knew something. And this occurs whenever from viewing it
[the phantasma] as itself we change perspective and view it as derived from another. 220 (451a2-8)

The phantasma that enters into remembrance is, like the figure that is at once figure and
copy, both something by itself and from another (450b20-26). Because the memory
phantasma may occur as either a memory or a non-memory phantasia presentation, there
can be doubt over whether a memory phantasma is really a memory, i.e., whether the
phantasma is really derived from an actual, prior cognition. Aristotle says that we do not
know (ἴσμεν, 451a3) and that we are in doubt (διστάζομεν, a5), so he is speaking of
humans. Lacking reason, beasts that possess memory cannot fall into doubt about the
status of their phantasmata. If a phantasma occurs without a strong sense of past time
attached during a wakeful state, the beast perceives its phantasma as a sense-like
presentation without past aspect due to which the beast may act (see De anima 429a5-6).
If a phantasma occurs with past aspect attached, the beast remembers. In neither case
will a beast adopt a doxic position about its phantasia or remembrance. Doubt is a doxic
state.221 Critical capacity in beasts does not extend beyond the scope of the sense faculty.
While the beast that possesses a sense of time can discriminate phantasmata that
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καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐνίοτ’ οὐκ ἴσμεν, ἐγγινομένων ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοιούτων κινήσεων ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰσθέσθαι
πρότερον, εἰ κατὰ τὸ ᾐσθῆσθαι συμβαίνει, καὶ εἰ ἔστι μνήμη ἢ οὔ, διστάζομεν· ὁτὲ δὲ συμβαίνει ἐννοῆσαι
καὶ ἀναμνησθῆναι ὅτι ἠκούσαμέν τι πρότερον ἢ εἴδομεν. τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει, ὅταν θεωρῶν ὡς αὐτὸ
μεταβάλλῃ καὶ θεωρῇ ὡς ἄλλου.
221
See Nicomachean Ethics 1146b26-27: Some people have no doubt about their opinions, but suppose
themselves to know with precision (ἔνιοι γὰρ τῶν δοξαζόντων οὐ διστάζουσιν, ἀλλ’ οἴονται ἀκριβῶς
εἰδέναι).
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represent past cognitive activity from motions presently perceived, the beast lacks
capacity for forming judgments concerning the veracity of what it remembers. The fact
that human beings can fall into doubt about whether some phantasia is a memory or not
indicates that humans especially live an autobiographical existence that is self-reflective
and self-critical. For the beasts, presentations of past cognitive activity connect to an
appetitive life. Beasts cannot be moved to reflect on their memories, but only act due to
them. Humans both act due to memory and adopt opinions about the status of their
memories.
We might wonder why doubt about a particular memory should arise. Aristotle
does not say, but doubt over whether a phantasia is a memory is unlikely unless
something comes into conflict with the status of phantasia as by itself or from another.
For example, I remember taking my book to my office, but when I get home, the book is
lying on the entryway table. (Can a beast become perceptually confused concerning
whether a memory fits with its present perception?) A present perception casts doubt on
the veracity of the memory. In the absence of any present perception or evidence that
conflicts with a memory, only a memory could cast doubt on another memory. A
memory X may be called into question when juxtaposed with other memories with
similar past time attached if memory X does not fit sufficiently well with the other
memories. For example, we might remember being at the party and having talked to
John, but in juxtaposition with other memories that do not occasion any doubt we might
begin to doubt whether it was John. Alternately, a phantasma may seem to fit well with
other memories, but past aspect is not strongly perceived in connection with this or we
are unsure how well the phantasma fits with other memories. But it is possible for
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humans to consider and recollect (ἐννοῆσαι καὶ ἀναμνησθῆναι, 451a6) that the
phantasma represents some past cognitive activity and then one switches from a
suspension of belief to remembrance and beholding the phantasma as a copy.
Aristotle contrasts those who stand in two ways (διστάζειν) with those who stand
outside of themselves (ἐξιστάναι). To doubt means to stand in two ways in relation to
something; one is not sure which ground to occupy. The insane stand outside of
themselves. Those in doubt may discern an inconsistency between what their dubious
memory presents and other memories that precede, are concurrent, or posterior to the
temporal location of the dubious memory in question. The judgment that phantasia does
or does not well fit with other memories belongs not to the sense capacity, but to the
deliberative. Those who stand outside of themselves have lost the capacity to discern any
conflict. The vision of having seen a giant cyclops or having been turned into a pig does
not conflict with the trip to the market for Antipheron. Those who are out of their minds
resemble the beasts in their inability to oppose whatever is presented to them as a
memory.
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Chapter Five: What is memory and remembrance?

In the final, considered definition of memory, Aristotle defines both memory and
remembering. Why Aristotle refers both to memory (mnêmê) and remembering (to
mnêmoneuein), and not just to memory, is because memory (mnêmê) may refer either to
the dispositional possession of memories (retention) or to the exercise of the operation
that engages with the memories possessed (remembering). The inclusion of remembering
(to mnêmoneuein) in addition to memory (mnêmê) signals that both the disposition and
the activity are under consdieration.
Therefore, what memory (μνήμη) and remembrance (τὸ μνημονεύειν) is has been said, that it is a hexis
concerning a phantasma, inasmuch as (ὡς) it is a copy of that of which it is a phantasma, and of what
among the parts in us it belongs, that it belongs to the primary perceptive part and that by means of
which we perceive time.222 (451a14-17)

The ambiguity of hexis as between a disposition (first actuality) and an activity (second
actuality) allows Aristotle to define memory in both its applications as retention and
remembering. Affection (pathos) in the initial definition (449b24-25) has been
subsequently explained as a phantasma that serves as a copy of an actual, prior instance
of cognition; hence, phantasma as copy replaces pathos in the final definition. What we
are to see is that memory in its application as retention is the disposition for entering into
an activity (remembering) in relation to a particular class of objects, namely, to
phantasmata that serve as copies of past cognitive activity.
The memory hexis is (1) a shared actuality between something that has and
something that is had and (2) a disposition for relating in a better or worse way to a class
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τί μὲν οὖν ἐστι μνήμη καὶ τὸ μνημονεύειν, εἴρηται, ὅτι φαντάσματος, ὡς εἰκόνος οὗ φάντασμα, ἕξις, καὶ
τίνος μορίου τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, ὅτι τοῦ πρώτου αἰσθητικοῦ καὶ ᾧ χρόνου αἰσθανόμεθα. My translation preserves
the correspondence of the singular to be verb (ἐστι, 451a15) with the dual subject of memory and
remembrance.

239

of affections or objects (see Meta v 20, 1022b4-8). Both senses of hexis apply to memory
in application as both retention and remembering. As retention, memory is the
dispositional possession of memory phantasmata. The memory phantasma is received
and kept by the soul and the part of the body that contains the principle of sense
perception (450a27-32). These phantasmata motions are retained dispositionally, ready
to be actualized. When actualized under the right conditions, they move the soul to
remember. The status of memory in its application as retention as a disposition for
entering into acts remembering is evident from Aristotle’s articulations of memory and
remembering according to second actuality throughout De memoria.
For always whenever one is in actuality regarding remembrance (ἐνεργῇ κατὰ τὸ μνημονεύειν), in this
way one says in soul that previously one heard or perceived or considered this. 223 (449b22-23)
For always whenever one is in actuality with memory (ἐνεργῇ τῇ μνήμῃ), just as was also mentioned
before [i.e., 449b22-23], that one saw this, or heard or learned it, one perceives-in-addition that it
happened previously.224 (450a19-21)
For the one who is in actuality with memory (ὁ ἐνεργῶν τῇ μνήμῃ) observes this affection [a
phantasma] and perceives this. (450b17-18).225
For the one who is at work with memory (ἐνεργοῦντα τῇ μνήμῃ), it is impossible not to suppose [so],
but instead to fail to notice that one is recalling. 226 (452b26-28)

Of particular importance is the consistent use of the verb ἐνεργεῖν (to be in actuality) in
the third person to describe memory acts or the exercise of remembrance. Aristotle is
careful to point out that it is not the memory hexis that enters into the activity of
remembrance, but rather the human (or animal) subject enters into activity in virtue of
memory that the subject possesses. Remembering is an activity of relating to
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ἀεὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ κατὰ τὸ μνημονεύειν, οὕτως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λέγει, ὅτι πρότερον τοῦτο ἤκουσεν ἢ
ᾔσθετο ἢ ἐνόησεν.
224
ἀεὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ τῇ μνήμῃ, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴπομεν, ὅτι εἶδε τοῦτο ἢ ἤκουσεν ἢ ἔμαθε,
προσαισθάνεται ὅτι πρότερον·
225
ὁ γὰρ ἐνεργῶν τῇ μνήμῃ θεωρεῖ τὸ πάθος τοῦτο καὶ αἰσθάνεται τούτου.
226
ἐνεργοῦντα δὲ τῇ μνήμῃ μὴ οἴεσθαι ἀλλὰ λανθάνειν μεμνημένον οὐκ ἔστιν·

240

phantasmata. Attribution of the activity (second actuality) to the subject who possesses
the hexis rather than to the hexis fits with Aristotle’s treatment of hexeis elsewhere. In
the background is the Aristotelian triple scheme of first potentiality – second
potentiality/first actuality – second actuality. A paradigmatic example of the triple
scheme appears in De anima ii 5, where Aristotle discusses the transition from ignorance
or privation of literacy to the exercise of reading (417a21-b2). An illiterate human has an
undeveloped or first capacity to read and write. When an illiterate human has acquired
the knowledge of how to read and write, there is now a developed capacity for reading
and writing (second potentiality). Once developed, the human can enter into the
operation of reading and writing (second actuality). Knowledge is an unmoved
disposition (hexis) in virtue of which the human enters into contemplative activity.
Inasmuch as knowledge is an unmoved mover, knowledge does not enter into activity,
but in virtue of the knowledge possessed, the human can enter into an activity that utilizes
the knowledge. For example, the artist who possesses an art enters into artistic activity in
virtue of the knowledge that is in the artist’s soul. Character is an unmoved, stable
disposition in accordance with which the human who possesses it enters into action in
characteristic ways. A temperate person engages in refraining from excessive drinking
and feels delight in drinking an appropriate amount of alcohol relative to the drinker’s
condition (and in the right circumstances). In a similar way, retention is a disposition
concerning phantasmata in virtue of which and in accordance with which the subject who
possesses the disposition enters into acts of remembering.227 Remembering is the activity
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“In accordance with which a subject enters into an activity” requires some explanation. Below I will
argue that the memory is a hexis in virtue of which its possessor relates in a better or worse way to its past
cognitive activity.
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of perceiving perception a phantasma as a copy of the remembering subject’s previous
cognition, along with the awareness that what the phantasma represents has past aspect.
Because the phantasma motion retained is a copy of prior cognition, the phantasma can
move the soul in accordance with the sort of actuality it possesses. Hence, it is not the
retention and keeping of phantasmata that enters into activity. Rather, the remembering
subject enters into an activity in virtue of the retention.
Some might object that Aristotle is here defining only the disposition for
remembering and not the activity on the grounds that the definition includes no mention
of any sense of past time. Sense of past of time may be seen to enter with the phrase
“hexis of phantasma inasmuch as the phantasma is a copy of that of which it is the
phantasma” (φαντάσματος ὡς εἰκόνος οὗ φάντασμα ἕξις, 451a15-16). Because hexis can
refer to an actuality shared between what has and what is had, “hexis of phantasma
inasmuch as the phantasma is a copy” allows for both retention and remembrance. The
remembering subject has a hold of a memory in actuality rather than in potentiality and
perceives this.228 The definition allows for a sense of past time through the inclusion of
the phrase “having the phantasma as a copy.” Having the phantasma in mind as a copy
of prior cognitive activity is possible only under the condition that the remembering
subject views what the phantasma presents as belonging to the past. Otherwise, the
remembering subject will not look upon the phantasma as a copy. For Aristotle, the
phantasma that enters into remembrance is factually a copy of prior cognition regardless
of how one looks upon it. Hence, the mention that remembrance is a disposition
concerning a phantasma as (ὡς) a copy of that of which it is the phantasma can signal
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See 450b17-18: “For the one who is in actuality with memory (ὁ ἐνεργῶν τῇ μνήμῃ) observes this
affection [a phantasma] and perceives this.”
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that one is in a state of (hexis) perceiving in actuality the phantasma as a copy of the prior
cognition from which it derives.
The definition is a typical instance of Aristotle’s articulation by genus and
differentia. The broader genus into which memory and remembrance fall is hexis, while
the proximate genus is hexis of a phantasma. What distinguishes memory from other
hexeis of phantasmata is that memory is a hexis of a phantasma inasmuch as the
phantasma is a copy; hence, “inasmuch as the phantasma is a copy of that of which it is
the phantasma” supplies the differentia. The other species within the proximate genus
“hexis of a phantasma” are various hexeis of non-memory phantasia. Because all
phantasia is derived from the activity of sense perception, a variety of phantasia can
persist in the soul-body composite. Phantasia enters into thinking when it provokes
contemplation of a universal, enters into deliberation when practical thinking projects
future action, and enters into animal motion when phantasia combines with desire and
appetite. For phantasia to enter into memory in its application as retention, the persisting
phantasia must not only be derived from sense perception according to actuality, but
come about such that it serves as a copy of the very sense perception from which it
derives. In contrast, constructive, contemplative, deliberative, and desiderative phantasia
need not present a copy of some actual, prior instance of cognition.229 For phantasia to
enter into memory in its application as remembrance, not only must the subject who
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I do not mean to apply that these various, distinguishable applications of phantasia are always distinct
from one another. Surely there is much overlap between memory phantasia and desiderative phantasia
that initiates animal motion and between memory phantasia and deliberative phantasia in humans that
concerns right action. What separates phantasia in its application as remembrance is (1) a required sense
of past time and (2) the requirement that the phantasia present a copy of something that was actually
cognized previously; these two requirements may not be necessary to initiate desire and animal motion.
Probably practical deliberation always involves memory, but some constructive envisioning of possibilities
also enters in.
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remembers be aware of a phantasma that is a copy as a copy, but there must be an
additional sense that past aspect is attached to the phantasia. To take the phantasma as a
copy of actual prior cognition already indicates that past aspect is perceived. Hence, the
differentia that distinguishes remembrance according to actuality from other sorts of
phantasia applications is not only that one has a phantasma in mind as a copy, but that
one has combined the phantasia with a sense of past time. Aristotle manages to supply a
definition that accounts for memory both in its application as dispositional retention and
in its application as the operation of remembrance. Hexis covers both the dispositional
retention of phantasmata and the activity of remembering itself.
So far I have concentrated on the final, considered definition of memory and
remembrance insofar as it articulates the form of memory: memory and remembrance is a
certain sort of hexis. But insofar as memory is an affection common to the soul and to
the body, memory is an enmattered affection. In De anima i 1, Aristotle illustrates how
affections common both to the soul and to the body ought to be defined: “If thus, it is
clear that affections [of the soul] are enmattered logoi. Hence, the definitions are such as
follows: ‘To be angry is a sort of motion of such a body or a part or a faculty by this for
the sake of this’” (εἰ δ’ οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι τὰ πάθη λόγοι ἔνυλοί εἰσιν· ὥστε οἱ ὅροι
τοιοῦτοι οἷον “τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι κίνησίς τις τοῦ τοιουδὶ σώματος ἢ μέρους ἢ δυνάμεως ὑπὸ
τοῦδε ἕνεκα τοῦδε,” 403a24-27). Affections common to soul and to body are
“enmattered logoi” (λόγοι ἔνυλοί, 403a25) will have defninitions that include an account
of the matter and substratum in which they inhere. As an enmattered, natural
phenomenon, the definition of an affection common to the soul and to the body should
include an articulation of the four causes (see Phys. ii 3, 194b16-95a3). An enmattered
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affection has a form (logos), a moving cause, a material cause, and a final cause. The
affection does not necessarily have a matter, but as an affection, it does have a substratum
in which it inheres or to which it happens. The substratum of an affection common both
to soul and to body should be a living substance or a part of the living substance, so
Aristotle mentions that anger is a motion that belongs to a body (or body part) or a
faculty. Motion proper belongs to body alone, but an affection common to soul and to
body cannot be motion simply because the soul does not undergo alteration. Hence,
Aristotle carefully speaks of anger as a motion of a sort (tis) that belongs to such a sort of
body or to a faculty of such a sort of body. Anger is defined by means of a genus (it is a
motion of a sort) and the differentia is provided by the subject of the affection, the
moving cause, and the final cause. Being a motion of a sort (tis) motion is the form, the
body or part and the faculty of this in which the motion takes place is the matter, by this
(hupo toude) is the moving cause (e.g., an insult), and for the sake of this (heneka toude)
is the final cause (e.g., revenge or desire for justice).
The final, considered definition of memory tracks closely the paradigmatic
definition of anger. In addition to (1) the form (hexis of a phantasma inasmuch as it is a
copy), we should expect the definition of memory to articulate (2) the substratum for the
hexis (the body part and faculty of which memory is the affection), (3) what gives rise to
the hexis (the moving cause), and (4) that for the sake of which the hexis is (final cause).
What memory and remembering are (the form) is a hexis of a phantasma inasmuch as it
is a copy of that of which it is the phantasma. As a relation, the memory hexis does not
have a matter, but, like anger, the memory hexis does have a substratum in which it
inheres, the part of the soul and the body to which it belongs. The substratum of memory
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is the primary perceptive part (to proton aisthêtikon) and that by which we perceive time
(τίνος μορίου τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, ὅτι τοῦ πρώτου αἰσθητικοῦ καὶ ᾧ χρόνου αἰσθανόμεθα,
451a16-17). I have translated to proton aisthêtikon as the primary perceptive part
although part is not included in the phrase because Aristotle speaks of the part (μόριον) in
us to which memory belongs in 451a16. The “primary part” could refer to the faculty or
to the body part that serves as the substratum for the faculty, while “that by means of
which we perceive time” is the faculty. Aristotle spoke of the part of the body that
contains sense perception and into which the memory phantasmata are stamped in
450a27-32; it is the heart and the primary faculty of perception that serve as the
substratum for memory. The ultimate moving cause of retention and remembering is the
past cognitive activity that gives rise to memory phantasmata, but the proximate moving
cause of memory in both its applications as retention and remembering are the
phantasmata that are copies of actual, prior instances of cognitive activity. Retention
arises whenever a phantasma is received by the primary perceptive part and kept
dispositionally. Remembering occurs whenever the actualized motion of the memory
phantasma and an associated motion proportionate to passage of time moves the primary
perceptive part. Finally, that for the sake of which memory and remembering are is the
engagement of past cognition, i.e., perceiving a phantasma as a copy of prior cognition.
Here, as is often the case with natural phenomena, the final and formal causes overlap.
Why it is fitting to categorize memory as a hexis.
Several implications follow from categorizing memory as a hexis. Beyond the
advantageous ambiguity hexis has between first actuality and second actuality that allows
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Aristotle to slide between speaking of memory as a disposition and an activity, we might
wonder why it is so fitting and appropriate to place memory within the genus hexis.
What commentators generally have failed to emphasize, if not realize, is that memory is a
disposition in virtue of which one is well or poorly disposed toward memorable objects.
Citing NE 1105b19-28 and Meta 1022b10-12, Richard Sorabji points out that hexis can
mean a developed disposition in virtue of which one is well or poorly disposed toward a
certain class of affections, but does not explore how memory might actually be such a
disposition.230 David Bloch denies that there is any evidence in De memoria suggesting
that memory means anything like a disposition in virtue of which its subject relates well
or poorly to a class of affections and wrongly asserts that such an understanding of hexis
is limited to practical contexts.231 I say wrongly because, for example, Meta v 20,
1022b10-12 includes health as a disposition that disposes us well or poorly toward
something, and health is an affection that falls within the study of physics. In what
follows, I set out how the understanding of hexis as a disposition in virtue of which one is
well or poorly disposed toward a class of affections fits well with the text of De memoria,
and I consider the implications for what it means to treat memory as such a hexis.
The first clue that memory is a hexis in accordance with which we are disposed
well or poorly toward a class of affections arrives quite early in the text: “For those who
are good with memory and good with recollection are not the same, but for the most part
those better at remembering are the slow while those better at recollecting are the quick
and the good learners” (οὐ γὰρ οἱ αὐτοί εἰσι μνημονικοὶ καὶ ἀναμνηστικοί, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ
πολὺ μνημονικώτεροι μὲν οἱ βραδεῖς, ἀναμνηστικώτεροι δὲ οἱ ταχεῖς καὶ εὐμαθεῖς,
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Richard Sorabji (2004) 69. See also Cat. vii, 9a4-10.
David Bloch (2007) 111.
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449b6-8). That all are not equally good with memory already indicates that memory has
us well or poorly disposed toward remembering our past in varying degrees. Second,
those with bodily conditions too fluid or too sclerotic or too dense (those with dwarf-like
builds) do not retain well the phantasmata needed for remembering (see 450a32-b11;
53a31-b7). Those with the appropriate sort of bodily condition are better disposed
toward the retention and remembrance of their past. Third, it is possible to improve
memory with repeated exercises, which suggests that with practice it is possible to alter
one’s relation to memorable objects for the better (451a12-14).232 These passages suggest
that memory is a disposition in virtue of which the possessor both has and is well or
poorly disposed toward the reception, keeping, and engagement with phantasmata of
prior cognitive activity.
Hexis as that which disposes one well or poorly toward a class of affections fits
well with memory in its application as both retention and remembrance. As a disposition,
a hexis is a relation between things (see Phys vii 3, 246b3-20). In chapter three, I give a
detailed account of the physiological and psychological conditions impacting on retention
and only review the main points here.233 Memory in its application as retention is a
relation of bodily qualities in relation to phantasmata. Those excessively fluid and
excessively hard in physiology cannot well receive and retain phantasmata needed for
remembering. Phantasmata are easily lost and rubbed out in the excessively fluid and
not easily received in the excessively hard (451a32-50b11). If the body is too fluid or too
hard, this may also impact the quality of the phantasma retained, which in turn will affect
accuracy in remembering. If there is due proportion between fluidity and hardness, one is
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Cf. Cat. 9a1-5 and DM 451b10-16.
See “The physiological and psychological conditions that impact retention,” pp. 157-69.
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well disposed both to receive and to hold onto memory phantasmata.
Still, efficacy in retention cannot be reduced to physiology alone. Retention of
details differs in different people as when witnesses to an accident retain and recall
variant and sometimes conflicting details. We do not retain all things, but some things
and not others and this indicates that retention is selective. The implication is that
retention is a relation of both bodily qualities and psychological elements in relation to
phantasmata. We tend to retain those things that strike us more strongly than others or
that involve intense passion (pleasure and pain). If this is right, then character will
impact what is retained in addition to physiology. What causes great pleasure or pain is
more likely to make a deeper impression and character is the developed relation to
pleasure and pain. Different character dispositions have people more disposed to retain
some things than others. Depending on the sort of physiological hexis one possesses, one
will be disposed to hold onto a phantasma well or poorly in a general way. Depending
on the sort of character one has, one will be more prone to hold onto phantasmata of
certain things better than others. Interest (which connects to pleasure and pain), habit,
and practice impact what tends to strike us with enough force to be retained. For
example, Aristotle observes that the great-souled (μεγαλόψυχοι) tend to remember
(μνημονεύειν) the favors they have done for others rather than favors done for them on
the grounds that being in a position to do a favor is superior to the position that needs a
favor. Because the great-souled individual is worthy of greatness and being in need of or
receiving a favor is beneath having no need and doing a favor, the great-souled person
“hears about his favors done with pleasure, but about favors received without
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pleasure”.234 Nor is the great-souled individual disposed to harbor ill will (μνησίκακος)
toward others because the great-souled do not remember with animosity toward others.235
One thinks also of Nietzsche’s remarks about the petty-minded who, due to their
peevishness, hold onto and retain every insult. Because the peevish find insults
incredibly painful, insults received make lasting impressions and the peevish cannot let
go of them. In contrast, the great-souled, aristocratic types have short memory for such
things.236
Intriguingly, Aristotle has habituation impact greatly on what among our past
activities we are moved to keep and return to. The influence of habituation on retention
suggests that memory is hexis developed or impacted by practice and repetition.
But it happens that some [phantasmata] set in motion just once are habituated (ἐθισθῆναι) more
(μᾶλλον) than others often set in motion. Hence, although having seen some things only once, we
remember (μνημονεύοεμν) them more (μᾶλλον) than others seen often. 237 (DM 451b14-16)

Some phantasmata set up by a prior act of cognition are from the start more disposed to
be activated than others and, hence, to move their possessor to remember. Habituation
typically results from repetition, but undergoing a single, impactful event may be enough
to set up a dispositional tendency to return to that event over and over. For instance, if
someone suffers through a bad car wreck, this may give rise to a dispositional tendency to
remember the wreck often and more often than other things experienced multiple times,
say, going to the zoo. Some phantasmata will be set up with a stronger tendency to be
activated than others. Such phantasmata will require less force of association to be
triggered and a broader array of things will remind us, whereas phantasmata retained
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NE iv 3, 1124b11-15.
NE iv 3, 1125a3-5.
236
See On the Genealogy of Morals i 10.
237
συμβαίνει δ’ ἐνίας ἅπαξ ἐθισθῆναι μᾶλλον ἢ ἑτέρας πολλάκις κινουμένους· διὸ ἔνια ἅπαξ ἰδόντες
μᾶλλον μνημονεύομεν ἢ ἕτερα πολλάκις.
235
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with less dispositional force might require more determinate associations to be triggered.
For example, if someone suffered through a horrible collision, anything to do with cars
may remind, whereas as memory of a fender bender will require more specific items of
association to be triggered. Some things may require that we encounter them multiple
times before retention of a phantasma of the encounter is established.
Of interest is the correlation between the dispositional force of the phantasma and
the strength with which something is remembered. We remember (μνημονεύοεμν) more
(μᾶλλον) those things of which the phantasma is more (μᾶλλον) habituated. Habituated
means to have developed a dispositional tendency. So some phantasma are more
disposed to be activated and move us to remember more (μᾶλλον) than others. Mallon
(μᾶλλον) is perhaps usefully underspecified. More (μᾶλλον) habituation to remember
could mean more in terms quality, quantity, or both. If more habituated to remember X is
in reference to quality, then perhaps we are to see that one remembers X more fully and
completely and with more accuracy than other things. If more habituated to remember is
in reference to quantity, then remembrance of X occurs with more frequency and the one
who remembers will be more easily moved to remember X than other things.
We should see that the role of habituation in memory is a central reason why it is
so fitting to refer to memory as a hexis that has us disposed well or poorly toward our
past. The dispositions that develop from habit follow from an individual’s experience.
The setup of retention and subsequent remembering by habituation is especially fitting
because habit allows for individual experience and difference. If memory is formed from
habit, this would explain (1) why different people have better memory for different kinds
of things, (2) why different people have a tendency to remember different things, (3) why
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different people are moved to remember by different associations, and (4) why different
people become better with memory than recollection and vice versa. Habituated
remembrance and retention may have some overlap with what our term “selective
memory” captures.238 Often we seem to remember only what we wish. This fits with
character disposition: as we tend voluntarily to choose in accordance with what appears
pleasant, so perhaps people tend to remember what they find pleasant and of interest
while tuning out what is unpleasant (i.e. we may tend to tune out and fail to retain what
we find unpleasant or take little interest in). As different people find different things to
be pleasant out of habit, so people tend to remember different sorts of things out of habit.
And as we tend to pay more attention to what we pursue and enjoy, the sort of things we
tend to be good at remembering follow our interests and pleasures. Thus, the impact of
habit on the development of memory helps account for idiosyncrasy in what tends to get
retained and remembered.
To sum up, memory is a hexis that has us relate well or poorly to memorable
objects in several senses. First, retention has us disposed to hold onto memories well or
poorly (long-term memory versus short-term memory). Those able to hold onto
memories easily and permanently have good retentive disposition, whereas those who
hold onto memories with difficulty and only for limited periods have a poor
disposition.239 Second, we may retain memories more or less accurately. Some may be
more prone to vague, rather than to precise memory. Further, some are more prone to
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The possible connection between my interpretation of Aristotle’s habituated remembrance and selective
memory was suggested to me by Ronald Polansky.
239
Here I am not considering whether it is better to have long term or short term memory about all past
events, but only how well one holds on to past events. In certain cases, it might be better for an animal or
human to lack permanent, photographic recall of horrible things that have happened to them or that they
have witnessed.
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distortion of their past than others. For example, Aristotle mentions an Antipheron who
tends to treat his false imaginings as true memories of things he experienced (451a8-12).
Third, we may see that retention has us retaining certain classes of things better than
others (selective memory). Depending on the sort of character one has developed,
different sorts of things will tend to make a greater impression and be retained.
Memory in the primary and lesser senses.
There is one other feature of Aristotle’s account that deserves further attention. I
have maintained throughout the dissertation that Aristotle conceives of the memorable
object (τὸ μνημονευτόν) in the proper and primary sense as the remembering subject’s
own past, cognitive activity. At least in those parts of De memoria where the aim is
taxonomical, Aristotle narrowly limits memory to the past cognitive activity of the
remembering subject. Because Aristotle limits memory to the remembering subject’s
past activity, we should see that Aristotle conceives of memory and remembering in the
primary sense much more narrowly than perhaps do others. Yet, we should see that there
are passages in De memoria ii and elsewhere that allow for a less governing sense of
memory that is less restrictive and fits with our more inclusive way of speaking of
memory. I will examine first Aristotle’s narrow view of the governing sense of memory
in relation to broader, less primary views and examine second how Aristotle allows for
the less narrow view.
To better appreciate the narrow, taxonomical classification favored by Aristotle, it
will be helpful briefly to scan roughly the current classification of memory in philosophy.
John Sutton surveys the rough consensus pertaining to types of memory that has emerged
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among philosophers and psychologists. Here I will only refer to the philosophical
terminology Sutton surveys.240 Sutton sees three main types. (1) Propositional memory is
memory that something is the case, which includes facts, objects, and states of affairs.
For example, I remember that Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 49 BC or I remember that
water consists of two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen. (2) Habit or procedural
memory is memory of how to do something, which may include skills, specialized
kinesthetic movements, and activities that require a specific sequence of actions. For
example, we sometimes speak of remembering how to ride a bike or how to play a
melody on a guitar (kinesthetic movements), how to build a cabinet or solve a
geometrical proof (skill, knowledge), and how to cook a meal (skill, sequence of actions).
(3) Episodic or personal memory is memory that concerns the remembering subject’s
own experiences from which the remembering subject’s memories are derived. As
Sutton puts it, episodic memory “brings us into contact with the particular past events
which such memories are about and by which they are caused.”241 We might suppose that
remembering our own past activity and retrieving information and know-how previously
acquired are, if not the same, very similar actions. In both cases something is called to
mind that was previously acquired and retained. Both propositional memory (memory
pertaining to facts and features about objects) and habit memory (memory pertaining to
how to do something) as defined involve the retrieval of information previously acquired
and retained. Yet, only episodic or personal memory is memory in the governing sense
in De memoria.
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John Sutton (2016) URL = < http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/memory/#VarRem>.
Loc. cit.
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Regarding propositional memory of facts and objects, Aristotle would insist that
an object X called to mind in such a way that X is not connected to any previous
cognition of X is not a case of remembering in the primary sense. The reason why is that
an object abstracted from any prior cognition of it cannot include the relevant past aspect
that enters into remembering. If I call to mind an object, a cat, or a fact, that the sun rises
in the east, there is nothing intrinsically temporal about these. It is not just that they are
not necessarily past objects, it is that they are not conceived as temporally located
anywhere. For Aristotle, an object will lack temporal position if it is conceived of as
abstracted from any continuum of motions; in such a case, there is no “when” the thing
thought about has happened. Time is a number of the before and after regarding motions.
Any object or fact conceived as abstracted from any prior or subsequent motions will not
be in relation to any before or after. An object can be perceived as having a place in time
only when the object is conceived as belonging to some continuum of motions. It may be
helpful here to point out a distinction between the conception of something that “takes”
time and something that can be placed temporally relative to other events. For example,
thinking of a cat running from a porch to a tree has a beginning, middle, and end. The
thought is about something that takes time to happen. But this event that takes time will
be without temporal position unless it is conceived as in relation to events that preceded
or followed. Unless thought in relation to other events or the present moment, there is no
“when” the cat ran, only a sense of the duration of the event itself. Remembering in the
primary sense, so Aristotle would argue, is of the past (449b15) and the sense of past time
relevant in memory only arises when the remembering subject calls to mind an object in
connection with some previous cognition of it (449b22-24; 50a19-21; 50b11-15). It is
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the remembering subject’s own prior and present cognition that provides the continuum
of motions into which the memorable object fitted in memory.
I have just argued that an object or fact is temporally positionless if it is conceived
as abstracted from any continuum of motions. Does this mean that the retrieval of
historical facts previously acquired and retained is an act of memory in the primary
sense? Again, Aristotle would argue no on the grounds that the historical fact retrieved
does not contain past aspect in the relevant sense. It will be helpful to consider how (1)
the past time that enters into the thinking of historical facts differs from (2) the sense of
past time present in remembering. The genus of the memorable object (τὸ μνημονευτόν)
is the past (τὸ γενόμενον, what has come about), but the differentia is the remembering
subject’s own prior cognition. In the opening section of De memoria, where the aim is
taxonomical (449b9-28), Aristotle excludes as memorable any object that does not
include the remembering subject’s own prior cognitive activity. Genuine memory is
directly caused by the very event the memory is about; hence, memory is about and puts
us in relation to the prior cause that gave rise to the memory. The remembering subject
looks upon a present phantasma as a representation of the absent, past activity that gave
rise to the phantasma. It is the sense that memories are copies of their prior cause that
informs the peculiar sense of past time that enters into remembering. In remembering,
we are directed back to the source of the memory and we perceive ourselves to return to
the prior cause of the memory because the prior cause is precisely what the memory
portrays (or indicates). The memory phantasma is a copy of its cause.
In contrast to remembering my past activity, my thought that consists of a
historical fact is not about the prior cause that gave rise to the thought in me. Caesar
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crossing the Rubicon did not directly cause me to possess the opinion or knowledge of
Caesar’s movements. Rather, hearing it, reading about it, or otherwise learning of it
caused the thought of the fact to be in me. Hence, when I think merely of the fact that
Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 49 BC, I am neither returned to Caesar’s movements nor
to my own prior activity. There is no sense of “returning back to the time when” in
thinking of historical facts as there is when one remembers something one did yesterday
or two years ago. We should see that the thinking of historical facts takes the form of a
judgment (phasis) inasmuch historical facts involve the predication of a subject: Caesar
did X at time T. Past aspect is present in thoughts of historical facts as a temporal
predicate posited of a subject in a judgment. The judgment as conceived has no past
aspect, even if the referent of the judgment does. Remembering in the primary sense
includes the sense that what has happened before is appearing or indicated anew in the
memory. For Aristotle, the vehicle through which the remembering subject’s past
activity appears anew is not a judgment conceived, but a phantasma perceived that acts
on the remembering subject conjointly with a motion proportionate (to a more or less
precise extent) to the time elapsed since the event perceived which the phantasma
depicts. I have a supposition (ὑπόληψις) that Caesar previously crossed the Rubicon in
49 BC. But I do not perceive my proposition to be the appearing anew of something that
happened previously. In contrast, when I remember reading about or learning about
Caesar crossing the Rubicon in 49 BC, I perceive the memory to be the appearing anew
of my previous learning. The memory phantasma is perceived as a representation and
appearing anew of the past. The thought of a historical fact is a declaration about the past
made in the present, not a reappearance of the past. Only when the judgment about
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Caesar’s movements is fitted to my past cognitive activity does the judgment become a
memory and a reappearance of something I did previously.
In addition to objects, facts, and states of affairs, often we speak also of
remembering how to do something (“habit memory”), such as how to play a melody on
an instrument or how to build a cabinet, or remembering things that we know, such as
how to derive an equilateral triangle from a given radius. The reason why it is sensible to
make knowledge the object of remembering in our expressions is because knowledge is
something retained. We may see that categorizing as remembering the cognition of
objects, facts, skills, opinion, or knowledge previously acquired and retained effectively
reduces all thinking that involves the retrieval of retained information to some form of
remembering. Thinking would be other than remembering only under the condition that
what is thought is not something previously acquired and retained. And because the
exercise of knowledge is of something previously acquired, broadening memory to
include objects formerly as opposed to past cognition of objects runs the risk of
collapsing knowing and remembering. For scientific taxonomical purposes, then, the
inclusion of time sense keeps memory to its proper place and keeps memory from being
muddled with supposition that deals with present objects (449b13-18). While anything
retained is by necessity something acquired previously, not everything retained is
cognized as belonging to the past. Because Aristotle restricts memory in the primary
sense to what has occurred previously, acts of knowing cannot be acts of remembering.
If one moves from potentially thinking of how to derive an equilateral triangle in
potentiality to actuallythinking of how to derive an equilateral triangle, one does not take
up anything past unless the proof is conceived as connected to some prior learning,
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thinking, or figuring out. Similarly, when a jazz pianist sits down to improvise within the
limits of a given chord progression, the pianist need not (and probably does not) recall
any previous occurrence of playing; the pianist simply exercises skill at playing jazz
piano. Indeed, attempting to recall previous occurrences of playing or how to play with
much clarity or specificity would likely get in the way of playing in the present.
Aristotle classifies art (technê) as right reasoning that pertains to making
something and classifies knowledge (epistêmê) as demonstration of what is necessary or
for the most part (see NE vi 3-4). Both knowledge and art, like memory in its application
as retention, are first actualities and dispositions (hexeis) of the soul, except that art and
knowledge are intellectual dispositions, whereas retention is a disposition of the
perceptive part of the soul. Rather than having remembering as the second actuality of
knowledge or opinion, Aristotle has us merely acting dispositionally on the knowledge or
belief that we possess. Knowledge and belief are things retained, but dubiously
memories in the primary sense for Aristotle. While we can speak of dispositions as
things retained, cognitive dispositions are not so much memories retained in the soul as
they are developed, stable capacities from out of which the possessor enters into certain
kinds of activity in relation to certain sorts of objects. For instance, geometrical
knowledge is a stable disposition in virtue of which the possessor can provide
demonstrations of geometrical proofs. The person who works through a demonstration
need not recall any previous learning or working through the proof. On account of the
developed, stable understanding of geometry and its principles, the geometer exercises
geometrical understanding rather than remembering it. This is even more obvious with
literacy. It would be strange to claim that when reading one remembers how to read.
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Rather, one reads by exercising a developed disposition for the activity. Procedural
memory is especially dubiously an instance of remembering in the case of reading,
writing, and speaking. We do not recall how to speak. We act on a fully developed
disposition for speech.
To sum up, we should see that both a genus, what has (already) come about (τὸ
γενόμενον), and a differentia, the remembering subject’s own prior cognition, enter into
the primary, governing sense of memory. The differentia shows that the primary,
governing sense of memory is episodic. Although Aristotle does not say explicitly, the
reason why episodic memory is the primary sense is probably because (1) episodic
memory allows for other sorts of memory in the less governing sense and (2) episodic
memory is most widely distributed sort of memory (as Aristotle defines it) and, hence,
the most basic. Episodic memory is memory in the exemplary sense because if one can
remember one’s past cognition of X, then one can also retain and return to X abstracted
from the original cognition of X. While retention of the cognition of X includes X, the
retention of X need not so much include retention of the cognition of X (which the
retrieval of information without the ability to recall prior cognition of the information
confirms). This fits with Aristotle’s tendency to provide comprehensive explanations by
dealing with exemplary instances of the subject matter under discussion.
Further, we might see that episodic memory is primary because it is the only sort
that is distributed universally among all the animals that remember. In chapter one of De
memoria, where the aim is at least in part taxonomical (one aim is to say what memory
is), Aristotle says that as many among the animals as have a sense of time remember
(449b28-30). Nowhere in DM chapter one does Aristotle waver from his commitment

260

that remembering is of the past cognition of X. The implication of the two positions in
De memoria chapter one, that (1) all animals with a sense of time remember and that (2)
Aristotle never wavers from the commitment to memory as the cognition of X, is that all
animals with memory must possess episodic memory. Perhaps there are less primary
forms of memory in addition to the episodic sort, but there is no memory hexis that is not
a relation to prior cognitive activity. Hence, memory in the primary sense is episodic. It
is not until the second chapter of De memoria, where the inquiry is devoted mostly to the
uniquely human capacity of recollection, that Aristotle begins to speak with any
frequency of remembering X seemingly abstracted from any prior cognition of X.
Tellingly, when speaking of being put in mind of past objects seemingly abstracted from
any prior cognition of the object, Aristotle refers to “they” or “we,” meaning human
rather than beasts. They who seem to recollect (δοκοῦσιν ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι) by means of
the place schema of memory (topoi) are moved to take up autumn (DM ii, 452a12-16)
and whenever it is necessary to remember a name (δέῃ ὄνομα μνημονεῦσαι), if we know
(ἴσμεν) a similar name, we sometimes hit upon the similar name rather than the one we
wish to remember (DM ii, 452b4-7).
These passages possibly suggest that humans, but not beasts, are able to
remember past objects without much focus on the prior cognition of the object. If the
beasts too much remember X abstracted from the former cognition or cognitions of X,
then the beast has something in the soul that is not very particular. Probably beasts are
restricted to episodic memory of prior sense perception because beasts are tied to
particulars without access to universals. And because the beasts lack calculative
phantasia, beasts will have a poor sense of time. We should see that their sense of past
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time is a vague sense as they cannot remember with precision (see 452b29-53a4). Beast
memory is tied to prior sense perception, but because the beasts lack the ability to locate
their memories temporally with much precision, they are unlikely able to remember with
much context. Lacking much precision in locating their past cognition, the particularity
of beast memory can only be so particular. Because humans possess calculative
phantasia and can locate their past activity with precision, humans have memory that
exceeds the beasts regarding both particulars and universals.242
Passages from outside of De memoria support the view that Aristotle allows for a
less governing sense of memory, but one which applies only to humans. In Metaphysics i
1 and especially in Posterior Analytics ii 19, Aristotle links memory to experience
(ἐμπειρία) and the acquisition of universals and science. In Posterior Analytics ii 19,
Aristotle lays out the role of memory in learning of and grasping universals.
From sense perception arises memory (μνήμη), as we say, and from many memories (μνήμης
πολλάκις) of the same thing arises experience (ἐμπειρία): for a single experience is many memories
(πολλαὶ μνῆμαι) in number. And from experience or from the whole universal settled in the soul, of
the one beside the many, that which is one thing in all those, [there arises] a source of art and
knowledge, if it concerns genesis, of skill, but if being, of knowledge. 243 (100a3-9)

Many memories of sense perceptions of the same species (poodle) or genus (dog)
constitutes an experience of the species or genus. Of interest is Aristotle’s mentioning
that a single experience is many memories in number pertaining to the same thing. An
experience is not simply an aggregate heap of memories, but an impression of a class of
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Cf. NE vi 7, 1141b14-22. Practical judgment moves back and forth from the particular to the universal.
Because action requires choice concerned with ultimate particulars guided by what is universal, the
practically wise will require memory of prior, specific actions in relation to the current circumstance. The
implication is that the practically wise have memory of specific instances of prior activity and not just a
vague sense of generally having done this or that kind of thing.
243
Ἐκ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεως γίνεται μνήμη, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης πολλάκις τοῦ αὐτοῦ γινομένης
ἐμπειρία· αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνῆμαι τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐμπειρία μία ἐστίν. ἐκ δ’ ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκ παντὸς ἠρεμήσαντος
τοῦ καθόλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοῦ ἑνὸς παρὰ τὰ πολλά, ὃ ἂν ἐν ἅπασιν ἓν ἐνῇ ἐκείνοις τὸ αὐτό, τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ
ἐπιστήμης, ἐὰν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, τέχνης, ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπιστήμης.
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beings or of a type of feature that belongs to a class built up from many different
memories of the same class or feature. If I have enough memories of different poodles, I
can represent through phantasia a token instance of the kind poodle. From the
impression of the token type, I can begin to pick out universals that belong to the kind
poodle: quadruped, curly coat, etc. Memories that enter into experience need not so
much be tied to any particular prior cognition of the object remembered and so there is
not so much a sense of past time. But because the experience involves the retention of
phantasmata of the kind X, in a lesser way these can be called memories. So memory in
the less governing sense (i.e., the experience of memory) that is not so tied to particulars
is necessary for grasping what memory is in the primary sense! Because things known
and opined are previously acquired and subsequently retained in the soul, we can speak
of these as memories in a lesser way inasmuch as they are retained and retrieved. And as
it is possible to remember past exercise of knowledge, opinion, and skill, to this extent it
is possible to refer to knowledge retained as a memory of a sort.
Hence, we see how Aristotle provides a comprehensive account of what memory
is. In the primary sense, memory is a hexis in relation to phantasmata that serve as
copies of prior cognition that disposes the animal well or poorly toward its past. In the
primary governing sense, memory is a hexis that disposes the animal well or poorly
toward its prior cognitive activity as prior; this sort of memory is distributed universally
among all the animals that remember. In a lesser way, memory is a hexis that disposes
the human well or poorly toward past objects and is not so much focused on the prior
cognition of the object or the sense that the object is past.
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Appendix 1: Recall (τὸ μεμνῆσθαι) versus remembrance (τὸ μνημονεύειν).

In order better to understand recall (μέμνησθαι), it is necessary to look to the
explanation of recall provided in chapter two of De memoria. Aristotle does not provide
any explanation in chapter one. I will refer to μέμνησθαι as recall in order to distinguish
it from remembrance (μνημονεύειν).
Recollection differs from relearning in this way, that one will be able somehow due to oneself to be
moved toward what follows the source. But whenever one cannot do this oneself except on account of
another, one no longer recalls (μεμνῆσθαι).244 (452a4-7)

In order to recollect, there must be (1) a source (ἀρχή) in the one who recollects through
which one may be moved to take up a lost thought or memory (451b8-10) and (2) an
abiding memory or thought in the one who is to recollect it (451b2-6). If such a source is
not present, then one cannot be moved to take up again the abiding, but presently
inaccessible memory or deed. The knowledge will have to be relearned or the matter of
concern of the lost memory will have to be experienced anew. Additionally, if the
thought or the memory of concern has been somehow destroyed or permanently lost, it
will be impossible to return to this. The source is an associated nexus of thoughts and
motions (phantasmata) in virtue of which the subject that possesses this can be moved to
the missing matter of concern. Recollection differs from relearning knowledge in that the
one who recollects has the motions associated with matter of concern in him or herself
that lead to the missing subject matter. If the associations that lead to the missing
knowledge must be provided by an outside source, then one no longer recollects, but
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καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρει τὸ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι τοῦ πάλιν μανθάνειν, ὅτι δυνήσεταί πως δι’ αὑτοῦ κινηθῆναι
ἐπὶ τὸ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχήν. ὅταν δὲ μή, ἀλλὰ δι’ ἄλλου, οὐκέτι μέμνηται.
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relearns. Hence, recollection works through habituated associations (451b10-22).245
Motions (phantasmata) are associated by necessity or by habit (451b10-14). If a pair of
motions is connected by necessity, then the movement of one must give rise to the other.
By necessity, Aristotle may be thinking of ideas that are analytically bound to one
another: if one happens to think of a bachelor, one must also think of an unmarried male
or if one thinks of a triangle, one must also think of a shape that has three sides, etc. The
reference could also be to a kind of hypothetical necessity: if recollection of a particular
item is going to occur, then by necessity this motion must follow that motion.
Alternately, some motions are connected by habit so that if one movement occurs, then
(for the most part) so does another. It appears that habituated associations among
phantasmata also occasion remembrance. Those things are more easily remembered to
which the one remembering has been more strongly accustomed (see 451b10-16).
Recollection occurs whenever an associated train of phantasia is set going such that one
is moved to take up the wanted thought or memory (452a7-10). It probably does not
matter whether the movement is occasioned by the one who recollects or whether
someone else “jogs” the memory of the one trying to recollect: to jog someone’s memory
is to set in motion the needed train of associations without which the one who wishes to
recollect will be unable to arrive at the wanted missing term. Aristotle gets to Plato’s
treatment of learning as recollection, but stops short of entering into metaphorical or
mythical territory. The person who recollects must search for something that he or she
already has in him or herself and by means of a source that he or she possesses. The
searching may be provoked by another, but successful provocation requires that the one
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συμβαίνουσι δ’ αἱ ἀναμνήσεις ἐπειδὴ πέφυκεν ἡ κίνησις ἥδε γενέσθαι μετὰ τήνδε.
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who is provoked possesses already the needed source of associated ideas. When Socrates
asks the slave obviously leading questions, the slave boy must still come to understand
and work things out for himself (and the ability to work things out is a source that
belongs to the slave). The difference between the Platonic recollection metaphor for
learning and Aristotle’s treatment is that Aristotle has recollection depend on possessing
a memory or knowledge that one has previously learned in this life.
If one is able through oneself to be moved toward the missing matter of concern
that follows the source (the associated ideas), then under these conditions one will
recollect rather than relearn (καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρει τὸ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι τοῦ πάλιν
μανθάνειν, ὅτι δυνήσεταί πως δι’ αὑτοῦ κινηθῆναι ἐπὶ τὸ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχήν, 452a4-6).
Whenever one is not able through oneself to be moved toward the missing matter of
concern that follows a source that one possesses, but must be moved by another and
something external, then under this condition one no longer recalls (μέμνηται) [the
missing matter of concern] (ὅταν δὲ μή, ἀλλὰ δι’ ἄλλου, οὐκέτι μέμνηται, a6-7).
Recollection and recall (μεμνῆσθαι) are not the same thing, although Aristotle has them
closely linked in 452a4-7. Aristotle starts out by distinguishing recollection from
relearning. Recollection may occur when one is able through oneself to be moved toward
a missing term that follows upon an associated nexus of phantasmata (a4-6). If one is
unable to be moved (κινηθῆναι) to the missing term through a source in oneself, then one
no longer recalls (οὐκέτι μέμνηται) (a6-7). To be moved (κινηθῆναι) is either a condition
for recall (μεμνῆσθαι), an explanation of the sort of thing that recall is, or something that
results in recall. I think that οὐκέτι (a7) indicates that the right reading is to take recall
(μέμνηται, a7) as the process or action of calling to mind or being put in mind of an
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absent item rather than the presently having in mind an item one has been moved to take
up. Were οὐκέτι μέμνηται to mean that one no longer (presently) attends to a term in
mind, then we must read, “Whenever one is unable through oneself to be moved toward
the missing term that follows the source, but must be moved toward the term by
something external or by someone else, then one no longer (presently) attends to the term
in question.” Of course, if one does not have the source in virtue of which one is moved
to the missing term, one cannot have had in mind the missing term so as no longer to
attend to it presently. Hence, it makes no sense to read μέμνηται in 452a7 as referring to
the result of having been moved or put in mind of something, namely, ‘having something
in mind that has been recalled’; μέμνηται refers to the movement in virtue of which
something comes to mind or is brought to mind. Aristotle is not saying that when we
lack a source we no longer have in mind what has been recalled. Rather, Aristotle asserts
that if one lacks the power and source to be moved to the missing item, one will no
longer be able to be moved to retrieve the missing term: one no longer recalls, one no
longer retrieves the absent term.
If my reading of οὐκέτι (452a7) and the surrounding contextual implications are
correct, then recall (μεμνῆσθαι) looks to refer to an activity of calling something to mind
or being put in mind of something. It should be noted that in chapter one, 450b27-51a2,
where Aristotle provides an explanation of how the soul relates to a phantasma when
remembering, Aristotle speaks of the soul perceiving a phantasma as a likeness or not
“whenever the motion of the phantasma is actual” (ὅταν ἐνεργῇ ἡ κίνησις αὐτοῦ,
450b27-28). The primary focus of the chapter on memory and remembrance is not how
the one who remembers is moved or moves to take up a memory phantasma, but what
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occurs upon being engaged by a memory phantasma. At least part of the point of
450b27-28, as “whenever” (ὅταν) indicates, is that memory phantasmata are not always
actualized and that the subject in whom they are retained is not always being affected by
them. How memory phantasmata come to be before the mind in the first place is not
discussed until chapter two of De memoria and it is in the context of how phantasmata
come before the mind that recall (μεμνῆσθαι) becomes a focus of discussion in chapter
two.
Aristotle emphasizes a relation between being moved (κινηθῆναι) and recall
(μεμνῆσθαι). And to be moved to a term presently absent to mind is just what Aristotle
goes on to say recall accomplishes.
And often one is not able straightaway to recollect, but searching, one is able and discovers. And this
comes about by setting in motion many [i.e., phantasmata], until one sets moving the sort of motion
through which the matter of concern will follow. For (γάρ) recall (τὸ μεμνῆσθαι) is the moving power
(δύναμιν τὴν κινοῦσαν) present within, and this so as to be moved (κινηθῆναι) by oneself, namely
(καί), by those motions which one possesses (ἔχει), as was said.246 (452a7-12).

Recollection works by setting in motion many phantasmata until a phantasma is set in
motion with which the wanted missing item is in proximate association. The talk of
motions set in motion from which follows the missing item is a reference to the
accustomed patterns of association set up among phantasmata in the soul-body
composite (451b10-22). The definition of recall (τὸ μεμνῆσθαι) is introduced to explain
(γάρ) ultimately how recollection through a series of associated phantasmata is possible;
recollection advances by setting in motion associated motions from which one will follow
a phantasma of the missing matter of concern. Why it is possible to set in motion many

246

πολλάκις δ’ ἤδη μὲν ἀδυνατεῖ ἀναμνησθῆναι, ζητῶν δὲ δύναται καὶ εὑρίσκει. τοῦτο δὲ γίγνεται κινοῦντι
πολλά, ἕως ἂν τοιαύτην κινήσῃ κίνησιν ᾗ ἀκολουθήσει τὸ πρᾶγμα. τὸ γὰρ μεμνῆσθαι ἐστι τὸ ἐνεῖναι
δύναμιν τὴν κινοῦσαν· τοῦτο δέ, ὥστ’ ἐξ αὑτοῦ καὶ ὧν κινήσεων κινηθῆναι, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. I read καί in
the last sentence as epexegetical.
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phantasmata is because (γάρ) there is a power (δύναμις) for setting in motion a series of
associated phantasmata. When one phantasma is set in motion, it will move (for the
most part, 451b13-14) another associated phantasma and this another and so on. Once in
motion phantasmata become moved movers: set in motion, a phantasma is capable of
moving other phantasmata, but also the one who possesses these. The language of
moving and being moved (“For recall is the moving power…as was said” 452a10-12)
echoes the language in 452a5-6247 and a8-10248 and so “as was said” (a12) may refer to
a5-6 and a8-10. Aristotle also has previously mentioned (451b10-14) that motions
(phantasmata) in the soul-body composite are associated through necessity, or (for the
most part) through habituation, so that 451b10-14 could also be the reference of “as was
said.” Hence, Aristotle emphasizes that recall is a power that moves such that the things
set in motion, namely, the phantasmata in association that one possesses, in turn move
the subject that possesses them.
While 452a5-7 places recall within the context of recollection, the definition of
recall in 452a10-12 suggests broader application. Recall is the power to set phantasmata
in motion such that the subject possessing the power is in turn moved by the phantasmata
set in motion. What it means for the subject that possesses the power of recall “to be
moved” is hardly obvious. In 452a5-6, to be moved means to be moved from one
phantasma (τὴν ἀρχήν) to another that follows by association (ἐπὶ τὸ μετά). Aristotle
illustrates with an example of recollecting a time of the year.
For recall (τὸ μεμνῆσθαι) is the moving power present within, and this so as to be set in motion by
oneself, namely, by those motions which one possesses, as was said. But it is necessary to seize a
source: it is for this reason that some seem to recollect from places. And the cause is that they go
quickly from one thing to another, for example from milk to white, from white to air, and from this to
247

“…one will be able somehow due to oneself to be moved toward what follows the source.”
“…this comes about by setting in motion many [i.e., phantasmata], until one sets moving the sort of
motion through which the matter of concern will follow.”
248
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wet, from which one is put in mind (ἐμνήσθη) of late autumn, when this is the season one seeks.249
(452a10-16)

Recollection requires getting ahold of a proper source from which the desired missing
term can be found.250 Of key interest is Aristotle’s conjugation of μεμνῆσθαι in the
passive voice, ἐμνήσθη (a16), to be put in mind. Through a series of associated
phantasmata one is put in mind of late autumn. The one who recollects sets in motion a
phantasma that represents milk. How the phantasma that represents milk is set in motion
in the first place is because the one who wishes to recollect is not completely blank.
There is some context that motivates thinking of the particular starting point. The
starting point in the example is a phantasma representing milk, from which one is moved
by association through a sequence of associated items until one is reminded of late
autumn by a phantasma that represents moisture.251 Once the phantasma that serves as a
source is set going, the source moves whatever phantasma with which it is in association
and the one who recollects is put in mind of what the associated phantasma represents
and so on. Because late autumn is in the genitive (μετοπώρου), late autumn cannot be the
subject of ἐμνήσθη; the precise claim is not that “late autumn gets remembered,”
although remembering late autumn is what happens. Rather, the precise claim is that the
one who engages in recall is put in mind (ἐμνήσθη) of or moved to think of late
autumn.252 The emphasis is not not on remembering late autumn, but being moved to take
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τὸ γὰρ μεμνῆσθαι ἐστι τὸ ἐνεῖναι δύναμιν τὴν κινοῦσαν· τοῦτο δέ, ὥστ’ ἐξ αὑτοῦ καὶ ὧν ἔχει κινήσεων
κινηθῆναι, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. δεῖ δὲ λαβέσθαι ἀρχῆς· διὸ ἀπὸ τόπων δοκοῦσιν ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι ἐνίοτε. τὸ δ’
αἴτιον ὅτι ταχὺ ἀπ’ ἄλλου ἐπ’ ἄλλο ἔρχονται, οἷον ἀπὸ γάλακτος ἐπὶ λευκόν, ἀπὸ λευκοῦ δ’ ἐπ’ ἀέρα, καὶ
ἀπὸ τούτου ἐφ’ ὑγρόν, ἀφ’ οὗ ἐμνήσθη μετοπώρου, ταύτην ἐπιζητῶν τὴν ὥραν.
250
For an excellent discussion of the mnemonic place system technique, see Richard Sorabji (2004) 22-34.
251
The connection between moisture and late autumn is possibly that winter is the rainy season in Greece
and late autumn is close to winter.
252
G. R. T. Ross (1906) 115 gets it right and wrong. Ross translates ἐμνήσθη as ‘call to mind’, indicating a
process, but Ross translates ἐμνήσθη as if it were active. J. I. Beare (1908), Richard Sorabji (2004) 56 and
Sachs (2001) 176 all give the active ‘remembers’. David Bloch (2007) 43, 90 gives ‘from which autumn is
recalled’, but as I point out, ‘autumn’ is in the genitive and cannot be the subject. See Smyth § 1358:
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up late autumn. How recall (μεμνῆσθαι) differs from recollection is that recollection is a
directed search that makes use of the power of recall. Recall is a more general power to
be moved from one phantasma to another. Because there are patterns and associations of
phantasmata in the soul-body composite, there is the potency to be moved from one
phantasma to another in virtue of the associations. When one phantasmata is set going,
we are moved to take up another associated with this and so on.253 Recall is the power to
be moved to take up some X absent to mind due to an association X has with a
phantasma that is present to mind. Hence, recall underlies and is instrumental both to
remembrance and to recollection.
Aristotle tells us that there is an inner ability or capacity for moving phantasmata
(recall), but hardly elaborates on the features the power possesses or how it moves. We
may see that this under specificity is purposeful, for several things could function as a
moving power of phantasmata. What sets a phantasma in motion may be something
external, such as sense perception that is similar to some phantasma retained in the soulbody composite. Because like affects like, motion X set up by a particular sense activity
can move another phantasma Y retained that is like X. Phantasma Y is before the mind
in potentiality and when moved by motion X, Y comes to be before the mind in actuality.
Hence, the association of phantasmata by habit and custom nicely allows Aristotle to
account for why this or that memory “pops” into our head due to association with
whatever we currently perceive or think. In the case of a predatory beast, for example,
the sight of its prey moves retained phantasmata that represent past interactions with

“With the accus. μεμνῆσθαι means to remember something as a whole, with the gen. to remember
something about a thing, bethink oneself.” Note that ‘bethink’ means to come to think something. To
μεμνῆσθαι autumn is to to be put in mind of the time of the year in which something occurred.
253
For a similar, but alternate interpretation of 452a10-12, see David Bloch (2007) 86-89; 105-106.
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similar prey. In this way the beast comes to remember itself chasing or eating past prey.
The beast’s perceptual activity actualizes phantasmata similar to the perceptual activity.
Further, once desire has been generated by present perception, further memories may be
recalled. Suppose the prey of a snow leopard is atop a rocky outcropping with which the
leopard has no previous experience. The appetite to reach the prey along with the present
perception may set in motion several phantasmata that represent previous attempts to
scale various ascents, triggering memories of past attempts at scaling. For humans, sense
perception likewise can trigger recall of some memory due to the association among
phantasmata, but recall need not be due to sense perception alone. Because human
beings have rational and deliberative phantasia (λογιτικὴ καὶ βουλευτικὴ φαντασία, De
anima iii 10, 433b29; iii 11, 34a7), supposition and thinking things through generally can
cause movement among phantasmata of past cognition. This is especially clear in the
case of practical thinking. Consideration of what is best to do in a new situation sets in
motion phantasmata that represent similar past situations, causing these situations to
come before the mind. Why recollection differs from recall is because recollection is a
directed search among associated phantasma for a memory to which the one who wishes
to recollect has lost immediate access and which must be hunted down. Recall is nothing
other than the power to set phantasmata in motion to be before the mind in actuality.
Hence, recall underlies both recollection and remembrance, but recall is neither of these.
If recall is instrumental for both recollection and remembrance, this would explain why
recall is used to explain not only both remembrance and recollection and why Aristotle
contrasts recollection with remembrance, but never with recall. On the contrary, recall is
essential for recollection.
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